SHAMSHAD AHMAD

PAKISTAN AND WORLD AFFAIRS

The Story of Pakistan is One of Remorseless Tug and Pull

Revised & Updated Edition

for **CSS, PMS, PCS**

Current Affairs, MA Pol. Science
& All Other Relevant Exams

"We are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral code, customs and calendar, history and tradition, aptitudes and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law, we are a nation."

QUAID-E-AZAM
MUHAMMAD ALI JINNAH
Address at the Lahore Session of
All India Muslim League 1940

dchildren

Title Photograph: Faisal Shamshad

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S12 days

PREFACE

> *"One cannot separate economics, political science, and history. Politics is the control of the economy. History, when accurately and fully recorded, is that story. In most textbooks and classrooms, not only are these three fields of study separated, but they are further compartmentalized into separate subfields, obscuring the close interconnections between them."*
>
> **— J.W. Smith; The World's Wasted Wealth 2, (Institute for Economic Democracy, 1994) p. 22**

In politics, as in every other aspect of life, what people "know" and "understand" largely determines what they see, hear, and feel and how they think and act. In looking at world affairs, and at the acts of other men, all men see what is not, and see not what is, because all of us are prisoners of perceptions already embedded in our minds, and like to interpret what we want to see or what is easiest to see because we just suppose we have seen it before.

Walter Lippmann once said that we see the world through stereotypes, i.e. the pictures-in-our-heads that can be called habits or perceptions what may appear as "conditioned responses." This way of looking at and thinking about the world is perhaps the only way we have for understanding or responding to the world affairs. Every-one who studies or teaches or writes about a country's history, its political system and governance issues or even on its external relations is bound to spend some time considering what Plato once called "shadows-on-the-wall" as if they were real.

And as for politicians, diplomats, strategists, lawmakers and ordinary citizens, young or old, who do some studying, their vision is invariably blurred and their judgment twisted, more often than not, by lenses which magnify or minify or otherwise distort. No wonder, our views on most subjects are coloured not only by our "habits or perceptions" but also by our "loyalties" that we develop under compulsions of history, geography, or political and socio-economic reasons. A man without loyalties is a man without a country, without a faith, without shared beliefs and hopes which make life livable.

But loyalties are also the source of "prejudice" and "error". To avoid "blurred" visions and perceptions based on "prejudice" and "error" one needs a holistic worldview rooted in objectivity. To see the world truly, one must see it steadily and see it wholly. Citizens, students, teachers or others involved in academics anywhere in the world, even in the highly literate and free communities cannot hope to achieve full success in this endeavour unless they pursue the truth. And pursuing truth is a continuing adventure that must go on but truth is to be found in the course of journey, not at the end of the journey. This is an unending process.

Unless we take a holistic look over the world affairs and that includes the affairs of our own state, we are bound to have only a near-sighted and myopic worldview. Contemporary mankind somehow seems to have so mismanaged the relations among nations as to confront us all with dire peril and often bitter tragedies. But we are unlikely to learn very much what is useful about these matters, or how to act relevantly in the service of our purposes, unless we first try to examine and understand the world affairs in their widest possible perspective rather than limiting our worldview to an evening's news broadcasts or next morning's headlines.

Books on history and world affairs provide the real nourishment to the quest for knowledge-based awareness. There is no dearth of literature all over the world on international relations and matters pertaining to world affairs. In Pakistan too, the academic vineyard is deluged with textbooks on this subject mostly by authors from the Western world representing a particular shade of opinion. This leaves our students with a difficult task of sifting out what is of relevance to them and what is not. Most of these textbooks represent conditioned, if not prejudiced, opinion on international issues which often confuses Pakistani students and academics.

The book 'Pakistan and World Affairs' is meant to facilitate the Pakistani mind not only to comprehend the historic evolution of political, economic and governmental processes in our own country but also to understand the course of "world affairs" through a practitioner's prism. Academic inquiry has to be objective enough not to leave the readers' minds with unanswered questions. This book is not intended to fill any void in academic minds but is only a modest attempt by a practitioner of diplomacy and international relations, who spent his professional lifetime in dealing with relations between and among states, to contribute to a more focused and clearer understanding of the domestic as well as global perspectives.

Shamshad Ahmad

ADVANCE PRAISE FOR

PAKISTAN AND WORLD AFFAIRS

'Pakistan & World Affairs' is a unique addition to the perspectives on Pakistan and an invaluable contribution to understanding and analysis of the history and policies of the country and the issues that confront it. The book covers a vast spectrum and is a veritable compendium of significant events and policy matters discussed and analyzed by Shamshad Ahmad, an eminent practitioner of diplomacy who served in highest positions of responsibility and policy making, and of representing Pakistan. The book provides insights available to very few in the country and is a treasure trove of information based on personal experience and meticulous research that will surely inspire further discussion and clear understanding of our past and contemporary challenges.

With its serious and balanced tone, the book is a refreshing departure from the current discourse on politics and world affairs in the country that is becoming increasingly polarized, polemical and noisier. The opening chapter on historical background testifies to an open and inclusive point of view opted by the author for his narrative and critique. He reclaims Pakistan's past when it was the cradle of two of famed civilizations of antiquity. At the time of independence we saw ourselves as a new country but an ancient land and part of the continuing story of human civilization. It was only much later that an influential segment of the society sought to disown our pre-Islamic heritage which only breeds prejudice and narrow-mindedness. Shamshad effort is a welcome reminder to open our minds.

The book has an incredible spread and beyond history its twelve chapters dwell on as diverse issues as international politics, globalization, nuclear issues, the malaise afflicting the Muslim world, economy, state craft and social issues. Yet there is a coherence in their relevance to the challenges Pakistan faces internally and externally. This is important as implicitly this Marathon of a study focuses our attention to our real issues and the demands of global environment that must be understood for progress and development instead of remaining mired in the confusion of conspiracy theories and a besieged mentality. This book with its multiple dimensions weaving together the author's experience, research and insights, will serve as a remarkable source material and will provide positive impetus to all those, especially of the younger generation, wanting to seek understanding, a sober assessment of our problems, and a direction to overcome them.

Riaz Mohammad Khan
Former Foreign Secretary

The title of this stupendous work, 'Pakistan & World Affairs,' is a misnomer. It is much more than that. The author, Shamshad Ahmad, a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, is one of those rare diplomats whose sense of history, with which this fascinating book glistens, has enabled him to provide rare insights into some of the most complex problems of our times.

Shamshad led the foreign office at the defining moment of the history of Pakistan – when the country became a nuclear power. The evening preceding that transformative event is an occasion to remember. India had demonstrated its nuclear capability and immediately threatened Pakistan with annihilation. The night before Islamabad responded with its matching response, there were credible reports that the country's nuclear facilities were to be destroyed in a joint Indo-Israeli operation. Shamshad summoned the Indian envoy to the foreign office at the dead of night and warned him that if the threats did not stop by a specified time, Pakistan would retaliate. The tensions suddenly dissipated and the next day Pakistan went nuclear as a consequence of which the danger evaporated like the winter frost that disappears with the warmth of day.

All writing, is in a sense, a form of autobiography and hence this background about the author. Shamshad has been much more than a witness to a transformative phase of the country's history. Yet this work goes far beyond his personal experiences. It encapsulates the history of Pakistan from ancient times to the contemporary era. It shatters with a single blow the distortion that bigoted opinion would have the younger generation believe that the story of this land began with the advent of Islam. 'Pakistan & World Affairs' is a narrative that is as informative as it is thought-provoking. The reader opens the pages of this exhaustive study as though embarking on a voyage of expectation and emerges with profit.

S. Iftikhar Murshed
Former Ambassador

FOREWORD

A book with the central theme of informing the people of Pakistan where Pakistan stands amongst the community of the world, authored by an accomplished diplomat of Pakistan who has served four decades as a professional diplomat in all the four continents is a rare welcome addition amongst the writing and reading population in a society in which the tradition is to keep the knowledge and useful information close to one's chest, or at best to use it as anecdote in private or group conversations.

I have seen and read a number of books written by foreign diplomats who give only a page or two to Pakistan as if Pakistan does not matter in the world affairs. Otherwise too their emphasis is mostly on the proliferation of nuclear technology by Pakistan or the rising fundamentalism in the country. Again some insider journalists have written books focused on Pakistan but more as a foreign journalist and who have convoluted or misinterpreted the origin and history of Pakistan.

Some of our respected Ambassadors like Jamshed Marker, Iqbal Akhund, Riaz M. Khan and Samiullah Koreshi have written about their involvement and understanding of few important situations and sensitive events which they encountered and had to solve as a diplomat. But I get an impression that these are more of an autobiography.

Instead, Shamshad Ahmad has undertaken an extraordinary journey of taking us along with him into the time and starting his narration from the ancient history when Pakistan may have been born in the "cradle of civilisation", and passing through bye-gone Aryan and Buddhist civilisations, updating it to Muhammad bin Qasim who ushered a new era of Muslim civilisation followed by Muslim Sultanate and the magnificent Mughal rule and administration lasting from 1526 to 1858. But following the law of history as predicted by the great Muslim historian Ibn-e-Khaldun it did finally suffer implosion under its vastness and weight.

Shamshad Ahmad then tirelessly takes us through the colonial rule first by the exploiter and plunderer East India Company followed by properly organised but authoritative control by London who too denuded gradually and imperceptibly the wealth of great subcontinent called India. During this period Shamshad has not missed to note the tension between religion (conservative Islam) and sufism and lamenting on the decadence of the Muslim population he feels elated when talking about the Muslim awakening under whose impulse he informs us how we finally got a homeland for Pakistan the then largest Muslim state committed to egalitarianism and rule of law as explained by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah on 11th of August, 1947. This is all history which Shamshad Ahmad sees as a seasoned diplomat through the prism of his experience.

After independence he experiences the frustration and declines in the status of the country. The contrast hurts the patriotic diplomat who gives vent to his feelings in Chapter 4 referring to various crises and failures including the scourge of corruption, neglect of education and menace of terrorism. However, he rightly takes satisfaction in serving his country as best as he could in his various capacities as a diplomat at home and abroad. To his credit are to have served as Secretary-General of ECO as well as Pakistan's Ambassador and permanent representative to United Nations.

As Foreign Secretary, Shamshad held the highest post in the hierarchy of foreign service and he laboured for the resumption of Indo-Pakistan peace process and co-authored an integrated and structured mechanism for "composite dialogue" between the two historically hostile neighbours. When India and Pakistan became *de facto* nuclear state, the fear of Armageddon which worried the world motivated Shamshad Ahmad to spell out a framework of "Nuclear Risk Reduction" which is still working due to its perfect and fair mechanism and procedure.

There are many other milestones of achievement duly categorised and explained for the layman in various parts of the book. Mr. Shamshad Ahmad retired in 2002 but restless as he is, he continued to be usefully engaged both as senior consultant to UN and subscribing articles to the national media.

I find him dedicating his book *inter alia* to his wife. I think it is a proper dedication because after retirement the family must be looking for more time with Mr. Shamshad Ahmad which he also deserved but he instead gave it to the nation.

It is indeed heartening that Shamshad Ahmad has now come up with a comprehensive book starting from the ancient times and fully informing us where we stand in the world today. He has fully and with clarity given his views about history and the role that Pakistan could in the context of that history play in the world affairs.

Now, a few words about the role of a diplomat (In the 1950s, I briefly served as Pakistan's Foreign Minister, and in that capacity, also had an opportunity of addressing the UN Security Council during the 1965 India-Pakistan War). The traditional method of conducting foreign affairs in the 19th and first half of the 20th century has, since the emergence of global powers, dramatically changed. These global powers are too powerful than any other powerful nation before this period. Their policies invariable have a global effect and as they arrogantly execute their policies, other nations often have to adjust themselves to these policies.

Options of actions and initiatives available to a country of Pakistan's size (in terms of GDP and technical advancement) are limited. Many a times, it has to take things as they are and adjust them for its own benefit as best as a country can afford. Shamshad's new book tells us how to do it and assures us that through vision, will and confidence as a nation the adjustment and maneuverability is possible.

I had the advantage of having participated in many seminars regarding national issues in which Mr. Shamshad Ahmad also spoke. I found him focused and refreshing. In each of his talks he would end while addressing the people of Pakistan to be a part of the solution. This is why he wants now the people of Pakistan to know and understand where Pakistan stands today in the world affairs. Rightly so the knowledge and awareness gives the nation the requisite confidence.

I hope the book will be useful not only to the scholars and students interested in the foreign affairs but also for our young boys in the Foreign Ministry; and I hope even our leaders who unfortunately are reported not to be much interested in reading the books. I can't help complimenting Shamshad Ahmad for the awe inspiring vastness of his study and the subject that he has dealt with in his voluminous book. Both Shamshad Ahmad and his book are an asset.

S. M. Zafar

CHAPTER 1

PAKISTAN'S HISTORY & HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

I. PAKISTAN'S HISTORY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A Cradle of Ancient Civilisation

Pakistan emerged as an independent country on August 14, 1947, but it has a history of over five thousand years. When British archeologist Sir Mortimer Wheeler was commissioned in 1947 by the Government of Pakistan to give a historical account of the then new country, he entitled his work *Five Thousand Years of Pakistan.* [1] Indeed, the land of Pakistan has been a cradle of ancient civilizations.

With well-developed cities, Indus Valley Civilization (ca 2500-1600 BC), the principal sites of which lay in Pakistan's present-day Sindh and Punjab provinces, was contemporary of the Nile, Mesopotamian and Yellow River civilizations. Over two thousand years ago, Gandhara Buddhist Civilization also flourished in areas now part of northern Pakistan with Taxila as a seat of Buddhist culture and learning. With passage of time, local Hindu rulers were displaced by Muslim conquerors from Central Asia, who in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, entered northwestern India through the same passes in the mountains used earlier by the Indo-Aryans.

Pakistan's Islamic heritage thus goes back to more than a millennium, and combines traditions of Central Asia and West Asia in its architecture, language, poetry and literature. During this period, India witnessed Muslim rule at successive intervals under different dynasties which left deep impact on the lifestyle of the people of the subcontinent. There may have been many reasons for Muslim conquests but the major reason was the spread of Islam in this part of the world which now constitutes a major religion not only in South West Asia but also East Asia.

The cultural heritage of Pakistan is spread over the centuries, starting from pre-historic times to the present-day with the richness of its history, cultural traditions and heritage matched only by the diversity and beauty of Pakistan's landscape.

Stone Age

Some of the earliest relics of Stone Age man in the subcontinent are found in the Soan Valley of the Potohar region near Rawalpindi, with a probable antiquity of about 500,000 years. No human skeleton of such antiquity has yet been discovered in the area, but the crude stone implements recovered from the terraces of the Soan carry the saga of human toil and labour in this part of the world to the inter-glacial period. These Stone Age men fashioned their implements in a sufficiently homogenous way to justify their grouping in terms of a culture called the Soan Culture.

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[1] *Five thousand years of Pakistan: an archaeological outline*, Mortimer Wheeler, Publisher, C. Johnson, London; 1950.

Predominantly an agricultural region, its inhabitants learned to tame and husband animals and cultivate crops some 9,000 years ago. Farming villages dating from 6000 BC have been excavated in Balochistan, the North West Frontier Province and Punjab. About 3000 BC, amidst the rugged wind-swept valleys and foothills of Balochistan, small village communities developed and began to take the first hesitant steps towards civilization. Mehrgarh in Balochistan was a developed settlement and an important Neolithic site.

These pre-historic men established their settlements, both as herdsmen and as farmers, in the valleys or on the outskirts of the plains with their cattle and cultivated barley and other crops. Here, one finds a more continuous story of human activity, though still in the Stone Age. [2]

Red and Buff Ware Cultures

Careful excavations of the pre-historic mounds in these areas and the classification of their contents, layer by layer, have grouped them into two main categories of Red Ware Culture and Buff Ware Culture. The former is popularly known as the Zhob Culture of North Balochistan, while the latter comprises Quetta, Amri Nal and Kulli Cultures of Sindh and south Balochistan. Some Amri Nal villages or towns had stone walls and bastions for defence purposes and their houses had stone foundations.

An important feature of this composite culture is that at Amri and certain other sites, it has been found below the very distinctive Indus Valley culture. It probably represents one of the local societies which constituted the environment for the growth of the Indus Valley Civilization.[3] When the primitive village communities in the Balochistan area were still struggling against a difficult highland environment, a highly cultured people was trying to assert themselves at **Kot Diji** in the Sindh province, one of the most developed urban civilizations of the ancient world which flourished between the years 3300 and 1300 BC in the Indus Valley sites of **Moenjodaro** and **Harappa**.

Indus Valley Civilization

From the earliest times, the **Indus River Valley** region has been both a transmitter of cultures and a receptacle of different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. **Indus Valley Civilization** (known also as Harappan culture) spread and flourished in the northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent in present-day Pakistan along the Indus River valley in Punjab and Sindh, and was the first major civilization in South Asia.

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[2] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting; Islamabad, 1986.

[3] *ibid*

There are several theories about the origin of Indus valley Civilization. The Indus people might have come from Mesopotamia as they had links with them. It was the time of decline of Mesopotamian Civilization. In the settlements at Indo-Iranian borders there was a concept of village society. So they might have come from northwestern borders (Iran). But all these are hypotheses and not established facts. The only fact is that the Indus people had trade relations with the people of both Mesopotamia and Iran.[4]

This civilization, which had a writing system, urban centres, and a diversified social and economic system, was discovered in the 1920s at its two most important sites: Moenjodaro, in Sindh near Sukkur, and Harappa, in Punjab south of Lahore.[5] The imposing ruins of the beautifully planned towns present clear evidence of the unity of a people having the same mode of life and using the same kind of tools.[6] These people possessed a high standard of art and craftsmanship and a well-developed system of quasi pictographic writing, which despite continuing efforts still remains undeciphered.

A number of other lesser sites stretching from the Himalayan foothills in Indian Punjab to Gujarat east of the Indus River and to Balochistan to the west have also been discovered and studied. How closely these places were connected to Moenjodaro and Harappa is not clearly known, but evidence indicates that there was some link and that the people inhabiting these places were probably related.

Indus Valley Civilization was essentially a city culture sustained by surplus agricultural produce and extensive commerce, which included trade with Sumer in southern Mesopotamia (today's modern Iraq). Copper and bronze were in use, but not iron. Mohenjodaro and Harappa were built on identical plans of well-laid-out streets, elabourate drainage systems, public baths, differentiated residential areas, flat-roofed brick houses and fortified administrative and religious centers enclosing meeting halls and granaries. Weights and measures were standardized:

By far the most exquisite but most intriguing artifacts unearthed to date are the small, square steatite seals engraved with human or animal motifs. Large numbers of the seals have been found at Mohenjodaro, many bearing pictographic inscriptions generally thought to be a kind of script. Despite the efforts of philologists from all parts of the world, however, and despite the use of computers, the script remains undeciphered, and it is unknown if it is proto-Dravidian or proto-Sanskrit.

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[4] *http: storyofpakistan.com/origin-of-indus-civilization*

[5] *Five thousand years of Pakistan: an archaeological outline,* Mortimer Wheeler. Publisher, C. Johnson, London; 1950.

[6] *Pakistan Year Book,* Ministry of Information & Broadcasting; Islamabad, 1986.

Nevertheless, extensive research on the Indus Valley sites, which has led to speculations on both the archaeological and the linguistic contributions of the pre-Aryan population to Hinduism's subsequent development, has offered new insights into the cultural heritage of the Dravidian population still dominant in southern India. Artifacts with motifs relating to asceticism and fertility rites suggest that these concepts entered Hinduism from the earlier civilization.[7]

The Indus Valley Civilization's decline beginning around 1700 BC is attributed to foreign invaders, who at some sites violently destroyed the cities. But with recent research, historians have become unsure as to the exact causes of decline of the Indus Civilization.

But one thing is clear. The Indus Valley Civilization existed in the western part of the subcontinent, almost exclusively on the banks of the **Indus River (present-day Pakistan).** Therefore, the assertion that the current-day Pakistanis are inheritors of the Indus Valley Civilization is not an exaggeration. This makes Pakistan the real inheritor of one of the oldest civilizations of the world.

Aryan Civilization

Until the entry of the Europeans by sea in the late fifteenth century, and with the exception of the Arab conquests of Muhammad bin Qasim in the early eighth century, the route taken by peoples who migrated to India has been through the mountain passes, most notably the Khyber Pass, in today's northwestern Pakistan. Although unrecorded migrations may have taken place earlier, it is certain that migrations increased in the second millennium BC. [8]

In or about 1500 B.C., the Aryans from Central Asia descended upon the Punjab and settled in the Sapta Sindhu, which signifies the Indus plain. They brought with them and developed the rudiments of the religio-philosophical system of what later evolved into Hinduism. They developed a pastoral society that grew into the Rigvedic Civilization. The Rigveda is replete with hymns of praise for this region, which they describe as "God fashioned". The earlier hymns exhibit the Aryans on the northwestern frontiers of India just starting on their long journey.

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[7] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting; Islamabad, 1986

[8] *A country study: Pakistan*, US Library of Congress, 1994.

They show the Aryans on the banks of the Indus, divided into various tribes, sometimes at war with each other, sometimes united against the "dark-skinned" aborigines. They also brought an early version of Sanskrit, the base of Urdu, Punjabi, and Sindhi languages that are spoken in much of Pakistan today. They settled down as husbandmen, tilled their fields with the plough, and lived in villages or towns. But they also clung to their old wandering life, with their herds and "cattle-pens."

Cattle, indeed, still formed their chief wealth, the coin in which payments of fines were made; and one of their words for war literally meant "a desire for cows". They learned to build "ships," perhaps large river-boats, and also seemed to have heard something of the sea.[9] The Aryan tribes in the Veda were acquainted with most of the metals, and had among them blacksmiths, coppersmiths and goldsmiths, besides carpenters, barbers and other artisans. They fought from chariots, and freely used the horse, although not yet the elephant, in war.

In those early days the Aryan tribes were known to be divided into four social grades on a basis of colour: the Kshatriyas or nobles, who claimed descent from the early leaders; the Brahmans or sacrificing priests; the Vaishyas, the peasantry; and last of all the Sudras, the hewers of wood and drawers of water, of non-Aryan descent. Even below these there were low tribes and trades, aboriginal tribes and slaves.[10] But it is also clear that so long as the Sapta Sindhu remained the core of the Aryan Civilization, it remained free from the caste system.

The caste institution and the ritual of complex sacrifices took shape in the Ganges Valley where a social and political system evolved in which the Aryans dominated but various indigenous peoples and ideas were also accommodated and absorbed. There can be no doubt that the Indus Valley Civilization contributed much to the development of the Aryan civilization.[11]

Buddhist Civilization

The Iron Age Vedic Civilization extended over much of the Indo-Gangetic plain and which witnessed the rise of major polities known as the Mahajanapadas. By the sixth century BC, knowledge of Indian history becomes more focused because of the available Buddhist and Jain sources of a later period. The systems called

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[9] *ibid.*

[10] *ibid.*

[11] *A country study: Pakistan, US* Library of Congress; 1994.

Jainism and Buddhism had their roots in prehistoric philosophies but they were founded respectively by Vardhamana Mahavira and Gotama Buddha, both of whom were preaching in Magadha during the reign of Bimbisara (c. 520 BC).

Northern India was at that time populated by a number of small princely states that rose and fell in the sixth century BC. In one of these kingdoms, Magadha, Mahavira and Gautama Buddha were born in the sixth or fifth century BC and propagated their śramanic philosophies. Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha was born in 623 BC in the Kapilvastu (Lumbini) area located in the Terai plains of south-east of modern Nepal as testified by the inscription on the pillar erected by the Mauryan Emperor Asoka in 249 BC.

In sixth century BC, the people of the region were getting increasingly dissatisfied with the Hindu caste system. When Buddha, son of a Kshatriya king preached equality in men, his teachings were quickly accepted throughout the northern part of the subcontinent. In this milieu the rise of Buddhism became a phenomenon that affected the history of the region for several centuries. Buddha's teachings proved enormously popular when considered against the more obscure and highly complicated rituals and philosophy of Vedic Hinduism.

The original doctrines of the Buddha also constituted a protest against the existing inequities of the caste system, attracting large numbers of followers. Around the same time Gandhara, being the easternmost province of the Achaemenid Empire of Persia, became a major power in the region. Its two cities – Pushkalavati, or present-day Charsadda near Peshawar, and the capital Taxila, were the centre of civilization and culture.[12] For a time, Gandhara also was a 'jewel' of Buddhist civilization.

Scholars of Gandhara travelled east to India and China and were influential in the development of early Mahayana Buddhism. The art of Gandhara included the earliest frescos known in human history and the first -- and some of the most beautiful -- depictions of bodhisattvas and the Buddha in human form. During the next two hundred years Buddhism spread over northern India, perhaps receiving a new impulse from the Greek kingdoms in the Punjab.

About the middle of the third century BC Asoka, the king of Magadha or Behar who reigned from 264 BC to 227 BC, became a zealous convert to Buddhism. He is said to have supported 64,000 Buddhist priests; he founded many religious houses, and his kingdom is called the Land of the Monasteries to this day. He organized it on the basis of a state religion.

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[12] *http.//storyofpakistan.com*

Kingdom of Gandhara

At about the same time, the semi-independent Kingdom of Gandhara, roughly located in northern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan centred in the region of Peshawar, stood between the expanding kingdoms of the Ganges Valley to the east and the Achaemenid Empire of Persia to the west. Its main cities were *Purushapura* (modern Peshawar) and *Takshashila* (modern Taxila).

The Kingdom of Gandhara lasted from the early first millennium BC to the 11th century AD. Gandhara probably came under the influence of Persia during the reign of Cyrus the Great (559-530 BC). The Persian Empire fell to **Alexander the Great in 330 BC**, and he continued his march eastward through Afghanistan and into India. Alexander defeated Porus, the Gandharan ruler of Taxila, in 326 BC and marched on to the Ravi River before turning back. The return march through Sindh and Balochistan ended with Alexander's death at Babylon in 323 BC.

Greek rule did not survive in northwestern India, although a school of art known as Indo-Greek developed and influenced art as far as Central Asia. With the fall of Greek rule in northwestern India, Alexander's successors founded the Indo-Greek kingdom of Bactria based in what is today's Afghanistan and extending to Peshawar. At times they controlled the northwestern of region present-day Pakistan and even Punjab after Maurya power waned in the region.[13]

The region of Gandhara was conquered by Chandragupta (r. ca. 321-ca. 297 BC), the founder of the Mauryan Empire, the first universal state of northern India, with its capital at present-day Patna in Bihar. His grandson, Ashoka (r. ca. 274-ca. 236 BC), became a Buddhist. Taxila became a leading centre of Buddhist learning. Successors to Alexander at times controlled the northwestern of region present-day Pakistan and even Punjab after Maurya power waned in the region.

The discovery of the Gandhara grave culture in Dir and Swat will go a long way in throwing light on the period of Pakistan's cultural history between the end of the Indus culture in 1500 BC and the beginning of the historic period under the Achaemenians in the sixth century BC Hindu mythology and Sanskrit literary traditions seem to attribute the destruction of the Indus civilization to the Aryans, but what really happened, remains a mystery.

The Gandhara grave culture has opened up two periods in the cultural heritage of Pakistan: one of the Bronze Age and the other of the Iron Age. It is so named because it presents a peculiar pattern of living in hilly zones of the Gandhara region as evidenced in the graves. This culture is different from the Indus culture and has little relations with the village culture of Balochistan. Stratigraphy as well as the artifacts discovered from this area suggests that the Aryans moved into this part of the world between 1,500 and 600 BC.

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[13] *A country study: Pakistan*, US Library of Congress, 1994.

Gandhara Art, one of the most prized possessions of Pakistan, flourished for a period of 500 years (from the first to the fifth century AD) in the present valley of Peshawar and the adjacent hilly regions of Swat, Buner and Bajaur. This art represents a separate phase of the cultural renaissance of the region. It was the product of a blending of Indian, Buddhist and Greco-Roman sculpture. Gandhara Art in its early stages received the patronage of Kanishka, the great Kushan ruler, during whose reign the Silk Route ran through Peshawar and the Indus Valley, bringing great prosperity to the whole area. [14] After it was conquered by Mahmud of Ghazni in 1021 CE, the name Gandhara disappeared. During the Muslim period, the area was administered from Lahore or from Kabul. During Mughal times the area was part of Kabul province.

Kushan Empire

Following the rise of the Central Asian Kushan Empire in later centuries, the Buddhist culture of Afghanistan and Pakistan, centred on the city of Taxila just west of Islamabad, experienced a cultural renaissance known as the Gandhara period. The northern regions of Pakistan came under the rule of Central Asian nomadic tribes called Sakas who at the start of the first century BC, had founded a kingdom in Gandhara (modern Kandahar in Afghanistan and northern areas of Pakistan) displacing the ailing Indo-Greek kings but were later were driven eastward by Pahlavis (Parthians related to the Scythians) who in turn were displaced by the Kushans (also known as the Yueh-Chih in Chinese chronicles).

The Kushans had earlier moved into territory in the northern part of present-day Afghanistan and had taken control of Bactria. Along with the Indo-Parthians (Pahlavas), the Sakas dominated India from present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan right over to parts of Maharashtra and Kathiawar (modern Gujarat). Kanishka, the greatest of the Kushan rulers (ca AD 120-60), extended his empire from Patna in the east to Bukhara in the west and from the Pamirs in the north to central India, with the capital at Peshawar (then Purushapura). Kushan territories were eventually overrun by the Huns in the north and taken over by the Guptas in the east and the Sassanians of Persia in the west.

Mauryan Empire

There are remarkable similarities between the organizations of that great empire and the Mauryan empire of the third century BC, while Kautilya's Arthshastra also shows a strong Persian influence, Alexander of Macedonia after defeating Darius III in 330 BC had also marched through the South-Asian subcontinent up to the river Beas, but Greek influence on the region appears to have been limited to contributing a little to the establishment of the Mauryan empire. Greek rule did not survive in northwestern India, although a school of art known as Indo-Greek developed and influenced art as far as Central Asia.

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[14] *A country study: Pakistan*, US Library of Congress, 1994.

The expansion of two kingdoms in the northeast laid the groundwork for the emergence of India's first empire, ruled by the Mauryan dynasty (ca. 321–185 BC).[15] The region of Gandhara was conquered by **Chandragupta** (ca. 321-ca. 297 BC), the founder of the **Mauryan Empire,** the first universal state of northern India, with its capital at present-day Patna in Bihar. By 303 BC, Chandragupta Maurya had gained control of an immense area ranging from Bengal in the east to Afghanistan in the west and as far south as the Narmada River. Much of his success is attributed to his prime minister and mentor, Kautilya (also known as Chanakya), author of the *Arthashastra,* a cool calculating realpolitik treatise on the acquisition and maintenance of power. [16]

His son, Bindusara extended the empire into central and parts of southern India. His grandson, **Ashoka, the third Mauryan emperor** (ca. 273–232 BC) is one of the most famous rulers in Indian history. Ashoka's rule extended over much of what is today's Afghanistan, Pakistan and northern India. After his conversion to Buddhism, Taxila became a leading centre of Buddhist learning. The great empire that Asoka built in the subcontinent included only that part of the Indus basin which is now known as the northern Punjab. The rest of the areas astride the Indus were not subjugated by him. These areas, which now form a substantial part of Pakistan, were virtually independent from the time of the Guptas in the fourth century AD until the rise of the Delhi Sultanate in the thirteenth century. [17]

The Gupta Empire

Much of northern and central India was united in the forth to sixth centuries AD and remained so for two centuries, under the Gupta Empire. This period, witnessing a Hindu religious and intellectual resurgence, is known among its admirers as the classical age or even "Golden Age" of Hindu civilization. Sanskrit literature was of a high standard; extensive knowledge in astronomy, mathematics, and medicine was gained; and artistic expression flowered. Society became more settled and more hierarchical and rigid social codes emerged that separated castes and occupations. The Guptas maintained loose control over the upper Indus Valley.

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[15] *"Mauryan Empire (ca. 323-185 B.C.)":Timeline of Art History. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000*

[16] *ibid.*

[17] *ibid.*

The Hunas (Huns)

In the mid fifth century AD, the Hephthalites or Hunas (the Huns), a fierce and warlike people from Central Asia who ruled a vast empire with their capital at Balkh invaded Northwest India. They occupied the Kabul valley and Gandhara, and invaded the then weakening Gupta Empire. In about 445 AD Skanda Gupta stemmed the tide of the Hun eruption and around 460 AD he repulsed them. The Huns then waited till after the death of Skanda Gupta to re-enter India from the Kabul valley after the conquest of Kushan. They also established themselves in Gandhara. Their conquest was accomplished with extreme ferocity and the Gupta regime was completely extinguished.[18] The tide of Hun invasions receded by the end of the sixth century, when the Turks and the Persians attacked them in Bactria, but as elsewhere the Huns had acted as a catalyst in the affairs of northwestern India.

The last pan-Indian Hindu Kingdom was that of Emperor Harsha Vardhana who successfully defeated the Huns and established a large kingdom over most of North India. But he was unable to bring the entire country under his rule. Northern India suffered a sharp decline after the seventh century. As a result, Islam came to a disunited India not only with the Arab conquest of Sindh but also through the same passes that Indo-Aryans, Alexander, Kushans, and others had entered.[19]

II. ADVENT OF ISLAM IN THE SUBCONTINENT

Trade relations between Arabia and the subcontinent dated back to ancient times. Long before the advent of Islam in Arabia, the Arabs used to visit the coast of southern India, which then provided the link between the ports of south and Southeast Asia. After the Arab traders became Muslim, they brought Islam to South Asia. A number of local Indians living in the coastal areas embraced Islam. However, it was the Muslim conquests in Persia, including the provinces of Kirman and Makran, which brought the Arabs face to face with the then ruler of Sindh, who had allied with the ruler of

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[18] *Kurbanov, Aydogdy (2010). "The Hephthalites: Archaeological and Historical Analysis"*, p. 24. Retrieved 17 January 2013.

[19] *A country study: Pakistan*, US Library of Congress; 1994.

Makran against the Muslims. But, it was not until the sea-borne trade of the Arabs in the Indian Ocean was jeopardized that serious attempts were made to subjugate Sindh.

The initial entry of Islam into India came in the first century after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The Umayyad caliph in Damascus sent an expedition to Balochistan and Sindh in 711 led by Muhammad bin Qasim (for whom Karachi's second port is named). An autonomous Muslim state linked with the Umayyad and later the Abbassid Caliphate was established with jurisdiction extending over southern and central parts of present Pakistan.[20] Quite a few new cities were established and Arabic was introduced as the official language.[21] Coastal trade and the presence of a Muslim colony in Sindh, however, permitted significant cultural exchanges and the introduction into the subcontinent of saintly teachers. Muslim influence grew with conversions.

During the reign of the great Umayyad Caliph Walid bin Abdul Malik, Hajjaj bin Yousaf was appointed as the governor of the Eastern Provinces. At that time, Raja Dahir, a Brahman, ruled Sindh and was known to be unpopular with his subjects. He also gave protection to pirates who were active on the coastal areas and whenever they got a chance, they plundered the ships passing by Daibul. During those times, some Muslim traders living in Ceylon died and the ruler of Ceylon sent their widows and orphans back to Baghdad. They made their journey by sea, and as their eight-ship caravan passed by the seaport of Daibul, Sindhi pirates looted it and took the women and children prisoner.

When news of this attack reached Hajjaj, he demanded that Dahir return the Muslim captives and the looted items. He also demanded that the culprits be punished. Dahir replied that he had no control over the pirates and was, therefore, powerless to rebuke them. On this Hajjaj decided to invade Sindh. Two small expeditions sent by him failed to accomplish their goal. Thus, in order to free the prisoners and to punish the guilty party, Hajjaj decided to undertake a huge offensive against Dahir, who was patronizing the pirates.

Muhammad bin Qasim (695-715)

In October 711, Hajjaj sent 6,000 select Syrian and Iraqi soldiers, a camel corps of equal strength and a baggage train of 3,000 camels to Sindh under the command of his nephew and son-in-law, Muhammad bin Qasim, a young boy of just seventeen years. He also had a *'manjaniq'*, or catapult, which was operated by 500 men and could throw large stones a great distance. On his way the governor of Makran, who provided him with additional forces, joined him. Also, a good number of local subjects who had suffered at the hands of native rulers joined the Arab forces.

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[20] *ibid.*

[21] *ibid.*

Muhammad bin Qasim first captured Daibul establishing the first permanent Muslim foothold in the subcontinent. He then turned towards Nirun, near modern Hyderabad, where he easily overwhelmed the inhabitants. Dahir decided to oppose the Arabs at Raor. After a fierce struggle, Dahir was overpowered and killed in 712. Raor fell into the hands of the Muslims. The Arab forces then occupied Alor and proceeded towards Multan. Along the way, the Sikka (Uch) fortress, situated on the bank of the Ravi, was also occupied. The Hindu ruler of Multan offered resistance for two months after which the Hindus were overpowered and defeated.

Prior to this, Muhammad bin Qasim had taken Brahmanabad and a few other important towns of Sindh. Muhammad bin Qasim was planning to proceed forward when the new Caliph Suleman bin Abdul Malik recalled him. He died when he was only 20. But he left behind a legacy of historic Islamic victory which led to the establishment of an autonomous Muslim state in India, linked with the Umayyeds, and later, the Abbassid Caliphate was established with jurisdiction extending over southern and central parts of present Pakistan. Arabic was introduced as the official language in this area. The sea pirates of Sindh, who were protected by Raja Dahir, were crushed. As a result of this, sea trade flourished. The port of Daibul became a busy and prosperous commercial centre.

The Muslim conquest of Sindh brought peace and prosperity to the region. The local people who had been living a life of misery breathed a sigh of relief. Qasim followed a lenient policy and treated the local population generously. Everyone had full religious freedom and even the spiritual leaders of local religions were given salaries from the government fund. No changes were made in the local administration. All taxes were abolished and *jazia* was imposed. Everyone was treated equally. Law and order was restored. Poor people, especially Buddhists, were very impressed by his policies and many of them embraced Islam. A number of mosques and *madaris* were constructed in important towns.

The establishment of Muslim rule also paved way for future propagation of Islam in Sindh and the adjoining regions. In a short period of time, Sindh became a centre of Islamic learning. A number of religious scholars, writers and poets emerged and they spread their knowledge. The Muslims learned Indian sciences like medicine, astronomy and mathematics. Sanskrit books on various subjects were translated into Arabic. During the reign of Haroon al-Rasheed, a number of Hindu scholars were even invited to Baghdad. With the conquest of Lahore by Mahmud of Ghazni, missionary activity began again under the aegis of sufis who were the main agents in the Islamization of the entire region.

Subsequently, Muslim warriors from Central Asia established their kingdoms in other parts of India. **Mahmud Ghaznavi** launched several invasions of India defeating the local rulers. During those invasions, some of the areas (Multan and some other regions) were already under Muslim rule but in a weakened form. The Ghaznavids (976-1148) and their successors, the Ghauris (1148-1206), were Central Asian by origin and they ruled their territories, which covered mostly the regions of present Pakistan, from capitals outside India. Muslim influence grew with conversions as well as Islamic conquests through the traditional north-western routes.

Mahmud Ghaznavi (971-1030)

Alptigin, one of the Turkish slaves of the Samanid ruler, Abdul Malik, rose to the status of governor of Khurasan. However, when his patron died, he was stripped of his title and forced to leave the land. He captured a small area in Afghanistan and established his rule in the city-state of Ghazni in 962 with the aim of conquering his own land, a desire that remained in the hearts of his successors. After his death in 977, he was succeeded by his son-in-law **Subuktigin** under whose rule, Ghazni soon emerged as a political and military power of the region.

Alarmed at the rising power in the neighbourhood, the Hindu Shahi Raja Jaipal attacked Ghazni. Jaipal was defeated. In order to save his life, he promised to pay tribute. But after going back home, he not only defaulted but also took support from other Hindu *rajas* of the region and again attacked Subuktigin in 991. His fate was not different this time. He was defeated and had to pay a heavy ransom besides giving away the areas of Lamghan and Peshawar.

Meanwhile, Subuktigin died and his son Mahmud ascended the throne in 998. Jaipal took advantage of the situation, and to avenge his defeat at the hands of Subuktigin, organized an army of 12,000 horsemen, 30,000 foot soldiers and 300 elephants. This movement forced Mahmud, who was preparing to invade Central Asia, to turn his attention towards India. The battle against Jaipal was the beginning of a long series of attacks by Mahmud against South Asia.

According to most historians, Mahmud invaded India 17 times to crush the power of the Hindu *rajas* and *maharajas* who were always busy planning conspiracies against him. After defeating Tarnochalpal in 1021, Mahmud formally annexed Punjab. After the fall of Punjab, the Hindu think-tank assembled at Somnath - which was more of a political centre than a temple - to plan a big war against Mahmud. He took all the *rajas* and *maharajas* by surprise when he attacked Somnath and crushed the Hindu headquarters of political intrigue.

During his 17 expeditions, he did conquer a number of places in the subcontinent but never established his rule over them or annexed any part of the conquered territories except the Punjab. The most important impact of Mahmud's expeditions was the conquest of Punjab for the first time by Muslims and the establishment of Muslim rule and society in the region. This was a significant event in the history of Islam as the Muslims gained their first foothold in northern India. He spent his last five years in dealing with the affairs of Ghazni and in making plans to conquer Central Asia.

After the death of Mahmud, the Ghaznavid dynasty lost much of its vigour; yet during the days of his son Masud and grandson Mahmud, Lahore remained an important province of the Ghaznavid Empire. Later, the Ghaznavid rulers moved their headquarters from Ghazni to Punjab and ruled Peshawar, Lahore and Multan till the last half of tweflth century when Muhammad Ghori defeated them. Muslim conquests were expanded under Mahmud and his successor Ghaznavids until the late twelfth century, when the Ghoris overran the Ghaznavids and extended the conquests in northern India.[22]

From the time of the Ghaznavids, Persian more or less replaced Arabic as the official language. The economic, political and religious institutions developed by the Muslims bore their unique impression. The law of the State was based on *shariah* and in principle the rulers were bound to enforce it. A new language, Urdu, derived mainly from Arabic and Persian vocabulary and adopting indigenous words and idioms, came to be spoken and written by the Muslims and it gained currency among the rest of the Indian population.

III. ESTABLISHMENT OF MUSLIM RULE

Sultanate (1206-1526)

Though Muslims entered South Asia with the conquest of Sindh by Muhammad bin Qasim and then with the annexation of Punjab by Mahmud Ghaznavi, yet the real credit of the establishment of Muslim rule in the region goes to Shahab-ud-Din Muhammad Ghori. The Ghoris had a long history of differences with the Ghaznavids, which eventually resulted in the capture of Ghazni at the hands of Ghiyas-ud-din Muhammad bin Sam, the ruler of Ghor, in 1173. Ghiyas-ud-din handed over Ghazni to his younger brother Muhammad Ghori and himself concentrated on the conquest of Khorasan.

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[22] *www:story of pakistan.com/conquests*

After taking charge of Ghazni, Muizz-ud-din Muhammad bin Sam, commonly known as **Shahab-ud-din Muhammad Ghori (1160-1206)** is one of the key persons who played a significant role in the establishment of Muslim rule in north India. An ambitious person, Muhammad Ghori spent most of his time in preparation for an attack on South Asia. In 1175, he invaded the subcontinent for the first time through the Gomal pass and occupied Multan and Uch, but failed to capture Gujarat. He again came through the Khyber Pass with the aim of attacking the Ghaznavid territories. He managed to capture Peshawar in 1179 and Sialkot in 1185, and finally Lahore in 1186.

After taking over the Ghaznavid area of Punjab, Ghori decided to fight against the Hindu Rajputs. In 1191, he conquered Bathinda in the territory of Chauhans and then decided to go back to Ghazni. But on learning that Prithvi Raj was marching towards Bathinda to recapture the fort, Ghori came back to defend his conquest. A bloody war was fought at Tarain after which Rajputs reclaimed Bathinda. Back in Ghazni, Ghori spent a year in preparation and then attacked the Rajputs again. The result of the second battle of Tarain, fought in 1192, was totally opposite from the first one.

The Rajputs were defeated and Prithvi Raj was killed. Victory in the second battle of Tarain opened the door to further conquests for Ghori. Muslims defeated many of the Rajput clans and captured Badaun and Oudh. Kanauj and Benares were captured in 1194, and Bayana and Gawalior in 1195. One of Ghori's most trusted lieutenants, Qutb-ud-Din Aibak moved forward and captured Delhi in 1196. Ghori himself went back to Ghazni but appointed Aibak as his viceroy in the region and was keen to receive feedback on the political and social activities of Delhi. Aibak was the first Muslim governor of Delhi.

Ghori appointed another of his slaves, Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji, to look after the land of Oudh. With the revenue coming from the land, Khilji established a small force of horsemen. With the support of these horsemen, Khilji captured Bengal and some parts of Assam. Ghori appointed Khilji as the governor of Bengal. After his death in 1206, his Turkish slaves ruled the region and left a great impact on history.

The Muslim rule established by Muhammad Ghori in South Asia lasted for more than seven centuries. Ghori took special interest in South Asia and by establishing his permanent hold in the region, he managed to push permanent Muslim rule much further east than Mahmud Ghaznavi did. He took the small state of Ghazni from his brother Ghiyas-ud-Din Muhammad bin Sam and turned it into an empire by conquering vast territories. First, he captured the area ruled by the Ghaznavids and later on extended his rule to north

India and Bengal. He was an able general and a brave soldier. He never let a temporary defeat stand in his way.

Muhammad Ghori is remembered as an empire builder and is justly called the founder of the Muslim Empire in Indo-Pakistan. From 1206 to 1526 AD, five different dynasties held sway culminating into the Mughal rule (1526-1707) which continued, though nominally, till the War of Independence in 1857. His successors established the first dynasty of the Delhi Sultanate, the Mamluk Dynasty (Mamluk means "slave") in 1211. The territory under control of the Muslim rulers in Delhi expanded rapidly.

The sultans of Delhi enjoyed cordial relations with Muslim rulers in the Near East but owed them no allegiance. The sultans based their laws on the Quran and the *shariah* and permitted non-Muslim subjects to practise their religion. The sultans ruled from urban centres - while military camps and trading posts provided the nuclei for towns that sprang up in the countryside. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the sultanate was its temporary success in insulating the subcontinent from the potential devastation of the Mongol invasion from Central Asia in the thirteenth century.[23]

Slave Dynasty

The concept of equality in Islam and Muslim traditions reached its climax in the history of South Asia when slaves were raised to the status of Sultan. The Slave Dynasty ruled the subcontinent for about 84 years. Qutb-ud-Din Aibak, Shams-ud-Din Iltutmush and Ghiyas-ud-Din Balban, the three great Sultans of the era, were themselves sold and purchased during their early lives. The Slave Dynasty was the first Muslim dynasty that ruled India.

Muhammad Ghauri had no son so he raised thousands of slaves like his sons. Ghauri had the habit to buy every talented slave he came across. He would then train them in the way royal children were trained. During Ghauri's regime, slaves occupied all key positions in the government machinery. Three favourite slaves of the Sultan were Qutb-ud-Din Aibak, Taj-ud-Din Ildiz and Nasir-ud-Din Qubachah. He appointed them governors of Delhi, Ghazni and Lahore, respectively. Ghauri never nominated his successor but it was obvious that the successor was to be one of his slaves.

When Ghori died in 1206, the *amirs* elected Aibak as the new Sultan. Aibak first shifted his capital from Ghazni to Lahore and then from Lahore to Delhi. Thus, he was the first Muslim ruler who ruled South Asia and had his headquarters in the region as well. Aibak could only rule for four years and died in 1210. He was succeeded by his son Aram Shah, who proved to be too incompetent to hold such an important position. The Turk nobles invited Iltumish, one of the slaves and son-in-law of Aibak, to assume charge of the state affairs. Iltumish ruled for around 26 years from 1211 to 1236 and was responsible for setting the Sultanate of Delhi on strong footings. [24]

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[23] *A country study: Pakistan,* US Library of Congress, 1994.

Iltumish was a good soldier and an outstanding statesman as well. When Chenghiz Khan descended upon Central Asia (1219), he kept him out of India through consummate diplomacy and a determined military posture. Delhi and Lahore were saved from the ravages of the Mongols. On the death of Iltumish, a war of succession started between his children. His daughter Razia Sultana ascended the throne in 1236 as the first-ever empress of the Muslim rule in South Asia. The Turkish nobles resented having a woman as their ruler, especially when she started challenging their power. They began conspiring against her. In 1239, they made her brother Bahram the Sultan. She died in 1340.[25]

Finally the youngest son of Iltutmush, Nasir-ud-Din Mahmud became Sultan in 1245.[26] Though Mahmud ruled India for around 20 years, during his entire tenure, the main power remained in the hands of Balban. On death of Mahmud, his Prime Minister Ghyasuddin Balban directly took over the throne and ruled Delhi from 1266 to 1287. Balban consolidated the administrative set-up of the empire and completed the work started by Iltutmush. Balban's successors could not handle the affairs of the state, and the throne was captured by the Ariz-i-Mumalik who declared his independence with the title of Jalal-ud-Din Khilji in 1290.

The most important institution that developed under the Slave Dynasty was the institution of Chalgan or the Forty. Chalgan were a corps of highly placed and powerful officers, whom Iltutmush had organized as his personal supporters. They were like the cabinet for the Sultan. However, during the days of civil war between the successors of Iltutmush, the Chalgan started looking for their personal gains and played one prince against the other.

During this era the Chalgan became very strong. Each one of them started considering himself as the deputy of the Sultan. When Balban assumed charge as Sultan, he murdered some of them while others were banished from the kingdom. There is no doubt that by crushing their power, Balban strengthened his rule, but actually he destroyed the real power of the Slave Dynasty. With this the rule of the Slave Dynasty came to an end.

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[24] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad, 1986.

[25] *http://storyofpakistan.com/razia-sultana*

[26] *http://storyofpakistan.com/slave-dynasty*

Khilji Dynasty (1290-1320)

The founder of the Khilji Dynasty in South Asia, Malik Firuz, was originally the Ariz-i-Mumalik appointed by Kaiqubad during the days of decline of the Slave Dynasty. He took advantage of the political vacuum that was created due to the incompetence of the successors of Balban. To occupy the throne, he only had to remove the infant Sultan Kaimurs. On June 13, 1290, Malik Firuz ascended the throne of Delhi as Jalal-ud-Din Firuz Shah. Khiljis were basically Central Asians but had lived in Afghanistan for so long that they had become different from the Turks in terms of customs and manners. Thus, the coming of Khiljis to power was more than a dynastic change.[27]

As majority of the Muslim population of Delhi was Turk, the arrival of a Khilji ruler was not much welcomed. Yet Jalal-ud-Din managed to win the hearts of the people through his mildness and generosity. He retained most of the officers holding key positions in the Slave Dynasty. His own nephew and son-in-law, Alauddin Khilji killed Jalal-ud-Din and took over as the new ruler. Alauddin's reign is marked by innovative administrative and revenue reforms, market control regulations and a whirlwind period of conquests. It is considered the golden period of the Khilji rule. However, before the death of Alauddin, his house was divided in different camps which resulted in the ultimate collapse of the Khalji Dynasty in 1320.

A Turk noble, Ghazi Malik became Sultan assuming the title of Ghyasuddin Tughluq Shah, thus becoming the founder of the Tughluq Dynasty. After becoming Sultan, Ghiyas-ud-Din concentrated on crushing the Hindu *rajas* and conquered Bengal, which was no longer part of the central empire since the death of Balban. When he came back after the successful Bengal expedition, he was killed in a ceremony, and his son Muhammad Tughluq succeeded him.

Muhammad Tughluq was a man of ideas, not action. He tried to implement a number of his own schemes which did not work. A civil war like situation was created and a tussle began between the power-hungry princes. The nobles, who in order to gain more power, started supporting one prince or the other, further worsened the situation. Amir Timur's invasion on Delhi in 1398 further destroyed the political and economic standing of the Tughluqs. The dynasty eventually came to an end in 1414 when Khizar Khan founded the Saiyid Dynasty in Delhi.

Saiyid Dynasty (1414-1451)

Khizar Khan collaborated with Timur during his invasion on India. As a reward, on his departure from the area, Timur made

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[27] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad, 1986.

Khizar the governor of Lahore, Multan and Dipalpur. When Mahmud Shah, the last of the Tughluq rulers, died in 1412, Daullat Khan Lodhi and Khizar both attempted to occupy the throne of Delhi. In 1414, Khizar won the battle and established the rule of his dynasty in Delhi. Although Khizar Khan was completely sovereign, he preferred to rule in the name of Timur, and then in the name of Timur's successor, Shah Rukh.

As a result of Timur's invasion and the continuous wars for succession among the successors of Firuz Shah, a number of states and provinces of the Sultanate of Delhi declared their independence. Khizar tried to reintegrate these states through force, but failed in his mission. During his rule, the Sultanate was reduced to Sindh, western Punjab, and western Uttar Pradesh. Khizar died a natural death on May 20, 1421. His son Mubarik Shah succeeded Khizar. Unlike his father, Mubarik declared himself Sultan but he was killed in 1434. The reign of his successors was also marked by political instability, leaving the writ of the Sultanate confined only to Delhi.

Lodhi Dynasty (1451-1526)

Finally, Buhlul Lodhi occupied Delhi and established his rule putting an end to the Saiyids Dynasty in 1451.The Lodhi Dynasty was the first and last Afghan dynasty to rule in South Asia, with the exception of Sher Shah Suri, the only other Afghan who ruled this region. Buhlul Lodhi, the founder of the dynasty, was the governor of Sarhind. When the Saiyids became weak, he first occupied the province of Punjab and later on captured the throne of Delhi. His coronation was held on April 19, 1451. He also managed to capture a number of nearby states that had become independent in the final days of the Tughluqs and Saiyids.

When Buhlul died in July 1489, his son Nizam Khan succeeded him. Nizam took over the crown on July 17, 1489. He assumed the title of Sikandar Shah. Sikandar proved to be the most capable ruler of the Lodhi Dynasty. He not only managed to crush the revolts of his relatives, but was also able to establish just administration in India. He was the founder of the historical city of Agra. Like his father, Sikandar also died a natural death in November 1516.[28] A war of succession broke out between two of his sons, Ibrahim and Jalal which eventually resulted in the downfall of the Lodhi rule. Ibrahim Lodhi, the last of the Lodhi sultans was defeated by Babur of Ferghana in 1526.

The Sultanate era was a unique epoch of Muslim achievements. Firstly, because a small minority which was just the ratio of one to thousands conquered, established control and administered the vast

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[28] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad, 1986.

Indian land in a very brief period of time. Secondly, the young Sultanate dynasty successfully checked the Mongol attacks which had ruined older, stable empires from Central Asia to borders of Egypt and Crimea. Thirdly, the efficient system of administration proved to be the foundation for the great Mughal Empire. They built great buildings that motivate an aesthetic sense and inspire imagination up till now. The era produced great men of letters, poets, musicians, artists, architects and craftsmen that added to the cultural richness of the subcontinent.[29]

IV. THE MUGHAL EMPIRE (1526-1858)

India in the sixteenth century presented a fragmented picture of rulers, both Muslim and Hindu, who lacked concern for their subjects and who failed to create a common body of laws or institutions. Outside developments also played a role in shaping events. The circumnavigation of Africa by the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama in 1498 allowed Europeans to challenge Arab control of the trading routes between Europe and Asia.

In Central Asia and Afghanistan, shifts in power pushed Babur of Ferghana (in present-day Uzbekistan) southward, first to Kabul and then to India. The dynasty he founded endured for more than three centuries. [30]

Claiming descent from Changez Khan and Timur, Babur combined strength and courage with a love of beauty, and military ability with cultivation. Babur concentrated on gaining control of northwestern India. He did so in 1526 by defeating the last Lodhi sultan at the first Battle of Panipat, a town north of Delhi. Babur then turned to the tasks of persuading his Central Asian followers to stay on in India and of overcoming other contenders for power, mainly the Rajputs and the Afghans. He succeeded in both tasks but died shortly thereafter in 1530. The Mughal Empire was one of the largest centralized states in pre-modern history and was the precursor to the British Indian Empire.

Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur (1526-1530), swept across the Khyber Pass and founded the **Mughal Empire** covering modern day Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh in India after defeating Ibrahim Lodhi in the Battle of Panipat in 1526. The Mughals were Timurid descendents from Central Asian Turks of Farghana Valley (now Uzbekistan) with significant Mongol admixture. He was only 14 when he ascended the throne of the Central Asian kingdom of Farghana, now in Uzbekistan. His greatest ambition was to rule

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[29] *http://storyofpakistan.com/major-achievements*

[30] *A country study: Pakistan*, US Library of Congress, 1994.

Samarkand. He fought many battles in the pursuit of this goal, winning and losing his kingdom many times in the process. In 1504, he ventured into what is now Afghanistan and conquered Kabul.

In order to consolidate his rule, he invaded India five times, crossing the River Indus each time. The fifth expedition resulted in his encounter with **Ibrahim Lodhi** in the first battle of Panipat in April 1526. Babur's army was better equipped than Lodhi's; he had guns while the sultan relied on elephants. The most successful of Babur's innovations was the introduction of gunpowder, which had never been used before in the subcontinent. This combined with Babur's newer tactics gave him a greater advantage. Babur's strategy won the war and Ibrahim Lodhi died fighting.

Panipat was merely the beginning of the Mughal rule. Akbar laid its real foundation in 1556. At the time of the battle of Panipat, the political power in India was shared by the Afghans and the Rajputs. After Panipat, the Hindu princes united under Rana Sanga, the Raja of Mewar, resulting in a sizable force. Babur's army showed signs of panic at the size of the huge opposing army. Babur was able to instill confidence in his soldiers to fight and when the armies met in the battle at Kanwaha, near Agra on March 16, 1527, Babur was able to win decisively. Babur thus became the king of Central India.

He was not destined to enjoy the fruits of his conquests as he died shortly afterwards in Agra on December 26, 1530. He was buried at Kabul in accordance with his wish. The Mughal age is famous for its multifaceted cultural developments. The Timurids had a great cultural tradition behind them. Their ancestral kingdom at Samarkand was the meeting ground of the cultural traditions of Central and West Asia. The Mughals brought with them Muslim cultural traditions from Turko-Iranian areas, which inspired the growth of the Indo-Muslim culture.

Babur was succeeded by his eldest son **Nasiruddin Muhammad Humayun (1530-40 and 1555-1556)** who could not assert a strong monarchical authority. He had inherited a freshly won empire with a host of troubles; the Afghan nobles, the Rajputs and worst of all, his three treacherous brothers. They caused numerous problems for him. Following his father's advice, Humayun treated his brothers kindly and appointed them to high positions but none of them was a source of strength to him.

Humayun almost lost the empire his father had fought so hard to bequeath him. In the first ten years of his rule, he faced a host of challenges not only from his younger brothers but also from the Afghan general **Sher Shah Suri** who had served under Babur and eventually took over the Mughal Empire after defeating Humayun in the Battle of Kanauj in 1540.

Humayun went into self-exile, escaping towards Iran via Sindh, and spent the next 15 years of his life in Kabul from 1540 to 1555. While in Sindh, he married a young Persian girl, Hamida Bano, who joined him in his wanderings. A year later in Umerkot in upper Sindh, his first son Akbar was born on November 23, 1542. Legend has it that Humayun prophesied a bright future for his son, and thus accordingly, named him Akbar.[31]

Later, with the help of the King of Persia, **Humayun** captured Kabul and Kandhar and was able to re-ascend the throne at Delhi and Agra in 1555 after defeating Sikandar Suri. Humayun then seriously devoted himself to the affairs of the kingdom and towards improving the system of government. In January 1556, he met his tragic end by slipping from the famous building known as Din Panah that Humayun had built in 1533.

Humayun's tomb is located in Delhi close to the Din Panah citadel also known as Purana Qila (Old Fort). The tomb now a UNESCO-declared world heritage was commissioned by Humayun's first wife Bega Begum (Haji Begum) in 1669-70 and designed by Mirak Mirza Ghias, a Persian architect chosen by Bega Begum. It was the first garden-tomb on the Indian subcontinent and also the structure to use red sandstone at such scale.

Sher Shah Suri (1540-1545) was an Afghan leader who started his career in the private service of Babur before rising to be a commander in the Mughal army and then as the governor of Bihar. Seeing the weaknesses in the Mughal rule and military organization, Sher Shah took advantage of the problems faced by Humayun. In 1537, when Humayun was elsewhere on an expedition, Sher Khan overran the state of Bengal and in 1540 he managed to overthrow the Mughal rule after defeating Humayun in the battles of Chaunsa and Kanauj.

These defeats were the first setback to the infant Mughal Empire. Humayun was forced to retreat in self-exile to Kabul where he lived the next 15 years of his life from 1540 to 1555. Sher Shah ruled for a short period of five years in which he not only consolidated his power but also brought about important reforms. He died in 1545 from a gunpowder explosion. He was a practical and farsighted ruler who was way ahead of his contemporaries. He is remembered in history for the numerous reforms that he undertook to strengthen the government. He was indeed the greatest ruler that sat upon the throne of Delhi.

A brilliant strategist, Sher Shah proved himself a gifted administrator as well as an able general. His reorganization of the empire laid the foundations even for the subsequent Mughal emperors. With his deep knowledge and practical experience, he made many brilliant additions and improvements to the existent system. He introduced reforms in various areas. Akbar later built on these reforms and extended them further. Many of these reforms pertained to the army, but the principal reforms for which he is remembered are those connected with revenue administration.

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[31] *http://storyofpakistan.com*

Sher Shah employed a powerful army and personally inspected, appointed and paid the soldiers, thus making him the focus of loyalty and subduing the jealousies between clans and tribes. He formulated a sound imperial administration that was inspired by the Safavid regime in Iran. He also set up a revenue collection system based on the measurement of land. Justice was provided to the common man. Numerous civil works were carried out during his short reign; planting of trees, wells and building of *sarais* (inns) for travellers was done. Roads were laid; it was under his rule that the Grand Trunk Road from Bengal to Kabul was built. The currency was also changed to finely mint silver coins called *Dam*.

After Sher Shah's accidental death in 1545, his son Islam Shah became the ruler of north India who relied heavily on the calibre and administrative skills of his chief minister **Hem Chandra** familiarly called **Hemu**. On Islam Shah's death in 1554, the Suri successors did not come up to the challenges of the empire. Hemu took the advantage of Suri dynasty's aridity in talent and ascended the throne of Delhi himself on October 7, 1556, assuming the title of **"Vikramaditya"** that had been earlier adopted by many Hindu kings since the Vedic times.

After crowning himself as Emperor of India at Purana Quila in Delhi, he re-established the Hindu rule (albeit for a very short duration of less than a month) in north India, after over 350 years of Muslim rule. Hemu struck coins bearing his title. He was defeated by Emperor Akbar's forces in the Second Battle of Panipat on November 6, 1556.

After Humayun's death, his eldest son **Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar (1556-1605)** took over the reign of the empire. Akbar was born in exile and was only 13 years old when his father died. Akbar's reign holds a certain prominence in history; he was the ruler who actually fortified the foundations of the Mughal Empire. After a series of conquests he managed to subdue most of India. Areas not under the empire were designated as tributaries. He also adopted a conciliatory policy towards the Rajputs, hence reducing any threat from them.

Akbar the Great, as he came to be known, was both a capable ruler and an early proponent of religious and ethnic tolerance. Along with his military conquests, he introduced a series of reforms to consolidate his power. He set up a host of institutions that proved to be the foundation of an administrative system that operated even in British India. Akbar's rule also stands out due to his liberal policies towards the non-Muslims, his religious innovations, the land revenue system and his famous Mansabdari system. Akbar's Mansabdari system became the basis of Mughal military organization and civil administration.

Akbar was the proponent of an early form of multiculturalism going to an extent of propounding what he called "Din-e-Elahi" as a new concept of communal tolerance aimed at "Hindu-Muslim unity." He declared "Amari" or non-killing of animals in the holy days of Jainism and rolled back the *jizya* imposed upon non-Muslims, mainly Hindu people. He appointed nobles and *mansabdars* without any religious discrimination. No wonder, Akbar's religious innovations and policies, seen as deviation from Islamic faith have historically been a source of debate and controversy. Akbar also patronised literary works and scholars. His court had numerous scholars of the day who are well-known as "Nauratan".

Akbar had three sons: Prince Saleem, Murad and Daniyal. Prince Murad and Daniyal died in their prime during their father's lifetime. However, Akbar faced problems with Prince Salim and the last four years of Akbar's life were consumed in crushing Salim's rebellion. Akbar fell ill and died of slow poisoning on October 27, 1605. With him ended the most glorious epoch in Indian history.

Akbar was succeeded by his son, **Nur-ur-Din Saleem**, who took the title of **Jehangir,** meaning "Conqueror of the World". During his reign **(1605-1628), Jehangir** expanded the empire through the addition of Kangra and Kistwar and consolidated the Mughal rule in Bengal. Although many rebellions arose in the empire, especially in Bengal and Mewar, Jehangir was able to suppress them all. Jehangir was renowned for administering impartial justice to his people, irrespective of their religious faith.

Around this time, European traders had started coming to India. The English were able to find favour with Jehangir and cultivated him through works of art, of which Jehangir was a connoisseur. The first ambassador to the Mughal court was Sir Thomas Roe who was able to secure many trading facilities for his countrymen. In return, the Company offered to provide the Emperor with goods from the European market. Jehangir sent a letter of goodwill to King James I through Sir Thomas Roe in 1617:

> *"The letter of love and friendship which you sent and the presents, tokens of your good affections toward me, I have received by the hands of your ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe (who well deserves to be your trusted servant), delivered to me in an acceptable and happy hour; upon which mine eyes were*

> *so fixed that I could not easily remove them to any other object, and have accepted them with great joy and delight."*
>
> *"Upon which assurance of your royal love I have given my general command to all the kingdoms and ports of my dominions to receive all the merchants of the English nation as the subjects of my friend; that in what place soever they choose to live, they may have free liberty without any restraint; and at what port soever they shall arrive, that neither Portugal nor any other shall dare to molest their quiet; and in what city soever they shall have residence, I have commanded all my governors and captains to give them freedom answerable to their own desires; to sell, buy, and to transport into their country at their pleasure.*
>
> *For confirmation of our love and friendship, I desire Your Majesty to command your merchants to bring in their ships of all sorts of rarities and rich goods fit for my palace; and that you be pleased to send me your royal letters by every opportunity, that I may rejoice in your health and prosperous affairs; that our friendship may be interchanged and eternal."*[32]

The Mughal rule reached its climax during Jahangir's reign. In the history of Mughal architecture, Jahangir's reign marks the period of transition between its two grand phases, namely the phase of Akbar and that of his grandson, Shah Jahan. The most important feature of this period is the substitution of red sandstone with white marble. He was also fond of laying gardens. One of the most famous gardens laid by him was the Shalimar Bagh in Lahore. The Mughal style of art was greatly developed during his reign.

Jehangir is buried in a garden in a Lahore suburb Shahdara which is the only Mughal tomb located in present-day Pakistan. He was succeeded by his third son Prince **Shahab-ud-Din Muhammad Khurram** assuming the name of **Shah Jahan (1628-1658)**, who further expanded his empire to Kandhar in the north and conquered most of southern India. He was the fifth Mughal emperor after Babur, Humayun, Akbar, and Jahangir. As a young boy, he was the favourite of his legendary grandfather, Akbar the Great. The Mughal Empire was at its zenith during Shah Jahan's rule. This was due to almost 100 years of unparalleled prosperity and peace.

Inheritance of power and wealth in the Mughal empire was not determined through primogeniture, but by princely sons competing to achieve military successes and consolidating their power at court. This often led to rebellions and wars of succession.

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[32] *Indian History Sourcebook: England, India, and the East Indies, 1617 AD.*

No wonder, a complex political climate surrounded the Mughal court in Prince Khurram's formative years. In 1611, his father, Jahangir married Nur Jahan, the widowed daughter of an Afghan noble. She rapidly became an important member of Emperor Jahangir's court and, together with her brother Asaf Khan, wielded considerable influence. Arjumand Bano was Asaf Khan's daughter and her marriage to Prince Khurram consolidated Nur Jahan and Asaf Khan's positions at court.

Court intrigues, however, including Nur Jahan's decision to have her daughter from her first marriage wed Shah Jahan's youngest brother Shahzada Shahryar and her support for his claim to the throne led Khurram, supported by Mahabat Khan, into open revolt against his father in 1622. The rebellion was quelled by Jahangir's forces in 1626 and Khurram was forced to submit unconditionally. But on his father's death, he succeeded to the Mughal throne as **Shah Jahan**, a title pointing to his pride in his Timurid roots and his ambitious the history.

Shahanshah Shah Jahan's first act as ruler was to execute his chief rivals and imprison his step-mother Nur Jahan. This allowed Shan Jahan to rule without contention. During his reign, the world witnessed the unique development of arts and culture of the Mughal Empire. Mughal architecture reached its supreme exuberance during Shah Jahan's period. He chose marble as the chief medium for all his architectural undertakings and built marble edifices at Agra such as the Diwan-i-Aam, the Diwan-i-Khas, the Shish Mahal, Delhi's Red Fort and Moti Masjid in the Lahore Fort, which have been described as the most elegant buildings of their class to be found anywhere.

The famous Takht-e-Taus or the Peacock Throne, said to be worth millions of dollars by modern estimates, also dates from his reign. He was also the founder of the new imperial capital called Shahjahanabad, now known as Old Delhi. Shah Jahan is also believed to have had a very refined taste in the arts and architecture, and is credited with having commissioned about 999 gardens in Kashmir, his favourite summer residence. But his greatest architectural creation was the exquisite conception of the mausoleum of his wife, Arjumand Bano Begum (Mumtaz Mahal) at Agra.

The Taj Mahal is the crowning glory and culmination of Mughal architecture. Its construction commenced in 1631 and was completed sometime around 1653. Shah Jahan is considered to be one of the greatest Mughals. His reign has been called the Golden Age of the Mughals and one of the most prosperous ages of Indian civilization. In 1658, he fell ill and was confined by his son Emperor Aurangzeb in Agra Fort until his death in 1666. He was buried in Taj Mahal next to his wife Mumtaz Mahal.

Muhy-ud-Din Muzaffar Aurangzeb Alamgir (1658-1707) ruled for almost 50 years, matching Akbar's reign in longevity. But he kept his five sons away from the royal court with the result that none of them was trained in the art of government. This proved to be very damaging for the Mughals later on. Aurangzeb himself had three brothers (Dara Shikoh, Shah Shuja and Murad) and had to claim the throne by force. Dara Shikoh was eclectic in his beliefs; therefore Aurangzeb challenged his father's choice of his eldest son Dara Shikoh to be his successor.

The contest for power was primarily between Dara Shikoh and Aurangzeb because, although all four sons had demonstrated competence in their official roles, it was around these two that the supporting cast of officials and other influential people also mostly circulated. Historians of the Mughal era are convinced that factional lines in the succession dispute were not, by and large, shaped by ideology. "To focus on divergent philosophies neglects the fact that Dara was a poor general and leader."[33]

When Shah Jehan fell seriously ill, all his sons proclaimed succession. After a war of succession among all the brothers, Aurangzeb was victorious. But as Shah Jehan was in absolute favour of Dara, Aurangzeb no longer trusted him, and had Shah Jehan placed under polite restraint in his own palace at the Agra Fort but did not mistreat him. Shah Jahan was cared for by his daughter Jahanara and died in 1666.

In his 50-year rule, **Aurangzeb Alamgir,** the sixth Mughal Emperor tried to fulfil his great ambition of bringing the entire sub-continent under one rule. In 1687, Bijapur and Golkonda, the last of the two Shia states surrendered to the Mughal Empire. By 1689, almost all of southern India was a part of the Mughal Empire which expanded to 3.2 million square kilometres, with a population estimated as being between 100 million and 150 million.[34]

Aurangzeb, a pious and staunch Muslim, was not unmindful of the rights of non-Muslims, and gave many generous grants for the restoration of Hindu temples during his reign. He also appointed Hindus to leading and commanding positions in his government. His chief architectural achievement is the Badshahi Mosque at Lahore, the largest mosque in the world at the time it was built.

Under his rule, the borders of the Mughal Empire spread out farther than ever before. But due to lack of communication and poor infrastructure, it was difficult to hold the empire together. If the court was in the north, there was rebellion in the south, and vice versa. Though he ruled longer than any of his predecessors, yet he could not stop the decline of the Mughal Empire, which hastened after his demise as none of his sons was trained to rule. His reign lasted for 49 years from 1658 until his death in 1707.

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[33] *A Concise History of Modern India,* Metcalf, Barbara D., Metcalf, Thomas R. Cambridge University Press. (2006).

[34] *The empire of the great Mughals,* Schimmel, Annemarie, Reaktion Books, London (2004).

Even when ill and dying, Aurangzeb made sure that the populace knew he was still alive, for if they had thought otherwise then the turmoil of another war of succession was likely. He died in Ahmednagar on February 20, 1707 at the age of 88, having outlived many of his children. His modest open-air grave in Khuldabad expresses his deep devotion to his Islamic beliefs. It is sited in the courtyard of the shrine of the sufi saint Shaikh Burhan-ud-din Gharib, who was a disciple of Nizamuddin Auliya of Delhi.

When Aurangzeb died, there were 17 legitimate claimants to the throne that included not only his sons but also his grandsons and great grandsons. After the death of the emperor two brothers fought near Agra in the same battle site that Aurangzeb had fought his brother Dara Shikoh. **Prince Muazzam** prevailed and killed his brother Prince Azam Shah and assumed the title Bahadur Shah I or Shah Alam I. He ruled for five years from 1707 to 1712 and momentarily revived the Mughal Empire.

Within decades of Aurangzeb's death, the Mughal emperor had little power beyond the walls of Delhi. Aurangzeb's son, Bahadur Shah I succeeded him, and the Mughal Empire, both due to Aurangzeb's over-extension and Bahadur Shah's weak military and leadership qualities entered a period of terminal decline. Immediately after Bahadur Shah occupied the throne, the **Maratha Empire** – which Aurangzeb had held at bay, inflicting high human and monetary costs – consolidated and launched effective invasions of Mughal territory seizing power from the weak emperor.

Their leader **Shivaji** proclaimed himself **'Chhatrapati'** or **Emperor** in 1674. He died in 1680 but his able successors, known as Peshwas who often led as generals also, took the Maratha Empire to its zenith. Pune, the seat of Peshwas, flowered as a centre of Hindu learning and traditions. In addition to the Mughals and various Rajput kingdoms, several independent Hindu states, such as the Vijayanagara Empire, the Maratha Empire, Eastern Ganga Empire and the Ahom Kingdom, flourished contemporaneously in southern, western, eastern and northeastern India, respectively. But the Maratta's power increased and they became the unchallenged rulers of Deccan.

In the province of Punjab, the Sikhs under Guru Govind Singh became a force to reckon with. One of the reasons that power centres kept springing up outside Delhi was the frequent change in the succession of empires. Nearly 17 kings were crowned during the period spanning from 1707 to 1857. The empire went into a slow decline after 1707 with its last sovereign ruling only around Delhi region. After the death of Bahadur Shah I, a civil war broke out. Marathas were now constantly attacking Delhi.

The raids by Nadir Shah and repeated incursions of Ahmad Shah Abdali resulted in quick disposal of the next two emperors Ahmad Shah and Alamgir II until in 1759 Shah Alam II ascended the throne. His reign would last several decades. However, he would preside over more loss of territory to the British. When the Nawab of Bengal lost to Robert Clive, Shah Alam II was forced to recognize Clive as a *diwan* (chancellor) and Bengal slipped to the British hands permanently. In 1806, Shah Alam's son Akbar Shah II acceded to the much diminished empire of the Mughals and ruled until 1837.

The Mughal Empire's gradual decline in the early 18th century provided opportunities for the Afghans, Balochis, Sikhs, and Marathas to exercise control over large areas in the northwest of the subcontinent until the British East India Company gained ascendancy over South Asia. The last Mughal emperor was Bahadur Shah Zafar (1837-1858) who after the 1857 War of Independence was deposed by the British in 1858 and exiled to Rangoon in Burma where he died in obscurity in 1862.

The Mughal dynasty ruled most of the Indian subcontinent for more than three centuries. The Mughal emperors married local royalty and allied themselves with local *maharajas*. For a short time in the late 16th century, Lahore was the capital of the empire. The architectural legacy of the Mughals in Lahore includes the Shalimar Gardens built by the fifth emperor Shah Jahan, and the Badshahi Mosque built by the sixth emperor, Aurangzeb, who is regarded as the last Great Mughal Emperor as he expanded the domain to its zenith.

V. DECLINE OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

Aurangzeb's death (1707) is generally regarded as the beginning of gradual decline and fall of the once extensive, prosperous and powerful Mughal Empire. During his reign, the Mughal Empire reached its greatest extent, although his policies also led to its dissolution. Although, he was an outstanding general and a rigorous administrator, Mughal fiscal and military standards declined as security and luxury increased. Land rather than cash became the usual means of remunerating high-ranking officials, and divisive tendencies in his large empire further undermined central authority.

By 1700, the **Marathas** ravaged the Mughal provinces in the north and internal dissatisfaction and secessionist agendas from the Rajputs, Sikhs and Jats arose due to the weakness of the Mughal

Empire's administrative and economic systems.[35] Although it took nearly 150 years before the House of Babur finally disappeared from the scene, the cracks that had appeared at Aurangzeb's death widened. Different regions of what today is modern Pakistan began asserting independence.

The weakened Mughal Empire invited havoc in the form of the **Persian king Nadir Shah**, in 1738-39. On his orders a general massacre of the citizens of Delhi was carried out, resulting in the death of 30,000 people. He defeated the **Mughal emperor Mohammad Shah** at the battle of Karnal and occupied most of Balochistan and the Indus plain. Another threat to the Mughal Empire came from the Afghans of Rohilkhand, lying northeast of Delhi. By the middle of 18th century, the Rohillas became independent of the Mughal rule. At the same time the Jats also raised their heads against the central rule.

After Nadir Shah's death, the Durrani kingdom was established in 1747 by one of his Afghan generals, **Ahmad Shah Abdali** after conquering all of today's Afghanistan and Pakistan, including much of northeastern Iran, Balochistan, Peshawar, Multan, Sindh and Punjab regions in the Indian subcontinent. He decisively defeated the Marathas at the 1761 Battle of Panipat which was fought north of Delhi.

In the south, a succession of autonomous dynasties (the Daudpotas, Kalhoras and Talpurs) had asserted the independence of **Sindh**, from the end of Aurangzeb's reign. Most of Balochistan came under the influence of the **Khan of Kalat**, apart from some coastal areas such as **Gwadar**, which were controlled by mutually competing and armed Portuguese, French and Dutch trading companies. Another threat to the Mughal Empire came from the Afghans of Rohilkhand, lying northeast of Delhi.

By the middle of eighteenth century, the Rohillas became independent of the Mughal rule. At the same time the Jats also raised their heads against the central rule. In 1758, the Maratha Empire's general, Raghunath Rao conquered Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Kashmir and drove out **Timur Shah Durrani**, the son and viceroy of Ahmad Shah Abdali. Lahore, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan, Peshawar, Kashmir and other *subahs* on the south eastern side of Afghanistan's border were under the Maratha rule for the most part.

In Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Kashmir, the Marathas were now major players.

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[35] *A Concise History of Modern India*, Metcalf, Barbara D., Metcalf, Thomas R., Cambridge University Press. (2006).

In 1761, following the victory at the **Third Battle of Panipat** between the Durranis and the Maratha Empire, **Ahmad Shah Abdali** captured remnants of the Maratha Empire in Punjab and Kashmir regions and re-consolidated control over them. The Maratha Empire broke into smaller kingdoms that survived till they were eventually subdued by the British East India Company.

Taking advantage of this chaotic situation, the East India Company was already strengthening its military capabilities. They conspired with Hindu traders and moneylenders against **Nawab Sirajuddollah of Bengal** to take over his principality. The **Battle of Plassey of 1757** is considered a major breakthrough for the British in the subcontinent. It paved the way for the company's rule in Bengal, and hence the whole of India ultimately came under the Company's rule. The Mughal Empire reached its greatest extent in the time of Aurangzeb Alamgir, but it collapsed with dramatic suddenness within a few decades after his death.

The Mughal Empire owes its decline and ultimate downfall to a combination of factors; including Aurangzeb's religious policy which is regarded as a cause for the decline of the Mughal Empire as it led to disunity among the people. The main cause of the Mughal downfall, however, was the absence of worthy and competent successors after Aurangzeb. The character of Mughal kings had deteriorated over a period of time. Successive rulers after Aurangzeb, in particular, were weak and lacked the character, motivation and commitment to rule the empire strongly. They had not only become lazy and cowardly but also totally disregarded their state duties and were unable to detain the declining empire from its fall.

The absence of any definite law of accession was another important factor. The war of successions not only led to bitterness, bloodshed, and loss of money and prestige of the empire over a period of time, but to its eventual fall. The degeneration of the rulers had also led to the moral degeneration of the nobility. Under the early Mughals, the nobles distinguished themselves both in war and peace. But the elite under the later Mughals, as indeed those in today's Pakistan, were more interested in worldly pursuit and self-enhancement giving rise to extravagance and corruption in the administration. Growth of hostile and rival cliques in the court also undermined the strength of the government.

One of the most potent causes of the fall of the Mughal Empire was the deterioration and demoralization of the army. The military had not only become inefficient but also lacked in training, discipline and cohesion. The army was outdated and consisted of contingents maintained by various nobles, which was the main source of army's weakness. As the weakening of the nobles occurred, so did the army. This was because of the soldiers, instead of identifying and uniting as Mughal Indians, identified themselves with their ancestral ethnicities. The Mughals had no navy and only maintained small ships that were no match for the well-equipped ships of the foreign traders. It was this weakness that the French and the British used to their advantage, and were eventually able to establish their control over India.

Another factor contributing to the decline was the financial position of the Mughals, which had become deplorable. The war of successions, rebellions and luxurious style of living had depleted the once enormous treasury and had led to financial bankruptcy. During the time of Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire had expanded to reach its maximum size. This vast area had become impossible for one ruler to control and govern from one centre. It was during the later Mughals that Deccan, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa declared their independence.

The raids by Nadir Shah, and repeated invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali, resulted in further weakening of the empire. The already weakened empire faced further encroachment by the British and the French, which proved to be the last nail in the already drowning empire's coffin. The British and French, who had initially come as traders, took full advantage of the weakening empire and soon became masters of the whole of India.[36]

In the 19th century, Muslims like **Syed Ahmad Barelvi** and **Shah Ismail** carried out *jihad* against the Sikhs, as did **Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan in Deccan against the British**. However, they could not stop the downfall of the Muslim rule. The final crunch came after the war of 1857 when the Mughal rule officially came to an end and India came under the direct rule of the British crown. Taking advantage of this chaotic situation, the East India Company began strengthening its military capabilities. They conspired with Hindu traders and moneylenders against Nawab Sirajuddollah of Bengal to take over his principality.

The Battle of Plassey of 1757 is considered a major breakthrough for the British in the subcontinent. It paved the way for the Company's rule in Bengal, and hence the whole of India ultimately came under the Company's rule. The main reasons for the decline of the Mughal Empire could thus be summarized as:

- Weak successors after Aurangzeb who could not manage and unite the Empire
- Nadir Shah's invasion
- Rise of Sikhs, Jats and Marathas
- British ascendancy in India

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[36] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

- Absence of any definite succession law or norm
- Revolt of the Marathas and the Sikhs
- Outdated and ill-equipped army
- Religious intolerance
- Financial crisis
- Luxurious and extravagant rulers

VI. THE BRITISH ARRIVAL IN INDIA

British East India Company (1600)

The Portuguese had traded directly with India for over 100 years before the British arrived in India as traders. In 1583, Queen Elizabeth I dispatched the ship Tyger to the subcontinent to exploit trade opportunities. Sixteen years later on October 31, 1600, a group of merchants incorporated themselves into the East India Company which was given monopoly rights on all trade with India. The Company's first ship Hector under the captaincy of William Hawkins arrived at the port of Surat in 1608. In 1614, the British East India Company opened its first office in Bombay.

This was the period when the Mughal Empire was at the height of its splendor in the seventeenth century controlling greater part of the vast subcontinent under a consolidated government with its capital at Delhi. The Mughal Empire included the whole of the Indus and Ganges valleys. In southern India, which has always had a separate history from the north, there were three minor Muslim states, while on the southeast coast, there were a number of small Hindu principalities. From a humble beginning, the East India Company's trade and commerce soon began to multiply and the Company established several trading posts in various parts of India, especially on the east and west coast including Bombay, Madras and Calcutta.

In 1615, Sir Thomas Roe reached the court of the Mughal emperor Jehangir as the emissary of King James I, and gained for the British the right to establish a factory at Surat. The British continued to seek concessions from the Mughal rulers and gradually eclipsed the Portuguese by securing an unrivalled trading monopoly in India. Numerous trading posts were established along the east and west coasts with large English communities developed around the three presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras.

In 1717, the Company achieved its hitherto most notable success when it received a royal dictat from the Mughal emperor exempting the Company from the payment of custom duties in Bengal. In violation of a trade agreement with the Nawab of Bengal, the British started reinforcing Fort William in Calcutta. This led to a clash between the British and the son of the Nawab of Bengal, Sirajuddollah, who opposed the British violation and reinforcement of Fort William. Owing to the treachery of his uncle **Mir Jaffar, Nawab Sirajuddollah was defeated in the Battle of Plassey in 1757.**

Although the British had earlier ruled in the factory areas, the beginning of British rule is often dated from the **Battle of Plassey.** Clive's victory was consolidated in 1764 at the Battle of Buxar (in Bihar), where the emperor, Shah Alam II, was defeated. As a result, Shah Alam was coerced to appoint the Company to be the *diwan* (collector of revenue) for the areas of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. The company thus became the supreme, but not the titular, power in much of the Ganges Valley, and the Company agents continued to trade on terms highly favourable to them.

After the Battle of Plassey, the British began the systematic conquest of the subcontinent. It was mainly the Muslims who raised resistance to the British rule. The other organized group, the Marathas, periodically sided with the British against the Muslims. The people of India were not united against the foreign aggressors, which made it easier for the British to seize power. The Marathas, threatened by the British challenged them under the leadership of their Peshwas. This resulted in a series of Anglo-Marathas wars, which finally resulted in bringing the Marathas confederacy under the British rule.

The area controlled by the Company expanded during the first three decades of the nineteenth century by two methods. The first was the use of subsidiary agreements (*sanad*) between the British and the local rulers, under which control of foreign affairs, defence, and communications was transferred from the ruler to the Company and the rulers were allowed to rule as they wished (up to a limit) on other matters.

This development created what came to be called the Native States, or Princely India, that is, the world of the *maharaja* and his Muslim counterpart the Nawab. The second method was outright military conquest or direct annexation of territories; it was these areas that were properly called British India. Most of northern India was annexed by the British.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, the British, in guise of the East India Company, had become deeply enmeshed in the politics of India. The British and French had both obtained permission to open factories and forts in India. It was in the guise of defence for their forts that they were able to establish large forces in India. In the middle of the eighteenth century the war between France and Britain was extended to the subcontinent in order to establish control over India. The British succeeded in their mission as they took advantage of the constant bickering of the local rulers and the lack of consolidated power.

Some Muslim rulers like Haider Ali and his son Tipu Sultan single-handedly tried to free India from the British yoke, but were defeated. The remaining centres of Muslim power crumbled one by one. Mysore disappeared as a Muslim state in 1799 when Tipu Sultan was killed in the Battle of Seringapatam. Oudh was annexed in 1856. Hyderabad had already become a dependency of the East India Company. After minimizing the major threats, the British systematically expanded their control and by 1823 had become masters of two-thirds of India. They were then able to proudly claim: "The sun never sets on the British Empire."

The Company's commercial policy eliminated the Muslims from internal and foreign trade. When the Europeans came to the subcontinent, the Muslim merchants lost much of their commerce with foreign countries. But they maintained their hold on internal trade and their commercial activities extended to the Persian Gulf and the coastal territories of the Arabian Sea. During the Company's rule, the Muslim traders were pushed out of this area as well by the competition of the Company's traders who enjoyed many special concessions.

Interestingly, even under the Mughals, India was never united; it had never been united in all its history. Moreover, it had always been governed by foreign conquerors, mostly invaders from the northwest. This fact together with the innumerable varieties of race, language and caste by which the Indian peoples were divided, had prevented the upgrowth in India of any sentiment of nationality or patriotism. This fundamental fact explains the ease with which the Indians accepted foreign rule, and even supplied the soldiery by which this rule was facilitated and established.

However, it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that almost all of the territory that constitutes Pakistan and India came under the rule of the British East India Company. The patterns of territorial acquisition and rule as applied by the company in Sindh and Punjab and the manner of governance became the basis for direct British rule in the British Indian Empire and indirect rule in the princely states under the paramountcy of the crown. At the start of the nineteenth century, most of present-day Pakistan was under independent rulers. Sindh was ruled by the Muslim Talpur *mirs* (chiefs) in three small states that were annexed by the British in 1843.

As the British increased their territory in India, so did Russia expand in Central Asia. The East India Company signed treaties with a number of Afghan rulers and with Ranjit Singh. Russia backed Persian ambitions in western Afghanistan. In 1838 the Company's actions bought about the First Afghan War (1838-1842). Assisted by Sikh allies, the company took Kandahar and Kabul and made its own candidate *emir*. The *emir* proved unpopular with the

Afghans, however, and the British garrison's position became untenable.

The retreat of the British from Kabul in January 1842 was one of the worst disasters in British military history, as a column of more than 16,000 (about one-third soldiers, the rest camp followers) was annihilated by Afghan tribesmen as they struggled through the snowbound passes on their way back to India. The British later sent a punitive expedition to Kabul, which it burned in retribution, but made no attempt to reoccupy Afghanistan. In Punjab, annexed in 1849, a group of extraordinarily able British officers, serving first the Company and then the British crown, governed the area.

They avoided the administrative mistakes made earlier in Bengal. A number of reforms were introduced, although local customs were generally respected. Irrigation projects later in the century helped Punjab become the granary of northern India. The respect gained by the new administration could be gauged by the fact that within ten years Punjabi troops were fighting for the British elsewhere in India to subdue the uprising of 1857-58. Punjab was to become the major recruiting area for the British Indian Army, recruiting both Sikhs and Muslims.

The uprising of 1857-58 heralded the formal end of the Mughal Empire and marked as well the end of the Company rule in India. The British Parliament passed the Government of India Act, 1858, which transferred authority to the British crown, represented in India by the governor-general, who thereafter also had the title of viceroy. Queen Victoria was proclaimed empress of India in 1877.

The Sikh Empire (1799-1849)

The Sikh Empire existed from 1799 (exactly 100 years after Guru Govind Singh, the tenth Sikh Guru had created the Khalsa) till 1849. Although the empire came under the power of Maharaja Ranjit Singh upon his coronation in 1799, the Sikhs had ruled these lands since 1716 as a collection of autonomous Misls (or fighting clans) that were governed by feudal barons/*misldars*.

In Punjab, the decline of the Mughal Empire allowed the rise of the Sikhs, first as a military force and later as a political administration in Lahore. Taking advantage of rapid governmental changes in Delhi, the Sikhs established their stronghold in Gujranwala in 1763 under **Charhat Singh,** the head of one of the local Sikh clans. On his death, he was succeeded by his son **Maha Singh** who in turn was followed by the most famous Sikh leader in the history of Punjab, **Maharaja Ranjit Singh** (1780-1839) who first became the chief of the Sukerchakias (a Sikh clan located in what is now Pakistan) on the death of his father in 1792, and then founded the Sikh Empire in a vast region of the Indian subcontinent in the early half of the nineteenth century.

The Sikh Empire consisted of much of the region what was then an extended version of Punjab, centred on Lahore. It included not only the present-day Indian and Pakistani Punjab regions but also the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa districts bordering Afghanistan. In 1799, Ranjit Singh captured Lahore from the Bhangi Misl with the connivance of local Muslim notables and later made it his capital. This was the first important step in his rise to power. Ranjit Singh was crowned on April 12, 1801 as the Maharaja of Punjab. He was only 20 years old at the time.

In 1802, he captured Amritsar, a city sacred to the Sikhs and then spent the following years fighting the Durrani rulers of Afghanistan. After driving them out of Punjab, Ranjit Singh and his Sikh army invaded ethnic Pashtun territories in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He captured Multan which encompassed the southern parts of Punjab, Peshawar (1818), Jammu and Kashmir (1819), and by 1820 he had consolidated his rule over the whole of Punjab between the Sutlej and the Indus rivers.

Maharaja Ranjit Singh was the most powerful of all the Sikh rulers and ruled over a large empire for complete 40 years. He fought several wars with the Afghans in 1813, 1823, 1834 and 1837 in which his forces made significant territorial advances. The Battle of Jamrud in 1837 became the last confrontation between the Sikhs and the Afghans in which Ranjit Singh's commander Hari Singh Nalwa was killed while the Afghans turned to Kabul to deal with the Persian invasion on its western border in Herat and internal fighting between various princes.

After his death in 1839, the Sikh Empire collapsed within a year. His two sons Kharak Singh and Sher Singh briefly ruled the Empire which was already crumbling from within. When Ranjit Singh's youngest son Dulip Singh was crowned Maharaja of Punjab in 1843, his Empire was divided into small principalities controlled by several Sikh *jagirdars*. This situation provided an opportunity to the British East India Company to put an end to the Sikh stronghold in the Punjab in 1849. The kingdom had then fallen into disorder, with court factions and the Khalsa (the Sikh army) contending for power at the Lahore Durbar (court).

In the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845), the Sikh Empire was defeated and all major decisions were then managed by the British East India Company. The Second Anglo-Sikh War (1849) saw the annexation of Punjab, including the present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to the Company's territories marking the end of Ranjit Singh's Sikh Empire. Kashmir was transferred by sale in the Treaty of Amritsar in 1850 to the Dogra Dynasty, which ruled the area under British paramountcy until 1947. The British took Maharaja Dulip Singh to England in 1854, where he was put under the protection of the Crown.

When the foreign minister of Ranjit Singh's court, Fakir **Azizuddin**, met the British Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, in Simla, Auckland asked Fakir Azizuddin which of the Maharaja's eyes was missing. Azizuddin replied:

> *"The Maharaja is like the sun and sun has only one eye. The splendor and luminosity of his single eye is so much that I have never dared to look at his other eye."*

The governor-general was so pleased with this reply that he gave his gold watch to Azizuddin.

VII. THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1857)

The War of Independence broke out in January and March 1857. This eruption in which both Hindus and Muslims rebelled against the British did not occur as a result of one specific event or cause; it was an accumulation of several events, involving diverse political, economic, military, religious and social causes over time resulting in its eventual outbreak.

The anti-British sentiment had been growing for decades in reaction to the increasing British interference in the local socio-economic system and its indifference to local religious and cultural sensitivities. The Doctrine of Lapse, part of the British policy of expansionism, was also greatly resented. If a feudal ruler did not leave a male heir through natural process, i.e. his own child, not an adopted one, the land became the property of the British East India Company. Within eight years, Lord Dalhousie, the then governor-general of India, annexed many kingdoms including Jhansi and Oudh.

Nobility, feudal landholders, and royal armies found themselves unemployed and humiliated. Even the jewels of the royal family of Nagpur were publicly auctioned in Calcutta, a move that was seen as a sign of abject disrespect by the remnants of the Indian aristocracy. In addition, the Bengal army of the East India Company drew many recruits from Oudh, they could not remain unaffected by the discontent back home.

Indians were unhappy with the Draconian rule of the British which had embarked on a project of rather rapid expansion and westernization, that were imposed without any regard for historical subtleties in Indian society. Changes introduced by the British, such as outlawing *sati* (the ritual burning of widows) and child marriage, were accompanied with prohibitions on Indian religious customs, seen as steps towards a forced conversion to Christianity.

The justice system was considered inherently unfair to the Indians. In 1853, the British Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen opened the Indian Civil Service to native Indians; however, this was viewed by some of educated Indians as an insufficient reform. The official Blue Books — entitled *East India (Torture) 1855–1857* - revealed that the Company officers were allowed an extended series of appeals if convicted or accused of brutality or crimes against Indians. The Company also practised financial extortion through heavy taxation. Failure to pay these taxes almost invariably resulted in appropriation of property.

Another important reason for the rebellion was the attitude towards the Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar. Lord Dalhousie, the governor-general of India at the time, had insulted the emperor by asking him and his successors to leave the Red Fort, the palace in Delhi. Later, Lord Canning, the next governor-general of India, announced in 1856 that Bahadur Shah's successors would not even be allowed to use the title of the king. Such discourtesies were resented by many of the people and the Indian rulers.

By 1848, however, the Company's financial difficulties had reached a point where expanding revenue required expanding British territories in South Asia massively. The Company began to set aside adoption rights of native princes and began the process of annexation of more than a dozen independent *rajas* between 1848 and 1854.

There was also fierce resentment over the discriminatory procedures and preferences for recruitment into the British army. The *sepoys* were a combination of Hindu and Muslim soldiers. Just before the Rebellion there were over 200,000 Indians in the army compared to about 40,000 British. There were also grievances over the issue of promotions, based on seniority. This as well as the increasing number of European officers in the battalions made promotion process for Indian officers very slow.

The *sepoys* had their own list of grievances against the Company *Raj*, mainly caused by the ethnic gulf between the British officers and their Indian troops. The British had issued new gunpowder cartridges that were widely believed to be greased with cow or pig fat, which insulted both Hindus and Muslims. Other than Indian units of the British East India Company's army, much of the resistance came from the old aristocracy, who were seeing their power steadily eroded under the British.

There was also a rumour that the British were contaminating the *sepoys'* flour with ground-up pig and cow bones (despite the fact that it was produced by native contractors). Another rumour that spread was an old prophecy that the Company's rule would end after a hundred years. Their rule in India had begun with the Battle of Plassey in 1757. *Chapaties* and Lotus flowers began to circulate around large parts of India, quoting the famous line "*Sub lal hogya hai*" (everything has become red), passed around by people from town to town and village to village, as a symbol of the prophecy and a sign of the coming revolt.

The final spark was provided by the reaction of the Company officers to the controversy over the ammunition for new Enfield rifle. To load the new rifle, the *sepoys* had to bite the cartridge open. It was believed that the paper cartridges that were standard issue with the rifle were greased with lard (pork fat) which was regarded as unclean by Muslims, or tallow (beef fat), regarded as anathema to Hindus. The soldiers refused to use these cartridges.

After an uprising in Meerut, soldiers in the British army in Bengal launched a full-scale mutiny against the British. This mutiny spread swiftly across the subcontinent. The British quickly realized their mistake and tried to assure the *sepoys* that they would not have to use cartridges greased with beef or pork fat. But the *sepoys* distrusted their British officers. Rumours quickly spread from one regiment to another that the British were insulting the Hindu and Muslim religions by issuing the new greased cartridges.

In April 1857 at a military post near Delhi, 85 *sepoy* cavalrymen refused to use the new cartridges when ordered to do so. The British court-martialled and sentenced them to prison. After the sentencing, the British humiliated them by stripping off their uniforms and shackling their ankles in front of 4,000 *sepoy* troops. Shocked by what they had seen, the troops mutinied. They quickly overwhelmed the British and released the *sepoy* prisoners.

As the *sepoys* entered Delhi, the people of the city joined them in seeking out the old Muslim king. Both Hindus and Muslims respected him as a symbol of the traditional way of life. At first reluctant, Bahadur Shah II, "King of Delhi," finally agreed to take up the *sepoy* cause. He called for all Hindus and Muslims to unite. "May all the enemies of the Faith be killed today," he said, "and the [foreigners] be destroyed root and branch!" Shocked by the capture of Delhi by *sepoy* mutineers, the British began to disarm the East India Company Sepoy regiments. When the *sepoy* mutiny first erupted, the British had only 23,000 regular British army troops in India to restore order.

Eventually, the British had to bring in troops from all over their empire to fight the rebels. Civilian rebels soon outnumbered the *sepoys*. The mutiny grew into a general uprising against the British across northern and central India. *sepoy* regiments, together with farmers, villagers, government workers, dispossessed estate owners, and bands of robbers looted and burned British homes, churches, missions, and East India Company property. They also hunted down and killed any British people they found. Initially, the Indian soldiers were able to push back the British forces.

The British army was driven out of Delhi and the Indian soldiers took control of the city. Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Mughal King, was compelled to lead the freedom fighters. In Bahadur Shah Zafar, the rebels found a symbol of freedom, but a mere symbol was all he was. Wanting to spend his days writing poetry, the man was in no way even a remnant of the glory of his forefathers. He proclaimed himself the emperor of the whole of India. The civilians, citizens and other dignitaries took oath of allegiance to the emperor. The emperor issued his own coin and appointed his sons to key posts.

The initial success of the freedom fighters gave a boost to the War of Independence. The Indian army captured the important towns of Haryana, Bihar and Mahdya Pardesh. However, the British forces at Meerut and Ambala put up a resolute resistance to the royal army and held them back for several months. The British proved to be a formidable foe with their superior weapons and better strategy. The freedom fighters badly lacked in adequate resources and their planning proved to be extremely brittle. The royal forces were finally defeated.

British army units began their own war of vengeance. On their way to recapture Delhi, British soldiers randomly tortured, shot, and hanged hundreds of Indian people. The British executed many *sepoy* mutineers they captured by lashing the victim to the muzzle of a cannon and blasting him to pieces. The British army entered Delhi and the Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar went into hiding. The British quickly regained control of Delhi, and took revenge in the most gruesome manner by killing innocent people indiscriminately. A large-scale massacre of the inhabitants of Delhi was carried out to avenge the killings of the British soldiers.

The Mughal emperor was captured from his sanctuary, the tomb of Emperor Humayun on September 20, 1857. The emperor's sons were slaughtered in cold blood. Their bodies were beheaded and their heads were presented to the aging emperor in prison. Bahadur Shah was imprisoned in Rangoon, Myanmar, where he breathed his last in 1862.[37]

Muslims in the Aftermath

The failure of the War of Independence had disastrous consequences for the Muslims as the British placed all responsibility for this event on them. They attributed the 1857 uprising to the Muslims alone who were considered the "main culprits" and thus bore the brunt of British wrath. Determined to prevent recurrence of any uprising, the British deliberately followed a repressive policy against the Muslims subjecting them to indiscriminate seizures, confiscations and executions.

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[37] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

After 1857, the British administrators deliberately followed a discriminatory policy against the Muslims, even in filling minor jobs. They were kept out of all responsible government posts. Advertisements inviting applications for government jobs specifically mentioned that Muslims would were not eligible. Conscious efforts were made to close all avenues of honest living for the Muslims. The attitude of the British rulers towards the Muslims was that of antipathy.

According to William W. Hunter, a prominent historian who served in the Indian Civil Service during those years, "The Muslims of India are, and have been for many years, a source of chronic danger to the British power in India." No wonder, practically every measure taken by the British, from the Battle of Plassey in 1757 till the end of the nineteenth century, affected Muslims for the worse. Without free access to government employment, the Indian Muslims had neither social status nor honourable means of subsistence.[38]

The newly-introduced English system of education had many drawbacks for the Muslims, mainly because it made no provisions for religious education. As a result, they stayed away from it. Thus, within a few years of loss of political power, the Muslims lost all avenues of employment, were dispossessed of their estates and deprived of the benefits of education. A highly-cultured community turned into a backward and poor people. In their place British-educated Hindus began to occupy positions in governments offices formerly held by the Muslims.

Again, W. W. Hunter admits, that the exclusion of the Muslims was so complete that in the government offices of Calcutta they could not expect a post higher than that of a porter, messenger, filler of inkpots and mender of pens. If this situation had prolonged, it would have done the Muslims an irreparable damage. The British replaced *shariah* by what they termed as the Anglo-Mohammedan Law. English became the official language. These developments had a deep socio-economic and political impact on the people of India, particularly the Muslim community which became more retrogressive in its outlook and shunned western way of life.

Hindu majority adjusted itself with the new socio-economic dynamics and started acquiring the benefits of their numerical majority. By a series of revenue and financial measures, the British smashed the political and social position of the Muslims. In the province of Bombay, the government appointed "Inam Commission" to inquire into the land grants of the Muslim times. The Commission took away 20,000 estates from the Muslims and thus ruined many families and institutions of the community. Muslim society in the decades following the events of 1857 presented a picture of desolation and decay. The Muslim response to this situation also aggravated their plight. They refused to learn English and to associate with the British.

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[38] *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali; Columbia University Press, New York (1967).

The Muslims kept themselves aloof from western education as well as government service. But, their compatriots, the Hindus, did not do so and accepted the new rulers without reservation. They acquired western education, imbibed the new culture and captured positions hitherto filled in by the Muslims. This was a severe drawback for the Muslims. Hindus, on the other hand, were forging ahead in all fields. They formed a new middle class which assumed a leadership role in the new India that was taking shape under British role. In 1878, for example, "there were 3155 Hindus as against 57 Muslims holding graduate and post-graduate degrees.[39] Out of 600 graduates from the universities of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, only 19 were Muslims.

As the ideological divide between the Muslims and the Hindus of India was deepening, strong feelings of nationalism in India, communal conflicts and movements based on religious affinities rather than class or regions caught strength. Some people felt that the very nature of Islam called for a communal Muslim society. Added to this were the memories of power over the Indian subcontinent that the Muslims held on to, especially those in the old centres of Mughal rule. These memories might have made it exceptionally difficult for Muslims to accept the imposition of colonial power and culture.

VIII. IMPACT OF ISLAM IN INDIA

It was in the early thirteenth century that the foundations of the Muslim rule over India were laid with extended boundaries and Delhi as the capital. The economic, political and religious institutions developed by the Muslims bore their unique impression. The law of the State was based on *shariah* and in principle the rulers were bound to enforce it. Any long period of laxity was generally followed by reinforcement of these laws under public pressure. It reflected a Persianised Islam represented by the Turks which dominated the political and social scene in India for centuries. Turko-Persian administrative institutions were introduced which also became the basis of the Delhi Sultanate and later to some degree of the Mughal empire.

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[39] *Indian Muslims:* A Political History, Ram Gopal, Bombay (1959).

Muslims ruled most of the Indian subcontinent with brief intervals for nearly a millennium. Their arrival in the region can be broadly categorized in three distinct phases. The first starting in early eighth century with the Arab conquest of the Sindh region where they entrenched themselves up to Multan in the north with their rule surviving until the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate in the twelfth century which saw an organised movement of conquests and immigration from Central Asia marking the second phase of the Muslim era in the subcontinent.

The third phase involved the Mughal period from 1526 to 1858 representing the zenith of the Muslim rule in India.[40] Because of its location at the western edge of South Asia, Sindh was one of the earliest regions to be influenced by Islam. It was part of the Islamic empires of the Umayyeds and Abbasids. sufi missionaries played a pivotal role in converting millions of native Sindhis to Islam. The Arab occupation of Sindh had a distinct characteristic which differed from the Turko-Persian make-up of the Delhi Sultanate.

The Arabs established military camps in the larger cities keeping the local administration's infrastructure intact. They did not curtail the privileges enjoyed by the Brahmins, and non-Muslims were allowed complete freedom of worship.[41] From the time of the Ghaznavids, Persian more or less replaced Arabic as the official language. The Muslim kingdom of Punjab under Ghaznavids lasting for almost two centuries became the eastern-most centre of Persian culture, and had an important bearing on the subsequent history of India.

The impact of Islam on the South-Asian subcontinent was deep and far-reaching. Its influence on the social and religious life in the whole region was outstanding. "The followers of Islam," writes R. C. Mazumdar, an eminent historian of India, "settled in large numbers, but they did not merge themselves into the Hindu pattern. So, for the first time in Indian history, two distinct but important communities and cultures stood face to face, and India was permanently divided into two powerful units."[42]

Hinduism and Islam stood poles apart in their attitudes to life. Islam as a religion, strongly monotheistic and insisting on the equality of human beings whereas Hinduism showed extreme flexibility towards God, and was founded on a caste system which divided society into privileged and underprivileged. Hindus and Muslims had a different worldview altogether. They did not take the same view of history. Muslim achievements in the political, social and economic fields were generally belittled by the Hindus.[43]

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[40] *A journey towards discovery*, Syed Razi Wasti, Jinnah Rafi Foundation, Lahore (1996).

[41] *ibid.*

[42] *An Advanced History of India*, R. C. Mazumdar; London (1960).

The Muslim culture rooted in the teachings of Islam that developed in the subcontinent over a period of centuries thus created a large new community in this part of the world with its own distinct identity which continues to present a different aspect of human thought and action. This distinctiveness of the two communities was evident in the "encounter" between Hindu and Muslim cultures that began over a thousand years ago, leaving a profound influence on both.

They have met at thousand points, on battlefields and at festivals, around market places and in homes, on spiritual heights and in the lowlands of mundane affairs. They have learnt from each other; their tongues have mixed to produce new and rich languages; in music and poetry, painting and architectures, in styles of dress and cuisine, and in ways of living, they have left their mark on each other. And yet, they have remained distinct and far apart. They have mixed but never fused; they have co-mixed but have never become one. Hindu and Muslim families that have lived in the same neighbourhoods for generations can be distinguished at a glance from one another.[44]

Islam introduced not only a new religion, but a new civilization, a new way of life and new set of values. Islamic traditions of art and literature, of culture and refinement, of social and welfare institution, were established by Muslim rulers throughout the subcontinent. A new language, Urdu, derived mainly from Arabic and Persian vocabulary and adopting indigenous words and idioms, came to be spoken and written by the Muslims and it gained currency among the rest of the Indian population. Apart from religion, Urdu also enabled the Muslim community during the period of its ascendancy to preserve its separate identity in the subcontinent, and is now the national language of Pakistan.

Religion and Sufism

The Mughal rulers were pretty tolerant of other beliefs and hence their reign is deemed fairly secular. Nevertheless, Islam spread far and wide by leaps and bounds in this era, not due to the efforts of the state but mainly because of the sufis and mystics who attracted and inspired the masses with their saintly and humane behaviour. The other significant feature was heterodox movements, which were egged on by the Islamic teachings and intended to reform Hinduism.

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[43] *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Columbia University Press, New York (1967).

[44] *ibid.*

A well-known example of these religious awakenings can be observed in Bhagti movement, one part of it remained within the limits of orthodoxy and produced men like Tulsi Das whose Ramayana has remained the Bible of the Hindu masses where Hindi is spoken. Apart from these movements there were also individuals who rebelled against Hindu religion like Kabir, Dadu and Guru Nanak. Their mode of teachings was rather motivated by that of Muslim saints and poets, not Hinduism.

The spread of Islam in the subcontinent is the story of untiring efforts of numerous saints and sufis who dedicated their lives to the cause of service to humanity. Along with Muslim warriors came Muslim saints and sufis, who propagated Islam in India. While Muslim warriors conquered these parts of the subcontinent by force, the Muslim saints identified themselves with the people, and interpreted Islam to them as a rational approach to better life in this world and hereafter.

The people in the subcontinent were not converted to Islam under any pressure of the armed forces of the conquerors; they accepted Islam voluntarily because of the appeal of the message of Islam as conveyed and preached by Muslim sufis. The most important amongst them was **Sheikh Ali Hajvari**, popularly known as **Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh (990-1077)**. He was a renowned sufi who came to Lahore after the death of Mahmud Ghaznavi in early part of the eleventh century and spent the rest of his life in spreading the message of Allah in Punjab. .

Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh who leads the list of Muslim saints arriving in the subcontinent was a great sufi scholar of his time and had brilliant knowledge of the Quran, tradition, history, jurisprudence and logic etc. that is testified by the treasure trove in his classic book in Persian entitled **'Kashful Mahjub'** which is considered as the first authentic book on sufism. He had great skill in discourses, debates and profoundness of thought. He was of the opinion that no sufi could achieve the highest spiritual state without participating in *shariah*.

During this period, a number of sufi *salasil* started emerging in Islam. They played an important role in propagating the mystic aspect of Islamic teachings. sufi *salasil* which gained prominence in Punjab were Chishtiyah, Suhrawardiyah, Qadiriyah and Naqshbandiyah. Each *silsila* was founded by an eminent spiritual personality of the time who commanded a great respect among the masses. These *salasil* while laying stress on purification of inner self rather than following religious dogmas blindly, served as training centres of spiritual learning.

By the time the Muslim Empire was established at Delhi, sufi fraternities had come into being and the sufi influence was far more powerful than it was in earlier days under the Arabs in Sindh. The two great fraternities that established themselves very early in Muslim India were the Suhrawardiyah and the Chishtiyah. The Suhrawardiyah order was founded by **Sheikh Abu-al-Najib Abd al-Qadir Suhrawardi (1097-1162)** and was introduced into Muslim India by **Sheikh Baha-ud-Din Zakariya (1182-1268)** of Multan.

With Multan as its center the *silsilah* became dominant in the areas that now constitute Pakistan. **Hazrat Khawaja Muin-ud-Din Chishti (1141-1230)** introduced the Chishtiyah *silsilah* in the subcontinent. He settled in Ajmer. Because he established the first sufi *silsilah* in the Indian subcontinent, he is often referred to as Hind-al-Wali. The Chishtiyah order remained the most popular order during the Sultanate period. Khawaja Muin-ud-Din Ajmeri's chief disciple, **Khawaja Qutb-ud-Din Bakhtiyar Kaki,** who lived at Delhi, was held in high esteem by Iltutmush.

Shaikh Farid-ud-Din Ganj-e-Shakar (1173-1265), the most popular saint of Chishtiyah *silsilah* in the twelfth and thirteenth century was pioneer of sufi movement in the Punjab, and inherited a rich religious, mystic and cultural tradition of Islam. He appointed **Sheikh Nizam-ud-Din Auliya (1238-1325)** as his *khalifah*. It was Nizam-ud-Din Auliya who trained a group of sufis for the propagation of Islam in Gujarat, the Deccan and Bengal.

The disciple of Sheikh Baha-ud-Din Zakariya, **Syed Jalal-ud-Din Bukhari,** popularly known as **Mukhdum Jahanian Jahangasht,** was one of the most important saints of the Suhrawardiyah order. He played an important part in the propagation of Islam in Sindh. Shah Jalal came from Turkey and was a great Suhrawardy saint of Bengal. He came to the subcontinent in the reign of Iltutmush. Due to his missionary activities, Islam gained good ground in Sylhet. **Sheikh Ala-ul-Haq and his son Nur Qutb Alam** established new orders after their names in Bengal, and are responsible for large-scale conversions in Sylhet, Bengal.[45]

Sufism, or *tasawwuf* as it is known in the Muslim world, is Islamic mysticism which according to Ibn-e-Khaldun, the fourteenth century Arab historian is "... dedication to worship, total dedication to Allah the most High, disregard for the finery and ornament of the world, abstinence from the pleasure, wealth, and prestige sought by most men, and retiring from others to worship alone." Through the centuries sufis contributed hugely to the spread of Islamic thought and literature beyond Muslim lands. The supreme mission of the sufis was to preach and make the people understand Islam.

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[45] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

Sufism sprang up largely in reaction to the worldliness that infected Islam when its leaders became the powerful and wealthy rulers of multitudes of people and were influenced by foreign cultures. The spread of sufism has been considered a definitive factor in the spread of Islam, and in the creation of integrally Islamic cultures, especially in Africa and Asia. Recent academic work on these topics has focused on the role of sufism in creating and propagating the Islamic culture and in resisting European imperialism in North Africa and South Asia.

Muslim Revivalism in India

In the sixteenth century, during the reign of Akbar, Islam faced overwhelming threats. Akbar had started a series of experiments with Islam, propagating his own religion Deen-i-Ilahi, an amalgamation of Hindu and Muslim beliefs. The Deen-i-Ilahi, as propounded by Akbar, was a mixture of various religions, and combined mysticism, philosophy and nature worship. It recognized no gods or prophets and the emperor was its chief exponent. To believe in revelation was considered as *taqlid* (following authority blindly), fit only for the uneducated and the illiterate.

Akbar's **Infallibility Decree in 1579** and **Deen-i-Ilahi in 1581** were considered to be grave threats to Islam and literally made the orthodox Muslims as outcasts in the affairs of the state. Akbar was actually influenced by the Hindu Bhagti Movement that had started during the Sultanate period. During this period the Muslims in India had become so deficient in the knowledge of Islam that they had more belief in karamat or miracles of the saints than Islamic teachings.

The ulema and theologians of the time had ceased to refer to the Quran and *hadith* in their commentaries, and considered jurisprudence the only religious knowledge. Many sufis, including Qazi Mulla Muhammad of Jaunpur and Qazi Mir Yaqoob of Bengal, condemned Akbar's religious innovations. During the time of Akbar, the Chishtiyah order recovered its ground but its influence waned to some extent after him. The Qadiriyah silsila was introduced in the subcontinent by Nimatullah and Makhdum Muhammad Jilani towards the middle of the century.

Hazrat Mujaddid Alf Sani (1564-1624)

The Naqshbandiya *silsila* rendered great services to counter pantheistic ideas of Akbar, and highlighted meticulous obedience to *shariah* necessary for mystic discipline and knowledge. It was introduced and popularized by Khawaja Baqi Billah and his disciple **Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi** who set upon himself the task of purifying the Muslim society. His aim was to rid Islam of the accretions of Hindu pantheism. He was highly critical of the philosophy of

Wahdat-ul Wujud, against which he gave his philosophy of *Wahdat-ush-Shuhud*. His greatest work on Islamic philosophy was the *Tauheed-i-Shuhudi.*

Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi, the first of the great Muslim reformers in India, commonly known as **Mujaddid Alf Sani** (the reformer of the second millennium), was born in Sarhind (Punjab) on June 26, 1564. He belonged to a devout Muslim family that claimed descent from Hazrat Umar Farooq (RA). His father Sheikh Abdul Ahad was a well-known sufi of his times. Sheikh Ahmed received his basic education at home. His initial instructions in the Holy Quran, *hadith* and theology were rendered in Sirhind and then he was sent to Sialkot where he learnt logic, philosophy and theology, and devoted most of his time to the study of *hadith* and *tafseer*. He worked for some time in Lahore as well.

But the greater part of his life was spent in Sirhind, where he was to become the champion of Islamic revival in India opposing the heterodoxies prevalent in the time of Mughal *emperor* Akbar. He entered into correspondence with Muslim scholars and clerics and laid stress on following the true contours of Islam. To him, mysticism without *shariah* was misleading. He stressed the importance of *namaz* and fasting. Through preaching, discussions and his *maktubat* addressed to important nobles and leaders of religious thought, he spread his message amongst the elite in particular.

As he and his followers also worked in the imperial camp and army, he was soon noticed by Jehangir. Jehangir, unlike his father, was a more orthodox Muslim. But he still insisted on full prostration by all his subjects. Sheikh Ahmad refused to prostrate before him, as a result of which he was imprisoned at Gwalior Fort for two years until the emperor realized his mistake. Jehangir then not only released Sheikh Ahmed, but also recalled him to Agra. Jehangir thereafter retracted all un-Islamic laws implemented by Akbar.

He opposed all plans to bring Islam and Hinduism together on the religious level, knowing that it would loosen the Muslim grip on the sources of imperial strength. It was a mission to counter the concept of "Hindu, wielding the sword of Islam." Because of his letters, and general atmosphere in the country, he contributed to the swing from Akbar's heterodoxy to Aurangzeb's vigorous orthodoxy instead of a return to Babur and Humayun's policy of *laissez-faire*. Iqbal rightly regarded him as the "Spiritual Guardian of the Muslims of the subcontinent" and one whom God had alerted to the great perils inherent in the syncretism of Akbar.

Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi's greatest contribution was undoubtedly the task of countering unorthodox sufism and mystic beliefs. He organized the Naqshbandiya order to reform the society and spread the *shariah* among the people. **Mujaddid Alf Sani** wrote many books, including *Ithba-al-Nubuwwah*. In this pamphlet, he quoted Imam Ghazali justifying the need for prophethood and explaining the inadequacies of human intellect. His other famous works included *Ishat-ul-Nabat* and *Risal-i-Nabuliat*. Through verbal preaching, discussions and his *maktubat* (letters) addressed to important nobles and leaders of religious thought, he spread his message amongst the elite in particular. He continued preaching Islam till the end of his life and passed away in 1624.

Shah Waliullah (1703-1762)

In the eighteenth century, Islam in the subcontinent continued to be faced with menacing problems. Besides the growing threat to the Muslim rule from the rise of two Hindu rebellious groups, namely Marathas and Jats, Muslims themselves were facing a serious identity crisis with increasing sectarian conflict, low moral tone of the society, poor understanding of the Holy Quran and general ignorance of Islam. These were just some of the issues which gave rise to fear that political collapse would be accompanied by religious disintegration.

This did not happen; rather an era of religious regeneration was inaugurated, which was due more than anything else to the activities of one man, **Shah Waliullah** whose reform movement rejuvenated spiritual basis for national cohesion among Indian Muslims. He studied the writings of each school-of-thought to understand their point of view, and then wrote comprehensive volumes about what is fair and just in light of the teachings of Islam. He worked out a system of thought, beliefs, and values, on which all but the extremists could agree.

Shah Waliullah belonged to a religious family. Born in 1703 when the reign of Aurangzeb was nearing its end, he was educated at Madrasa-i-Rahimiyah by his father Shah Abdul Rahim. After finishing his education, he went for pilgrimage and higher studies to Hejaz. At this that, Muslims in India were divided into Hanfia, sufi, Shia, Sunni and Mullah sects. While in Hejaz, he decided to launch a campaign to popularize Islamic values amongst the Muslims and to present Islam in a rational manner.

By the time he returned to Delhi in July 1732, the decline in Mughal fortunes had started. The social, political, economic and religious conditions of the Muslims were very poor. On his return to India, he not only identified the causes for the decline of the Muslims, but also pointed out the remedies. Shah Waliullah believed that the various problems Muslims faced were due to their ignorance about Islam and the Holy Quran. His singular and most important act was his translation of the Holy Quran into simple Persian, the then language of the land, so that people of the subcontinent could understand and follow it.

Shah Waliullah directed his teachings towards reorienting the Muslim society with the concepts o f basic social justice, removing social inequalities, and balancing the iniquitous distribution of wealth. He studied the writings of each school-of-thought to understand their point of view, and then wrote comprehensive volumes about what is fair and just in light of the teachings of Islam. He worked out a system of thought, beliefs, and values, on which all but the extremists could agree. He recommended the application of *ijtihad* against blind *taqlid*, and believed that intellectual revolution was necessary for a political change. He thus provided a spiritual basis for national cohesion.

His activities were not confined to spiritual and intellectual spheres only. He lived in troubled times and witnessed during his lifetime about a dozen rulers occupying the throne of Delhi. He tried to reconcile the basic differences amongst the different sections of the Muslims and considered the government as an essential means and agency for regeneration of the community. Born in an age of decadence and chaos, Shah Waliullah hoped for a world of peace and prosperity. No scholar of mediaeval India had grasped the various aspects of civics as had been done by Shah Waliullah. He considered 'self-consciousness' as a prerequisite of 'political consciousness.'

He also interpreted the Quran and *hadith* according to the context of the times. He established several branches of his school at Delhi for effective dissemination of his ideas. In his book *Hujjat-ullah-il-Balighah*, he pinpointed the causes of chaos and disintegration of Muslim society. These *inter alia* included economic mismanagement manifest in undue pressure on public treasury and heavy taxation on peasants, merchants, and workers with the result that tax evasion was rampant. Shah Waliullah was the only Muslim scholar of mediaeval India who realized the importance of economics in a social and political set-up. In his view, no economic exploitation was to be tolerated in an Islamic state.

He visualized a social order based on economic equality, fraternity and brotherhood which were the principal norms of governance and Islamic practices of social justice followed during the time of the Righteous Caliphs. He advocated the maintenance of economic equilibrium in the society and strongly criticized the accumulation of wealth which leads to all sorts of evils in the world. Endowed with a keen political insight, he observed with deep anguish the breaking up of Muslim power in the subcontinent and wrote open letters to Mughal rulers including the emperor and also to artisans, peasants, workers, soldiers, and Muslim masses in general reminding them all of their obligations to the Muslim State.

He played a vital role in the Indian politics of his times and was greatly instrumental in forging a united Muslim front against the rising Maratha power which was threatening the last vestige of the Muslim rule in northern India. He chose the most capable and disciplined Muslim leaders of his time for combating the Marathas. Among these were Najibuddaula, the leader of the redoubtable Rohillas and Ahmad Shah Abdali, the ruler of the brave Pathans. It was on account of his call that Ahmad Shah Abdali appeared on the field of Panipat in 1761 and put an end to the Marathas dream of dominating the subcontinent.

Shah Waliullah was responsible for awakening in the community the desire to win back its moral fervor and maintain its purity. To rescue a community's conscience, identity, belief and faith from destruction was no small achievement. Even after his death in 1762, his sons and followers carried on his work. Many future Islamic leaders and thinkers were inspired by his example. His own son, Shah Abdul Aziz (1735-1823), translated the Holy Book into Urdu, the language of Muslim masses in India and after his father's death, took over as the teacher of hadith in place of his father and later became one of the great Islamic scholars. Shah Waliullah indeed laid the foundation of Islamic renaissance in the subcontinent and became a source of inspiration for almost all the subsequent social and religious reform movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Syed Ahmed Shaheed Brelvi (1786-1831)

Syed Ahmed Shaheed Brelvi was born in Rai Bareli in 1786. His father died whilst he was still young and in 1806 he moved to Delhi and enrolled in the Madrassa Rahimiyah. For two years he studied under the sons of Shah Waliullah learning the Quran and the *hadith*. He was a direct spiritual descendant of the sufi scholar Shah Waliullah through his disciple Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824). But Syed Ahmad was more a man of action than a scholar, and in 1812 he joined the forces of Nawab Amir Khan of Tonk, a Pathan military leader to take part in *jihad* against the British.

It was during this period that Syed Ahmad learned to use European weaponry. He was soon given command of a group of soldiers but because of his piety he was also made responsible for leading the troops in prayer. By this time, thanks to British manipulations, the Mughal emperors were left with little real power and the Sikhs had become dominant in the Punjab. Syed Ahmad called for armed struggle against both to restore Muslim power. In 1817, Syed Ahmad returned to Delhi where his work became important in trying to restore Islam to its original purity. He selected a particular way on the command of his spiritual guide Shah Abdul Aziz and devoted himself in the preparation of the holy war.

As a man of action Syed Ahmad was an ideal person to act as a leader to work against British power in India and to try to ensure that Muslim were ruled by fellow Muslims. He believed that the freedom of Muslims could only come as a result of armed struggle against the foreign and non-Muslims forces which were oppressing them. Syed Ahmad believed that there was a need to end the evils that had corrupted Islamic society. Consequently, even when he served as an army officer he surrounded himself with men of great piety who were prepared to reject worldly wealth and work for improving the moral and intellectual lives of Muslims.

The British had ensured that the Mughal emperors had little real power and the Sikhs were dominant in the Punjab. Syed Ahmad founded the *jihad* movement, which called for armed struggle to overthrow non-Muslim oppression and restore Muslim power. He believed that once this was done Islam could be rejuvenated to Islamic beliefs which had crept into everyday life. Syed Ahmad believed that the revival of Islam in India and the freedom of Muslims could only come as a result of armed struggle against the foreign and non-Muslim forces which were oppressing them. In 1821, he went to perform Hajj but stayed there for two years where he met with the great thinkers of Islam and got knowledge about the movements of Islam in the world.

On his return from Hejaz in 1823, he was ready to take action, and devoted himself to the religious and social reformation of the Muslims and the preparation of *jihad*. He launched his movement known as "Mujahideen Movement" for the religious and social reformation of the Muslims and toured Punjab and the North West Frontier to enlist men to fight the Sikhs. His travels across India took him through Rajasthan, Sindh and Balochistan, and into Afghanistan where he found that the Afghan troops were suspicious of each other and not always prepared to join him in his *jihad*. At this time the Punjab was under the control of the Sikh regime of Ranjit Singh, who had also extended his authority into the North West Frontier.

The Muslims were suffering under Sikh rule because they were unable to carry out many of their religious practices – even the call to prayer was banned in some places. In the 1820s, the Sikhs of Punjab had conquered Peshawar and other Pakhtun areas and ruled it up to 1849. Syed Ahmed Shaheed Brelvi started *jihad* to eliminate the domination of Sikhs in these areas, and in order to revive Islamic values and traditions in these regions, he toured different areas around Delhi and Punjab, where number of his followers joined him. Shah Ismail Shaheed along with 6,000 followers also joined Syed Ahmed in his *jihad* Movement. In 1826, Syed Ahmed established his headquarters near Peshawar. He defeated the Sikhs first in Akora and then at Hazro.

Syed Ahmad's victories established him as a successful military leader and encouraged other tribes to join the *mujahideen*. Soon his army numbered over 80,000 strong. In 1827, he was unanimously proclaimed as "Amir-ul-Momineen". Islamic laws were enforced in the area which was controlled by Syed Ahmed Shaheed Brelvi. The movement of the holy war was initially very successful but soon conspiracies began against Syed Ahmed. His major problem was that his army consisted from many different communities with different approaches on how to pursue the campaign. The Sikhs took advantage of the situation and fully exploited these differences.

The Sikh emperor Ranjit Singh was able to bribe some of the local chieftains (Sardar Yar Mohammad and his brother Sultan Mohammad Khan) to plot against the *khilafat* of Syed Ahmed. Although Yar Muhammad was later killed in battle against the *mujahideen*, his brother, Sultan Muhammad Khan also waged war against Syed Ahmad. The disloyalty of the tribal leaders disheartened him. This constant campaigning against fellow Muslims was not what Syed Ahmad wanted, so he moved his forces to Balakot, hoping to liberate Kashmir and Hazara. But once again, Syed Ahmad was betrayed when local leaders told the Sikhs of a way to attack him through the mountains.

The Sikhs made a surprise attack on the forces of Syed Armed. The Battle of Balakot (1831) was a fiercely contested one. His forces fought the Sikhs with heroism but because of betrayals from within the local chieftains and disloyalties within his own ranks, an organised uprising occurred in which Syed Ahmed's followers in Peshawar and in neighbouring areas were murdered compelling his forces' retreat into the hills where finally Syed Ahmed and his commander-in-arms Shah Ismail together with 6,000 of *mujahideen* soldiers were killed in Balakot by Sikh Army on May 6, 1831.

It was the first example in Indian history of a movement formed to free the Muslims from the tyranny of non-Muslim or foreign rulers. This movement produced a spirit of survival among Indian Muslims leading to a freedom struggle. The main objectives of the Mujahideen Movement could be summed up as following:

- To preach unity of Allah Almighty.
- To revive the teachings of Islam and prepare the Muslims to live their lives simply according to the teachings of Islam.
- To protect the Muslims against acts and ideas which are contrary to Islamic values.
- To preach *jihad* because it was not possible to get freedom from evil force without armed struggle.

- To protect the Muslims from the worship of other things except Allah.

It was not a movement in order to place a particular leader in power but, instead, to achieve religious and spiritual freedom. This purpose was a uniting force for Muslims. Many of Syed Ahmed's soldiers had been spiritual leaders or teachers. The fact that they were prepared to die for their cause was an inspiration to all Muslims. Syed Ahmad's efforts were an inspiration to all Muslims in defending their religion, their culture and their freedom. His movement is regarded by many historians as the fore-runner of the Pakistan Movement in India. Those Muslims who later campaigned for their own homeland saw Syed Ahmad as an example of a Muslim struggle for the Muslim cause.

Faraizi Movement (1830-1857)

The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed a religious reform movement known as Faraizi Movement in East Bengal. The term Faraizi is derived from *farz* meaning obligatory duties enjoined by Allah. The Faraizis are, therefore, those who aimed at enforcing the obligatory religious duties. The exponent of the movement, Haji Shariatullah (1781-1840), however, interpreted the term in a broader sense to include all religious duties enjoined by the Quran as well as by the *Sunnah* of the Holy Prophet (PBUH).

The founder of this movement was Haji Shariatullah born in 1781 in Faridpur District of Bengal. At this time the condition of the Bengali Muslims in the subcontinent was very miserable. The British policy of distrust and oppression towards the Muslims rendered them economically and educationally crippled; and the oppression of the zamindars made their lives unbearable. On his return after protracted stay of 20 years in Makkah, Haji Shariatullah started his reform movement which basically targeted the most oppressed class of the Muslims.

He asked them to give up un-Islamic customs and practices and to act upon the commandments of the religion or Islamic injunctions called *Faraiz* or duties. Hence, his followers came to be known as Faraizis. He was opposed to superstitious beliefs and practices, and forbade *Tazia* on the occasion of Muharram and singing and dancing at the time of wedding ceremonies.

His movement was also directed against the oppression perpetrated by the *zamindars*. He declared the country *Dar-ul-Harab*, as Eid and Friday prayers could not be offered there. The Faraizi movement infused new life into the lives of the Muslims of Bengal. It wrought great agitation among them, especially the peasants who were imbued with his doctrines. Thus, he sowed the seeds of independence in Bengal. He died in 1840.

His son Muhammad Mohsin, known as **Dudu Mian**, succeeded Haji Shariatullah. Dadhu Mian popularized and strengthened the movement by organizing it in a systematic way. He acquired great influence amongst the Muslim peasants and craftsmen of Bakerganj, Dhaka, Faridpur Mymensingh and Pabna districts. He divided the Faraizi settlement into small units of 300 to 500 families and appointed a *gaon khalifah* over each unit who kept him informed about everything in their jurisdiction.

In organising the Faraizi society, **Dudu Mian** had two objectives in view, viz. (i) protecting the Faraizi peasantry from the oppression of the zamindars and European indigo planters, and (ii) securing social justice for the masses. He vehemently opposed the taxes imposed by the landlords on Muslim peasants, and asked his followers to settle in lands managed by the government. During the revolt of 1857, he was put under arrest for organizing the peasants of Faridpur districts against the British government. He died in 1860.

Mir Nasir Ali, known as **Titu Mir** is another important figure who was moved by the sufferings of the Muslim of Bengal. After returning from Pilgrimage, **Titu Mir** devoted himself to the cause of his country. He made Narkelbaria, a village near Calcutta, the centre of his activities. Many oppressed Muslim peasants gathered round Titu Mir in their resistance against the Hindu landlord, Krishna Deva Raj. Titu Mir was able to defeat Krishna Deva and set up a government.

The British aiding the Hindu landlords sent an army of 100 English soldiers and 300 *sepoys* to Narkelbaria. In 1831, **Titu Mir** died fighting the British forces. The death of Titu Mir did not dishearten his followers. His example rather served as a source of inspiration for them in the years to come.[46]

IX. BRITISH COLONIAL RULE (1858-1947)

The British Indian Empire

Starting with the East India Company, the British had already emerged as the dominant force in South Asia. Their rise to power was gradual extending over a period of nearly one hundred years. By 1845, the British Empire had expanded from Bengal to Sindh, and all that remained free was Punjab which had traditionally been a different ball game altogether. It had been ruled by successive conquerors marching into India through the Khyber Pass.

Forming the western flank of the subcontinent, Punjab remained an area of great strategic importance to all rulers of India.

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[46] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

It was a very large administrative division, centred on Lahore, and included not only the present-day Indian and Pakistani Punjabi regions but also the North West Frontier districts bordering Afghanistan. Much of the region had been the Sikh Empire, ruled by Ranjit Singh since 1799 until his death in 1839. The kingdom had then fallen into disorder, with court factions and the Khalsa (the Sikh army) contending for power at the Lahore Durbar (court). After two Anglo-Sikh Wars, the entire region was annexed by the East India Company in 1849.

The Koh-i-Noor diamond that Ranjit Singh had worn in his headdress now became a part of the crown jewels at Westminster. Subsequently, the East India Company effected far-reaching changes in the area. One of these was the change in the court language. Even during the Sikh rule, the court language had remained Persian but under British rule, it was changed, first to Urdu, and then to English. The western education system was introduced and knowledge of English made compulsory. These changes adversely affected the Muslims who being in a shock of having lost out to the British were not ready yet to grasp the new configuration of forces.

When the British first appeared on the scene, they saw that it would be to their advantage to heighten these Hindu-Muslim contrasts. There was even an attempt to re-write Indian history, so as to show Muslims as oppressors and persecutors in order that the Hindus, who formed the bulk of India's population, should have a more lively appreciation of the blessings of British rule. [47] For a century and a half, the English had been humble petitioners to the Mughal Emperors and their viceroys. But as the Mughal Empire started declining, the British took no time in changing their role.

Events turned in their favour about the middle of the eighteenth century, and for the next hundred years they were engaged in exploiting and undermining the empire of their erstwhile patrons. In this undertaking, they employed all the weapons of diplomacy, force, and bluff, which they had used with equal advantage in their trade with India. The Hindus, with whom they had long been connected through trade, were their natural allies in this struggle against the Muslims, and when they finally won in 1857, the English used their power to crush the Muslims still further.

The struggle for freedom which led to the uprising of 1857 ended in disaster for Muslims. The Mughal Empire was extinguished, and the British government assumed sovereignty over the lands of the British East India Company. In November 1858, the Company was abolished and the British government took direct control of India. The British control over the subcontinent grew in the next 50 years and culminated in the British Raj. The governor-general of India gained a new title (Viceroy of India).

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[47] *The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan*, S. M. Ikram and Percival Spear; OUP (1955).

In 1877, Queen Victoria took the title of Empress of India on the advice of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli. Her Indian empire's realm continued to expand, until Hunza, the remote kingdom bordering China, fell into British hands in 1891, bringing the expansion to its zenith. The British delineated the frontier separating British India from Afghanistan in 1893. The resulting **Durand Line** cut straight through the tribal area of the Pathans. The British left the tribal areas to govern themselves under the supervision of British political agents. [48]

The British thus became masters of India, where for nearly a millennium Muslims had ruled. The colonial administration embarked on a programme of reform, trying to integrate Indian higher castes and rulers into the government and abolishing attempts at Westernization. The Viceroy stopped land grabs, decreed religious tolerance and admitted Indians into civil service, albeit mainly as subordinates.

In looking for the causes of the Mutiny the authorities alighted on two things: religion and the economy. On religion it was felt that there had been too much interference with indigenous traditions, both Hindu and Muslim. On the economy, it was now believed that the previous attempts by the Company to introduce free market competition had undermined traditional power structures and bonds of loyalty placing the peasantry at the mercy of merchants and moneylenders.

In consequence, though theoretically the new British Raj was constructed in part around a conservative agenda, based on preservation of tradition and hierarchy but in actual effect, the British rulers characterised the outbreak as an act of treachery against themselves and called it the 'Mutiny'. It continued to be so described throughout the British rule. The Victorian model of administration in British India became the standard reference point for law, order, and probity in areas that are now contemporary Pakistan. At the apex of the administration stood the governor-general, almost always a British peer.

The governor-general held supreme legislative and executive powers and was responsible directly to the secretary of state for India, a member of the British cabinet.

British India was divided into provinces (*subas*) for administrative purposes, each headed, depending on size and importance, by a governor or lieutenant governor. Provinces were divided into divisions, and these in turn were divided into districts (*zilla*), the basic administrative units, encompassing substantial territory and population. In many cases, the provinces and districts followed the lines of those created by the Mughals.

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[48] *A country study*, Pakistan; US Library of Congress, 1994.

The district officer was the linchpin of the system. The officer was revenue collector as well as dispenser of justice and was called district collector, district magistrate, and, in some areas, deputy commissioner (the DC) with equal validity. District officers were usually drawn from the prestigious meritocracy, the Indian Civil Service. Recruitment to the Indian Civil Service was competitive, based on examination of young men with a British classical education.

Exclusively British at its beginning, the Indian Civil Service was forced to open its doors to limited number of successful Indian candidates. After 1871 district boards and municipal committees were established to assist the district officers in their administrative functions. Thus, elective politics, in however limited a form, was introduced to the subcontinent. The governor-general was also known as the viceroy and crown representative when dealing with Indian princes.

Relations between the British crown and Indian princes were set out in an elusive doctrine of "paramountcy." The princes promised loyalty and surrendered all rights to conduct foreign or defence policy; the crown promised non-interference in internal affairs (except in cases of gross maladministration or injustice) and protection from external and internal enemies.

The British Raj was socially and politically conservative, but it brought profound economic change to the subcontinent. For strategic, administrative, and commercial reasons, the British developed transportation and communications including a vast road and railway system and kept them in good repair. Coal mines were opened in Bihar and Bengal, and irrigation canals were laid out in the Yamuna (also seen as Jumna), Ganges, and Indus Valley which was to become the largest irrigated area in the world.

The developmental changes brought about by the British were the best thing they did for the people of the subcontinent. The expansion of a vast irrigation network in Punjab led to the development of canal colonies, settled mainly by Sikhs and Muslims, and the designation of Punjab as the granary of India. Law and order guaranteed a high rate of return on British, and later Indian, investment in these enterprises. Unfortunately, the native successors after the independence, at least in Pakistan, have failed to preserve and maintain the infrastructures left behind by the British. The roads, railway system, bridges, and canals have all been suffering worst neglect.

On a political level it was also felt that the previous lack of consultation between rulers and ruled had been yet another significant factor in contributing to the uprising. In consequence, Indians were drawn into government at a local level. But this policy turned out to be blatantly discriminatory in favour of the Hindus as was manifest in the support the British gave them in their political awakening and mobilization in the late 1880s and beyond.

Heyday of the Empire

In the second half of the nineteenth century, both the direct administration of India by the British crown and the technological change ushered in by the industrial revolution, had the effect of closely intertwining the economies of India and Great Britain.[49] In fact, many of the major changes in transport and communications (that are typically associated with Crown Rule of India) had already begun before the Mutiny. Since Dalhousie had embraced the technological change then rampant in Great Britain, India too saw rapid development of all those technologies.

Railways, roads, canals, and bridges were rapidly built in India and telegraph links equally rapidly established in order that raw materials, such as cotton, from India's hinterland could be transported more efficiently to ports, such as Bombay, for subsequent export to England.[50] Likewise, finished goods from England were transported back, just as efficiently, for sale in the burgeoning Indian markets. However, unlike Britain itself, where the market risks for the infrastructure development were borne by private investors, in India, it was the taxpayers—primarily farmers and farm-labourers—who endured the risks, which, in the end, amounted to £50 million.[51]

In spite of these costs, very little skilled employment was created for Indians. By 1920, with the fourth largest railway network in the world and a history of 60 years of its construction, only ten per cent of the "superior posts" in the Indian Railways were held by Indians. The rush of technology was also changing the agricultural economy in India: by the last decade of the nineteenth century, a large fraction of some raw materials—not only cotton, but also some food-grains—were being exported to faraway markets.[52]

Consequently, many small farmers, dependent on the whims of those markets, lost land, animals, and equipment to money-lenders. More tellingly, the latter half of the nineteenth century also saw an increase in the number of large-scale famines in India. Although famines were not new to the subcontinent, these were particularly severe, with tens of millions dying, and with many critics, both British and Indian, laying the blame at the doorsteps of the lumbering colonial administrations. [53]

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[49] *A History of India*, Burton Stein, Oxford University Press (2001).

[50] *India Movement for Freedom:* Philip Oldenburg, Columbia University (2007).

[51] *A History of India*, Burton Stein, Oxford University Press (2001).

[52] *ibid.*

Although the Great Uprising of 1857 had shaken the British enterprise in India, it hadn't derailed it. Until 1857, the British, especially under Lord Dalhousie (1812-1860), had been hurriedly building an India which they envisaged to be on par with Britain itself in the quality and strength of its economic and social institutions. After the rebellion, the British became more circumspect. Much thought was devoted to the causes of the rebellion, and from it three main lessons were drawn.

At a more practical level, it was felt that there needed to be more communication and camaraderie between the British and Indians; not just between British army officers and their Indian staff, but in civilian life as well. The Indian army was completely reorganized: units composed of the Muslims and Brahmins of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, who had formed the core of the rebellion, were disbanded. New regiments, like the Sikhs and Balochis, composed of Indians who, in British estimation, had demonstrated steadfastness, were formed. From then on, the Indian army was to remain unchanged in its organization until 1947.

It was also felt that both the princes and the large land-holders, by not joining the rebellion, had proved to be, in Lord Canning's words, "breakwaters in a storm." They too were rewarded in the new British Raj, by being officially recognized in the treaties each state now signed with the Crown. At the same time, it was felt that the peasants, for whose benefit the large land reforms of the United Provinces had been undertaken, had shown disloyalty, by, in many cases, fighting for their former landlords against the British. Consequently, no more land reforms were implemented for the next 90 years: Bengal and Bihar were to remain the realms of large land holdings (unlike the Punjab and UP).

Lastly, the British felt disenchanted with Indian reaction to social change. Until the rebellion, they had enthusiastically pushed through social reform, like the ban on *sati* by Lord William Bentinck. It was now felt that traditions and customs in India were too strong and too rigid to be changed easily; consequently, no more British social interventions were made, especially in matters dealing with religion, even when the British felt very strongly about the issue (as in the instance of the remarriage of Hindu child widows).

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[53] *Modern South Asia:* History, Culture, Political Economy, Bose & Jalal, London-New York (2003).

Indian Independence Movement

The term 'Indian Independence Movement' encompasses a wide range of areas like political organisations, philosophies and movements which had the common aim to ending the company rule (East India Company) , and then British imperial authority, in parts of South Asia. The independence movement saw various national and regional campaigns, agitations and efforts, some non-violent and others not so.

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Rammohan Roy introduced modern education into India. Swami Vivekananda was the chief architect who profoundly projected the rich culture of India to the west at the end of nineteenth century. The first organised militant movements were in Bengal, but they later took to the political stage in the form of a mainstream movement in the then newly formed Indian National Congress (INC).

Inspired by A. O. Hume, a retired British civil servant, 73 Indian delegates met in Bombay in 1885 and founded the Indian National Congress. They were mostly members of the upwardly mobile and successful western-educated provincial elites, engaged in professions such as law, teaching and journalism. At its inception, the Congress had no well-defined ideology and commanded few of the resources essential to a political organization.

Instead, it functioned more as a debating society that met annually to express its loyalty to the British Raj and passed numerous resolutions on less controversial issues such as civil rights or opportunities in government (especially in the civil service). These resolutions were submitted to the Viceroy's government and occasionally to the British Parliament, but the Congress's early gains were meagre. Despite its claim to represent all India, the Congress voiced the interests of urban Hindu elites; the number of participants from other social and economic backgrounds remained negligible.

The last years of the nineteenth century saw a radical sensibility emerge among some Indian Intellectuals. This position burst onto the national all-India scene in 1905 with the **Swadeshi Movement** - the term is usually rendered as "self-reliance" or "self-sufficiency". The early part of the twentieth century saw a more radical approach towards political independence proposed by leaders such as the Lal-Bal-Pal and Aurobindo Ghosh.

The **Lal-Bal-Pal** (Lala Lajpat Rai, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Bipin Chandra Pal) were an assertive nationalist triumvirate who advocated the Swadeshi movement involving the boycott of all imported items and the use of Indian-made goods in 1907. They also mobilized Indians across the country against the Bengal partition, and the demonstrations, strikes and boycotts of English goods that began in Bengal soon spread to other regions in a broader protest against the Raj.

The last stages of the freedom struggle from the 1920s onwards saw Congress adopt Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's policy of non-violence and civil resistance, Muhammad Ali Jinnah's constitutional struggle for the rights of minorities in India, and several other campaigns. Legendary figures such as Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose later came to adopt a militant approach to the movement, while others like Swami Sahajanand Saraswati wanted both political and economic freedom for India's peasants and toiling masses. Poets including Rabindranath Tagore used literature, poetry and speech as a tool for political awareness.

The Indian independence movement was a mass-based movement that encompassed various sections of society. It also underwent a process of constant ideological evolution. Although the basic ideology of the movement was anti-colonial, it was supported by a vision of independent capitalist economic development coupled with a secular, democratic, republican, and civil-libertarian political structure. After the 1930s, the movement took on a strong socialist orientation, due to the increasing influence of left-wing elements in the INC as well as the rise and growth of the Communist Party of India.

The work of these various movements led ultimately to the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which created the independent dominions of India and Pakistan. India remained a Dominion of the Crown until January 26, 1950, when the Constitution of India came into force, establishing the Republic of India; Pakistan was a dominion until 1956 when it adopted its first Constitution and became a republic.

Muslim Political Awakening

The failure of the 1857 War of Independence had disastrous consequences for the Muslims as the British placed all the responsibility for this event on them. Determined to stop such a recurrence in future, the British followed deliberately a repressive policy against the Muslims. Properties and estates of those even remotely associated with the freedom fighters were confiscated and conscious efforts were made to close all avenues of honest living for them.

The Muslim response to this situation also aggravated their plight. Their religious leaders, who had been quite active, withdrew from the mainstream of the community life and devoted themselves exclusively to imparting religious education. Although the religious academies, especially those of Deoband, Farangi Mahal and Rai Bareilly, established by the ulema, did help the Muslims to preserve their identity, the training provided in these institutions hardly equipped them for the new challenges in India's politics.

The Muslims kept themselves aloof from western education as well as government service whereas their compatriots, the Hindus, did not do so and accepted the new rulers without reservation. They acquired western education, imbibed the new culture and captured positions hitherto filled in by the Muslims. If this situation had prolonged, it would have caused the Muslims an irreparable damage.

The man to realise the impending peril was Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), a witness to the tragic events of 1857. He exerted his utmost to harmonize British-Muslim relations. His assessment was that the Muslims' safety lay in the acquisition of western education and knowledge. He took several positive steps to achieve this objective. He founded a college at Aligarh to impart education on western lines. Of equal importance was the Anglo-Muhammadan Educational Conference, which he sponsored in 1886, to provide an intellectual forum to the Muslims for the dissemination of views in support of western education and social reform.

Similar were the objectives of the Muhammadan Literary Society, founded by Nawab Abdul Latif (1828-93), active in Bengal. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's efforts transformed into a movement, known as the Aligarh Movement, and it left its imprint on the Muslims of every part of the South-Asian subcontinent. Under its inspiration, societies were founded throughout the subcontinent which established educational institutions for imparting education to the Muslims.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was averse to the idea of participation by the Muslims in any organized political activity which, he feared, might revive British hostility towards them. He also disliked Hindu-Muslim collaboration in any joint venture. His disillusionment in this regard stemmed basically from the Urdu-Hindi controversy of the late 1860s when the Hindu enthusiasts vehemently championed the cause of Hindi to replace Urdu. He, therefore, opposed the Indian National Congress when it was founded in 1885 and advised the Muslims to abstain from its activities.

His contemporary and a great scholar of Islam, Syed Ameer Ali (1849-1928), shared his views about the Congress, but, he was not opposed to Muslims organizing themselves politically. In fact, he organized the first significant political body of the Muslims, the Central National Muhammadan Association. Although, its membership was limited, it had more than 50 branches in different parts of the subcontinent and it accomplished some solid work for the educational and political advancement of the Muslims. But, its activities waned towards the end of the nineteenth century.

Aligarh Movement (1858-1898)

The War of Independence, 1857 ended in disaster for the Muslims. The British chose to believe that the Muslims were responsible for the anti-British uprising; therefore they made them the subject of ruthless punishments and merciless vengeance. The British had always looked upon the Muslims as their adversaries because they had ousted them from power. With the events of 1857, this feeling was intensified and every attempt was made to ruin and suppress the Muslims forever. Their efforts resulted in the liquidation of the Mughal rule and the subcontinent came directly under the British crown.

After dislodging the Muslim rulers from the throne, the new rulers, the British, implemented a new educational policy with drastic changes. The policy banned Arabic, Persian and religious education in schools and made English not only the medium of instruction but also the official language. This spawned a negative attitude amongst the Muslims towards everything modern and western, and a disinclination to make use of the opportunities available under the new regime. This tendency, had it continued for long, would have proven disastrous for the Muslim community.

Seeing this atmosphere of despair and despondency, **Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898)** launched his attempts to revive the spirit of progress within the Muslim community of India. He was convinced that the Muslims in their attempt to regenerate themselves, had failed to realize the fact that mankind had entered a very important phase of its existence, i.e. an era of science and learning. He knew that the realization of the very fact was the source of progress and prosperity for the British. Therefore, modern education became the pivot of his movement for regeneration of the Indian Muslims. He tried to transform the Muslim outlook from a medieval one to a modern one.[54]

Sir Syed's first and foremost objective was to acquaint the British with the Indian mind; his next goal was to open the minds of his countrymen to European literature, science and technology. Therefore, in order to attain these goals, Sir Syed launched the **Aligarh Movement** of which Aligarh was the centre. He had two immediate objectives in mind: to remove the state of misunderstanding and tension between the Muslims and the new British government, and to induce them to go after the opportunities available under the new regime without deviating in any way from the fundamentals of their faith.

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[54] *A Journey Towards Discovery*, Syed Razi Wasti, Jinnah Rafi foundation, Lahore (1996).

Keeping education and social reform as the two planks of his programme, he devoted his **Aligarh Movement** to the realisation of the following objectives:

1. To create an atmosphere of mutual understanding between the British government and the Muslims.
2. To persuade Muslims to learn English education.
3. To persuade Muslims to abstain from politics of agitation.
4. To produce an intellectual class from amongst the Muslim community.

In 1869, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan accompanied his son, Sayyid Mahmud, to England. En route, he was impressed by the industrial, cultural and economic progress of the West, and was overawed by what he came across in England. During his visit to the University of Cambridge, he was struck not only with the quality and variety of formal instruction imparted to scholars but also with the valuable training given them in the art of 'civilised' living.

He came back with a firm resolve not only to uproot the social evils prevalent among Indian Muslims and to disseminate 'European literature and sciences' among them but also to break down the social barriers that separated them from their rulers. He took several positive steps to achieve this objective. It is remarkable that being himself uneducated in English, he became the torch-bearer of English education in Muslim India.

In 1875, he founded an educational institution called **Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College** (M.A.O. College) at Aligarh on the pattern of English public school system to impart education on western lines. It was finally converted into the **Aligarh Muslim University** in 1920. Its objective was to educate Muslim students by emphasizing the compatibility of Islam with modern western knowledge. The diversity among India's Muslims, however, made it impossible to bring about uniform cultural and intellectual regeneration.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's **Aligarh Movement** left its imprint on the Muslims of every part of the South Asian subcontinent. Under its inspiration, societies were founded throughout the subcontinent which established educational institutions for imparting education to the Muslims. Of equal importance was the **Anglo-Mohammadan Educational Conference,** which he sponsored in 1886, to provide an intellectual forum to the Muslims for the dissemination of views in support of western education and social reform.

This Conference met every year to take stock of the educational problems of the Muslims and to persuade them to get modern education and abstain from politics. It later became the political mouthpiece of the Indian Muslims and was the forerunner of the

Muslim League. Syed Ahmad Khan's **Aligarh Movement** therefore played a significant role in bringing about an intellectual revolution among the Indian Muslims, and succeeded in achieving its major objectives, i.e. educational progress and social reform.[55]

Tied to all the movements of Muslim revival was the opposition to assimilation and submergence in Hindu society. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's "Aligarh Movement" was, in a way, the starting point for Muslim political awakening in India which led to their struggle towards a separate Muslim homeland. It is no exaggeration to admit that the story of Muslim politics in the latter half of the nineteenth century is woven round the personality of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. [56]

Sir Syed had very early realised that the British were gradually introducing democratic institutions in India, and in order to understand these, a thorough grounding in western education was essential. He opposed Muslim participation in any political activity as he knew that they were educationally backward and would become a politically ineffective community. He even refused to join Syed Ameer Ali's (1849-1928) Central National Mohammadan Association in 1877 as he thought it had political leanings.[57] His assessment was that the Muslims' safety lay in the acquisition of western education and knowledge.

When the Congress was established, he advised the Muslims not to join it and instead devote themselves to seeking an English education. With a view to engaging them in some meaningful activity, he founded the Mohammadan Educational Conference. He did not like the Congress demand for an electoral system in India as this would perpetuate Muslim exclusion from the government. It was from this platform that Syed Ahmad Khan strongly advised the Muslims against joining the Hindu-dominated Congress. He was averse to the idea of participation by the Muslims in any organized political activity which, he feared, might revive British hostility towards them.

Sir Syed disliked Hindu Muslim collabouration in any joint venture. His disillusionment in this regard stemmed basically from the Urdu-Hindi controversy of the late 1860s when the Hindu enthusiasts vehemently championed the cause of Hindi to replace Urdu. He, therefore, opposed the Indian National Congress when it was founded in 1885 and advised the Muslims to abstain from its activities. He was in favour of reserved seats for Muslims and also promoted the idea that Hindus and Muslims are two distinct nations.

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[55] *Muslim Separatism in India*, Dr. Abdul Hamid, Oxford University Press.

[56] *ibid.*

[57] *ibid.*

This idea led to the Two-Nation Theory. He was the first person in the Imperial Legislative Assembly to have openly opposed the introduction of the electoral system and asserted that the Muslims were a separate "nation." Besides his prominent role in the educational uplift of the Muslims, Syed Ahmad Khan's writings played an important role in popularizing the ideals for which the Aligarh Movement stood.

His essay on "The Causes of Indian Revolt in 1858", and other writings such as "Loyal Mohammedans of India", *Tabyin-ul-Kalam*, and "A Series of Essays on the Life of Muhammad and Subjects Subsidiary Therein" helped to create cordial relations between the British government and the Indian Muslims. He started a monthly journal called the *Tehzib al-Akhlaq*. Its object was to bring home to the Muslims the need for liberalizing their religious thought and turning to western education in order to regain their former prosperity.[58] Fortunately, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was able to attract into his orbit a number of sincere friends who shared his views and helped him.

Among them were well-known figures like Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk, Hali, Shibli, Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, Chiragh Ali, Mohammad Hayat, and Zakaullah. Above all, his gifted son Syed Mahmud, a renowned scholar, jurist and educationist, was a great source of help to him. Syed Ahmad also succeeded in enlisting the services of a number of distinguished English professors like Beck, Morison, Raleigh and Arnold who gave their best in building up the Aligarh College into a first-rate institution.[59] His philosophy guided the creation of the All India Muslim League in 1906, as a political party separate from the Congress.

Sir Syed's ideas inspired both the liberal, pro-British politicians of the Muslim League and the religious ideologues of the Khilafat struggle. Sir Syed's patronage of Urdu led to its widespread use amongst Indian Muslim communities and following the partition of India its adoption as the official language of Pakistan, even though Bengali and Punjabi were more prevalent at the time. Sir Syed died on March 27, 1898. He was buried besides Sir Syed Masjid inside the campus of the Aligarh University. In the 1940s, the student body of Aligarh committed itself to the establishment of Pakistan and contributed in large measure to the activities of the Muslim League.

Indian National Congress (1885)

The nineteenth century marked the beginning of a gradual phase of political awakening between the both Hindu and Muslim communities of India. Some of those developments included administrative measures and political reforms with different impact on each community. Events like the passage of the Vernacular Press Act, 1878 and the Ilbert Bill of 1882, as well as the reduction of the age limit for the Civil Services exams in 1876 resulted in a wave of opposition from the middle class Indians. Consequently, some of them came together and formed a number of small political parties that came out in the streets for protests and rallies.

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[58] *Muslim Separatism in India*, Dr. Abdul Hamid, Oxford University Press

[59] *ibid*

The British foresaw the situation resulting in another rebellion on the pattern of the War of Independence of 1857. To avoid such a situation, the British decided to provide an outlet to the local people where they could discuss their political problems. In order to achieve this goal, **Allan Octavian Hume**, a retired British civil servant, had a series of meetings with **Lord Dufferin**, the Viceroy. He also visited England and met people like John Bright, Sir James Caird, Lord Ripon and some members of the British Parliament. Hume also had the support of a large number of Englishmen in India, including Sir William Wedderbun, George Yule and Charles Bradlaugh.

On his return from Britain, Hume consulted the local Indian leaders and started working towards the establishment of an Indian political organization. He invited the convention of the Indian National Union, an organization he had already formed in 1884, to Bombay in December 1885. Thus, the **Indian National Congress (INC)** was formed with British blessings. **Lord Dufferin** saw the formation of this "political association" as a convenient "safety valve" [60] against the rising tensions amongst educated Indians who had begun to grumble about the injustices of their colonial rulers. Educated Indian, particularly Bengali Hindu, had been fast becoming politically conscious.

The Congress which held its first session from December, 28-31, 1885 was attended by 72 delegates, most of whom were lawyers, educationalists and journalists. This first session of Congress was presided over by Womesh Chandra Banerjee who was also elected as the first president of the organization. The Hindus had surpassed the Muslims in the field of education, and it was natural that they should have been the first to join the Congress in large numbers. Only two Muslims attended its first session. A majority of them remained aloof from it.

Before the formation of this body, several other associations had been formed by reformers and thinkers focusing on local affairs or with provincial or local affiliations. But none had any political agenda or aspirations on an all-India basis. With the spread of western education and various social and religious reform movements, a class of people with high ambitions was coming forward, but there was no channel through which their concerns could be brought to the attention of the government.

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[60] *Allan Octavian Hume*, Sir William Wedderburn, London, (1913).

The Congress grew in time to be the most powerful political organization in India. It provided them a forum in which they would meet yearly and guide the government in what respects the administration was defective and how it could be improved." [61] To begin with, Congress acted as a 'Kings Party'. Its early aims and objectives were:

1. To seek the cooperation of all the Indians in its efforts.
2. To eradicate the concepts of race, creed and provincial prejudices and try to form national unity.
3. To discuss and solve the social problems of the country.
4. To request the government, give greater share to the locals in administrative affairs.

As time went by, the Congress changed its stance and apparently became the biggest opposition to the British government. Although the All-India National Congress was founded by a retired British civil servant and had the blessings of the then viceroy, certain prior events had led to its formation. Briefly these were: the educated classes' opposition to Lord Lytton's administration (1876-1880) because of several measures adopted by the government, i.e. reduction of the age limit for the Indian Civil Service examination, the financial burden imposed on India because of the Second Afghan War ((1878-1879), and the Indian Arms Act, 1878 and the Vernacular Press Act.

Members of the Congress belonged to an elite group and met regularly in different places and passed resolutions, copies of which were sent to the Secretary of State for India and Government of India. As a result of this incessant campaign, the government seemed to be ready to introduce political reforms to satisfy the moderate section of the Congress. In 1905, the success of the Liberal Party in Britain's elections and the appointment of **John Morley** (1839-1905) as Secretary of Sates raised the hopes of Congress leaders, especially **G. K. Gokhale** (1866-1915) and **S. N. Bannerjee** (1848-1925). John Morley did not disappoint them, and announced the continuation of the electoral system introduced in India in 1892.

By 1900, although the Congress had emerged as an all-India political organisation, its achievement was undermined by its singular failure to attract Muslims, who felt that their representation in government service was inadequate. Muslims primarily opposed the creation of Congress and refused to participate in its activities.

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[61] *History of the Indian National Congress*, B. Pattabhai Sitaramayyah, Bombay, (1946).

Out of the 72 delegates who attended the opening session of the Congress, only two were Muslims. Muslim leaders had already expressed their concern over their inadequate representation in elected bodies. John Morley's statement further heightened their concerns.[62]

The nationalistic sentiments among Congress members led to the movement to be represented in the bodies of government, to have a say in the legislation and administration of India. Congressmen saw themselves as loyalists, but wanted an active role in governing their own country, albeit as part of the Empire. This trend was personified by Dadabhai Naoroji, a Parsee from Bombay who was elected president of Indian National Congress in 1886 and later went as far as contesting successfully an election to the British House of Commons, becoming its first Indian member.

Furthermore, the Congress was a movement dominated by mostly educated Bengali Hindus which meant that they virtually ruled over all others; thus if the movement succeeded, the Hindu majority would rule over the Muslim minority. Their own lack of education was not the only factor that kept the Muslims away from the Congress; there were other factors too. Ostensibly, the Congress also wore an anti-British garb. For Muslims, there were reasons to be cautious in associating themselves with any such movement.

Sir Syed thought the Congress movement was seditious and advised the Muslims to keep away from the Congress. He had earlier turned down the INC's invitation to attend its opening session in Bombay. He predicted that the party would eventually become a Hindu party and would only look after the interests of the Hindus. Syed Ameer Ali, another important Muslim figure of the era, also refused to join the Indian National Congress.

Sir Syed who had boldly criticised the government's policy of suspicion and apathy towards the Muslims for their responsibility in the events of 1857 was the most prominent Muslim leader at that time.[63] After watching the activities of the Congress for some time, he concluded that the bureaucracy had not forgotten the events of 1857 and that Muslims should keep away from the Congress. Anti-Muslim campaign by Hindu reformers in the form of religious conversions, anti-cow slaughter campaign, and the preservation of Urdu in Arabic script also deepened the Muslim concerns of minority status and denial of rights if the Congress alone were to represent the people of India.

In 1907, the Congress was split into two factions. The *moderates* led by leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale

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[62] *A Journey Towards Discovery*, Syed Razi Wasti, Jinnah Rafi Foundation, Lahore (1996).

[63] *ibid.*

(1866-1915) wanted reform within the framework of British rule. The *radicals* led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) on the other hand advocated civil agitation and direct revolution to overthrow the British Empire and the abandonment of all things British. Gokhale criticized Tilak for encouraging acts of violence and disorder. Tilak considered 'Swaraj' as the natural and only way to protect the Indian economy from British exploitation and their biased and discriminatory policies. He was backed by rising public leaders like Bipin Chandra Pal and Lala Lajpat Rai, who held the same point of view.

Under them, India's three major states – Maharashtra, Bengal and Punjab region shaped the demand of the people and India's nationalism. But the Congress of 1906 did not have public membership and Tilak and his supporters were forced to leave the party. But with Tilak's arrest, all hopes for an Indian offensive were stalled. The Congress lost credit with the people, while Muslims were alarmed with the rise of Tilak's Hindu nationalism, and formed the All India Muslim League in 1906. Lajpat Rai's public run for the Congress presidency in 1907 was to split the Congress for almost a decade until the 1916 Lucknow Pact.

The divided Congress re-united in the pivotal Lucknow session in 1916, with Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Gopal Krishna Gokhale adorning the stage together once again. Tilak had considerably moderated his views, and now favoured political dialogue with the British. He, along with the young Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Mrs. Annie Besant launched the Home Rule Movement to put forth Indian demands for *Home Rule* – Indian participation in the affairs of their own country – a precursor to *Swaraj*.

Rise of Indian Nationalsim (1885-1905)

By the end of the nineteenth century, several nationalist movements had started in India.

Hinduism developed a large number of religious revivalist movements, partly inspired by the European romanticism, nationalism, and esotericism popular at the time while conversely and contemporaneously India also had a similar effect on European culture with Orientalism finding a mythical appeal in Western societies. Notable among these Hindu revivalist reform movements were Brahmo Samaj, a social and religious movement founded in Kolkata in 1828 by Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Arya Samaj, a Hindu reform movement founded by Swami Dayanand Saraswati in 1875.

As part of its campaign, the **Arya Samaj** also started Shuddhi movement in early twentieth century to bring back to Hinduism people converted to Islam and Christianity, set up schools and missionary organisations, and extended its activities outside India. **Shuddhi** had a social reform agenda behind its belligerent rationale and was aimed at abolishing the practice of untouchability by converting outcasts from other religions to Hinduism and integrating them into the mainstream community by elevating their position, and instilling self-confidence and self-determination in them.

The socio-political movement, derived from ancient rite of ***shuddhikaran*** or purification also involved ***Sangathan*** representing consolidation aspect of Hinduism in north India, especially Punjab in early 1900s, though it gradually spread across India. The movement strove to reduce the conversions of Hindus to Islam and Christianity, which were underway at the time. The radical Hindu revivalists included persons like **Bal Gangadhar Tilak** who attempted to mobilize Indians by appealing to an explicitly Hindu political identity, displayed, for example, in the annual public Ganapati festivals that he inaugurated in western India.

Tilak's extremist ally was **Punjab's** Lala Lajpat Rai, who was also active in the Hindu reform movement Arya Samaj as well as in Cow Protection Societies which sponsored agitation against the killing of cows that led to anti-Muslim riots in the United Provinces. The movement gained momentum with the support from Arya Samaj and its founding father Swami Dayananda Saraswati. He and his followers travelled across India which led to the establishment of cow protection societies in various regions of India starting at 1882.

In 1893, during the peak of this movement and immediately after an order from a British magistrate asking Muslims to register if they wanted to sacrifice, violence broke out in different parts of India. The movement antagonised Muslims who saw it as a Hindu tool for their oppression. Meanwhile, Hindu Maha Sabha established in 1900 as a non political party motivated by the Shuddhi and Sangathan movements soon got involved in politics taking anti-Muslim stance and declaring them as outsiders with no roots in India.

Its message to the Muslims in India was loud and clear: "If you want to leave India, leave but if you want to live in India, you must accept Hindumat." Thus, the beginning of the twentieth century saw a line being drawn making it impossible for Hindus and Muslims to live together in India. The Arya Shuddhi campaign provoked Muslim leaders and groups to respond, and this took the form of various Tabligh or Islamic missionary initiatives intended to counter the Arya Samaj's conversion drive and, going further, to attempt to spread Islam among non-Muslims as well.

The aggressive Hinduism preached by the Arya Samaj was not political in its conception. That it had been strengthened by political considerations cannot, however, be denied. It was only natural that the Muslims were exasperated at this change in the attitude of the orthodox Hindus, because it opened an entirely new chapter in

Indian history. Jinnah's Hindu-Muslim unity concept was rendered a serious setback.

Nevertheless, the work of men like Ramakrishna Paramhamsa (1836-1886), Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838-1894), Rabindranath Tagore (1868-1941) and Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917) as well as women such as the Scots-Irish Sister Nivedita (1867-1911) spread the passion for rejuvenation and freedom. They all espoused unity of religions providing the vision of a united India. The influence of these socio-religious groups became evident in pioneering reforms of Indian society.

The rediscovery of India's indigenous history by several European and Indian scholars also fed into the rise of nationalism among Indians. These ideas were later developed by Gandhi who was instrumental in establishing an independent India. Hindu-Muslim unity evaporated in the year after the Khilafat Movement and Hindu, Muslim riots began. The poison of differences between the two nations aggravated with the passage of time.

The differences reached to the peak when Shuddhi and Sangathan movements began. The Shuddhi Movement aimed at the mass conversion of certain backward groups of Muslims into Hindus by force whereas the Sangathan programme sought to organize the Hindus into a militant force to flight with the Muslims.

Resurgence of Muslim Nationalism

Despite the immense contribution of the British to the promotion of education and modernization of transport and communication in India, the British were never popular among the masses. The British were hooked on a culture of segregation and followed a divide-and-rule policy which caused general disillusionment with their policies. Even in conducting census, they categorized people on religious lines and treated them as distinct from each other. Their knowledge of the people of India was limited to their basic religious texts and their intrinsic differences rather than their common ancestral past or historic and cultural linkages.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Hindu leaders perceived the advantages of making allies in other lands, particularly in the home of the then ruling power. They kept in touch with British public opinion through friendly Britons who had retired from public services in India. The Indian National Congress with overwhelming Hindu membership flourished with British material and political support. In fact, the Hindus community as a whole derived the maximum advantages from the change of masters, and made the largest gains, educational and economic, under British suzerainty.[64]

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[64] *Muslim Separatism in India*, Dr. Abdul Hamid, Oxford University Press.

Three factors had kept Muslims away from the Congress: Sir Syed's advice to the Muslims to give it a wide berth, Hindu agitation against the partition of Bengal and the Hindu religious revivalism's hostility towards the Muslims. The Muslims remained loyal to Sir Syed's advice but events were quickly changing the Indian scene and politics were being thrust on all sections of the population. The main motivating factor was that the Muslims' intellectual class wanted representation; the masses needed a platform on which to unite. It was the dissemination of western thought by John Locke, Milton and Thomas Paine, etc. at the MAO College that initiated the emergence of Muslim nationalism.

The earlier political movements in India began in Bengal and the Deccan, independently and almost simultaneously. Their first leaders were parochial in outlook but gradually mutual contacts developed and different streams of political activity coalesced in the Indian National Congress from whose ranks emerged the future all-India leaders. Bal Gangadhar Tilak was the first to be so recognised. He was the first strategist of the Indian political movement who devised an enduring technique of political action for the Hindu community. He believed that Hinduism was strong enough to afford to alienate Muslims. Under him, the influence of the Indian National Congress grew and acquired remarkable ascendancy with British patronage.[65]

The Hindu-Muslim chasm was also being widened by an extremist, at times violent, Hindu revivalist movement which launched a campaign for return to what they perceived the glorious Hindu past. The Hindu revivalist movement rallied for a ban on the slaughter of cows and change of official script form Persian to the Hindu Devanagri script. Tilak's anti-cow slaughter campaign enraged Muslims causing Hindu-Muslim riots in many cities.

The Muslim community already victimized for their share in the 1857 War of Independence suffered discriminatory negligence on the part of the British rulers, and began to realise that they were doomed if they did not organise themselves. Congress politics evoked no enthusiasm among them.

The Simla Deputation (1906)

As the nineteenth century proceeded to its close, political developments gathered pace, due largely to the growing sense of impatience with foreign rule and to Hindu-Muslim differences. The British were particularly fearful of the Muslims whom they perceived as a potential threat and a possible challenge to their colonial rule. In order to win them over to their side, the British helped establish the

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[65] *ibid.*

M.A.O. College at Aligarh and supported the All-India Muslim Conference, both of which were institutions from which leaders of the Muslim League and the ideology of Pakistan emerged.

The partition of Bengal had been a welcome development for the Muslims of East Bengal who saw in it an opportunity for redressal of their sufferings. The Hindu politicians, including important Indian National Congress leaders violently opposed it. The Hindu agitation against the partition and other developments including the anti-Urdu circular issued by Sir Anthony McDonnell, Lieutenant Governor of the United Provinces convinced Muslims of the need for protecting their political interests.

Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk (1837-1907) who had succeeded Sir Syed Ahmad Khan as secretary M.A.O. College Aligarh assumed the mantle of leadership of the Muslims. He organised a 35-member Muslim deputation (known as **Simla Deputation**) led by the Aga Khan (1877-1957) to call on the Viceroy, Lord Minto on October 1, 1906 and demand separate electorate for the Muslims of India.[66]

In the address presented to the Viceroy, the deputation pointed out that "the Mohammedans of India number, according to the census taken in the year 1901, over sixty-two million or between one-fifth and one-fourth of the total population of His Majesty's Indian dominion.... Under any system of representation, extended or limited, a community in itself more numerous than the entire population of any first class European power except Russia may justly lay claim to adequate recognition as an important factor in the state."

The deputation demanded that the representation of Muslims be "commensurate not merely with their numerical strength but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they make to the defence of the empire...It is most unlikely that the name of any Muhammadan candidate will ever be submitted for approval of Government by the electoral bodies as now constituted unless he is in sympathy with the majority in all matters of importance."[67]

The Viceroy, Lord Minto in his reply to the Simla Deputation address reassured the Muslims that their political rights and interests as a community would be safeguarded by any administrative reorganization under him. This sympathetic reply encouraged the Muslim leaders to organise themselves as a political party. The birth of All, India Muslim League at Dhaka on December 30, 1906 provided the Muslims with a political platform from which to pursue their legitimate political rights as a separate community.[68]

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[66] *ibid*

[67] *ibid*

[68] *ibid*

The British conceded separate electorates in the Government of India Act of 1909 which confirmed the Muslim League's position as an all-India party. This was an important development with far-reaching consequences for the future of India as the idea of the separateness of Muslims in India was formally built into the electoral process of India. The Simla Deputation was successful because it led the Muslims of the subcontinent to assert their separate identity.

While the antecedents of Muslim nationalism in India go back to the early Islamic conquests of the subcontinent, organizationally it stems from the demand presented by the Simla Deputation to Lord Minto, the governor-general of India, in October 1906, proposing separate electorates for the Indian Muslims. The principal reason behind this demand was the maintenance of a separate identity of the Muslim nationhood.

In the same year, the founding of the All-India Muslim League, a separate political organization for Muslims, elucidated the fact that the Muslims of India had lost trust in the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress.

Besides being a Hindu-dominated body, the Congress leaders in order to win grass-root support for their political movements, used Hindu religious symbols and slogans, thereby arousing Muslim suspicions regarding the secular character of the Congress.[69] No doubt, the British were only too ready to accept the demands of the Simla Deputation, allowing the Muslims of India a new status and a new role in Indian politics. Apparently, Lord Minto was anxious to pull them out of their political discontent.

However, given the promptness with which the British responded to the demands of the Simla Deputation, some people looked at the Simla Deputation as a "command performance."[70] Separate electorates were given statutory recognition in the Indian Councils Act of 1909. Muslims were accorded not only the right to elect their representatives by separate electorates, but also the right to vote in general constituencies. In addition, they were also given weight-age in representation. The acceptance of the Deputation's demands proved to be a turning point in the history of the subcontinent.

For the first time, the Hindu-Muslim conflict was raised to the constitutional plan. The Muslims made it clear that they had no confidence in the Hindu majority and that they were not prepared to put their future in the hands of an assembly elected on the assumed basis of a homogenous Indian nation. It is in this sense that the beginning of separate electorate may be seen as the beginning of the realization of the Two-Nation Theory, its final and inevitable consequence being the partition of British India in 1947.[71]

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[69] *ibid.*

[70] *ibid.*

All-India Muslim League (1906)

At the dawn of the twentieth century, a number of factors convinced the Muslims of the need to have an effective political organization. Exactly three months after the Simla Deputation, on December 30, 1906, the annual meeting of Mohammadan Educational Conference held at Dhaka under the chairmanship of Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk. Almost 3,000 delegates attended the session making it the largest-ever representative gathering of Muslim India.

For the first time the conference lifted its ban on political discussion, when Nawab Salimullah Khan presented a proposal for establishing a political party to safeguard the interests of the Muslims. Accordingly, **the All-India Muslim League** was founded by Nawab Salimullah Khan at Dhaka, mainly with the following three main objectives:

1. To inculcate among Muslims a feeling of loyalty to the government and to disabuse their minds of misunderstandings and misconceptions of its actions and intentions.
2. To protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Muslims of India and to represent their needs and aspirations to the government from time to time.
3. To prevent the growth of ill will between Muslims and other nationalities without compromising to it's own purposes.

The headquarters of the All-India Muslim League was established in Lucknow, and Sir Aga Khan was elected as its first president. Also elected were six vice-presidents, a secretary and two joint secretaries for a term of three years. The initial membership was 400, with members hailing proportionately from all provinces. Maulana Muhammad Ali Jouhar wrote the constitution of the League, known as the "Green Book". Branches were also set up in other provinces. Syed Ameer Ali established a branch of the League in London in 1908, supporting the same objectives.

Many Hindu historians and several British writers have alleged that the Muslim League was founded at official instigation. They argue that it was Lord Minto who inspired the establishment of a Muslim organization so as to divide the Congress and to minimize the strength of the Indian freedom movement. But these statements are not supported by evidence. Contrary to this, the widely accepted view is that the Muslim League was basically established to protect and advance the Muslim interests and to combat the growing influence of the Indian National Congress.[72]

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[71] *ibid.*

Partition of Bengal (1905-1911)

Finding the Bengal Presidency too large for one governor to administer, in 1905 the English decided to redraw its boundaries and divided it into two parts. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, sent the proposal to London in February 1905. The Secretary of State for India St. John Brodrich sanctioned it in June, and the proclamation of the formation of the new province was issued in September. The province of Bengal and Assam came into being on October 16 1905.

The partition of Bengal that was essentially an administrative decision but it also had the incidental effect of concentrating attention on the development of the rural areas of east Bengal and Assam which had a predominantly Muslim but perennially neglected population. Western Bengal, being the first area to come under western influence, was already developed and industrialized.

It was a striking contrast to the eastern part where the Muslim peasantry was crushed under the Hindu landlords, the river system was infested with pirates, and very few funds were allocated for education. It was dreaded as a place of banishment. The Muslims outnumbered the Hindus in Eastern Bengal and this alleviated the Bengali Muslims politically and economically. This resulted in a series of unprecedented agitation by the Hindus. They alleged that Lord Curzon had deliberately tried to divide the Hindus and the Muslims by drawing a line between the Hindu and the Muslim halves of Bengal.

And by favouring the Muslims by giving them a new province in which they were in a clear majority, had struck a deadly blow to Bengali nationality. They branded him as the upholder of the devilish policy of 'divide and rule'.

The partition helped boost Bengali literature and language; efforts were also made towards the social, economic and educational uplift of the Muslims. The Muslims of India welcomed the partition of Bengal, but the Hindu community strongly opposed it. They launched a mass movement, declaring October 16 as a day of mourning in Calcutta. Influenced by the Chinese boycott of American goods, the Hindus started the Swadeshi Movement against the British. In the meantime, the Hindus raised the Band-i-Mataram as the national cry protecting worship of Shivaji as a national hero. This organized anarchist movement took a terrorist turn resulting in political sabotage and communal riots.

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[72] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

During the anti-partition movement, started by the Hindus, tensions between Muslims and Hindus became very intense. Its subsequent annulment in 1911 led to a further widening of the gap between the two communities. Keeping in view the fluid political situation in India and the cult of Hindu revivalism, the British decided to undo their earlier decision to please the Hindus. The provinces were reunited. This act disappointed the Muslims. It was a catalyst in Indian Muslims realizing the need for a separate homeland. The growing Hindu revivalism and anti-Muslim campaigns led to a corresponding rise in nationalistic sentiments among Muslims in India.

Minto-Morley Reforms (1909)

In 1906, Lord Morley, the Secretary of State for Indian Affairs, announced in the British Parliament that his government wanted to introduce new reforms for India, in which the locals were to be given more powers in legislative affairs. With this, a series of correspondences started between him and Lord Minto, the then governor general of India. A committee was appointed to propose a scheme of reforms.

The final report of the committee after the approval of Lord Minto and Lord Morley was passed by the British Parliament as the Act of 1909 which is commonly known as the Minto-Morley Reforms. The following were the main features of the Act of 1909:

1. The number of the members of the Legislative Council at the Centre was increased from 16 to 60.
2. The number of the members of the Provincial Legislatives was also increased. It was fixed as 50 in the provinces of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, and for the rest of the provinces it was 30.
3. The member of the Legislative Councils, both at the Centre and in the provinces, were to be of four categories, i.e. ex-officio members (Governor-General and the members of their Executive Councils), nominated official members (those nominated by the Governor-General and were government officials), nominated non-official members (nominated by the Governor-General but were not government officials) and elected members (elected by different categories of Indian people).
4. Right of separate electorate was given to the Muslims.

5. At the Centre, official members were to form the majority but in provinces non-official members would be in majority.
6. The members of the Legislative Councils were permitted to discuss the budgets, suggest the amendments and even to vote on them; excluding those items that were included as non-vote items. They were also entitled to ask supplementary questions during the legislative proceedings.
7. The Secretary of State for India was empowered to increase the number of the Executive Councils of Madras and Bombay from two to four.
8. Two Indians were nominated to the Council of the Secretary of State for Indian Affairs.
9. The Governor-General was empowered to nominate one Indian member to his Executive Council.

The Lucknow Pact (1916)

The visible trend of the two major communities progressing in opposite directions caused deep concern to leaders of all-India stature. They struggled to bring the Congress and the Muslim League on one platform. When All-India Muslim League came into existence, it was a moderate organization with its basic aim to establish friendly relations with the Crown. However, due to the decision of the British government to annul the partition of Bengal, the Muslim leadership decided to change its stance.

After the annulment of the partition of Bengal and the European powers' aggressive designs against the Ottoman Empire and North Africa, the Muslims became receptive to the idea of collaboration with the Hindus against the British rulers. The Muslim League changed its major objective and decided to join hands with the Congress in order to put pressure on the British government.

Lord Chelmsford's invitation for suggestions from the Indian politicians for the post-World War I reforms further helped in the development of the situation. In 1913, a new group of Muslim leaders had entered the folds of the Muslim League with the aim of bridging the gulf between the Muslims and the Hindus. The most prominent amongst them was **Muhammad Ali Jinnah,** who was already a member of Indian National Congress.

As a result of the hard work of Mr. Jinnah, both the Muslim League and the Congress met for their annual sessions at Bombay in December 1915. The principal leaders of the two political parties assembled at one place for the first time in the history of these organizations. The speeches made from the platform of the two groups were similar in tone and theme. Within a few months of the

Bombay moot, 19 Muslim and Hindu elected members of the Imperial Legislative Council addressed a memorandum to the Viceroy on the subject of reforms in October 1916.

The Congress-Muslim League rapprochement was achieved at the Lucknow sessions of the two parties on December 29 and December 31, 1916 and a joint scheme of reforms was adopted in the **Lucknow Pact.** As chief architect of the Lucknow Pact, **Mohammad Ali Jinnah was hailed as the "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity."** As the scheme was commonly referred to, the Congress accepted the principle of separate electorates, and the Muslims, in return for `weightage' to the Muslims of the Muslim minority provinces, agreed to surrender their thin majorities in the Punjab and Bengal.

The main clauses of the Lucknow Pact were:

1. There shall be self-government in India.
2. Muslims should be given one-third representation in the central government.
3. There should be separate electorates for all the communities until a community demanded for joint electorates.
4. System of weight-age should be adopted.
5. The number of the members of Central Legislative Council should be increased to 150.
6. At the provincial level, four-fifth of the members of the Legislative Councils should be elected and one-fifth should be nominated.
7. The strength of Provincial Legislative should not be less than 125 in the major provinces and from 50 to 75 in the minor provinces.
8. All members, except those nominated, were to be elected directly on the basis of adult franchise.
9. No bill concerning a community should be passed if the bill is opposed by three-fourth of the members of that community in the Legislative Council.
10. Term of the Legislative Council should be five years.
11. Members of Legislative Council should themselves elect their president.
12. Half of the members of Imperial Legislative Council should be Indians.
13. Indian Council must be abolished.
14. The salaries of the Secretary of State for Indian Affairs should be paid by the British Government and not from Indian funds.

15. Out of two Under Secretaries, one should be Indian.
16. The Executive should be separated from the Judiciary.

Although this Hindu-Muslim unity was not able to live for more than eight years, and collapsed after the development of differences between the two communities after the Khilafat Movement, yet it was an important event in the history of the Muslims of South Asia. It was the first time when Congress recognized the Muslim League as the political party representing the Muslims of the region. As Congress agreed to separate electorates, it in fact agreed to consider the Muslims as a separate nation. They thus accepted the concept of the Two-Nation Theory.

The post-Lucknow Pact period witnessed Hindu Muslim amity and the two parties came to hold their annual sessions in the same city and passed resolutions of identical contents. **The Lucknow Pact** showed that it was possible for middle-class, English-educated Muslims and Hindus to arrive at an amicable settlement on Hindu-Muslim constitutional and political problems. This unity reached its climax during the Khilafat and the Non-Cooperation Movements.[73]

The Khilafat Movement (1919-1924)

The Lucknow Pact showed that it was possible for middle-class, English-educated Muslims and Hindus to arrive at an amicable settlement on Hindu-Muslim constitutional and political problems. This unity reached its climax during the Khilafat and the Non-Cooperation Movements. The Muslims of South Asia, under the leadership of Ali Brothers, Maulana Muhammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali, launched the historic Khilafat Movement after the World War I to protect the Ottoman empire from dismemberment.

The general impression among the Muslims of India was that the western powers were waging a war against Islam throughout the world in order to rob it of all its power and influence. The Ottoman Empire was the only Muslim power that had maintained a semblance of authority and the Muslims of India wanted to save the Islamic political power from extinction. As an institution, the *khilafat* (caliphate) had a checkered past. It had originally migrated from Medina to Damascus and from Damascus to Baghdad. For sometime it was located in Egypt, and then it fell to the lot of Turkey, very much as a prize.

The Turkish sultans had claimed to be the caliphs of the Muslim world. As long as the Mughal Empire was in existence, the Muslims of India had not recognized their claim. At this critical juncture, when the Muslims of the subcontinent had no sovereign ruler of their own, they began to see the necessity of recognizing the

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[73] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

Sultan of Turkey as their own caliph. Tipu Sultan was the first Indian Muslim who, having been frustrated in his attempts to gain recognition from the Mughals had turned to the Sultan of Turkey to establish a legal right to his throne.

The Muslims of India had a strong feeling of identity with the world community of Islam. They had seen the decline in the political fortunes of Islam as the European powers conquered the Muslim lands one after the other. The Anglo-Russian convention of 1908 had reduced their next-door neighbour Iran to a mere dependency. Afghanistan also suffered as it was a bone of contention between Russia and Britain, and was now under the latter's sphere of influence.

The European powers had played a leading role in reducing the might of Turkey in Europe to Eastern Thrace, Constantinople and the straits in the Balkan Wars (1912-13). To seek revenge, the Turks decided to side with the Germans against the Allied Forces. The Indian Muslims supported this decision. Thus, the Muslims of India launched the Khilafat Movement in support of the Turkish Caliphate and the Ottoman Empire and protection of the Muslim holy places. The objectives were as follows:

1. To maintain the Turkish Caliphate.
2. To protect the holy places of the Muslims.
3. To maintain the unity of the Ottoman Empire.

There was absolute unanimity among the Indian Muslims. Though separated from Turkey by thousands of miles, they were determined to fight Turkey's battle from India. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948) linked the issue of Swaraj (or self-government) with the Khilafat issue to associate the Hindus with the Movement. The ensuing Movement was the first country-wide popular movement. [74] When the terms of the Treaty of Sevres between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire were announced in 1920, it caused deep resentment among the Muslims. They felt betrayed. In June 1920, 90 influential Muslims wrote to Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy, informing him of their intent to start a non-cooperation movement against the government from August, until the terms of the treaty with Turkey were revised. The British government, however, ignored the demands of the Khilafat Movement.

Besides other events, the arrest of the Ali Brothers in September 1921 gave a severe blow to the Khilafat Movement. Gandhi, who was using this movement to accelerate India's advance towards Swaraj, also withdrew his support for the Muslim cause in the aftermath of the Chauri Chaura incident in February 1922. Using the excuse that the national volunteers were responsible for the murder of

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[74] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

21 policemen, thus leading to violence, he called off the whole movement. In 1924, Turks under Mustafa Kamal were consolidating their position in Turkey. They announced an end to the Khilafat. It was a great blow to Indian *khilafatists* who had been campaigning on behalf of Turkey and *khilafat*. Gradually, the enthusiasm of the people died down and the Khilafat Conference and Committee developed new interests and in a short time nothing but their name remained.

A tragic offshoot of the Khilafat Movement was the Hijrat Movement proposed by Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind. When a land is not safe for Islam, a Muslim has two options; *jihad* or *hijrat*. Around 1925 eminent Muslims signed this *fatwa*. In the North West Frontier Province and Sindh, hundreds of families sold their land and property and departed in the direction of the Khyber Pass, to migrate to Afghanistan, a neighbouring Muslim state. In the month of August alone, some 18,000 Indian Muslims migrated to Afghanistan, a poor country which was unable to absorb so large an influx of population and sealed its borders. It is difficult to establish who was responsible for misleading such a large number of Muslims. According to one version, the idea of *hijrat* was originated from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.

Another tragic event related to the Khilafat Movement was the **Moplah Uprising** or Malabar Rebellion. The 1921 revolt originally began against the heavy-handed crackdown of the Khilafat Movement by the British but in due course, it developed into agrarian riots against the Hindu landlord's oppressive policies which were seen to have full British patronage. A pitched battle between the British regiment and the Moplahs killed several Europeans. Four thousand Moplahs were killed in action and tens of thousands were injured. In another incident, 66 Moplahs were suffocated to death in a Moplah Train Tragedy.

All this was followed by Hindu-Muslim communal clashes, particularly in Multan and Bengal in September 1922. The **Sanghattan and Shuddhi** movements were offshoots of these communal rioting, which were anti-Muslim and aimed at Hindu revivalism. Although the movement failed in its objectives, it had far-reaching impact on the Muslims of South Asia. After a long time they forged a united action on a purely Islamic issue which created momentarily solidarity among them. It also produced a class of Muslim leaders experienced in organizing and mobilizing the public. This experience was of immense value to the Muslims during the Pakistan Movement. The Khilafat Movement was no doubt an asset for the struggle of Pakistan. It made clear to the Indian Muslims to trust neither the British nor the Hindus, but to look to their own strengths for self-preservation.

Montague-Chelmsford Reforms (1919)

In World War I, the British claimed that they stood for the protection of democracy around the world. Thus, the Indians, who fought for them in this war, demanded that democracy should also be introduced in their country. In his famous August Declaration presented before the House of Commons on August 20, 1917, Montague, the Secretary of State for Indian Affairs said that in order to satisfy the local demands, his government was interested in giving more representation to the natives in India. New reforms would be introduced in the country to meet this objective. He came to India and stayed here for six months. During this period he held meetings with different government and non-government people.

Finally, in cooperation with the Governor-General Lord Chelmsford, Montague presented a report on the constitutional reforms for India in 1918. The report was discussed and approved by the British Parliament and then became the Government of India Act, 1919. This Act is commonly known as Montague-Chelmsford Reforms. The main features of these reforms included autonomy in administrative matters of the provinces concerning the 'Transferred Subjects' and also in the matters on which governor-general and his Legislative were in agreement. The Central Legislature was to consist of two houses, i.e. the Council of the State (Upper House) with 60 members and the Legislative Assembly (Lower House) with 144 members including a ratio of nominated members. The System of Diarchy was introduced in the provinces. Besides Muslims, other minorities were also given the right of separate electorate. The Montague-Chelmsford reforms were not accepted by most quarters in India as they fell far short of the Indian natives' expectations.

The Rowlatt Act (1919)

The **Rowlatt Act** was a law passed by the British in colonial India in March 1919, indefinitely extending "emergency measures" (of the Defence of India Regulations Act) enacted during the World War I in order to control public unrest and root out conspiracy. Passed on the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee, named for its president, British judge Sir Sidney Rowlatt, this Act effectively authorized the government to imprison for a maximum period of two years, without trial, any person suspected of terrorism living in the Raj. The Rowlatt Act gave British imperial authorities Draconian power to deal with revolutionary activities.

Mohandas Gandhi, among other Indian leaders, was extremely critical of the Act and argued that not everyone should be punished in response to isolated political crimes. The Act led to indignation from Indian leaders and the public at large, which caused the government to implement repressive measures. Gandhi and others found that constitutional opposition to the measure was fruitless; so on [redacted] *hartal* (strike) was organized where Indians would suspend all business and fast as a sign of their hatred for the legislation. This event is known as the Rowlatt Satyagraha.

However, the success of the hartal in Delhi, on March 30, was overshadowed by tensions running high, which resulted in rioting in the Punjab and other provinces. In Punjab particularly the protest movement was very strong, and on April 10, two outstanding leaders of the Congress, Dr. Satya Pal and Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, were arrested and taken to an unknown place. Rioting started in Amritsar on April 10, 1919. On April 13, 1919, a crowd assembled at the **Jalianwala Bagh.** These protestors were unaware of a ban that had just been imposed by the martial law administrators on public meetings. Sir Michael O'Dwaiyer opened indiscriminate fire on the crowd, resulting in 379 dead and 1,200 wounded. This incident is known as the **Jalianwala Bagh Tragedy (1919).**

Deciding that Indians were not ready to make a stand consistent with the principle of *ahimsa* (non-violence), an integral part of Satyagraha, Gandhi suspended the resistance. The British on their part too relented in their repressive approach, and accepting the report of the Repressive Laws Committee, the government of India repealed the Rowlatt Act, the Press Act and 22 other laws in March 1922.

Hindu-Muslim Antagonism

During the Khilafat Movement, Gandhi felt that this was the most opportune moment to bring about "Hindu-Muslim" unity under the Congress flag. Since each community had its own reason to join in an anti-British campaign, there was no commonality of purpose in the non-cooperation movement which soon lost its momentum. The Hindu community wanted to get rid of the British from India whereas the Muslims were struggling for restoration of the *khilafat* in Turkey.

As a matter of fact, the end of the non-cooperation movement marks the beginning of a new phase of Hindu-Muslim hostility. Despite several Hindu-Muslim unity conferences, the causes of conflict not be removed, and it seemed nothing could mitigate the intensity of the prevailing communal strife. The Hindu-Muslim antagonism continued to aggravate. This was evidenced by the Hindus' repudiation of the principle of separate electorate to which the Congress and the Muslim League leaders had mutually agreed in their 1916 Lucknow Pact.

About the same time, extremist Hindus organized two highly anti-Muslim movements, the Shudhi and the Sangathan. The former movement was designed to convert Muslims to Hinduism and the latter was meant to create solidarity among the Hindus in the event of communal conflict. In retaliation, the Muslims sponsored the Tabligh and Tanzim organizations to counter the impact of the Shudhi and the Sangathan. This was only a defensive move for missionary purposes. In the 1920s, communal riots broke out in different parts of the subcontinent at an unprecedented scale and frequency.

One important reason for the growing hostility between the two communities was the fact that with the inauguration of the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, powers in the provinces had begun to be transferred to the elected representatives of the people. Under these Reforms, some of the subjects had been transferred to the control of "popular" ministers whose policies accentuated communal differences. Being in minority in most provinces, the Muslims were naturally disadvantaged by the implementation of the new reforms. [75]

X. TOWARDS A SEPARATE MUSLIM HOMELAND

In the light of the changing situation, the Muslims revised their approach too, and at a meeting of the Muslim League in Lahore in 1924 under the presidentship of M. A. Jinnah, they demanded constitutional safeguards. They now sought preservation of their numerical majorities in the Punjab and Bengal; separation of Sindh from Bombay; constitution of Balochistan as a separate province and introduction of constitutional reforms in the North-West Frontier Province.

The 1930s witnessed awareness among the Muslims of their separate identity and their anxiety to preserve it within separate territorial boundaries. An important element that brought this simmering Muslim nationalism in the open was the character of the Congress rule in the Muslim minority provinces during 1937-39. The Congress policies in these provinces hurt Muslim susceptibilities. These were calculated aims to obliterate the Muslims as a separate cultural unity. The Muslims were now left with no choice but to think in terms of seeking adequate safeguards, and began to consider seriously the demand for a separate Muslim state. Several Muslim leaders and thinkers inspired by Allama Iqbal's ideas contained in his Allahabad address presented elaborate schemes of partitioning the subcontinent on communal lines.

There were indeed several reasons for the birth of a separate Muslim homeland in the subcontinent. Besides the traditional British anti-Muslim stance rooted in their unrelenting fear of the potential threat from the Muslims who were the former rulers of the subcontinent, ruling India for over 700 years, Hindu revivalists also deepened the chasm between he two nations. They resented the Muslims for their protracted rule over India. Hindu revivalist movement was seen invasive of the Muslim religion, culture, language and tradition.

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[75] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

Tied integrally to all Muslim revivalist movements was the opposition to assimilation and submergence in Hindu society. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan who was the first to conceive of a separate Muslim homeland, had anticipated the Hindu political domination in the changing British system under their colonial rule, and brought the Muslims of India back into the political mainstream through their educational uplift and moderate postures.

Congress made several mistakes in their policies which further convinced the Muslim League that it was impossible to live in a undivided India after freedom from colonial rule because their interests would be completely suppressed.

One such policy was the institution of the "Band-e-Matram," a national anthem which expressed anti-Muslim sentiments, in the schools of India where Muslim children were forced to sing it. While the Congress was asking the British to "Quit India", the Muslim League passed a resolution in 1943 calling the British to "Divide and Quit". The British, on their part, had followed a divide-and-rule policy in India. Even in the census they categorized people according to religion and viewed and treated them as separate from each other.

The Muslim League gained power also due to the Congress. The Congress adopted policies that were inherently aimed at reducing the Muslims into a hapless minority with no role in the decision-making at any level. Their anti-Muslim bias was more than evident in the infamous Nehru Report which left no choice for the Muslims but to pursue a separate homeland. The Civil Disobedience Movement and the consequent withdrawal of the Congress party from politics also helped the League gain power, as they formed strong ministries in the provinces that had large Muslim populations. At the same time, the League actively campaigned to gain more support from the Muslims in India, especially under the guidance of dynamic leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

The Simon Commission (1927)

It was partly to press these demands that one section of the All-India Muslim League headed by Sir Muhammad Shafi cooperated with the Statutory Commission sent by the British government, under the chairmanship of **Sir John Simon in 1927** to report on India's future constitutional progress. The other section of the League headed by **Muhammad Ali Jinnah** boycotted the **Simon**

Commission for its all-white character and cooperated with the Nehru Committee to draft a constitution for India.

The **Simon Commission** did not recommend adequate safeguards for the Muslims, and the Nehru Committee almost completely ignored their interest. The **Nehru Report** had an extremely anti-Muslim bias and the Congress leadership's refusal to amend it disillusioned even the moderate Muslims. Its final version adopted by the Congress did not even agree to the principle of federation, insisting on a unitary form of government and claiming absolute power for the majority which was obviously Hindu.

The Nehru report demanded "full responsible government on the model of the constitutions of self-governing Dominions." The report recommended replacement of separate electorates by joint electorates with reservation of seats in proportion to its population for the minority but no such reservation was to be made in Punjab and Bengal. The report did propose full provincial status for NWFP and Balochistan, and separation of Sindh from Bombay to form a new province. This was the only concession to the Muslim point of view.

The Muslims opposed the Nehru report, and in January, 1929, an All Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi under the presidentship of the Aga Khan demanded specific safeguards for Muslim interests, including the retention of separate electorates. A positive aspect of Nehru Report was that it resulted in the unity of divided Muslim groups.[76]

Jinnah's Fourteen Points (1929)

In a meeting of the council of All-India Muslim League in Delhi on March 28, 1929, members of both the Shafi League and Jinnah League participated. Quaid-i-Azam termed the Nehru Report as a Hindu document, but considered simply rejecting the report as insufficient. He decided to give an alternative Muslim agenda. It was in this meeting that Quaid-e-Azam presented his famous Fourteen Points. These points were as follows:[77]

1. The form of the future constitution should be Federal system with residuary powers vested in the provinces.
2. A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all provinces.
3. All legislative in the country and other elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite principles of adequate and effective representation of minorities in every province without reducing the majority in any province to a minority or even equality.

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[76] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

[77] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad (1986)

4. In the Central Legislature, the Muslim representation shall not be less than one-third.
5. Representation of communal groups by separate electorates, provided that it would be open to any community to opt out of separate electorate in favour of joint electorate.
6. No territorial redistribution should in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and the North West Frontier Province.
7. Full religious liberty, i.e. liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.
8. No bill or resolution shall be passed in any legislative or any other elected body if three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such a bill.
9. Sind should be separated from Bombay as a separate province.
10. Reforms in North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces.
11. Provision should be made in the constitution giving Muslims an adequate share, along with the other Indians, in all the services of the state and in local self-governing bodies having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.
12. The constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture and for the protection and promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws and Muslim charitable institution and for their due share in the grants-in-aid given by the state and by local self-governing bodies
13. No cabinet, either central or provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of at least one-third Muslim ministers.
14. No change in the Constitution by the Central Legislature without the concurrence of the states constituting the Indian federation.

In retrospect, it must astonish thoughtful Hindus that these reasonable and moderate demands were rejected by Hindu leaders. The year 1930 opened with a threat by the Congress of mass civil disobedience under Gandhi's personal command. The reason given was the failure of the British government to implement the Nehru Report but the abolition of the salt tax was made the focal point of the agitation. The Muslims kept aloof. Within a year, the disobedience movement lost momentum.

Congress made several mistakes in their policies which further convinced the League that it was impossible to live in an undivided

India after freedom from colonial rule because their interests would be completely suppressed. One such policy was the institution of the "Band-e-Matram," a national anthem which expressed anti-Muslim sentiments, in the schools of India where Muslim children were forced to sing it. In October 1929, Viceroy Lord Irwin, after consultations with the Labour government then in power in England, announced the convening of a Round Table Conference to resolve the impasse by "seeking the greatest possible measure of agreement" on constitutional proposals.

The Idea of Pakistan (Allahabad 1930)

Several leaders and thinkers having insight into the Hindu-Muslim question proposed separation of Muslim India. However, the most lucid exposition of the inner feelings of the Muslim community was given by the greatest poet-philosopher of Muslim India, **Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938)** in his presidential address at the annual session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad in December 1930. He indicated in striking words the goal toward which the conscious and unconscious strivings of the Muslim community were taking them. He proposed a separate Muslim state at least in the consolidated Muslim majority regions of the northwest.

Later on, in his correspondence with Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, he included the Muslim majority areas in the northeast also in his proposed Muslim state. [78] Three years after his Allahabad address, a group of Muslim students at Cambridge, headed by Chaudhry Rahmat Ali, issued a pamphlet "Now or Never" in which, drawing letters from the names of the Muslim majority regions they gave the nomenclature of 'Pakistan' to the proposed Muslim state. Very few even among the Muslims welcomed the idea at time. It was to take a decade for the Muslims to embrace the demand for a separate homeland. [79]

The Round Table Conferences (1930-1932)

Meanwhile, three Round Table Conferences were convened in London during 1930-32, to resolve the Indian constitutional problem. The first session of the Round Table Conference was held in November 1930 followed by two more sessions over the two-year period. The Hindu and Muslim leaders, who were invited to these conferences, could not draw up an agreed formula and in 1932 the British government had to announce a **`Communal Award'** which constituted the basis of the Government of India Act, 1935.

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[78] *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Chaudhri Muhammad A Columbia University Press, New York (1973)

[79] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad (1986)

Under the **Communal Award**, Muslims were allocated percentages of seats in various provincial legislatures corresponding to their population in those provinces. In the Central Legislature, as demanded in Jinnah's Fourteen Points, one-third of the British Indian seats was reserved for Muslims. The Hindus denounced the Award; the Muslims acquiesced in it not because it did justice to their position but because the two sides had not been able to reach an agreement on their own.[80]

The additional percentage given to Muslims in provinces in which they were in minority was counterbalanced by similar weightage given to non-Muslims in Muslim majority provinces. Nowhere was the Hindu majority reduced to a minority but in the two provinces, the Punjab and Bengal, the Award reduced the Muslim majority to a minority.

Government of India Act, 1935

The deliberations of the Round Table Conferences resulted **in the Government of India Act, 1935** which provided for a "Federation of India" comprising provinces and princely states with independent legislative assemblies in all provinces of British India and creation of a central government incorporating both the British provinces and the princely states, and the protection of Muslim minorities.

The future constitution of independent India owed a great deal to the text of this Act which also provided for a bicameral national parliament and an executive branch under the purview of the British government. The provinces were given autonomy with respect to subjects delegated to them. Both the Congress and the Muslim League were critical of the Government of India Act 1935, but decided to participate in the elections to be held under it during the first weeks of 1937.

Although the national federation was never realized, nationwide elections for provincial assemblies were held in 1937. Despite initial hesitation, the Congress took part in the elections and won victories in seven of the eleven provinces of British India, and Congress governments, with wide powers, were formed in these provinces. In Great Britain, these victories were to later turn the tide for the idea of Indian independence.

Before the elections under this Act, the All-India Muslim League, which had remained dormant for some time, was reorganized by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who had returned to India in 1934, after an absence of nearly five years in

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[80] *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali; Columbia University Press, New York (1973)

England. The Muslim League could not win a majority of Muslim seats since it had not yet been effectively reorganized. However, it had the satisfaction that the performance of the Indian National Congress in the Muslim constituencies was bad.

After the elections, the attitude of the Congress leadership was arrogant and domineering. The classic example was its refusal to form a coalition government with the Muslim League in the United Provinces. Instead, it asked the League leaders to dissolve their parliamentary party in the Provincial Assembly and join the Congress.

Another important Congress move after the 1937 elections was its Muslim mass contact movement to persuade the Muslims to join the Congress and not the Muslim League. One of its leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru, even declared that there were only two forces in India, the British and the Congress. All this did not go unchallenged.[81] Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah countered that there was a third force in South-Asia constituting the Muslims. The All-India Muslim League, under his gifted leadership, gradually and skilfully started organising the Muslims on one platform.

With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, declared war on India's behalf without consulting Indian leaders, leading the Congress provincial ministries to resign in protest. The Muslim League, initially supported Britain in the war effort but it soon took the view that Muslims would be unfairly treated in an independent India dominated by the Congress.

Although there were other important national Muslim politicians such as Congress leader Ab'ul Kalam Azad, and influential regional Muslim politicians such as A. K. Fazl-i-Huq of the leftist Krishak Praja Party in Bengal, Sikander Hyat Khan of the landlord-dominated Punjab Unionist Party, and Abdul Ghaffar Khan of the pro-Congress Khudai Khidmatgar (popularly, "red shirts") in the North West Frontier Province, the British in the following years were to increasingly see the League as the main representative of Muslim India.

The Congress Rule (1937-1939)

The Government of India Act, 1935 was practically implemented in 1937. The provincial elections were held in the winter of 1936-37. There were two major political parties in the subcontinent at that time, the Congress and the Muslim League. Both parties did their best to persuade the masses before these elections and put before them their manifesto. The political manifestos of both parties were almost identical, although there were two major differences. Congress stood for joint electorate and the League for separate electorate; Congress wanted Hindi as official language with Deva Nagri script of writing while the League wanted Urdu with Persian script.

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[81] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad (1986)

In the election results, the Congress, as the oldest, richest and best-organized political party, emerged as the single largest representative in the Legislative assembles. Yet it failed to secure even 40 percent of the total number of seats. Out of the 1,771 total seats in the 11 provinces, Congress was only able to win slightly more then 750. Thus, the results clearly disapproved Gandhi's claim that his party represented 95 percent of the population of India. [82] Its success, moreover, was mainly confined to the Hindu constituencies. Out of the 491 Muslim seats, Congress could only capture 26.

Muslim League's condition was no better as it could also win only 106 Muslim seats. The party managed to win just two seats from the Muslim majority province of Punjab. The final results of the elections were declared in February 1937. The Indian National Congress had a clear majority in Madras, U.P., C.P., Bihar and Orrisa. It was also able to form a coalition government in Bombay and N.W.F.P. Congress was also able to secure political importance in Sindh and Assam, where they joined the ruling coalition. Thus, directly or indirectly, Congress was in power in nine out of eleven provinces.

The Unionist Party of Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and Praja Krishak Party of Maulvi Fazl-i-Haq were able to form governments in Punjab and Bengal, respectively, without the interference of Congress. Muslim League failed to form government in any province. Quaid-e-Azam offered Congress to form a coalition government with the League but the Congress rejected his offer. The Congress refused to set up its government until the British agreed to their demand that the governor would not use his powers in legislative affairs.

Many discussions took place between the Congress and the British government and at last the British government consented, although it was only a verbal commitment and no amendment was made in the Act of 1935. Eventually, after a four-month delay, Congress formed their ministries in July 1937. To investigate Muslim ogrievances, the Muslim League formulated the "Pirpur Report" under the chairmanship of Raja Syed Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur. Other reports concerning Muslim grievances in Congress-run provinces were A. K. Fazl-i-Haq's "Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule", and "The Sharif Report".

The allegation that Congress was representing Hindus only was voiced also by eminent British personalities. The Marquees of Lothian in April 1938 termed the Congress rule as a "rising tide of

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[82] *www.storyofpakistan.com* (Website)

Hindu rule". Sir William Barton writing in the "National Review" in June 1939 also termed the Congress rule as "the rising tide of political Hinduism".

At the outbreak of the World War II, the Viceroy proclaimed India's involvement without prior consultations with the main political parties. When Congress demanded an immediate transfer of power in return for cooperation of the war efforts, the British government refused. As a result, Congress resigned from power. Quaid-e-Azam asked the Muslims to celebrate December 22, 1939 as **a day of deliverance** and thanksgiving in token of relief from the tyranny and oppression of the Congress rule.

The Congress proved to be only a Hindu party and worked during its reign only for the betterment of the Hindus. Twenty-seven months of the Congress rule were like a nightmare for the Muslims of South Asia. Some of the Congress leaders even stated that they would take revenge from the Muslims for the last 700 years of their slavery. Even before the formation of government, the Congress started a Muslim Mass Contact Movement, with the aim to convince Muslims that there were only two political parties in India, i.e. the British and the Congress. The aim was to decrease the importance of the Muslim League for the Muslims.

After taking charge in July 1937, Congress declared Hindi as the national language and Deva Nagri as the official script. The Congress flag was given the status of national flag, slaughtering of cows was prohibited and it was made compulsory for the children to worship the picture of Gandhi at school. Band-e-Matram, an anti-Muslim song taken from Bankim Chandra Chatterji's novel *Anandamath*, was made the national anthem of the country. Religious intolerance was the order of the day. Muslims were not allowed to construct new mosques. Hindus would play drums in front of mosques when Muslims were praying.

The Congress government introduced a new educational policy in the provinces under their rule known as the Warda Taleemi Scheme. The main plan was to sway Muslim children against their ideology and to tell them that all the people living in India were Indian and thus belonged to one nation. In Bihar and CP, the Vidya Mandar Scheme was introduced according to which Mandar education was made compulsory at elementary level.

The purpose of the scheme was to obliterate the cultural traditions of the Muslims and to inculcate into the minds of Muslim children the superiority of the Hindu culture. The Congress ministries did their best to weaken the economy of Muslims. They closed the doors of government offices for them, which was one of the main sources of income for the Muslims in the region. They also harmed Muslim trade and agriculture. When Hindu-Muslim riots broke out due to these biased policies of the Congress ministries, the government pressured the judges; decisions were made in favour of Hindus and Muslims were sent behind the bar.

Pakistan Resolution (1940)

With the beginning of the World War II in September 1939, the Viceroy of India Lord Linlithgow declared India's entrance into the war without consulting the provincial governments. In this situation, Jinnah called a general session of the All-India Muslim League in Lahore in 1940 to discuss the circumstances and also to analyze the reasons for the defeat of Muslim League in the Indian general election of 1937 in some Muslim majority provinces.

The Muslim League held its annual session from March 22-24, 1940 at Minto Park, Lahore. This session proved to be historical. On the first day of the session, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah narrated the events of the last few months. In an extempore speech he presented his own solution of the Muslim problem. He said that "the problem of India was not of an inter-communal nature, but manifestly an international one and must be treated as such."

To him the differences between Hindus and the Muslims were so great and so sharp that their union under one central government was full of serious risks. They belonged to two separate and distinct nations and therefore the only chance open was to allow them to have separate states.

In his speech, Jinnah recounted the contemporary situation, stressing that the problem of India was no more of an inter-communal nature, but manifestly an international.[83] He criticised the Congress and the nationalist Muslims, and espoused the Two-Nation Theory and the reasons for the demand for separate Muslim homelands. According to Stanley Wolpert, this was the moment when Jinnah, the former ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, totally transformed himself into Pakistan's great leader. [84]

In the words of Quaid-e-Azam: "Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations that are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their concepts on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap."

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[83] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website) Lahore Resolution (1940).*

[84] *Jinnah of Pakistan,* Stanley Wolpert Oxford University Press (1984).

He further said, "Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of nation. We wish our people to develop to the fullest spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state." .[85]

On March 23, 1940, at its historic session held at Minto Park in Lahore, the Muslim League passed the historic Lahore Resolution that also came to be commonly known as the **Pakistan Resolution**, demanding a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. The resolution formally called for the creation of an independent state in regions where Muslims constituted a majority. The resolution moved by the Bengal Chief Minister, A. K. Fazl-i-Haq, and introduced by Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman and others *inter alia* stated that:

> *"No constitutional plan would be workable or acceptable to the Muslims unless geographical contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary. That the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign...Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights of the minorities, with their consultation. Arrangements thus should be made for the security of Muslims where they were in a minority."*

The Resolution repudiated the concept of United India and recommended the creation of an independent Muslim state consisting of Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sindh and Balochistan in the northwest, and Bengal and Assam in the northeast. It was made a part of the All-India Muslim League's constitution in 1941. It was on the basis of this resolution that in 1946 the Muslim League decided to go for one state for the Muslims, instead of two.[86]

The Pakistan demand had a great appeal for the Muslims of every persuasion. It revived memories of their past greatness and promised future glory. They, therefore, responded to this demand immediately.

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[85] *The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan*, S. M. Ikram and Percival Spear; OUP (1955).

[86] *Essays on Pakistan*, Syed Iftikhar Ahmed, Alpha Bravo Publishers, Lahore (1983).

The Ideology of Pakistan

As early as in the beginning of the eleventh century, Abu Rehan al-Biruni who came to South Asia along with the troops of Mahmud Ghaznavi and stayed in the area for a long time had observed that Hindus differed from the Muslims in all matters and habits. In *Kitab-ul-Hind*, he compared the equality and brotherhood of the Muslim society with the inequality of the Hindu caste system. He further explained his argument by elabourating that the Hindus considered Muslims *mlachha*, or impure, forbidding any connection with them, be it intermarriage or any other bond of relationship. They even avoided sitting, eating and drinking with them, because they thought they would be "polluted".[87]

According to him, the Hindus looked at Muslims as "the devil's breed, and our doings as the very opposite of all that is good and proper". Al-Biruni, to many, is the real founder of the Two-Nation Theory in South Asia. A deep study of the history of this land proves that the differences between Hindus and Muslims were not confined to the struggle for political supremacy, but were also manifested in the clash of two social orders. Despite living together for more than a thousand years, they continued to develop different cultures and traditions. Their eating habits, music, architecture and script, are all poles apart. Even the language they speak and the dresses they wear are entirely different. [88]

The Ideology of Pakistan has its roots deep in history. The history of South Asia is largely a history of rivalry and conflict between the Hindus and Muslims of the region. Both communities have been living together in the same area since the early eighth century, since the advent of Islam in India. Yet, the two have failed to develop harmonious relations. The ideology of Pakistan also stems from the instinct of the Muslim community of South Asia to maintain their individuality by resisting all attempts by the Hindu society to absorb it.

Muslims of South Asia believe that Islam and Hinduism are not only two religions, but also two social orders that have given birth to two distinct cultures with no similarities.

After centuries of experience, the Muslims of South Asia genuinely believed that they were a nation in the modern sense of the word. The basis of their nationhood was not territorial, racial, linguistic or ethnic. It was ideological. They were a nation because they belonged to the same faith, Islam. On this basis, they considered it their fundamental right to be entitled to self-determination.

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[87] *http://storyofpakistan.com/al-biruni.*

[88] *ibid.*

Addressing the Lahore session of the All India Muslim League on March 22, 1940, Quaid-e-Azam was very close to al-Biruni's thesis in theme and tone. He stated "Hindus and Muslims belonged to two different religious philosophies, with different social customs and literature. They neither intermarry, nor eat together, and indeed belong to two different civilizations whose very foundations are based on conflicting ideas and concepts. Their outlook on life and of life is different," he said. He emphasized that in spite of the passage of about 1,000 years, the relations between the Hindus and Muslims could not attain the level of cordiality. [89]

The only difference between the writing of al-Biruni and the speech of Quaid-e-Azam was that al-Biruni made calculated predictions, while Quaid-e-Azam had history behind him to support his argument. The ideology of Pakistan took shape through an evolutionary process. Historical experience provided the base; Sir Syed Ahmad Khan began the period of Muslim self-awakening; Allama Iqbal provided the philosophical explanation; Quaid-e-Azam translated it into a political reality; and the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, by passing Objectives Resolution in March 1949, gave it legal sanction. [90]

The Two-Nation Theory

The Two-Nation Theory which eventually became the basis of India's partition stipulated that that there were two distinct nations, Hindus and Muslims, living in the territory of the subcontinent. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was the first exponent of the Two-Nation Theory in the modern era. He believed that India was a continent and not a country, and that among the vast population of different races and different creeds, Hindus and Muslims were the two major nations on the basis of nationality, religion, way-of-life, customs, traditions, culture and historical conditions. The politicization of the Muslim community came about as a consequence of three developments:

1. Various efforts towards Islamic reform and revival during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
2. The impact of Hindu-based nationalism.
3. The democratization of the government of British India.

While the antecedents of Muslim nationalism in India go back to the early Islamic conquests of the subcontinent, organizationally it stems from the demands presented by the Simla Deputation to Lord Minto, the governor-general of India, in October 1906, proposing separate electorates for the Indian Muslims. The principal reason behind this demand was the maintenance of a separate identity of the Muslim nationhood. In the same year, the founding of the All-India Muslim League, a separate political organization for Muslims, elucidated the fact that the Muslims of India had lost trust in the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress.

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[89] *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Columbia University Press, New York (1973)

[90] *http://storyofpakistan.com/al-biruni*

Besides being a Hindu-dominated body, the Congress leaders in order to win grass-root support for their political movements, used Hindu religious symbols and slogans, thereby arousing Muslim suspicions regarding the secular character of the Congress. Events like the Urdu-Hindi controversy (1867), the partition of Bengal (1905), and Hindu revivalism, set the two nations, the Hindus and the Muslims, further apart. Re-annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911 by the British government brought the Congress and the Muslim League on one platform.

Starting with the constitutional cooperation in the Lucknow Pact (1916), they launched the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements to press upon the British government the demand for constitutional reforms in India in the post-World War I era. But after the collapse of the Khilafat Movement, Hindu-Muslim antagonism was revived once again. The Muslim League rejected the proposals forwarded by the Nehru Report and they chose a separate path for themselves. The idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of northern India as proposed by Allama Iqbal in his famous Allahabad Address showed that the creation of two separate states for the Muslims and Hindus was the only solution.

The idea was reiterated during the Sindh provincial meeting of the League, and finally adopted as the official League position in the Lahore Declaration of March 23, 1940.

Thus, these historical, cultural, religious and social differences between the two nations accelerated the pace of political developments, finally leading to the division of British India into two separate, independent states, Pakistan and India, on August 14 and 15, 1947, respectively.

XI. PAKISTAN MOVEMENT: THE FINAL PHASE

The British government recognized the genuineness of the Pakistan demand indirectly in the proposals for the transfer of power which Sir Stafford Cripps brought to India in 1942. Both the Congress and the All-India Muslim League rejected these proposals for different reasons. The principle of secession of Muslim India as a separate dominion was, however, conceded in these proposals. After the failure, a prominent Congress leader, C. Rajagopalachari, suggested a formula for a separate Muslim state in the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress, which was rejected at that time but later on, in 1944, formed the basis of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks.

The Gandhi-Jinnah talks had eminent significance with regard to the political problems of India and the Pakistan Movement. The talks between the two great leaders of the subcontinent began in response to the general public's desire for a settlement of Hindu-Muslim differences. On July 17, 1944, Gandhi wrote a letter to Quaid-e-Azam in which he expressed his desire to meet him. Quaid-e-Azam asked the Muslim League for permission for this meeting. The League readily acquiesced.[91]

The Gandhi-Jinnah talks began in Bombay on September 19, 1944, and lasted till the 24th of the month. The talks were held directly and via correspondence. Gandhi told Quaid-e-Azam that he had come in his personal capacity and was representing neither the Hindus nor the Congress. Gandhi's real purpose behind these talks was to extract from Jinnah an admission that the whole proposition of Pakistan was absurd.

Quaid-e-Azam painstakingly explained the basis of the demand of Pakistan. "We maintain," he wrote to Gandhi, "that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a 100 million. We have our distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all the cannons of international law, we are a nation." He added that he was "convinced that the true welfare not only of the Muslims but of the rest of India lies in the division of India as proposed in the Lahore Resolution."

Gandhi, on the other hand, maintained that India was one nation and saw in the Pakistan Resolution "nothing but ruin for the whole of India." "If, however, Pakistan had to be conceded, the areas in which the Muslims are in an absolute majority should be demarcated by a commission approved by both the Congress and the Muslim League. The wishes of the people of these areas will be obtained through referendum. These areas, according to Gandhi's assertion, shall form a separate state as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination.

"There was to be a 'treaty of separation' which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communication, custom and the like which must necessarily continue to be the matters of common interest between the contracting countries."[92] This meant, in effect, that power over the whole of India should first be transferred to Congress, which thereafter would allow Muslim majority areas that voted for separation to be constituted, not as independent sovereign state but as part of an Indian federation. Gandhi contended that his offer gave the substance of the Lahore Resolution. Quaid-e-Azam did not agree to the proposal and the talks ended.

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[91] *Muslim Separatism in India,* Dr. Abdul Hamid, Oxford University Press.

[92] *ibid.*

The Pakistan demand was popularized during the World War II. Every section of the Muslim community - women, students, ulema and businessmen - was organized under the banner of the All-India Muslim League. Branches of the party were opened in the remote corners on the subcontinent. Literature in the form of pamphlets, books, magazines and newspapers was produced to explain the Pakistan demand and distributed widely. The support gained by the All-India Muslim League and its demand for Pakistan was tested after the failure of the Simla Conference, convened by the Viceroy Lord Wavell, in 1945.

Elections were called to determine the respective strength of the political parties. The All-India Muslim League election campaign was based on the Pakistan demand. The Muslim community responded to this call in an unprecedented way. Numerous Muslim parties were formed making united parliamentary board at the behest of the Congress to oppose the Muslim League. But the All-India Muslim League swept all the thirty seats in the Central Legislature and in the provincial elections also, its victory was outstanding.

After the elections, on April 8-9, 1946, the All-India Muslim League called a convention of the newly-elected League members in the Central and Provincial legislatures at Delhi. This convention, which constituted virtually a representative assembly of the Muslims of South Asia, on a motion by the Chief Minister of Bengal, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, reiterated the Pakistan demand in clearer terms.

At the end of World War II, the United Kingdom moved with increasing urgency to grant India independence. The Congress Party and the Muslim League, however, could not agree on the terms for a constitution or establishing an interim government.

Cripps Mission (1942)

The British government wanted to get the cooperation of the Indian people in order to deal with the war situation. The divergence between the two major representative parties of the country harassed the British government. It found it difficult to make the war a success without the cooperation of both the Hindus and the Muslims. On March 22, 1942, Britain sent Sir Stafford Cripps with constitutional proposals. The important points of the declaration were as follows:

(a) General elections in the provinces would be arranged as soon as the war ended.

(b) A new Indian dominion, associated with the United Kingdom would be created.

(c) Those provinces not joining the dominion could form their own separate union.

(d) Minorities were to be protected.

However, both the Congress and the Muslim League rejected these proposals. Jinnah opposed the plan, as it did not concede Pakistan. Thus, the plan came to nothing.

Gandhi-Jinnah Talks (1944)

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Wavell Plan and Simla Conference (1945)

In May 1945, Lord Wavell, the Viceroy of India, went to London and discussed his ideas about the future of India with the British government. The talks resulted in the formulation of a plan of action that was made public in June 1945. The plan is known as Wavell Plan. It suggested reconstitution of the Viceroy's Executive Council in which the Viceroy was to select persons nominated by the political parties. Different communities were also to get their due share in the Council and parity was reserved for Caste-Hindus and Muslims.

While declaring the plan, the Secretary of State for Indian Affairs made it clear that the British government wanted to listen to the ideas of all major Indian communities. Yet he said that it was only possible if the leadership of the leading Indian political parties agreed with the suggestions of the British government. To discuss these proposals with the leadership of major Indian parties, Wavell called for a conference at Simla on June 25, 1945. Leaders of both the Congress and the Muslim League attended the conference, which is known as the Simla Conference. However, differences arose between the leadership of the two parties on the issue of representation of the Muslim community.

The Muslim League claimed that it was the only party that represented the Muslims in India and thus all the Muslim representatives in the Viceroy's Executive Council should be its nominees. Congress, which had sent Maulana Azad as the leader of their delegation, tried to prove that their party represented all the communities living in India and thus should be allowed to nominate Muslim representative as well. Congress also opposed the idea of parity between the Caste-Hindus and the Muslims. All this resulted in a deadlock. Finally, Wavell announced the failure of his efforts on July 14. Thus the Simla Conference couldn't provide any hope of proceeding further.[93]

General Elections (1945-1946)

With the failure of the Simla Conference, Lord Wavell announced that the Central and Provincial Legislature elections would be held in the winter of 1945, after which a constitution-making body would be set up. He also announced that after the elections, the Viceroy would setup Executive Council that would have the support of the main Indian political parties. Both the Muslim League and the Congress opposed the proposal. Quaid-e-Azam declared that Muslims were not ready to accept any settlement less than a separate homeland for them and the All India Congress Committee characterized the proposal as vague, inadequate and unsatisfactory because it had not addressed the issue of independence.

Despite this, the two parties launched huge election campaigns. They knew that the elections would be crucial for the future of India, as the results were to play an important role in determining their standing. The League wanted to sweep the Muslim constituencies so as to prove that they were the sole representatives of the Muslims of subcontinent, while Congress wanted to prove that, irrespective of religion, they represent all the Indians. [94] Both the Muslim League and the Congress opposite slogans during their campaigns.

The Muslim League presented a one-point manifesto "If you want Pakistan, vote for the Muslim League". Quaid-e-Azam himself toured the length and breadth of India and tried to unite the Muslim community under the banner of the Muslim League. The Congress, on the other hand, stood for United India. To counter the Muslim League, the Congress press abused the Quaid and termed his demand for Pakistan as the "vivisection of Mother India", "reactionary primitivism" and "religious barbarism". Congress tried to brand Muslim League as an ultra-conservative clique of knights, *khan bahadurs*, toadies and government pensioners.

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[93] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

[94] *Muslim Separatism in India*, Dr. Abdul Hamid, Oxford University Press

The Congress also tried to get the support of all the provincial and central Muslim parties who had some differences with the League, and backed them in the elections. Elections for the Central Legislature were held in December 1945. Though the franchise was limited, the turnover was extraordinary. The Congress was able to sweep the polls for the non-Muslim seats. They managed to win more than 80 percent of the general seats and about 91.3 percent of the total general votes. The Leagues performance, however, was even more impressive: it managed to win all the 30 seats reserved for the Muslims.

The results of the provincial election held in early 1946 were not different. Congress won most of the non-Muslim seats while Muslim League captured approximately 95 percent of the Muslim seats. In a bulletin issued on January 6, 1946, the Central Election Board of the Congress claimed that the election results had vindicated the party as the biggest, strongest and the most representative organization in the country.

On the other hand, the League celebrated January 11, 1946, as the 'Day of Victory' and declared that the election results were enough to prove that Muslim League, under the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam, was the sole representative of the Muslims of the region.

Cabinet Mission Plan (1946)

All of the British government's attempts to establish peace between the Congress and the Muslim League had failed. The results of the general elections held in 1945-46 served to underline the urgency to find a solution to the political deadlock, which was the result of non-cooperation between the two major parties. The British government sent a Cabinet Mission to the subcontinent in early 1946 to resolve the constitutional deadlock.

The mission consisted of Lord Pathic Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty. The purpose of the mission was:

1. Preparatory discussions with elected representatives of British India and the Indian states in order to secure agreement as to the method of framing the Constitution.
2. Setting up of a constitution body.
3. Setting up an Executive Council with the support of the main Indian parties.

The Mission arrived on March 24, 1946, and conducted negotiations with various political parties but failed to evolve an agreed formula. Finally, the Cabinet Mission put forward its own proposals on May 16, 1946. The main points of the proposed plan were:

- There would be a Union of India comprising the British India and the Indian States which will be responsible for foreign affairs, defense and communications.
- There would be three federal groupings, one comprising six Hindu majority provinces and the other two comprising the Muslim majority provinces, namely the Punjab, North-Western Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the West and the provinces of Bengal and Assam in the East linked at the Center in a loose federation with three subjects. Provinces could opt out of any group after the first general elections.
- The provinces and the states shall be the basic units. All subjects other than the Union subjects and residuary powers would vest in the provinces; the states would retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.
- The Union would have an Executive and a Legislature.
- There would also be an interim government having the support of the major political parties.

The Muslim League accepted the Plan on June 6, 1946 as a strategic move, expecting to achieve its objective in a not-too-distant future. The Congress had also agreed to the Plan on May 24, 1946, though it rejected the interim setup and soon realizing the larger implications to the Congress, its leaders began to interpret it in a way not visualized by the authors of the Plan. Jawaharlal Nehru, addressing a press conference on July 10, said that the Congress had agreed to join the constituent assembly, but saying it would be free to make changes in the Cabinet Mission Plan.

The real obstacle, it soon became clear, was that Congress wanted total authority in India. the Hindus must be in absolute control; political power must not be shared with Muslims. In a letter to Cripps, Gandhi wrote, "If you have courage you will do what I suggested from the very beginning...You will have to choose between the two–the Muslim League and the Congress, both your creations.[95]

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[95] *The Emergence of Pakistan: Chaudhri Muhammad Ali; Columbia University Press, New York (1973)*

Interim Government (1946)

The Viceroy should now have invited the Muslim League to form the government as it had accepted the interim set-up; but he did not do so. This prompted the All-India Muslim League to withdraw its acceptance of the Cabinet Plan and the party observed August 16 as a 'Direct Action Day' to show Muslim solidarity in support of the Pakistan demand. It was further shocked when Viceroy Wavell invited the Congress to join the interim government, although it had practically rejected the plan.

However, the Viceroy soon realized the futility of the scheme without the participation of the League. Therefore, on October 14, 1946, he extended an invitation to them as well. An interim government was formed in October 1946 with the participation of the Muslim League. Liaquat Ali Khan, I. I. Chundrigar, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Jogandra Nath Mandal were included as ministers in the new interim set-up. Liaquat Ali Khan, as finance minister, and his other colleagues from the Muslim League were able to fight for the party objective from within the interim g overnment.

As minister of finance, the budget Liaquat Ali Khan presented what was called a "poor man's budget" as it adversely affected the Hindu capitalists. The deadlock between the Congress and the League further worsened in this set-up. Under these circumstances, the Muslim League disassociated itself from the Cabinet Plan and resorted to "Direct Action" to achieve Pakistan. As a result, Viceroy Wavell invited the Congress to join the interim government, although it had practically rejected the plan.

June 3, 1947 Partition Plan

Quaid-e-Azam made it clear that the demand for Pakistan had the support of all the Muslims of India and that he could not withdraw from it. After a short time the situation inside the interim government and outside convinced the Congress leadership to accept Pakistan as the only solution of the communal problem. The British government, after a last attempt to save the Cabinet Mission Plan in December 1946, also moved toward a plan for the partition of India.

On March 22, 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten arrived as the last viceroy with a clear mandate to draft a plan for the transfer of power. It was also announced that power would be transferred from British to Indian hands by June 1948. After holding talks with political leaders and parties, he prepared a Partition Plan in April

1947 for the transfer of power which, after its approval by the British government, was announced on June 3, 1947.[96]

Under this Plan, the British government declared that it would bestow full dominion status upon two successor states - India and Pakistan, formed from areas in the subcontinent in which Muslims were the majority population. Under this arrangement, the various princely states could freely join either India or Pakistan. Both the Congress and the Muslim League accepted the Plan. Interestingly, however, before the announcement of the plan, Nehru who was staying with Mountbatten as a guest in his residence at Simla, had a look at the plan and rejected it.

Mountbatten then asked V. P. Menon, the only Indian in his personal staff, to present a new plan for the transfer of power. Nehru edited Menon's formula and then Mountbatten himself took the new plan to London, where he got it approved without any alteration. Attlee and his cabinet gave the approval in a meeting that lasted not more than five minutes. In this way, the plan that was to decide the future of the Indo-Pak subcontinent was actually authored by a Congress-minded Hindu and was approved by Nehru himself.

Mountbatten came back from London on May 31, and on June 2 met seven Indian leaders. These were Nehru, Patel, Kriplalani, Quaid-e-Azam, Liaquat, Nishtar and Baldev Singh. After these leaders approved the plan, Mountbatten discussed it with Gandhi and convinced him that it was the best plan under the circumstances. The plan was made public on June 3, and is thus known as the June 3rd Plan.

The following were the main clauses of this Plan:

1. The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Punjab and Bengal were to meet in two groups, i.e. Muslim majority districts and non-Muslim majority districts. If any of the two decided in favour of the division of the province, then the Governor-General would appoint a boundary commission to demarcate the boundaries of the province on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims.
2. The Legislative Assembly of Sindh (excluding its European Members) was to decide either to join the existing Constituent Assembly or the New Constituent Assembly.
3. In order to decide the future of the North West Frontier Province, a referendum was proposed. The electoral college for the referendum was to be the same as the

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[96] *www.storyofpakistan.com (Website)*

electoral college for the provincial legislative assembly in 1946.

4. Balochistan was also to be given the option to express its opinion on the issue.
5. If Bengal decided in favour of partition, a referendum was to be held in the Sylhet District of Assam to decide whether it would continue as a part of Assam, or be merged with the new province of East Bengal.

At a press conference on June 4, 1947, Mountbatten stunned everyone by announcing August 15, 1947, as the date for the transfer of power—ten months earlier than scheduled earlier. The reasons for this haste are still the subject of debate, but it is probable that Mountbatten wanted to shock the quarrelling parties into realizing that they were hurtling toward a sectarian precipice. He claimed that "at every stage and every development of the June 3 Plan, he had worked hand in hand with Indian leaders and that the plan came as no shock and no surprise too them". It was clear Mountbatten he had been persuaded to do so by Congress leaders who wanted to advance the partition date for motivated reasons.

It was a conspiracy that was to benefit India. A hurried transfer of power would have given Pakistan no time to prepare itself for the challenges of a new state whereas the Indian Union was to inherit the entire administrative machinery of the Governmnet of India. In the remaining two month period, both Patel and Mountbatten had stipulated it would be impossible to carry out an orderly division of the administrative machinery and resources or even to complete the innumerable tasks involved in setting up the governments of Pakistan and of the partitioned provinces of the Pun jab and Bengal. No wonder, the rush only exacerbated the chaos.

RADCLIFFE AWARD

Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a British judge assigned to draw the borders of the two new states, was given barely forty days to remake the map of South Asia. As part of the partition plan, the boundaries had to be defined to ensure that provinces, districts, and villages that were predominantly Muslim went to Pakistan, while Hindu majority areas remained with India. Provinces like Baluchistan, Sindh, N. W. F. P. and East Bengal provided little difficulty. But serious problems arose in demarcation of boundaries in Punjab where other than Muslims, a substantial number of Hindus and Sikhs were also residing. Thus the province itself had to be partitioned along communal lines.[97]

In an almost frantic, cruel rush, the Boundary Commission divided districts, villages, farmlands, water and property. Not only that, last minute dubious changes were made in the agreed demarcation lines depriving Pakistan of Muslim majority districts of Ferozepur and Gurdaspur, both of vital strategic importance to Pakistan's future security and wellbeing. Likewise, in Bengal, contrary to the majority population rule, Calcutta was allocated to India. Even the announcement of the new borders was willfully delayed and finally announced two days after India's Independence.

Emergence of Pakistan

On June 3, 1947, British prime minister Clement Attlee introduced a bill in the House of Commons calling for the independence and partition of India. On July 14, the House of Commons passed the India Independence Act, by which two independent dominions were to be created on the subcontinent; the princely states were left to accede to either. The partition plan stated that contiguous Muslim-majority districts in Punjab and Bengal would go to Pakistan, provided that the legislatures of the two provinces agreed that the provinces should be partitioned - they did. Sindh's legislature and Balochistan's Jirga (council of tribal leaders) agreed to join Pakistan.

Accordingly, the Muslim majority provinces, Bengal and Punjab, were partitioned. The assemblies of West Punjab, East Bengal and Sindh and in Balochistan, the Quetta Municipality, and the Shahi Jirga voted for Pakistan. A plebiscite was held in the Sylhet District of Assam, and, as a result, part of the district was transferred to Pakistan. A plebiscite was also held in the North-West Frontier Province. Despite a boycott by Congress, the province was deemed to have chosen Pakistan.

The princely states, however, presented a more difficult problem. All but three of the more than 500 states quickly acceded to Pakistan or India under guidelines established with the aid of Mountbatten. The states made their decisions after giving consideration to the geographic location of their respective areas and to their religious majority. Hyderabad, the most populated of the princely states, was ruled by a Muslim but had a Hindu majority and was surrounded by territory that would go to India, and Junagadh (a small state with a Muslim prince but a Hindu majority) presented a problem. Both hesitated but were forcibly absorbed into India.

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[97] *The Emergence of Pakistan: Chaudhri Muhammad Ali; Columbia University Press, New York (1973)*

The accession of the third state, Jammu and Kashmir, could not be resolved peacefully, and its disputed status remains the outstanding core issue between India and Pakistan.

The British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act on July 18, 1947. The Act created two dominions, Indian Union and Pakistan. It also provided for the complete end of British control over Indian affairs from August 15, 1947. The Muslims of the subcontinent had finally achieved their goal to have an independent state for themselves, but only after a long and relentless struggle under the single-minded guidance of the Quaid-e-Azam.

Accordingly, on August 14, 1947, the new independent state of Pakistan, comprising West Pakistan with the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)[98], and East Pakistan with the province of East Bengal, came into existence.[99] At midnight the next day (August 15, 1947), India was also freed from the colonial rule, ending nearly 350 years of British presence in India.

The people of Pakistan faced a gamut of problems immediately after independence. However, keeping true to their traditions, they overcame them after a while. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was appointed the first governor-general of Pakistan and Liaquat Ali Khan became its first prime minister. Pakistan became a dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations.

AN UNPALATABLE LEGACY

The history of the partition of the sub-continent would remain incomplete without mentioning of the reaction of Congress leaders to Pakistan's creation and the ensuing unprecedented migration in both directions with a ferocious bloodbath. After the Second World War, Britain simply no longer had the resources with which to control its greatest imperial asset. No wonder, its exit from India was messy, hasty, and clumsily improvised. From the vantage point of the retreating colonizers, however, it was in one way fairly successful.

Whereas the British rule in India had long been marked by violent revolts and brutal suppressions, the British Army was able to march out of the country with barely a shot fired and only seven casualties. Thanks to their collusive policies and malafide actions, it is the people of the sub-continent who suffered the worst. By 1948, as the great migration drew to a close, more than fifteen million people economically."[102] The post-1947 history shows how tenaciously India kept pursuing its avowed designs against the new state of Pakistan. It never spared any opportunity to undermine Pakistan's security and stability.

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[98] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad (1986).

[99] *East Pakistan later (1971) became the independent nation of Bangladesh when it separated from Pakistan with India's military help.*

India's overbearing geographic centrality in our region creates many problems including the fear of domination among all its neighbours and a host of border and water disputes in the region all of which involve India, be it India-Pakistan, India-Bangladesh or India-Nepal. On independence, Pakistan was born like the Siamese Twins with its two halves joined together just by a little bit of 'heart and mind'. It was a house divided, not against itself but by a thousand miles of hostile territory, a situation with no parallel anywhere in the world. The 'heart and mind' connection was too weak to withstand the pressures of physical separateness, and within less than quarter of a century it got severed brutally through India's military intervention.

To make things even worse, in recent years, the so-called liberal elites and pseudo intellectuals in our society have been willfully distorting our history misleading the youth that Pakistan's birth was only 'an accident of history' and that the India-Pakistan border is no more than an artificial 'thin' line drawn on paper. They are naïve enough to believe that if we were to erase this artificial 'thin' line, we would be living happily thereafter at peace together as 'one people' with no need for any armed forces. They are sadly mistaken and need a tutorial in history to know that Pakistan is not an accident of history.

Those familiar with the history of the subcontinent know why having lived together for centuries, Hindus and Muslims remained poles apart in their attitudes to life with a different worldview altogether. This distinctiveness of the two communities was evident in the "encounter" between the two communities and their cultures that began over a thousand years ago. And yet, they remained distinct and far apart. Nobody can deny this reality; otherwise, there would not have been two states carved out of India in 1947. The artificial 'thin line' that they want to erase is not just a line on paper. It is a border of an independent state drawn in blood.

A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS

Besides suffering the difficulties of any newly-independent state, Pakistan's birth pangs came from the legacy of problems that it inherited on the sub-continent's partition and which threatened its unity and very survival in the aftermath of its independence. These included:

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[102] *While Memory Srves (London, Chassell, 1950)p.257*

1. Disputed Borders

As part of the partition plan, the British Government appointed a Boundary Commission under Sir Cyril Radcliffe to demarcate permanent borders of the two emergent states. The boundaries had to be defined to ensure that provinces, districts, and villages that were predominantly Muslim went to Pakistan, while Hindu majority areas remained with India. Provinces like Baluchistan, Sindh, N. W. F. P. and East Bengal provided little difficulty. But serious problems arose in demarcation of boundaries in Punjab where other than Muslims, a substantial number of Hindus and Sikhs were also residing. Thus the province itself had to be partitioned along communal lines. [103]

In an almost frantic, cruel rush, the Boundary Commission divided districts, villages, farmlands, water and property. Not only that, last minute dubious changes were made in the agreed demarcation lines depriving Pakistan of Muslim majority districts of Ferozepur and Gurdaspur, both of vital strategic importance to Pakistan's future security and wellbeing. Likewise, in Bengal, contrary to the majority population rule, Calcutta was allocated to India.

2. Refugee Problem

In the aftermath of partition, a huge population exchange occurred between the two newly formed states. About 15 million people crossed the borders with over 8 million Muslims coming to Pakistan from India while nearly 7 million Hindus and Sikhs moving to India from the areas in Pakistan. About 5.5 million settled in Punjab Pakistan and around 1.5 million settled in Sindh.

Since the boundaries of the two states were not final even until after their formal independence, thousands of innocent men, women and children were caught unaware. The result was that many hastened across the borders, leaving their homes, land and personal property to seek refuge on the other side. Panic, fear, revenge and reprisals followed. Both India and Pakistan were soaked in blood. It left on Pakistan's doorstep, eight million refugees who had to be rehabilitated, clothed, fed and sheltered.

3. Unfair Division of Assets

Partition also involved dividing of the assets of the Sub-continent. India, being the larger country, got the lion's share in all transactions, leaving Pakistan with minimal resources to survive and build on. Equally disastrous was the economic situation. There were not sufficient skilled personnel to run the railways, hospitals and offices. There weren't enough chairs, tables or even stationery and paper pins for administrative purposes. Food was scarce. Pakistan had no industry.

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[103] *The Emergence of Pakistan: Chaudhri Muhammad Ali; Columbia University Press, New York (1973)*

4. No Cash

At the time of partition, the cash balances of undivided India stood at about Rupees 4,000 million. At the beginning of December 1947, India and Pakistan mutually came to an agreement that Pakistan would get Rupees 750 million as her share. Rupees 200 million had been already paid to Pakistan while Rupees 550 million were to be paid immediately. But this amount was withheld on the plea that Pakistan would use it in the war going on in Kashmir. However, as this stand was morally untenable, the remaining amount was later on released after Gandhi's fast and under world pressure on January 15, 1948.

Soon afterwards, Sardar Patel threatened that the implementation of the agreement would depend upon the settlement of the Kashmir issue. But, it was upon Gandhi's request that the Reserved Bank of India paid Pakistan Rupees 500 million, retaining the balance of Rupees 50 million to adjust some trumped up claim against Pakistan

5. The Indus Waters Dispute

The most explosive of Indo-Pakistan disputes was the question of sharing the waters of the Indus basin. On April 1, 1948, India cut off the supply of water from the two head works under its control. Fortunately, Eugene Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development offered the offices of the Bank for the solution of the water problem in 1952. A solution acceptable to both governments was agreed upon in 1960 at the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement at Karachi. This treaty is commonly known as the **"Indus Waters Treaty".**

The Treaty allowed for a transitional period of 10 to 13 years, after which the three eastern rivers, Sutlej, Bias and Ravi would fall exclusively to India's share and the waters of three western rivers, Chenab, Jhelum and Indus were given to Pakistan. During the transitional period, Pakistan would construct a system of replacement works consisting of two dams, five barrages and seven link canals financed by the Indus Development Fund.

A Permanent Indus Commission was established to adjudicate any future disputes over the allocation of waters. The Commission has survived two wars and provides an ongoing mechanism for consultation and conflict resolution through mutual inspections, dialogue, exchange of data and visits. The Commission is required to meet regularly to discuss potential disputes as well as cooperative arrangements for the development of the basin.

Either party must notify the other of plans to construct any engineering works which would affect the other party and to provide data about such works. In cases of disagreement, a neutral expert is called in for mediation and arbitration. While neither side has initiated projects that could cause the kind of conflict that the Commission was created to resolve, the annual inspections and exchange of data continue, unperturbed by tensions on the subcontinent.

More controversial, however, were the provisions on how the waters were to be shared. Since Pakistan's rivers flow through India first, the treaty allowed India to use them for irrigation, transport and power generation, while laying down precise do's and don'ts for Indian building projects along the way. The Indus Waters Treaty is however the longest agreement that has survived wars and is despite occasional differences is being implemented and upheld by the two countries.

In recent years, the two countries have been embroiled in two high-profile legal fights over India's controversial Baglihar Dam and 330 megawatt Kishan Ganga project in the Occupied Kashmir. The International Court of Arbitration has since asked India to temporarily stop some constructions on the project while assessments are being made. Pakistan is also considering arbitration to iron out differences over another dam — the Nimoo Bazgo — on the Indus. Pakistan has been experiencing water shortages that can be attributed to unauthorised upper riparian actions. Few believe India and Pakistan will actually go to war over the disputes, but one thing is for certain: water is making it harder for the long-time rivals to put their enmity behind them.

6. Disputed Accession of States

Prior to partition, there existed in British India many semi-autonomous Princely states whose future had to be settled before Britain withdrew from India. There were some 560 such states all over the Sub-continent. Some fell within Indian Territory, others in Pakistan.

According to the instruments of partition of India, the rulers of princely states were given the choice to freely accede to either India or Pakistan, or to remain independent. They were, however, advised to accede to the contiguous dominion, taking into consideration the geographical and ethnic issues. On July 25, 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten (the last Viceroy of India) in his address to the Chamber of Princes also advised them that in deciding the question of accession, they should take into consideration communal composition and the geographical location of their states.

Nearly all the states accepted the reality of the situation and opted either for Pakistan or India accordingly. But there were four states, Junagadh, Hyderabad, Jodhpur and Kashmir, which because of their peculiar situation did not conform to the agreed principle of partition:

(i) Junagadh

The ruler of Junagadh was a Muslim but 80 percent of his subjects were Hindus. On September 15, 1947, the Nawab acceded to Pakistan, despite the fact that his state did not fall within the geographical grouping of Pakistan. India protested, stormed in her troops, and forcibly reversed the Nawab's decision and Junagadh became a part of India.

(ii) Hyderabad

Hyderabad, the second of the non-conformist states was the largest and richest in India. Its population was 85 percent Hindu but the ruler (Nizam) was a Muslim. He was reluctant to accede either to India or Pakistan but was dismissed by Mountbatten for adopting this course. The Nizam was forced by the Indian government and Lord Mountbatten to join India. A standstill agreement was concluded between India and Hyderabad.

The Hindu subjects were incited to revolt against the Nizam's desire to be independent. The whole province suffered turmoil and violence. Hyderabad filed a compliant with the Security Council of the United Nations. Before the hearing could be started, Indian troops entered Hyderabad to "restore order", and under the pretext of "police action" Hyderabad was forced to join India. The Hyderabad army surrendered on September 17, 1948, and finally Hyderabad was annexed into the Indian Union.

(iii) Jodhpur

Yet another prince, the Maharaja of Jodhpur, expressed a wish to join Pakistan but Mountbatten warned him that his subjects were mostly Hindus and his accession to Pakistan would create problems. As a result Jodhpur, too, acceded to India.

(iv) Jammu & Kashmir

The case of Jammu & Kashmir was the reverse of Hyderabad. The ruler was Hindu while the population was overwhelmingly

Muslim and wanted to join Pakistan. India consistently pressurized the Hindu ruler to accede to India. Apprehending that the Hindu ruler was likely to succumb to Indian pressure, the people of Jammu and Kashmir rose against him, forcing him to flee from Srinagar. On 24th October 1947 they formed their own government.

On 27th October, the Government of India announced that the Hindu ruler had acceded to India. This claim was made on the basis of a fraudulent instrument of accession that it had obtained from the Hindu ruler. India sent its forces into the State and occupied a large part of Jammu and Kashmir. Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Viceroy Lord Mountbatten, solemnly declared that the people of the State would decide the final status of Jammu and Kashmir.

India took the matter to the UN Security Council in 1948. The UN Security Council through its Security Council Resolutions No. 47 (1948), 51 (1948), 80 (1950) and the United Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 declared that accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. These UN resolutions were accepted by both India and Pakistan.

Prime Minister Nehru declared before the Indian Parliament that India was committed to holding a free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir. However, India reneged on its commitment to hold plebiscite and has been obstructed all attempts for implementation of UNSC resolutions. In 1951 India projected the rigged assembly elections in the Indian occupied Kashmir as a substitute to the UN sponsored plebiscite.

The UN Security Council Resolution No.91 (1951) denied the authority of the Constituent Assembly to decide about the future of the state and reminded the parties that the final disposition of the state of Jammu & Kashmir is to be made in accordance with the will of the people of Kashmir. The UN Resolution No.122 (1957) reaffirmed the earlier resolution of 1951 stating that the elections could not be held as substitute to the plebiscite.

India now claims that Kashmir is an integral part of India. This contention is misleading and incorrect because the disputed character of Jammu & Kashmir has been recognized by the UN, accepted by both India and Pakistan and endorsed by the international community. For more than sixty five years now, the people of Kashmir are awaiting the exercise of their right to self-determination. Several efforts, for resolution of the issue, both at multilateral and bilateral levels have failed to show any meaningful result.

The Kashmir dispute continues to bedevil relations between Pakistan and India. Non-implementation of the Security Council resolutions coupled with the massive violations of the human rights by the Indian Security Forces is also a challenge for the international community.

CHAPTER 2

POST-INDEPENDENCE PAKISTAN - A CHEQUERED HISTORY

I. THE FOUNDER OF PAKISTAN

Father of the Nation Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's achievement as the founder of Pakistan, dominates everything else he did in his long and crowded public life spanning some 42 years. Yet, by any standard, his was an eventful life, his personality multidimensional and his achievements in other fields were many, if not equally great.

Indeed, several were the roles he had played with distinction: at one time or another, he was one of the greatest legal luminaries India had produced during the first half of the century, an 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity', a great constitutionalist, a distinguished parliamentarian, a top-notch politician, an indefatigable freedom-fighter, a dynamic Muslim leader, a political strategist and, above all one of the great nation builders of modern times.

What, however, makes him so remarkable is the fact that while similar other leaders assumed the leadership of traditionally well-defined nations and espoused their cause, or led them to freedom, he created a nation out of an inchoate and down-trodden minority and established a cultural and national home for it, and all that within a decade. For over three decades before the successful culmination in 1947, of the Muslim struggle for freedom in the South-Asian subcontinent, Jinnah had provided political leadership to the Indian Muslims: initially as one of the leaders, but later, since 1947, as the only prominent leader - the Quaid-e-Azam.

For over 30 years, he had guided their affairs; he had given expression, coherence and direction to their legitimate aspirations and cherished dreams; he had formulated these into concrete demands; and, above all, he had striven all the while to get them conceded by both the ruling British and the numerous Hindus the dominant segment of India's population. And for over 30 years he had fought, relentlessly and inexorably, for the inherent rights of the Muslims for an honourable existence in the subcontinent.

Indeed, his life story constitutes, as it were, the story of the rebirth of the Muslims of the subcontinent and their spectacular rise to nationhood. Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim states in the world, is a living and exemplary monument of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. With his untiring efforts, indomitable will, and dauntless courage, he united the Indian Muslims under the banner of the Muslim League and carved out a homeland for them, despite stiff opposition from the Hindu Congress and the British government.

Early Life

Born on December 25, 1876, in a prominent mercantile family in Karachi and educated at the Sindh Madrassat-ul-Islam and the Christian Mission School at his birthplace, Jinnah joined the Lincoln's Inn in 1893 to become the youngest Indian to be called to the Bar, three years later.

Starting out in the legal profession with nothing to fall back upon except his native ability and determination, young Jinnah rose to prominence and became Bombay's most successful lawyer, as few did, within a few years. Once he was firmly established in the legal profession, Jinnah formally entered politics in 1905 from the platform of the Indian National Congress. He went to England in that year along with Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915), as a member of a Congress delegation to plead the cause of Indian self-government during the British elections.

A year later, he served as secretary to Dadabhai Noaroji (1825-1917), the then Indian National Congress president, which was considered a great honour for a budding politician. Here, at the Calcutta Congress session (December 1906), he also made his first political speech in support of the resolution on self-government.

Political Career

Three years later, in January 1910, Jinnah was elected to the newly-constituted Imperial Legislative Council. All through his parliamentary career, which spanned some four decades, he was probably the most powerful voice in the cause of Indian freedom and Indian rights. Jinnah, who was also the first Indian to pilot a private member's Bill through the Council, soon became a leader of a group inside the legislature.

Montague (1879-1924), Secretary of State for India, at the close of the World War I, considered Jinnah perfect mannered, impressive-looking, armed to the teeth with dialectics..."Jinnah," he felt, "is a very clever man, and it is, of course, an outrage that such a man should have no chance of running the affairs of his own country." For about three decades since his entry into politics in 1906, Jinnah passionately believed in and assiduously worked for Hindu-Muslim unity. Gokhale, the foremost Hindu leader before Gandhi, had once said of him, "He has the true stuff in him and that freedom from all sectarian prejudice which will make him the best ambassador of "Hindu-Muslim unity".

And, to be sure, he did become the architect of Hindu-Muslim unity; he was responsible for the Congress-League Pact of 1916, known popularly as Lucknow Pact - the only pact ever signed between the two political organizations, the Congress and the All-India Muslim League, representing, as they did, the two major communities in the subcontinent. The Congress-League scheme embodied in this pact was to become the basis for the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, also known as the Act of 1919.

In retrospect, the Lucknow Pact represented a milestone in the evolution of Indian politics. For one thing, it conceded Muslims the right to separate electorate, reservation of seats in the legislatures and weightage in representation both at the Centre and the minority provinces. Thus, their retention was ensured in the next phase of reforms.

For another, it represented a tacit recognition of the All-India Muslim League as the representative organization of the Muslims, thus strengthening the trend towards Muslim individuality in Indian politics. And to Jinnah goes the credit for all this.

By 1917, Jinnah came to be recognized among both Hindus and Muslims as one of India's most outstanding political leaders. Not only was he prominent in the Congress and the Imperial Legislative Council, he was also the president of the All-India Muslim League and that of the Bombay Branch of the Home Rule League. More importantly, because of his key-role in the Congress-League entente at Lucknow, he was hailed as the "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity."

Constitutional Struggle

In subsequent years, however, he felt dismayed at the injection of violence into politics. Since Jinnah stood for "ordered progress", moderation, gradualism and constitutionalism, he felt that political violence was not the pathway to national liberation but, the dark alley to disaster and destruction. In the ever-growing frustration among the masses caused by colonial rule, there was ample cause for extremism. But, Gandhi's doctrine of non-cooperation, Jinnah felt, was at best one of negation and despair: it might lead to the building up of resentment, but nothing constructive. Hence, he opposed tooth and nail the tactics adopted by Gandhi to exploit the Khilafat and wrongful tactics in the Punjab in the early '20s.

On the eve of its adoption of the Gandhian programme, Jinnah warned the Nagpur Congress session (1920): "You are making a declaration (of *Swaraj* within a year) and committing the Indian National Congress to a programme, which you will not be able to carry out." He felt that there was no shortcut to independence and that any extra-constitutional methods could only lead to political violence, lawlessness and chaos, without bringing India nearer to the threshold of freedom. The future course of events was not only to confirm Jinnah's worst fears, but also to prove him right.

Although Jinnah left the Congress soon thereafter, he continued his efforts towards bringing about a Hindu-Muslim entente, which he rightly considered "the most vital condition of Swaraj". However, because of the deep distrust between the two communities as evidenced by the country-wide communal riots, and because the Hindus failed to meet the genuine demands of the Muslims, his efforts came to naught. One such effort was the formulation of the Delhi Muslim Proposals in March 1927.

In order to bridge Hindu-Muslim differences on the constitutional plan, these proposals even waived the Muslim right to separate electorate, the most basic Muslim demand since 1906, which though recognized by the Congress in the Lucknow Pact, had again become a source of friction between the two communities. Surprisingly though, the Nehru Report (1928), which represented the Congress-sponsored proposals for the future constitution of India, negated the minimum Muslim demands embodied in the Delhi Muslim Proposals.

In vain Jinnah argued at the National Convention of Congress in 1928 that "What we want is that Hindus and Mussalmans should march together until our objective is achieved...These two communities have got to be reconciled and united and made to feel that their interests are common." The Convention's blank refusal to accept Muslim demands represented the most devastating setback to Jinnah's life-long efforts to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity, it meant "the last straw" for the Muslims, and "the parting of the ways" for him, as he confessed to a Parsee friend at that time.

Jinnah's disillusionment at the course of politics in the subcontinent prompted him to migrate and settle down in London in the early '30s. He was, however, to return to India in 1934, at the pleadings of his co-religionists, and assume their leadership. But, the Muslims presented a sad spectacle at that time. They were a mass of disgruntled and demoralized men and women, politically disorganized and destitute of a clear-cut political programme.

Muslim League Reorganized

Thus, the task that awaited Jinnah was anything but easy. The Muslim League was dormant: even its provincial organizations were, for the most part, ineffective and only nominally under the control of the central organization. Nor did the central body have any coherent policy of its own till the Bombay session (1936), which Jinnah organized.

To make matters worse, the provincial scene presented a sort of a jigsaw puzzle: in the Punjab, Bengal, Sind, the North West Frontier, Assam, Bihar and the United Provinces, various Muslim leaders had set up their own provincial parties to serve their personal ends. Extremely frustrating as the situation was, the only consolation Jinnah had at this juncture was in Allama Iqbal (1877-1938), the poet-philosopher, who stood steadfast by him and helped to chart the course of Indian politics from behind the scene.

Undismayed by this bleak situation, Jinnah devoted himself to the sole purpose of organizing the Muslims on one platform. He embarked upon country-wide tours. He pleaded with provincial Muslim leaders to sink their differences and make common cause with the League. He exhorted the Muslim masses to organize themselves and join the League. He gave coherence and direction to Muslim sentiments on the Government of India Act, 1935.

He advocated that the Federal Scheme should be scrapped as it was subversive of India's cherished goal of complete responsible government, while the provincial scheme, which conceded provincial autonomy for the first time, should be worked for what it was worth, despite its certain objectionable features. He also formulated a viable League manifesto for the election scheduled for early 1937. He was, it seemed, struggling against time to make Muslim India a power to be reckoned with.

Despite all the manifold odds stacked against it, the Muslim League won some 108 (about 23 per cent) seats out of a total of 485 Muslim seats in the various legislatures. Though not very impressive in itself, the League's partial success assumed added significance in view of the fact that the League won the largest number of Muslim seats and that it was the only all-India party of the Muslims in the country.

Thus, the elections represented the first milestone on the long road to putting Muslim India on the map of the subcontinent. Congress in power with the year 1937 opened the most momentous decade in modern Indian history. In that year came into force the provincial part of the Government of India Act, 1935, granting autonomy to Indians for the first time, in the provinces.

The Congress, having become the dominant party in Indian politics, came to power in seven provinces exclusively, spurning the League's offer of cooperation, turning its back finally on the coalition idea and excluding Muslims as a political entity from the portals of power. In that year, also, the Muslim League, under Jinnah's dynamic leadership, was reorganized *de novo*, transformed into a mass organization, and made the spokesman of Indian Muslims as never before.

Above all, in that momentous year were initiated certain trends in Indian politics, the crystallization of which in subsequent years made the partition of the subcontinent inevitable. The practical manifestation of the policy of the Congress which took office in July 1937, in seven out of eleven provinces, convinced Muslims that, in the Congress scheme of things, they could live only on sufferance of Hindus and as "second class" citizens.

The Congress provincial governments, it may be remembered, had embarked upon a policy and launched a programme in which Muslims felt that their religion, language and culture were not safe. This blatantly aggressive Congress policy was seized upon by Jinnah to awaken the Muslims to a new consciousness, organize them on all-India platform, and make them a power to be reckoned with. He also gave coherence, direction and articulation to their innermost, yet vague, urges and aspirations. Above all, he filled them with his indomitable will, his own unflinching faith in their destiny.

The New Awakening

As a result of Jinnah's ceaseless efforts, the Muslims awakened from what Professor Baker calls (their) "unreflective silence" (in which they had so complacently basked for long decades), and to "the spiritual essence of nationality" that had existed among them for a pretty long time. Roused by the impact of successive Congress hammerings, the Muslims, as Ambedkar (principal author of independent India's Constitution) says, "searched their social consciousness in a desperate attempt to find coherent and meaningful articulation to their cherished yearnings. To their great relief, they discovered that their sentiments of nationality had flamed into nationalism".

In addition, not only had they developed the will to live as a "nation", had also endowed them with a territory which they could occupy and make a State as well as a cultural home for the newly discovered nation. These two prerequisites provided the Muslims with the intellectual justification for claiming a distinct nationalism (apart from Indian or Hindu nationalism) for themselves. So that when, after their long pause, the Muslims gave expression to their innermost yearnings, these turned out to be in favour of a separate Muslim nationhood and of a separate Muslim state.

The formulation of the Muslim demand for Pakistan in 1940 had a tremendous impact on the nature and course of Indian politics. On the one hand, it shattered for ever the Hindu dreams of a pseudo-Indian, in fact, Hindu empire on British exit from India: on the other, it heralded an era of Islamic renaissance and creativity in which the Indian Muslims were to be active participants. The Hindu reaction was quick, bitter, and malicious.

Equally hostile were the British to the Muslim demand, their hostility having stemmed from their belief that the unity of India was their main achievement and their foremost contribution. The irony was that both the Hindus and the British had not anticipated the astonishingly tremendous response that the Pakistan demand had elicited from the Muslim masses. Above all, they failed to realize how a hundred million people had suddenly become supremely conscious of their distinct nationhood and their high destiny.

In channelling the course of Muslim politics towards Pakistan, no less than in directing it towards its consummation in the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, none played a more decisive role than did Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. It was his powerful advocacy of the case of Pakistan and his remarkable strategy in the delicate negotiations that followed the formulation of the Pakistan demand, particularly in the post-war period, that made Pakistan inevitable.

Leader of a Free Nation

In recognition of his singular contribution, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was nominated by the Muslim League as the governor-general of Pakistan, while the Congress appointed Mountbatten as India's first governor-general. Pakistan, it has been truly said, was born in virtual chaos. Indeed, few nations in the world have started on their career with almost no resources and in more treacherous circumstances. The new nation did not inherit a central government, a capital, an administrative core, or an organized defence force.

The establishment of Pakistan brought even greater responsibilities for Jinnah. The refugee problem, the withholding of Pakistani assets by India, and the Kashmir problem were a real test for the Quaid. However, his indomitable will prevailed. He worked out a sound economic policy, established an independent currency and the State Bank for Pakistan. He chose Karachi as the federal capital. The Punjab holocaust had left vast areas in shambles with communications disrupted. This, along with the *en masse* exodus of the Hindu and Sikh business and managerial classes, left the economy almost shattered.

With India denying Pakistan the major share of its cash balances, the treasury was empty. On top of all this, the still unorganized nation was called upon to feed some eight million refugees who had fled the insecurities and barbarities of the north Indian plains that long, hot summer. If all this was symptomatic of

Pakistan's administrative and economic weakness, the Indian annexation, through military action in November 1947, of Junagadh (which had originally acceded to Pakistan) and the Kashmir war over the State's accession (October 1947-December 1948) exposed her military weakness. In the circumstances, therefore, it was nothing short of a miracle that Pakistan survived at all. That it survived and forged ahead was mainly due to one man - Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

The nation desperately needed a charismatic leader at that critical juncture in the nation's history, and he fulfilled that need profoundly. After all, he was more than a mere governor-general: he was the Quaid-e-Azam who had brought the State into being. His very presence at the helm of affairs was responsible for enabling the newly-born nation to overcome the terrible crisis on the morrow of its cataclysmic birth. He mustered up the immense prestige and the unquestioning loyalty he commanded among the people to energize them, to raise their morale, to raise the profound feelings of patriotism that the freedom had generated, along constructive channels.

Though tired and in poor health, Jinnah yet carried the heaviest part of the burden in that first crucial year. He laid down the policies of the new state, called attention to the immediate problems confronting the nation and told the members of the Constituent Assembly, the civil servants and the armed forces what to do and what the nation expected of them. He saw to it that law and order was maintained at all costs, despite the provocation that the large-scale riots in north India had provided.

He moved from Karachi to Lahore for a while and supervised the immediate refugee problem in the Punjab. In a time of fierce excitement, he remained sober, cool and steady. He advised his excited audience in Lahore to concentrate on helping the refugees, to avoid retaliation, exercise, restraint and protect the minorities. He assured the minorities of a fair deal, assuaged their inured sentiments, and gave them hope and comfort. He toured the various provinces, attended to their particular problems and instilled in the people a sense of belonging.

He reversed the British policy in the North-West Frontier and ordered the withdrawal of the troops from the tribal territory of Waziristan, thereby making the Pathans feel themselves an integral part of Pakistan's body-politics. He created a new Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, and assumed responsibility for ushering in a new era in Balochistan. He settled the controversial question of the states of Karachi, secured the accession of States, especially of Kalat which seemed problematical and carried on negotiations with Lord Mountbatten for the settlement of the Kashmir issue.

The Quaid's Last Message

It was, therefore, with a sense of supreme satisfaction at the fulfillment of his mission that Jinnah told the nation in his last message on August 14, 1948: "The foundations of your State have been laid and it is now for you to build and build as quickly and as well as you can". In accomplishing the task he had taken upon himself on the morrow of Pakistan's birth, Jinnah had worked himself to death, but he had, to quote Richard Simmons, "contributed more than any other man to Pakistan's survival." Quaid-e-Azam had been ailing since long before Independence. By the time of Independence, he was quite an old man but still possessing a strong spirit. He hid the debilitating weakness caused by severely advanced tuberculosis. Researchers like Prof. Stanley Wolpert believed that by the end, cancer had developed as well. Quaid-e-Azam was convinced that if word of illness leaked out, his opponents would make the most of it. He denied his illness even to himself and remained intent and unflinching so as to achieve the dream of millions of Muslims.

At the time of independence, he was worn out by his intense struggle and opted to take the position of governor-general instead of that of Prime Minister. It had been proposed that the last Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, be allowed to continue as a joint governor-general of both Pakistan and India. Quaid-e-Azam refused to accept this proposal as he felt that a joint governor-general would not be able to do justice to both the countries. He firmly believed that since Pakistan was a sovereign state, it must be sovereign in all respects with its own executive and government. By this time, both aging and illness had mounted a terrible toll upon the Quaid. Although the flame still burnt bright, it was now at the cost of his own life. His physicians regularly advised him to take care of his health and to ease back on his work. But he never cared for it and kept on working hard day and night.

The Quaid's sickness grew more serious until his death on September 11, 1948. He was buried in Karachi amidst the tears of the entire nation mourning an irreparable loss. A man such as Jinnah, who had fought for the inherent rights of his people all through his life and who had taken up the somewhat unconventional and the largely misinterpreted cause of Pakistan, was bound to generate violent opposition and excite implacable hostility and was likely to be largely misunderstood. But what is most remarkable about Jinnah is that he was the recipient of some of the greatest tributes paid to any one in modern times, some of them even from those who held a diametrically opposed viewpoint. Aga Khan considered him "the greatest man he ever met". Beverley Nichols, the author of *Verdict on*

India, called him "the most important man in Asia", and Dr. Kailashnath Katju, the West Bengal Governor in 1948, thought of him as "an outstanding figure of this century not only in India, but in the whole world."

While Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, secretary-general of the Arab League, called him "one of the greatest leaders in the Muslim world." The Grand Mufti of Palestine considered his death as a "great loss" to the entire world of Islam. It was, however, given to Surat Chandra Bose, leader of the Forward Bloc wing of the Indian National Congress, to sum up succinctly his personal and political achievements. "Mr. Jinnah," he said on his death in 1948, "was great as a lawyer, once great as a Congressman, great as a leader of Muslims, great as a world politician and diplomat, and greatest of all as a man of action. By Mr. Jinnah's passing away, the world has lost one of the greatest statesmen and Pakistan its life-giver, philosopher and guide." Such was Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the man and his mission, such the range of his accomplishments and achievements. [1]

On September 13, 1947, world's newspapers carried profuse obituaries on Pakistan's Father of the Nation some of which were of historic significance. *The Times of London* wrote:

> *"Mr. Jinnah was something more than Quaid-e-Azam, supreme head of the State, to the people who followed him; he was more even than the architect of the Islamic nation he personally called into being. He commanded their imagination as well as their confidence. In the face of difficulties which might have overwhelmed him, it was given to him to fulfill the hope foreshadowed in the inspired vision of the great Iqbal by creating for the Muslims of India a homeland where the old glory of Islam could grow afresh into a modern state, worthy of its place in the community of nations. Few statesmen have shaped events to their policy more surely than Mr. Jinnah. He was a legend even in his lifetime."*[2]

The New York Times also came out with a long tribute to the Quaid while presciently looking at his early demise not only as an irreparable loss to the state of Pakistan but also a setback to the region. It said:

> *"The sudden death of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Governor General of the Dominion of Pakistan, adds a further complication to the complex situation on the Indian sub-*

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[1] *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan Website* (2012): *http://www.mofa.gov.pk*

[2] *The Times of London*, September 13, 1948.

> *continent. Pakistan has been left leaderless. Mr. Jinnah had resigned his presidency of the Moslem League (which actually governs Pakistan), holding that it was inappropriate for the Governor General to be also the titular head of a political party. But Mr. Jinnah had always been more than that, in any case. He was the Quaid-e-Azam, the real leader of India's Moslems. He was usually the brain, always the heart, of the Moslem League..."*
>
> *"It is not clear who will replace him, or, indeed, if he can be replaced. None stands out yet as a potential Jinnah. It seems inevitable that there will be a struggle for leadership and control and the form that struggle takes may well determine the course of events in that part of the world for the next decade." The New York Times concluded: "Today, as millions mourn Mr. Jinnah, there is also the hope that somehow there can be found some way of calm out of turbulence, of peace out of strife. But that miracle, like the other, cannot be worked in abstractions. It is not a matter of successions, or slogans, or positions, or policies. It is a matter of individual human beings who want peace and justice and brotherly love."*[3]

There couldn't be better depiction of the Quaid's greatness than what his biographer, an eminent historian Stanley Wolpert chose to begin the preface of his book *Jinnah of Pakistan*:

> *"Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Muhammad Ali Jinnah did all three. Hailed as "Great Leader" (Quaid-e-Azam) of Pakistan and its first governor general, Jinnah virtually conjured that country into statehood by the force of his indomitable will."*[4]

There has never been so great a need to revisit Mohammad Ali Jinnah's legacy as now, under the changed circumstances, to renew our resolve to adhere to his ideals, his principles and his vision of Pakistan. Nor has there been so much urgency to disseminate and popularize the political philosophy of Mr Jinnah — the Quaid-e-Azam to most of us — which has now largely been either ignored by the political community or hijacked by obscurantist forces and even distorted by self-serving ideologues to suit their own designs.

II. ALLAMA IQBAL: THE THINKER OF PAKISTAN

Sir Muhammad Iqbal, known as Allama Iqbal is the poet-philosopher of Pakistan who is widely regarded as having inspired the Pakistan Movement. He was an eminent academic, barrister, scholar and a renowned political leader in British India (November 9, 1877-April 21, 1938). Besides being one of the most important figures in Urdu literature with literary work in both Urdu and Persian languages, he is recognized the world over a great Muslim philosophical thinker of modern times. Iqbal is also known as *Shair-e-Mashriq* (Poet of the East), *Muffakir-e-Pakistan* (The Inceptor of Pakistan) and *Hakeem-ul-Ummat* (The Sage of the Ummah). In Iran and Afghanistan he is popularly known as Iqbāl-e Lāhorī or Iqbal of Lahore, and he is highly appreciated for his Persian work.

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[3] *The New York Times*, September 13, 1948.

[4] *Jinnah of Pakistan*, Stanley Wolpert; Oxford University Press, New York. (1984).

Iqbal received his early education in the traditional *maktab*. Later, he joined the Sialkot Mission School, from where he passed his matriculation examination. In 1897, he obtained his Bachelor of Arts Degree from Government College, Lahore. Two years later, he secured his Masters Degree and was appointed in the Oriental College, Lahore, as a lecturer of history, philosophy and English. In 1905, he travelled to Europe for his higher education. Having obtained a degree at Cambridge, he secured his doctorate at Munich and finally qualified as a barrister. Working under the guidance of Friedrich Hommel, Iqbal published his doctoral thesis in 1908 entitled: The Development of Metaphysics in Persia.[5]

In early years of his life, Iqbal stood for composite Indian nationalism. His Urdu poetry before 1906 and specifically poems such as 'The New Temple' and 'The Indian Anthem' bear ample testimony to this fact. His visit to Europe was a turning point with his thoughts evolving from Indian nationalism to Muslim nationalism. On his return to India in 1908, besides teaching and practising law, Iqbal continued to write poetry. He resigned from government service in 1911 and took up the task of propagating individual thinking among the Muslims through his poetry. He also carved out his views on Islamic universalism.

Deeply concerned as Iqbal was to see the Muslim peoples remain firmly anchored to their pristine Islamic legacy and heritage, he sought to resolve the inherent conflict between nationalism, the prime fact of national life in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and pan-Islamism, the ideal towards which he would like to see them strive. Thus, like the obsessively pan-Islamist Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) in the late nineteenth century, of whom Iqbal was a confirmed admirer, he, obviously after a long detour and excruciating reappraisal, finally arrived at the concept of a synthetic "Islamic" – but, more accurately, Muslim nationalism.[6]

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[5] ***storyofpakistan.com/allamaiqbal***

[6] ***historypak.com***

Iqbal believed that European concept of nationalism could not be applied to India where two distinct communities were living and did not share common language, culture or history. The Muslims possessed separate identity with their own religious and cultural values. These views were expressed in his poem 'The Anthem of the Islamic Community'.[7] Iqbal's first poetry collection, *Asrar-e-Khudi,* appeared in the Persian language in 1915. His other books of poetry include *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi, Payam-i-Mashriq* and *Zabur-i-Ajam.* Amongst these his best known Urdu works are *Bang-i-Dara, Bal-i-Jibril, Zarb-i Kalim* and a part of *Armughan-e-Hijaz.* [8]

By 1928, his reputation as a great Muslim philosopher was solidly established and he was invited to deliver lectures at Hyderabad, Aligarh and Madras. These series of lectures were later published as a book *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.*

In 1930, Iqbal was invited to preside over the open session of the Muslim League at Allahabad. In his historic Allahabad Address, Iqbal visualized an independent and sovereign state for the Muslims of North-Western India. These thoughts crystallized at Allahabad Session (December 1930) of the All India Muslim League, when in his Presidential Address, Iqbal presented the concept of a Muslim State in India. [9]

> *"I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan into a single State. Self-Government within the British Empire or without the British Empire. The formation of the consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of the North-West India."*

In 1932, Iqbal went to England as a Muslim delegate to the Third Round Table Conference. Having attended the Second Round Table Conference in September 1931 in London, he was keenly aware of the deep-seated Hindu and Sikh prejudice and unaccommodating attitude towards the Muslims in India. He had also observed the mind of the British government. Hence, he reiterated his apprehensions and suggested safeguards in respect of the Indian Muslims.[10]

> *"In so far then as the fundamentals of our policy are concerned, I have already expressed my views in my address to the All India Muslim League. In the present address I propose, among other things, to help you, in the first place, in arriving at a correct view of the situation as it emerged from a rather*

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[7] *historypak.com*

[8] *historypak.com*

[9] *storyofpakistan.com/allamaiqbal*

[10] *storyofpakistan.com/allamaiqbal*

> *hesitating behavior of our delegation during the final stages of the Round-Table Conference. In the second place, I shall try, according to my lights to show how far it is desirable to construct a fresh policy now that the Premier's announcement at the lest London Conference has again necessitated a careful survey of the whole situation."*

It must be kept in mind that since Maulana Muhammad Ali had died in January 1931 and Quaid-e-Azam had stayed behind in London, the responsibility of providing a proper lead to the Indian Muslims had fallen on Iqbal alone. He had to assume the role of a staunch guardian of his nation till Quaid-e-Azam returned to the sub-continent in 1935. According to Allama Iqbal the future of Islam as a moral and political force not only in India but in the whole of Asia rested on the organization of the Muslims of India led by the Quaid-e-Azam. During those years when the Quaid was in England, Iqbal built a strong, personal rapport with Jinnah, convincing Jinnah to end his self-imposed exile in London and to return to India to take charge of the League.

Allama Iqbal addressed several letters to Jinnah during June 1936 to November 1937 sharing with him his personal views on political problems and state of affairs of the Indian Muslims and urging him to come back. This series of correspondence is now a part of important historic documents concerning Pakistan's struggle for freedom. What is even more important is that Quaid-e-Azam himself decided to make Iqbal's letters public, marked 'Private' and 'Confidential'. In his 'foreword' to *Letters of Iqbal's to Jinnah*, he acknowledged that:

> *"Sir Muhammad Iqbal played a very conspicuous part, though at the time not revealed to public, in bringing about this consummation.... I think these letters are of very great historical importance, particularly those which explain his views in clear and unambiguous terms on the political future of Muslim India.... His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusions as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India, and found expression in due course in the united will of Muslim India as adumbrated in the Lahore resolution of the All-India Muslim League, popularly known as the "Pakistan Resolution," passed on 23rd March, 1940."* [11]

Iqbal's concept, thus, became the main source of inspiration for the movement of Pakistan.[12] With the seed already sown, the idea of a Muslim state began to evolve and take root. It soon assumed the shape of a Muslim state or states in the western and eastern Muslim majority zones as is obvious from the following lines of Iqbal's letter of June 21, 1937 to the Quaid-e-Azam, only ten months before the former's death:

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[11] *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, Lahore, 1942, pp.6-7

[12] *Iqbal's struggle for Pakistan, Prof.* Fateh Muhammad Malik (Al-Hilal; November 2015)

> *"A separate federation of Muslim Provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of Non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are."*

Ideologically separated from Congress Muslim leaders, Iqbal had also been disillusioned with the politicians of the Muslim League owing to the factional conflict that plagued the League in the 1920s. Discontent with factional leaders like Sir Muhammad Shafi and Sir Fazl-ur-Rahman, Iqbal came to believe that only Muhammad Ali Jinnah was a political leader capable of preserving this unity and fulfilling the League's objectives on Muslim political empowerment. The "Guide of the Era" that Iqbal envisaged in 1926 was found in the person of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Iqbal firmly believed that Jinnah was the only leader capable of drawing Indian Muslims to the League and maintaining party unity before the British and the Congress.

Indeed, the "Guide" organized the Muslims of India under the banner of the Muslim League and offered determined resistance to both the Hindu and the English designs for a united Hindu-dominated India. Through their united efforts under the able guidance of Quaid-e-Azam Muslims succeeded in dividing India into Pakistan and Bharat and achieving their independent homeland. To Iqbal, like Jinnah, Pakistan was not to be the end in itself. It was a means towards a greater end. In Iqbal's view, the religious ideal of Islam is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve rejection of the other.

Therefore, the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means displacement of the Islamic principle of social justice is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the people of Pakistan. Iqbal is the best articulated Muslim response to Modernity that the Islamic world has produced in the twentieth century. His response has three dimensions[13]:

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[13] Allama Iqbal Academy.

A creative engagement with the conceptual paradigm of modernism at a sophisticated philosophical level through his prose writings, mainly his *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* which present his basic philosophic insights;

His Urdu and Persian poetry which is the best embodiment of poetically mediated thought, squarely in the traditional continuity of Islamic literature and perhaps the finest flowering of wisdom poetry, or contemplative poetry or inspired poetry in the modern times.

As a political activist/social reformer – rising up to his social responsibility, his calling at a critical phase of history.

III. POST-INDEPENDENCE PAKISTAN

Journey of Hope and Disillusionment

> *"A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance."*
>
> **-Jawaharlal Nehru**

Pakistan's creation was, no doubt, the finest hour of our history. Our people saw in it the promise of long-cherished freedom, democracy and prosperity. The vision of a democratic and progressive Pakistan was unambiguously articulated in a resolution adopted at the first meeting of the Council of the Pakistan Muslim League in December 1947, when it pledged "to work for an ideal democratic state based on social justice, as an upholder of human freedom and world peace, in which all citizens will enjoy equal rights and be free from fear, want and ignorance."[14] Less than a month before his death, the Quaid addressed his last message to the nation on August 14, 1948 in which he reminded his people: "The foundations of your State have been laid and it is now for you to build and build as quickly and as well as you can."

On his own part, to quote Richard Symons, "in accomplishing the task he had taken upon on the morrow of Pakistan's birth, Jinnah had worked himself to death, but had contributed more than any other man to Pakistan's survival." Indeed, he died by his devotion to Pakistan. [15] Many of us who belong to the first generation that saw and experienced the formative phase of Pakistan and its creation as a dream of its founding fathers, are indeed discomfited at the thought of what Quaid-e-Azam had envisioned this country to be and where we actually stand today as a nation and as a state. Quaid-e-Azam did not live long to personally steer Pakistan to be what he thought and aspired will be "one of the greatest nations of the world."

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[14] *Dreams Unfulfilled*, Shamshad Ahmad; Jahangir Books; Lahore (2008).

[15] *ibid.*

Within the first year of our independence which woefully happened to be the last of his life, Quaid-e-Azam had presciently foreseen the coming events. He was disillusioned with the scarcity of calibre and character in the country's political hierarchy which was no more than a bunch of self-serving, feudalist and opportunistic politicians who were to manage the newly-independent Pakistan. Political ineptitude was writ large on the country's horizon. Quaid's worries were not unwarranted.

How many of us would remember or know that the Father of our Nation, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah spent the last hours of his life on that fateful day of September 11, 1947 lying helplessly in an ill-fated army ambulance which broke down due to "engine trouble" at a lonely stretch of the road while bringing him from the Mauripur Air Force Base to Karachi? Earlier on arrival from Quetta, no one from the government except his military secretary, Colonel Knowles, was present at the airport to receive him.

In her book, *My Brother*, Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah recalled those agonizing moments:

> *"Nearby stood hundreds of huts belonging to the refugees, who went about their business, not knowing that their Quaid, who had given them a homeland, was in their midst, lying helpless. Cars honked their way past, buses and trucks rumbled by, and we stood there immobilized in an ambulance that refused to move an inch...We waited for over one hour, and no hour, in my life has been so long and full of anguish."*

Does this painful recollection give us any food for thought or lead us to a feeling of regret and remorse? The answer lies in the barefaced contempt that we as a nation have shown to the Quaid's vision of a "strong, stable and democratic" Pakistan and his ideals of peace, equality, tolerance, rule of law and human rights. Indeed, the Quaid's vision of Pakistan remains unfulfilled.

During the last year of his life, Quaid-e-Azam addressed almost every segment of our society, including legislators, armed forces, civil servants, educationists, students, business community, workers, lawyers, and the public, providing guidelines on every aspect of national life for building up Pakistan into a modern and democratic welfare state, while also drawing their attention to what the nation expected of them. Addressing Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, the Quaid reminded the legislators of their "onerous responsibility" of framing the future constitution of Pakistan and functioning, as a full and complete sovereign body, as the federal legislature of Pakistan. But it took our politicians nine years and several governments to frame our first constitution in 1956 which could not last even three years. Our parliaments, one after the other, unfortunately, have never functioned as a "full sovereign body" as was envisioned by the Quaid.

The Quaid also gave us a roadmap of what he believed were the biggest challenges for the country's government. According to him, the foremost duty of a government was "to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects were fully protected by the state." He then warned us against what he called the "evils" of bribery, corruption, black-marketing, nepotism and jobbery. He wanted the government and the Assembly to take "adequate" measures to put these evils down with "an iron hand." We not only ignored his advice but are in fact living remorselessly with these "evils" as an integral part of our society.[16]

The Quaid-e-Azam, on many occasions, reminded the people of Pakistan of the importance of their responsibilities as citizens of this country. He regarded the ideals of democracy, equality, fraternity and brotherhood of man, rule of law, and human rights as the essence of a country's inner strength. Our performance in these areas certainly does not live up to the hopes the Quaid had placed in us. Crime and corruption are galore in our benighted land. No other country is familiar with the practice of forgiving as a matter of rule the elite loan-defaulters and the known highly placed plunderers of the national exchequer. Looters, plunderers, profiteers, murderers and killers could not have a safe haven anywhere else in the world.

Our Quaid gave us three principles; unity, faith and discipline. We found them of little relevance in our daily lives and have been flouting them gleefully. In fact, we don't believe in principles. We don't even believe in the rule of law. Even worse; we don't have the courage to admit there is something fundamentally wrong with us. We have no regret or remorse for the barefaced contempt that we as a nation have shown to the Quaid's vision of a 'modern, democratic welfare' state. Alas! Quaid-e-Azam did not get to know us well.

With Quaid-e-Azam's early demise, Pakistan was orphaned in its very infancy and lost the promise of a healthy youth with acute systemic deficiencies and normative perversities restricting its orderly natural growth. Among his known qualities of intellect and character, Quaid-e-Azam also had a unique ability to see far ahead of his times. Addressing the army officers at the Quetta Staff College on June 14, 1948, he reminded the armed forces of their constitutional responsibilities, urging them "to understand the true constitutional and legal implications of their oath of allegiance" to the country's Constitution. He warned them not to meddle in country's politics.

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[16] *Dreams Unfulfilled*, Shamshad Ahmad, Jahangir Books, Lahore (2008).

But ours is a sordid tale of broken oaths by both civilians ann non-civilians alike.

The Quaid believed in religious freedom and communal harmony. He urged the nation to shun sectarianism. We, however, had a different approach. Intolerance and fanaticism led us to violence with no parallel anywhere in the world. Pakistan is today seen as the hotbed of religious extremism and obscurantism. Proxy wars were fought on our soil. Sectarianism has ripped our society apart. Even mosques and churches have not been spared as venues of cold-blooded communal and sectarian killings. Sectarian violence has ripped our society apart. Terrorism is our *bête noire.* How painful it would have been for the Quaid to see his Pakistan burning from within.

After the Quaid, it was left without any sense of direction and in a state of political bankruptcy and moral aridity. It started cutting itself into pieces, losing within less than quarter of a century not only its own half but also its very rationale that had inspired its founding fathers to struggle for a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. The real Pakistan disappeared with its tragic dismemberment, and whatever was left has been converted into the "spoils of power."[17] We are still not decided on some of the vital questions related to our statehood. Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam and democracy but it has lived without practising the essence of both. A country, which was considered "twentieth century miracle" of a state and which was fought and won entirely through democratic and constitutional struggle now itself struggles haplessly for genuine democracy and constitutional primacy.

The story of Quaid's Pakistan is one of remorseless tug and pull between the civilian and military rulers on the one hand, and between liberal and religious forces on the other. In the process, the country has failed to develop a sustainable democratic system based on constitutional supremacy and institutional integrity. The main casualties have been the state institutions and the process of national integration. It is the story of a society that has been going round and round in aimless circles for 65 years. Absence of democracy, rule of law and good governance is its continuing hallmark.

Pakistan's Unpalatable Legacy

No doubt, on their emergence as two independent states on the map of the world as a result of a democratic political process, both Pakistan and India inherited a parliamentary tradition and began their independent statehood with a democratic path clearly charted out for them. To start with, however, there was no level-playing field for the state of Pakistan which not only had an unpalatable colonial legacy of its own to reckon with but also had to build an entire government from the scratch in 1947 under a state of emergency whereas India was born with an established political tradition and a fully intact bureaucratic apparatus in Delhi.

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[17] *Dreams Unfulfilled*, Shamshad Ahmad, Jahangir Books, Lahore (2008).

As the British Empire's realm was expanding, the colonial masters delineated the frontier separating Afghanistan from British India in 1893. The resulting Durand Line cut straight through the tribal areas of the Pathans which were later to become part of Pakistan. For tactical reasons, the British left the tribal areas totally isolated from the rest of India to govern themselves under the supervision of British political agents. No political reform or tradition could ever develop in these areas even till today.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the British were gradually devolving power to local authorities in several provinces across India but those reforms were never extended to the territories that later made up the bulk of Pakistan after the 1947 partition.

Whereas several of the provinces India inherited from the Raj had experience with some democracy, Pakistan inherited North-West Frontier Province and Punjab, the two highly militarized provinces of the Raj with no such tradition. Both territories were important military recruitment grounds for the Raj and were located along India's restive western frontier, where devolution was considered a security threat.

Even Balochistan and Sindh had seen more of British military expeditions rather than any political process. The British consolidated their power in Balochistan through two Afghan wars between 1839 and 1879 and after conquering Sindh from their bases in Bombay and Kutch in 1843 they forced Sindh to become part of the Hindu-dominated Bombay Presidency and followed highly discriminatory policies of lionizing the Hindu minority at the cost of Muslim majority. The British kept Sindhi unrest under control only through successive martial laws until Sindh regained its separate status as a separate province in 1935.

The situation in East Bengal which with India's partition in 1947 became the eastern wing of the newly-independent state of Pakistan also was no different in terms of discriminatory polices followed by the British towards Muslim majority areas of their Empire. With its Hindu majority, West Bengal being the first area to come under western influence was already developed and industrialized. It was a striking contrast to the Muslim majority eastern part which had remained totally neglected in British India's larger political agenda. Muslim peasantry was crushed under the Hindu landlords, the river system was infested with pirates, and very few funds were allocated for education. It was dreaded as a place of banishment. [18]

Finding the Bengal Presidency too large for one governor to administer, the British decided to redraw its boundaries and divided it into two parts in October 1905. This was a welcome development for the Muslims of East Bengal who saw in it an opportunity for redressal of their sufferings and a step towards their socio-economic and educational uplift. But the Hindu community violently opposed it and launched an anti-partition movement eventually managing to have it annulled in 1911 which led to further widening of the gap between the two communities. In this whole process, the British were also deliberately creating a new class of feudal elites in Sindh and Punjab as part of their larger political agenda to keep the restive less-privileged Muslim population under arbitrary control.

This unpalatable colonial legacy in conjunction with the country's feudalised political parties, social conservatism, and outside influences provided a fertile ground for Pakistan's non-political forces to grow in size and scale and gain an increasingly strong influence over the state. With frequent leadership miscarriages and resultant political instability in Pakistan, the military found it opportune to become *primus inter pares*, or first among equals. India certainly was not in this unenviable position. But for us it is not sufficient only to attribute Pakistan's failure in democracy to its tradition of military takeovers. There are in fact deep-rooted historical, socio-cultural and geopolitical factors that have hampered the post-independence democratic tradition in Pakistan.

Since independence, the politics and governments in Pakistan have remained hostage to the feudalised elite classes which have been inimical to any change in the country.[19] In India, the Congress emerged after independence as virtually a mini-parliament, with habits of debate, argument and negotiation. With its pre-independence leadership intact, India not only managed to forge a democratic constitution by 1950 but has also been holding elections every five years. It was also able to carry out far-reaching systemic reforms eliminating the vestiges of power in the country. Its leadership abolished the princely states and large land-holdings.

On the other hand, unlike India's Congress Party, the Muslim League, Pakistan's founding party was almost wholly dominated by few feudal families, which the British had patronised before partition and were powerful enough to retain control over national affairs through the bureaucracy and the armed forces. Besides military and the civil bureaucracy which wielded real authority, a number of politicians were also 'cycled' through recurring political and economic crises. Even after Muslim League's disintegration, the same feudalised oligarchy consisting of different men at different times under different political flags has remained in power with or without military collaboration. The feudal power structure is indeed at the root of Pakistan's political decay. It has also resisted land reforms in the country which it sees will strike at its own roots.

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[18] *The Tale of Democracy in Pakistan*, Shamshad Ahmad, *Criterion Quarterly*; December 2012

[19] *ibid.*

Invariably, the politicians proved to be corrupt, interested only in maintaining their political power and securing their own interests or those of their elite fraternity. As "elected" leaders, they never inspired hope for a democratic state that could provide socio-economic justice and fair administration to all Pakistani citizens. Within less than 25 years of our independent statehood, we lost half the country. Some blamed it on our physically being a house divided not against itself but by sitting astride more than one thousand miles of a hostile India's territory. The reality however was that as a newly independent nation, we just could not cope with the challenges of freedom inherent in our geopolitical and structural fault lines. [20]

Language became our first *bête noire*. We continue to remain possessed by the same ghosts in the name of culture, ethnicity and history. Instead of removing our systemic weaknesses and reinforcing the unifying elements of our nationhood, our power-hungry politicians have always succumbed to narrowly-based self-serving temptations. They rejected the popular will freely expressed in the December 1970 elections, and instead of exploring political remedies to the resultant crisis went along a military solution. It was the height of political opportunism and a humiliating military debacle leaving Pakistan physically amputated; the worst that could happen to any country in the world. And yet, we learnt no lesson from our mistakes. We are repeating the same mistakes.

The very reasons that precipitated the 1971 tragedy remained unaddressed in the new constitution which was adopted in 1973 under pressures emanating in the aftermath of the breakup tragedy rather than on merits of the document itself. Those who had no constitution-making mandate and were in fact responsible for creating a parliamentary gridlock leading to the breakup of Pakistan ironically became the authors of the flawed 1973 constitution. The political government formed in 1973 soon had problems with two provinces, the NWFP (now KPk) and Balochistan, dissolving their governments and imposing governor's rule in these provinces. This was followed by an armed uprising in some parts of Balochistan. [21]

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[20] *The Tale of Democracy in Pakistan*, Shamshad Ahmad, *Criterion Quarterly*, December 2012.

The then prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did seem to realise the need for systemic changes in the country. He went into early elections in the hope of two-third majority in parliament to be able to amend the constitution. His plans were preempted by a military takeover. Since then, the 1973 constitution has been amended 21 times but no government has ever attempted to correct the systemic anachronisms in our federal structure or to redress provincial grievances. The so-called 'devolution' under the Eighteenth amendment provides no solution to the core issue of inter-provincial disparities.

The problem is that the overbearing feudal and tribal power structure in Pakistan has been too deeply entrenched to let any systemic change take place. It doesn't suit them. They have always resisted reform in the country which they fear will erode their vested power and influence base. In the process, the country has failed to develop a sustainable democratic system based on constitutional supremacy and institutional integrity. The main casualties have been the state institutions and the process of national integration. The country is also engaged in a precarious struggle to define a national identity and evolve a political system needed for its ethnically and linguistically diverse population. [22]

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PAKISTAN

The State of Pakistan was created under the Independence Act, 1947.which was the amended version of the Government of India Act, 1935 The Act made the existing constituent assemblies, the dominion legislatures. These assemblies were allowed to exercise all the powers which were formerly exercised by the Central Legislature, in addition to the powers regarding the framing of a new Constitution, prior to which all territories were to be governed in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935.

The First Constituent Assembly

The First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan thus came into existence under Indian Independence Act, 1947, at the time of independence. Its roots went back to July 1946 when British India elected its Constituent Assembly, consisting of 296 members. The first meeting of the Assembly was to be held on December 9, 1946 but Muslim League refused to recognise the Assembly as a valid body and demanded a separate constituent assembly for Pakistan. With the acceptance of June 3, 1947 Plan, a separate constituent assembly was formulated for Pakistan.

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[21] *The Tale of Democracy in Pakistan*, Shamshad Ahmad, *Criterion Quarterly*, December 2012

[22] *ibid*

The first session of the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was held on August 10, 1947 at Sindh Assembly Building Karachi. J. N. Mandal was elected as temporary chairman of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. On August 11, 1947, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was elected as the president of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan as its Deputy President. On this day, the Assembly also formally approved Pakistan's National Flag. Under the Indian Independence Act, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was given two tasks – to prepare a Constitution and to act as the federal legislature.

The functions of central legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935 were granted to the Constituent Assembly. As a constitution making body it was completely independent. It could also amend the independence act by a simple majority and pass laws; moreover, no law could be made without its approval. Every bill that was passed needed to be signed by the president of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Initially, there were 69 members in the constituent assembly; this number was later increased to 79 including a female member in order to give representation to princely states and refugees. The mode of elections was on the basis of separate electorates.

There was a clear majority of Muslim League in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, with 60 members out of the total 79. The second major party was Pakistan National Congress with 11 members; and the third party was Azad Group with three members, a number which later decreased to 1. The Constituent Assembly was not able to work properly because its seats remained empty and some members migrated to India.

Though there was no opposition in the Constituent Assembly but there were groups that were critical of the League. On the left was Mian Iftikharuddin, a former congressmen and a communist. On the right were the religious critics like Maulana Shabir Ahmad Osmani.

On August 12, 1947, a resolution was approved regarding officially addressing Muhammad Ali Jinnah as "Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah". On the same day, a special committee called the "Committee on Fundamental Rights of Citizens and Minorities of Pakistan" was appointed to look into and advise the Assembly on matters relating to fundamental rights of the citizens, particularly the minorities, with the aim to legislate on these issues appropriately. On August 14, 1947, the Transfer of Power took place. On August 15, 1947, Quaid-e-Azam was sworn in as the first governor-general of Pakistan. Chief Justice of Pakistan Mian Sir

Abdur Rashid administered oath of office from him. The Quaid remained in this position till his death.

Early Constitution Building

The path to Pakistan's current constitution and government was often tortuous and accompanied by successive upheavals in the nation's political life. The years between 1947 and 1958 were marked by political chaos moderated by the administrative power and acumen of the then CSP. They were also the years in which the armed forces, especially the army, expanded its mission and assumed political influence alongside the CSP. The feudal politicians were the third element of a triumvirate of power that has ruled the country for most of its independent statehood. The foremost task before the first Constituent Assembly was to frame the constitution for the nation. The first major step in this direction was the passage of the Objective Resolution in the Constituent Assembly.

On March 7, 1949, the first Prime Minister Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan introduced the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly which adopted it on March 12, 1949. The Objectives Resolution which defined the basic principles of the new state was in effect to serve as the *grund norm* of Pakistan. It provided that Pakistan would be a state "wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed; wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunna; [and] wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to progress and practise their religions and develop their cultures."

On the same day, a Basic Principles Committee comprising of 24 Members was formed to prepare a draft Constitution on the basis of the Objectives Resolution. On October 16, 1951, Prime Minister Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated and Khawaja Nazimuddin took over as the prime minister on October 17, 1951.

The 1954 Civilian Coup

Seven years of debate failed to produce agreement on fundamental issues such as regional representation or the structure of a constitution. A final draft of the Constitution was prepared in 1954. By that time, Muhammad Ali Bogra had taken over as the prime minister. However, just before the final draft of the constitution could be placed in the House for approval, the Assembly was dissolved by the then Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad on October 24, 1954. This in fact was the first-ever albeit a civilian *coup d'état* in Pakistan's history. Prime Minister Bogra was asked to continue to run the administration, with a reconstituted cabinet, until such time as the elections were held. This was the beginning of political turmoil in Pakistan.

Maulvi Tamizuddin, president of the Assembly, challenged the dissolution in the Sind Chief Court, and won the case. The government in return, went to the Federal Court, where the famous judgment was given by the then Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, according to which Maulvi Tamizuddin lost the case. The Federal Court upheld the action of the governor-general, arguing that he had the power to disband the Constituent Assembly and veto legislation it passed. This preeminence of the governor-general over the legislature has been referred to as the vice regal tradition in Pakistan's politics. This decision of the Federal Court resulted in a constitutional deadlock, but after a decision by the Federal Court in Yusuf Patel Case and the reply of the Federal Court to a reference made by the governor-general, the constitutional impasse was resolved and a new Constituent Assembly was created on May 28, 1955 under Governor General's Order No.12 of 1955.

The 1956 Constitution

One of the major decisions taken by this Assembly was the establishment of West Pakistan (One Unit), with the aim to create parity between the two wings (East and West Pakistan). The Assembly achieved its mandate by giving the first constitution to the nation, i.e. the Constitution of Pakistan 1956. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was the prime minister at that time. The Constituent Assembly passed the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955 merging the provinces of West Pakistan into One Unit, and then finalised the draft of the new constitution which was introduced in the Assembly on January 9, 1956 and adopted by the Assembly on February 29, 1956. The assent was given on it by the governor-general on March 22, 1956 and the Constitution was enforced with effect from March 23, 1956. The Constituent Assembly also reconstituted itself as the national legislature -- the Legislative Assembly -- under the constitution it adopted.

Under this Constitution, Pakistan became an Islamic Republic; hence March 23 became to be celebrated as Pakistan's Republic day. It was the same day in 1940 that the historic Pakistan Resolution was adopted at Minto Park, Lahore.[23] On March 5, 1956, Maj. Gen. Iskandar Mirza became the first elected president of Pakistan. The 1956 Constitution provided for parliamentary form of government with all the executive powers in the hands of prime minister. President was Head of the State and was to be elected by all members of the National and Provincial assemblies. He was to hold office for five years. The president was to act on the advice of prime minister, except where he was empowered to act in his discretion.

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[23] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad, 1986.

Under 1956 Constitution, Parliament was unicameral. Legislative powers vested in the Parliament, which consisted of the president and the National Assembly comprising 300 members divided equally between East and West Pakistan. In addition to these 300 seats, five seats were reserved for women for each of the two wings, for a period of ten years: thus bringing the total membership of the House to 310. However, in the absence of any law to control the political parties and the problem of floor crossing, political instability perpetually ensued. Despite efforts to create regional parity between the East Wing and the West Wing, the regional tensions also remained.

The First Martial Law (1958)

Continuing regional rivalry, ethnic dissension, religious debate, and the weakening power of the Muslim League - the national party that spearheaded the country's founding - exacerbated political instability. Although the first general elections were scheduled for early 1959, President Iskandar Mirza abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the National and Provincial assemblies, and declared Martial Law on October 7, 1958. He appointed Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and a bureaucrat, Aziz Ahmad as secretary-general and deputy chief martial law administrator.

However, only three weeks later General Ayub—who was openly questioning the authority of the government prior to the imposition of martial law—deposed Iskandar Mirza on October 27, 1958 and assumed the presidency that practically formalized the militarization of the political system in Pakistan. Gen. Ayub Khan's takeover was welcomed by large segments of the population who were tired of the politicians' performance in the formative initial years of Pakistan's independent statehood. One of the major steps taken by him was the appointment of a Constitution Commission on February 17, 1960. The objective of this commission was to submit proposals, as to how best democracy can be strengthened and molded according to the country's socio-political environment and Islamic principles of justice.

The Commission submitted its report to the government on April 29, 1961. On the basis of this report a new Constitution was framed and given to the nation on March 1, 1962. General elections under the new Constitution were held on March 28, 1962 and elections to the special seats reserved for women were held on May

29, 1962. The first session of the third National Assembly was held on June 8, 1962 at Ayub Hall, Rawalpindi.[24]

The Constitution of 1962 envisaged a Federal State with presidential form of government, with National Assembly at the centre and the provincial assemblies in the provinces. The Legislatures, both at centre and in provinces were unicameral. The federal system had been curtailed by allowing the provincial governors to be appointed directly by the president. All executive authority of the Republic of Pakistan, under the Constitution, vested in the office of the president. President appointed his cabinet members who were directly responsible to him. The electoral system was made indirect, and the `Basic Democrats' for both wings were declared electoral college for the purpose of electing the assemblies and the president.

Basic democrats were 80,000 in number (40,000 from each East and West Pakistan). The total membership of the National Assembly was 156, one half of whom were to be elected from East Pakistan and other half from West Pakistan, also three seats were reserved for women from each province. The term of this assembly was three years. The norm was established that if the President was from West Pakistan, the speaker was to be from East Pakistan and vice versa. One of the major achievements of this Assembly was the passage of Political Parities Act, 1962. The 1962 Constitution went through eight amendments dealing with different subjects. On September 6, 1965, a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 30 of the Constitution was issued by the president when India invaded Pakistan.

The Second Martial Law (1969)

The second martial law was imposed on March 25, 1969, when President Ayub Khan abrogated the Constitution of 1962 and handed over power to the Army Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan who took over as the president of Pakistan and chief martial law administrator (CMLA). Acceding to popular demand, Gen. Yahya Khan's first major step was to abolish the one-unit system in West Pakistan. He however made no attempt to frame a constitution. The expectations were that a new constituent assembly would be set up by holding a free and fair election.

In order to hold the proposed elections, President Yahya Khan promulgated a Legal Framework Order on March 30, 1970 that also spelled out the fundamental principles of the proposed constitution and the structure and composition of the national and provincial assemblies. He later issued a Legal Framework Order (LFO) under which the first-ever general elections were held on December 7, 1970 on adult franchise and population basis. By any criteria, elections were free and fair. There was no interference from the government; it maintained strict neutrality showing no favor or discrimination for or against any political parties. The members of the ruling council of ministers were debarred from participation in the elections. There were no allegations of rigging of the elections as is often alleged in elections held in the countries of the Third World.

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[24] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad, 1986.

The Fateful 1970 Elections

But the results of the first and the last general elections in a united Pakistan tuned out to be disastrous from the standpoint of national unity and betrayed the failure political acumen and sagacity in upholding the imperative of national unity and integration. There was not a single national party in the country which enjoyed the confidence of the people of Pakistan, both East and West Pakistan. The Assembly was to consist of 313 members, 169 from East Pakistan and 144 from West Pakistan, including 13 reserved seats for women (6 were from West Pakistan and 7 from East Pakistan). Two regional parties -- the Awami League (AL) under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman in East Pakistan -- won 160 out of 162 seats allotted for East Pakistan whereas the Pakistan People's Party under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto bagged 88 seats out of 144 seats allotted for West Pakistan. Both could not secure even a single seat in the other Wing.

While the Awami League did put up candidates in West Pakistan and failed to win even a single seat, the PPP did not put up even a single candidate in East Pakistan. The PPP emerged as the single largest party in West Pakistan with majorities in Sindh and the Punjab; and the National Awami Party (NAP) together with their political ally, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), got clear majorities in Baluchistan and the NWFP. None of the West Pakistani political parties could win even a single seat in East Pakistan where the sole issue for the people to vote upon was the question of provincial autonomy. The Awami League fought the elections on the basis of its Six Points formula, which sought to restructure the existing federal system in order to ensure maximum political autonomy for East Pakistan.

Under this formula, only two portfolios -- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence – were to be retained by the central government. The PPP, on the other hand, was not willing to dilute the authority of the central government in-spite of assuring full provincial autonomy for all the provinces of Pakistan. The NAP and JUI coalition sided with the Awami League so that they might obtain maximum autonomy for their own provinces, i.e. Baluchistan and the NWFP. The election results truly reflected the ugly political reality: the division of the Pakistani electorate along regional lines and political polarization of the country between the two wings, East and West Pakistan. In political terms, therefore, Pakistan as a nation stood divided as a result of the very first general elections in 23 years of its existence.

Thus, the general elections of 1970 produced a new political configuration with three distinct centres of power, the Awami League in East Pakistan, the PPP in Sindh and the Punjab, and the NAP-JUI in Baluchistan and the NWFP. At the top of all this was the fourth centre of power, the armed forces with their spokesman, Gen. Yahya Khan. There were two major claimants of power: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. According to G. W. Chowdhury in his book *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, "both (the leaders) flourished on negative appeals to the illiterate voters of Pakistan, one by whipping up regional feeling against Punjabi domination and the other by whipping up militant national feelings against India. Neither had any constructive or positive approach. Mujib was apparently more interested in creating a separate state for Bengalis, Bangladesh since he had no trust in the ruling elite of West Pakistan." [25]

On the other hand, Bhutto was more interested in getting power, no matter whether in a united or divided Pakistan. In fact, he realized that in a united Pakistan, he had little chance of becoming either prime minister or president. According to G. W. Chowdhury, "he realized from his discussions with Bhutto before and after the 1970 elections that if he had to make a choice between the two 'Ps (Power or Pakistan), he would choose the former. He was more interested in getting a 21-gun salute as the head of the state than in the maintenance of the unity of Pakistan." [26] Negotiations were held between January and March 1971 between the two major regional leaders - Mujib and Bhutto - and the ruling military government under President Yahya Khan. But the tripartite negotiations for an agreed federal or even a confederal constitution was a dismal and total failure.

Under the Legal Framework Order, the president was to decide when the Assembly was to meet. Once assembled, it was to frame a new constitution within 120 days or stand dissolved. On February 13, 1971, the president announced that the National Assembly was to meet at Dhaka on March 3. By this time the differences between the main parties to the conflict had already crystallized. On 22 December 1970 the Secretary of the Awami League, Tajuddin Ahmad, claimed that his party having won an absolute majority had a clear mandate and was quiet competent to frame a constitution and to form a central government on its own. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman declared on January 3, 1971 that his party would not frame a constitution on its own, even though it had a majority. He refused, however, to negotiate on the Six Points, saying that they were now public property and no longer negotiable.

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[25] *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, G. W. Chowdhury, University Press Dhaka.

[26] *ibid*

The crux of the conflict was that the majority party in West Pakistan led by Bhutto was convinced that a federation based on the Six Points would lead to a loose confederation in name only, and would result in the division of the country into two states. These fears were evidently shared by the military leaders including President Yahya Khan who had publicly described Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman as the 'future Prime Minister of Pakistan' on January 14, 1971. Bhutto announced on February 15, that his party would not attend the National Assembly unless there was 'some amount of reciprocity' from the Awami League. Sheikh Mujib replied at a press conference on February 21, asserting that 'Our stand is absolutely clear. The constitution will be framed on the basis of the Six Points'. He also denied that the Six Points would leave the central government at the mercy of the provinces and contended that they were designed only to safeguard provincial autonomy.

On February 28, Bhutto demanded that either the 120-day limit for the National Assembly be removed or the opening session be postponed, declaring that if it was held on March 3 as planned, there would be a general strike throughout West Pakistan. President Yahya Khan responded next day by postponing the Assembly meeting to March 25. The postponement of the National Assembly came as a shattering disillusionment to the Awami League and their supporters throughout East Pakistan. It was seen as a betrayal and as proof of the authorities of the West Pakistan to deny them the fruits of their electoral victory. This resulted in the outbreak of violence in East Pakistan. The Awami League launched a non-cooperation movement and virtually they controlled the entire province.

The National Assembly could not meet on March 26 as scheduled due to widespread disturbances in East Pakistan where the army moved in on March 26 to control the situation. The civil disobedience movement later developed into a war in which the Indian Army became an aggressor party, and taking advantage of Pakistan's domestic political turbulence and geographical vulnerabilities, dismembered the country leading to the emergence a new independent state Bangladesh and leaving a truncated smaller Pakistan on December 16, 1971.

On December 20, 1971, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over as the president as well as the first civil chief martial law administrator. The first session of the National Assembly, due to the delay caused by the separation of East Pakistan, was held on April 14, 1972 at the State Bank Building, Islamabad, in which all 144 members from West Pakistan and two from former East Pakistan (Noor-ul-Amin and Raja Tridev Roy who had chosen to join Pakistan) participated. On April 17, 1972 an Interim Constitution was adopted by the National Assembly, which provided for a presidential form of government. Under this Constitution, the National Assembly was not to be dissolved earlier than August 14, 1973. The Interim Constitution dealt in detail with the distribution of powers between the Centre and the Provinces.

The 1973 Constitution

The Assembly also formed a Constitution Committee on April 17, 1972 to prepare the first draft for framing a constitution. The report of the Committee was presented with a draft constitution on December 31, 1972. It was unanimously passed by the Assembly in its session on April 10, 1973 and was authenticated by the president on April 12, 1973. This Constitution, called the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, was promulgated on August 14, 1973. Islam was declared the state religion of Pakistan. On the same day, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took oath as the prime minister, while Fazal Elahi Choudhary took oath as the president of Pakistan.

The 1973 Constitution provided for a parliamentary form of government where the executive authority of the state vests with the prime minister. The president, according to the Constitution, is at the apex, representing the unity of the Republic. This constitution represented a consensus on three issues: the role of Islam; the sharing of power between the federal government and the provinces; and the division of responsibility between the president and the prime minister, in keeping with parliamentary system with a greatly strengthened position for the latter.

The 1977 Military Coup

Despite the tenure of the Assembly being five years, as prescribed in the Constitution, Z. A. Bhutto, on January 7, 1977 announced the holding of elections before time. Consequently, on January 10, 1977, he advised the president to dissolve the National Assembly. Elections were held on March 7, 1977. The opposition charged the government with rigging the elections to the National Assembly and thereafter boycotted the provincial assemblies elections. Since the opposition had not accepted the National Assembly elections result, they did not take oath.

This resulted in severe political crisis and martial law was imposed after military takeover by the then Army Chief, Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, on July 5, 1977. He cancelled the elections that had been promised and kept the country under martial law until 1985. During this time, Zia pressed the policy that Pakistan's survival and progress were dependent on building an Islamic state. A number of measures were taken to implement this policy, including the introduction of the Federal Shariat Court. On December 24, 1981, under Presidential Order (P.O. 15 of 1981) a Federal Council (Majlis-e-Shoora) was constituted by the president. Its members were nominated by the president. The first session of this Council was held on January 11, 1982.

In this way, limited and controlled political activities were resumed, as a result of which general elections were later held for the National and Provincial assemblies on February 25, 1985, on non-party basis. The first session of the National Assembly was held March 20, 1985. Muhammad Khan Junejo (1985-88) was nominated as the prime minister by the President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. He received vote of confidence on March 24, 1985. Meanwhile a referendum was held in 1984 confirmed Zia's policy of Islamization. In this referendum, a "yes" vote agreeing with Zia's Islamization policy was also to be interpreted as a vote for Zia to remain in office as president for another five years. He did not complete his full term because of his death in an accident. But still he was the longest serving head of state of Pakistan.

On March 2, 1985, the revival of Constitution Order (P.O. 14 of 1985) was issued in which a large number of amendments were made in the Constitution. In 1985, elections were held for both the National and the provincial assemblies, an amended version of the 1973 constitution was revived and martial law was lifted. Zia remained president, and the amended constitution, including the controversial Eighth Amendment passed by the National Assembly in November 1985, gave predominant political authority to the president. The president could appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the provincial governors and could dissolve both the National and the provincial assemblies.

A significant feature of the 1973 constitution as amended in 1985, insofar as the Islamization process was concerned, was that the Objectives Resolution, adopted by the first Constituent Assembly in 1949 and made a preamble to the 1956, 1962, and 1973 constitutions, was incorporated as a substantive part (Article 2A) of this restored constitution. The Objectives Resolution provided, in part, that Pakistan would be a state "wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna." [27]

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[27] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting; Islamabad, 1986.

In November 1985, President Gen. Zial-ul-Haq got the notorious Eighth Constitutional Amendment passed by the Parliament. Besides making changes in other Articles in the Constitution, the most controversial Article 58(2)(b) was added, according to which the President acquired discretionary powers to dissolve the National Assembly. On May 29, 1988, President General Zia, using the power acquired under Article 58(2)(b), dissolved the National Assembly and dismissed Prime Minister Junejo.

Post-Zia-ul-Haq Era

After Gen. Zia's death in a mysterious plane crash in August 1988, fresh elections were held on November 16, 1988. On December 2, 1988 Ms. Benazir Bhutto was elected as Prime Minister.

On August 6, 1988 the National Assembly was dissolved by the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan under Article 58(2)(b). The general elections for the ninth National Assembly were held on October 24, 1990. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif took oath of prime minister on November 11, 1993. The National Assembly was dissolved again by the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, under Article 58(2)(b) on April 18, 1993.

The dissolution of the National Assembly was challenged in the Supreme Court of Pakistan and after hearing the case, the Assembly was restored by the apex court on May 26, 1993. The Assembly was dissolved on the advice of the prime minister on July 18, 1993. The elections for the tenth National Assembly was held on October 6, 1993. Ms. Benazir Bhutto was elected again as prime minister on October 19, 1993. The Assembly was, however, dissolved by President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari on November 5, 1996.

The elections for eleventh National Assembly was held on February 3, 1997. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif took oath as prime Minister on February 17, 1997. The new Assembly came into power with an overwhelming majority. The Article 58(2)(b) was later on omitted from the Constitution vide Thirteenth Amendment in the Constitution in April 1997.

The October 12, 1999 Military Coup

In a military coup, Chief of Army Staff Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who was also Chairman Joint Staff Committee, overthrew the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and declared himself as Chief Executive through a Proclamation of Emergency, on October 12, 1999. Through Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) issued on October 14 1999, he held the Constitution in abeyance, suspended the Senate, National and Provincial assemblies, chairman and deputy chairman Senate, speaker, deputy speaker National and

Provincial Assemblies and dismissed the Federal and Provincial governments.

The President Muhammad Rafiq Tarar was, however allowed to continue in his office. Under PCO (Order No. 6) October 29, 1999, (as amended by C.E. Order No.5, 4th July 2001), the National Security Council was established for the purpose to tender advice to the Chief Executive (later on president), on matters relating to Islamic ideology, national security, sovereignty, integrity and solidarity of Pakistan so as to achieve the aims and objective as enshrined in the Objectives Resolution 1949.

Syed Zafar Ali Shah, MNA and Illahi Bakhsh Soomro, Speaker National Assembly, challenged the suspension orders in the Supreme Court. The Court in its judgment on May 12, 2000 validated the military takeover by giving three years time frame to the government, starting from October 12, 1999. The Court, however, in its judgment asked the government to complete its agenda and then hand over powers to the elected government. The Court also allowed the military government to bring necessary constitutional amendments, provided that those should not change the basic feature of federal parliamentary democracy, independence of judiciary and Islamic provisions in the Constitution.

The Court reserved the right of Judicial Review and power of validity of any act or any action of the government, if challenged, in the light of State necessity. On June 20, 2001, through a notification, the Chief Executive assumed the office of the President of Pakistan under President's Succession Order, 2001. On the same day, through another Order, the president converted the orders of suspension of legislative bodies and their presiding officers, into dissolution. In August 2002, he issued the Legal Framework Order, adding numerous amendments to the Constitution. He also called for general elections on October 10, 2002.

The resultant puppet parliament (the twelfth National Assembly) brought a coalition government headed by PML-Q with MMA and MQM as its partners into power under Gen. Musharraf's watchful eyes which anticipatedly legitimized Musharraf's rule until he precipitated a judicial crisis in March 2007 accelerating his own downfall after the next parliamentary elections in 2008. The major constitutional amendments which Gen. Musharraf got approved from his own National Assembly of 2002 included the 17th Amendment in the Constitution which was aimed at keeping himself in power through changes in the articles 43-1, 63 (1) (d) and (k). Article 63-1 [d] and [k] were related to the office of the president when read with Article 41-2 even without the uniform.

On March 7, 2007, Gen. Musharraf tried to illegally dismiss the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, through a *mala fide* reference against him, which sparked a severe reaction from the lawyers' community, the media and Pakistan's civil society at large. Musharraf's reference against the Chief Justice was overturned by the Supreme Court. This was followed by the May 12 carnage in Karachi and an 'open war" was unleashed against the media and civil society. On November 3, 2007, he imposed emergency in the country in which he, as army chief, not only suspended the country's constitution, promulgating a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) but also illegally removed those judges of the superior courts who refused to take fresh oath under his PCO. Gen. Musharraf relinquished his army chief post on November 28, 2007.

On December 15, 2007, the emergency was lifted but nothing was restored. Musharraf took cosmetic measures only to further entrench his November 3 actions by giving them a life beyond the period of emergency through a flurry of unchallengeable presidential orders and decrees. Gen. Musharraf remained in power until 2008, first as Chief Executive and then as President who was elected by an assembly that he had created through an engineered election. He was ousted after all his efforts to remain in power failed and the people of Pakistan in the February 2008 elections overwhelmingly voted against his government and the system he represented. Musharraf was replaced by PPP co-chairperson Asif Ali Zardari (2008-2013) through his election on September 6, 2008 in the newly elected parliament.

The PPP-led coalition government headed by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani (March 2008-April 2012) after almost a year of pretensions and prevarication was forced to restore the Supreme Court judges illegally removed by Musharraf after the long march from Lahore to Islamabad on March 16, 2009. The newly elected government had earlier also removed media restrictions imposed by Gen. Musharraf during the 2007 state of emergency and lifted curbs on unions imposed during Musharraf's tenure. With these developments, the country returned to a democratic set-up with an 'independent' judiciary which the people expected to play a genuine role in the restoration of constitutional supremacy and the rule of law.

Since then, for some time, the Supreme Court apparently did play an independent role and took decisions of great importance to the rule of law in the country, and *inter alia* also declared the notorious NRO (National Reconciliation Ordinance) as null and void. The government however never implemented the superior court's verdict. Subsequently, scandals of all sorts eroded people's confidence not only in the PPP government but also other institutions including the judiciary. Meanwhile, the PPP-led coalition government did move forward on long-awaited constitutional reforms. In particular, on April 19, 2010, president Zardari signed into law the Eighteen Amendment.

The amendment ostensibly realigns executive powers by restoring the prime minister as the premier civilian official and returning the presidency to its original, more ceremonial role as head of state, which largely eliminates constitutional changes made by former president Musharraf to strengthen the presidency. Ironically, however, in practice, as long as Zardari was in the presidency, he wielded the real power. His two successive prime ministers were just the figureheads and merely acted as the 'rubber-stamp' chief executives. The reform package did abolish the two-term limit on prime ministers; restricted the president's power over judicial appointments; and reorganized center-province relations, empowering provincial assemblies to elect their own chief ministers.

The amendment renamed the North-West Frontier Province to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which means "Khyber side of the land of the Pakhtuns," in a nod to the region's ethnic Pashtun majority. The so-called devolution under this amendment was no more than a farce through which the politicians passed on some important subjects to the provinces but in practice they remained with the federal government. Likewise, the Nineteenth and Twentieth amendments were also seen no more than self-serving legislations only to manipulate the electoral process to the advantage of the two major political parties. This issue later triggered a huge political crisis questioning the very legality of the 2013 elections. The crisis led to by-elections in some constituencies and the rigging charges continue to be made by some parties.

The Twenty-first Amendment was adopted in the backdrop of the gruesome Peshawar tragedy as a response to the terrorist menace in the country. A 20-point National Plan of Action consisted of an emergency counter-terror strategy with the first two points involving the creation of military courts and execution of convicted terrorists whereas the remaining eighteen points pertained to the governmental policies and actions needed to win the war against terrorism. As a vigorous campaign to purge the society of extremism and obscurantism, the government was required to launch a well-coordinated, multi-dimensional counter-terror strategy involving a comprehensive and measured national policy based on political, economic, social, and humanitarian approach that focuses on the root causes of terrorism rather than its symptoms.

Ironically, this Amendment was passed by an All Parties Conference (APC) while the parliament stood bypassed. It was used only for rubberstamping the plan, which is nothing but an annotated list of normal governmental functions that successive governments had failed to perform. The military courts have since been functional and most of the convicted terrorist have been executed. But there is no sign yet of any action on the remaining eighteen points which in essence were normal responsibilities of a functional government.

V. SALIENT FEATURES OF PAKISTAN'S CONSTITUTIONS

The Constitution of Pakistan is the supreme law of Pakistan. While there have been several documents known as the Constitution of Pakistan, the existing constitution, The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, provides for a parliamentary system with a President as head of state and popularly elected prime minister as head of government. Pakistan has a bicameral legislature that consists of the Senate (upper house) and the National Assembly (lower house). Together with the President, the Senate and National Assembly make up a body called the Majlis-e-Shoora (Council of Advisors) or Parliament.

The Government of India Act, 1935

Under Section 8 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Government of India Act, 1935 became, with certain adaptations, the working constitution of Pakistan. But the need of a constitution to be framed by the elected representatives of the people, was all the more necessary for the free people of a sovereign state. Therefore, the first Constituent Assembly was formed under the Independence Act, 1947 and was entrusted with two separate functions:

- To frame a Constitution for the country.
- To set as a Federal Legislative Assembly or Parliament until that Constitution came into effect.

The powers and functions of the central legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935, were conferred on the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly could, however, amend the Indian Independence Act, 1947 or the Government of India Act, 1935, and no Act of the British Parliament could be extended to Pakistan without legislation by the Constituent Assembly. The first Constituent Assembly originally consisted of 69 members; subsequently the number of members was increased to 79 (including 44 from East Bengal).

Objectives Resolution

The first big step in the framing of a constitution for Pakistan was taken by the Constituent Assembly on March 12, 1949, when it passed a resolution on the 'Aims and Objectives of the Constitution', popularly known as the Objectives Resolution. It laid the foundation of the constitution and indicated the broad outline of its structure.

The resolution was moved by Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan. While moving the Resolution, he said:

> *"Sir, I consider this to be a most important occasion in the life of this country, next in importance only to the achievement of independence, because by achieving independence we only won an opportunity of building up a country and its polity in accordance with our ideals. I would like to remind the house that the Father of the Nation, Quaid-e-Azam, gave expression of his feelings on this matter on many an occasion, and his views were endorsed by the nation in unmistakable terms, Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this subcontinent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today."*

The resolution was debated for five days after which it was adopted on March 12, 1949.

The 1956 Constitution

After nine years of efforts, Pakistan was successful in framing a constitution in 1956. The Constituent Assembly adopted it on 29 February 1956, and it was enforced on March 23, 1956, proclaiming Pakistan to be an Islamic republic. The Constitution was lengthy and detailed; it contained 234 Articles divided into 13 Parts and six Schedules. The Constitution of 1956 provided for federal system with the principle of parity between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The Federal Legislature was to perform like the British Parliament. The Centre was invested with such powers as to take unilateral action in emergency and it could influence the provincial autonomy.

The Constitution of 1956 provided for the parliamentary form of government, where real executive authority was vested in a cabinet, collectively responsible to the legislature. The cabinet was presided over by the prime minister. The Constitution declared that there would be only one house of parliament known as the National Assembly and equality between the two Wings (i.e. East Pakistan and West Pakistan) was maintained in it. The governor-general was replaced by a president, who was to be elected by the electoral college comprising of members of the National and Provincial assemblies.

Familiar democratic rights and freedoms such as freedom of speech and expression, of assembly and association, of movement and of profession were all provided in the Constitution, with the usual qualifications. With regards to civil rights, familiar rights such as rights of life, liberty and property were granted, again with the usual qualifications and safeguards. The judiciary was given power to enforce the fundamental rights and the courts were to decide if a law was repugnant to any provisions of the fundamental rights. As per the Constitution, Urdu and Bengali were made national languages.

Islamic Provisions in the 1956 Constitution

- The text of Objectives Resolution was repeated in the preamble of the Constitution of 1956 without any major change.
- The name Islamic Republic of Pakistan was selected for the state of Pakistan.
- All citizens of Pakistan were granted freedom to profess, practice and propagate any religion and the right to establish, maintain and manage religious institutions.
- According to the directive principles, steps were to be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with principles in the Quran and Sunnah.
- No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Qur'an and Sunnah and that existing laws shall be brought into conformity with such injunctions. Whether a law was repugnant to Islam or not, would be decided by the National Assembly.
- Only a Muslim could be qualified for election as President.
- The President should set up an organisation for Islamic research and instruction in advanced studies to assist in the reconstruction of Muslims society on a truly Islamic basis.
- Teaching of the Quran was to be made compulsory for Muslims.
- The purchase and sale of alcohol was banned and prostitution was prohibited.
- No person should be compelled to pay any special tax, the proceeds of which were to be spent on the propagation of any religion other than his own.
- The state should endeavour to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries.

The 1962 Constitution

President Gen. Ayub Khan appointed a Commission on February 17, 1960 to report on the future political framework. The Commission was headed by the former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Muhammad Shahabuddin, and had ten other members, five each from East Pakistan and West Pakistan, composed of retired judges, lawyers, industrialists and landlords. The report of the Constitution Commission was presented to President Ayub on May 6, 1961 and thoroughly examined by the President and his Cabinet. In January 1962, the Cabinet finally approved the text of the new constitution. It was promulgated by President Ayub on March 1, 1962 and finally came into effect on June 8, 1962.

The Constitution contained 250 Articles divided into12 Parts and three Schedules. As per the Constitution of 1962, Pakistan was renamed as 'Republic of Pakistan'. The word 'Islamic' was dropped in this constitution. The Constitution provided for a federal system with the principle of parity between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Both the provinces would run their separate provincial governments. The responsibilities and authority of the centre and the provinces were clearly listed in the constitution. The Central Legislature had one house known as the National Assembly. There were 156 members of the National Assembly. The equality between the two wings were maintained in it.[28]

The Constitution of 1962 provided for a presidential form of government, as opposed to the parliamentary form of government under the 1956 Constitution. The president, who must be a Muslim not less than 35 years of age and qualified for election as a member of the National Assembly was to be elected indirectly by an electoral college in accordance with the provisions outlined in the Constitution itself. The electoral college formed by not less than 80,000 Basic Democrats (BD), equally distributed between the two provinces.

Under the Constitution of 1962, if the number of candidates for election to the office of president exceeds three, the speaker of the National Assembly was to convene a joint session of the members of the National and Provincial assemblies to select only three candidates for election, the remaining candidates then would not be eligible. This screening was not applicable to a person who was holding the office of the president, i.e. if the sitting president was also a candidate the number of candidates would be four.

The term of the president was five years to act as Head of State as well as chief executive—solely responsible for country's administration. Governor and minister were appointed and removed by him. He was eligible to promulgate Ordinances and veto against legislated laws only over-rideable by two-thirds of the National Assembly. However, the president was not empowered to dissolve the Assembly except at the cost of his office also.

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[28] *Pakistan Year Book*, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Islamabad, 1986.

There was no restriction of religion for a person holding the office of the speaker of the National Assembly. Secondly, if the president resigns from his office or vote of no-confidence passes against him, then according to the Constitution the speaker would act as the president till the election of new president. Under these special circumstances, a non-Muslim might get the chance to be an acting president of Pakistan.

The Constitution of 1962 provided for elections of the Central and Provincial assemblies for a term of five years. The members of the assemblies were elected by the Basic Democrats. The National Assembly was exclusively empowered to legislate for the central subjects. However, it could legislate on matters falling under provincial jurisdiction. The Assembly had to serve as a court in the cases of impeachment, conviction or declaring the president as incapacitated. It could amend the Constitution, but with two-thirds majority. Urdu and Bengali were recognised as national languages.

Islamic Provisions of the 1962 Constitution

- The preamble of the Constitution of 1962 was based on the Objectives Resolution.
- The Constitution laid down simply that the state of Pakistan shall be a republic under the name of 'Republic of Pakistan'. The word 'Islamic' was dropped in this Constitution. But when the National Assembly met in June 1962, there was a demand that the word 'Islamic' should be re-introduced. There was some justification for this demand. If Islamic provisions were to be maintained there was no reason why the republic should not be designated an Islamic republic. The first amendment (December 1962) therefore rectified this article.
- According to the principles of policy, steps were to be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam, and should be provided with facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to those principles and concepts.
- No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Quran and Sunnah and all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Quran and Sunnah.
- Only a Muslim could be qualified for the election as President.

- Teaching of the Quran and Islamiyat to the Muslims of Pakistan was made compulsory.
- Proper organisation of *zakat, waqf,* and mosques was ensured.
- Practical steps were to be taken to eradicate what were seen as social evils by Islam, such as the use of alcohol, gambling, etc.
- A novel Islamic provision in the 1962 Constitution had introduced an 'Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology' to be appointed by the President. The functions of the Council was to make recommendations to the government as to means which would enable and encourage the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam and to examine all laws in force with a view to bring them into conformity with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Quran and Sunnah.
- There shall be an organisation to be known as Islamic Research Institute, which shall be established by the President. The function of the Institute was to undertake Research and Instruction in Islam for the purpose of assisting in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis.
- The state should endeavour to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries.

The 1973 Constitution

After assuming power, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto invited the leaders of the parliamentary parties to meet him on October 17, 1972, which resulted in an agreement known as the 'Constitutional Accord', after an intensive discussion. As per consultations floated by PPP, the National Assembly of Pakistan appointed a 25-member committee on April 17, 1972, to prepare a draft of the permanent Constitution of Pakistan. Mahmud Ali Kasuri was the elected chairman of the Committee.

On October 20, 1972, the draft bill for the Constitution of Pakistan was signed by leaders of all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly. A bill to provide a constitution for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was introduced in the Assembly on February 2, 1973. The Assembly passed the bill unanimously on April 19, 1973 and endorsed by the President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on April 12, 1973. The Constitution came into effect from August 14, 1973. On the same day, Bhutto took over as the prime minister and y Fazal Elahi Chaudhry as the president of Pakistan.

This constitution represented a compromise consensus on three issues: the role of Islam; the sharing of power between the federal government and the provinces; and the division of responsibilities between the president and the prime minister, with a greatly strengthened position for the latter. The Constitution provided for federal system. The Federal Legislature is to function like the British Parliament. In order to allay fears of the provinces concerning domination of the Centre, the constitution established a bicameral legislature with a Senate (the upper house), providing equal provincial representation, and a National Assembly (the lower house), allocating seats according to population.

Islam was declared as the state religion. The Constitution named Pakistan as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Only a Muslim could become the President or the Prime Minister of Pakistan. No law repugnant to Islam shall be enacted and the present laws shall also be Islamized. The president must be a Muslim not less than 45 years of age, elected by members of Parliament and provincial asemblies. He is to hold office for a term of five years. The President could be removed by the resolution of parliament of not less than two-thirds of the total membership. The president could issue ordinances when the Parliament is not in session. The president has the power of granting pardon and the right to be kept informed by the Prime Minister on all matters of internal and foreign policies.

The Constitution sets forth the parliamentary system of Government. The head of the government, according to the Constitution, will be the prime minister. The prime minister and his Cabinet is accountable to the National Assembly for his actions. The Prime Minister would be elected by the majority of the National Assembly. The Constitution of 1973 introduced a new institution known as the 'Council of Common Interests' consisting of chief ministers of the provinces and an equal number of ministers of the federal government nominated by the prime minister. The Council could formulate and regulate the policy in the Part II of the Legislative List. In case of complaint of interference in water supply by any province the Council would look into the complaint.

Another major innovation in the Constitution of 1973 was the establishment of a National Finance Commission (NFC) consisting of the Federal and Provincial finance ministers and other members to advise on distribution of revenues between the federation and the provinces.

The Principles of Policy include Islamic way of life, promotion of local government institutions, full participation of women in national life, protection of minorities, promotion of social and economic well-being of the people, and strengthening the bonds with the Muslim world and to work for international peace. Under the 1973 Constitution, fundamental rights include security of person, safeguards as to arrest and detention, prohibition of slavery and forced labour, freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom to profess religion and safeguards to religious institutions, non-discrimination in respect of access to public places and in service, preservation of languages, script and culture. The judiciary enjoys full supremacy over the other organs of the state. Urdu is the national language.

The 1973 Constitution has been amended 21 times. It is now a different document altogether with each ruler or government seeking to amend it to suit to their own vested political interests. Amendments are being made not for the good of the people but for that of the rulers and legislators themselves.

Islamic Provisions of 1973 Constitution

- The name 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan' is selected for the state of Pakistan.
- Islam is declared as the state religion of Pakistan.
- Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan, individually or collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam.
- Steps shall be taken to make the teaching of the Quran and Islamiyat compulsory, to encourage and facilitate the learning of Arabic language and to secure correct and exact printing and publishing of the Quran.
- Proper organisation of *zakat*, *waqf* and mosques is ensured.
- The state shall prevent prostitution, gambling and consumption of alcohol, printing, publication, circulation and display of obscene literature and advertisements.
- Only a Muslim could be qualified for election as president (male or female) and prime minister (male or female). No restriction as to religion or gender on any other post, up to and including provincial governor and chief minister.
- All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions.
- A Council of Islamic Ideology shall be constituted referred to as the Islamic Council. The functions of the Islamic Council shall be to make recommendations to Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies about the ways and means of

enabling and encouraging the Muslims of the Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with the principles of Islam.

- The President or the Governor of a province may, or if two-fifths of its total membership so requires, a House or a Provincial Assembly shall, refer to the Islamic Council for advice on any question as to whether a proposed law is or is not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.
- For the first time, the Constitution of Pakistan gave definition of a Muslim which states: 'Muslim' means a person who believes in the Unity and Oneness of Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of the Islamic prophet, Muhammad, and does not believe in, or recognise as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad.
- The state shall endeavor to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries.
- The Second Amendment with effect from September 17, 1974 of the 1973 Constitution declared for the first time the Ahmadiyya (Qadianis) or the Lahori Ahmadiyya Movement as non-Muslims, and their leader, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who had styled himself as a so-called prophet of Islam, as a fraudster and imposter *nabi*.

Comparison with Previous Constitutions

With regard to provincial rights the 1973 constitution was in fact the most centralized of Pakistan's various constitutions. The Government of India Act of 1935, which Pakistan adopted as its first working constitution, granted the federal government 96 items of power. The 1956 constitution reduced that number to 49, and this was retained in the 1962 constitution. In 1973, however, it was enlarged to 114.

VI. POLITICAL HISTORY OF PAKISTAN

Challenges of State and Governance

On its independence, Pakistan was governed by the Government of India Act, 1935 as amended by the authority of the India Independence Act, 1947. The amended act provided at the center for a governor-general (as successor to the British viceroy) as head of state and for a Constituent Assembly with two separate functions - to prepare a constitution and to be a federal legislature until the constitution came into effect. The country's government was thus associated with a British-inherited parliamentary system, containing a strong central government as well as governments in the several provinces that also gave it a federal form.

At the outset, however, this structure of governor-general and parliamentary legislature took on singular characteristics tailored to the personality, prestige, and unique position occupied by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1947-48), Pakistan's first governor-general. No doubt, on Pakistan's independence, the Quaid was the supreme authority, the founder of the state, father of the nation and the chief political leader. As head of the All-India Muslim League, in 1940 he had mobilized the political effort that in just seven years won Pakistan's independence.

Quaid-e-Azam's ultimate authority came not from military power, not from the support of the bureaucracy, and not from constitutional prerogatives but from the political support of the people. In those circumstances, Jinnah chose to unite in himself the functions of head of state and the power of chief executive. In addition to his position as governor-general, he was also elected president of the Constituent Assembly. For the office of governor-general to be held by an active party politician who continued as political leader was an innovation. Initially, the arrangement may have seemed necessary to preserve national unity after independence and to facilitate the work of the new government.

But to uphold the democratic tradition, Quaid-e-Azam did not keep the leadership of the ruling Muslim League and resigned from its presidentship on December 17, 1947. The League elected Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman as its president. When the Quaid passed away, the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan (1947-51), and the cabinet assumed increased power, in more traditional roles, and Khawaja Nazimuddin, as the new governor-general, became a more traditional, nonpolitical head of state. Liaquat, however, found it difficult to establish his political authority. Whether the transfer of effective power to Liaquat while Jinnah was still alive might have created a precedent for future political stability in Pakistan is a moot point.

Political Instability

Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, in October 1951, was the catalyst for a series of constitutional and political crises. Governor-General Khawaja Nazimuddin became the prime minister and the then Finance Minister Ghulam Muhammad took over as governor-general. Bereaved of its two founding leaders within a short span of time, the Muslim League began to disintegrate. Within less than two years, we changed our prime minister and Muhammad Ali Bogra who was serving as Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington was called back to become the new prime minister. By 1953, dissensions within the League had led to the formation of several different political parties. Pakistan was raked by riots and famine,

The so-called parliament had become an arena of political feuds. Seven years of debate failed to produce any agreement on fundamental issues such as regional representation or the structure of a constitution. This impasse prompted Governor General Ghulam Mohammad (1951-55) to dismiss the Constituent Assembly on October 24, 1954 in what was the first coup of our history, albeit a civilian one. He appointed a new Council of Ministers on the ground that the existing one no longer represented the people of Pakistan. It was however generally known that the real reason for the dissolution was because the governor-general objected to the constitution which the Assembly was about to adopt.[29]

The President of the Constituent Assembly, Maulvi Tamizuddin, appealed to the Chief Court of Sindh to restrain the new Council of Ministers from implementing the dissolution and to determine the validity of the appointment of the new Council under Section 223-A of the constitution. In response, members of the new Council of Ministers appealed to the court saying that it had no jurisdiction to approve the request of the president to overturn the dissolution and appointments. They argued that Section 223-A of the constitution had never been validly enacted into the Constitution because it was never approved of by the governor-general, and therefore anything submitted under it was invalid. The Chief Court of Sindh ruled in favour of President Tamizuddin and held that the Governor-General's approval was not needed when the Constituent Assembly was acting only as a Constituent Assembly and not as the Federal Legislature.[30]

The Federation of Pakistan and the new Council of Ministers then appealed to the Federal Court. The appeal was heard in March 1955 (*Federation of Pakistan v Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan*). In the appeal hearing under Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, the Court decided that the Constituent Assembly functioned as the 'Legislature of the Domain' and that the governor-general's assent was necessary for all legislation to become law. Therefore, the Chief Court of Sindh had no jurisdiction to overturn the governor-general's dissolution and it was held as valid. However, the ground of which the Court found in favour of the Federation of Pakistan called into question the validity of all legislation passed by the Assembly, not to mention the unconstitutionality of the Assembly itself since 1950.

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[29] *Constitutional Legitimacy: A Study of the Doctrine of Necessity*, Leslie Wolf Phillips (1979).

[30] *Judgment and Order of the Chief Court of Sind at Karachi, February 9, 1955, PLD 1955 Sind*

To solve this problem, the governor-general invoked Emergency Powers to retrospectively validate the Acts of the Constituent Assembly. An appeal was filed against the governor-general for invoking emergency powers and the chief justice had to determine the constitutionality of invoking the Emergency Powers and whether the governor-general could give his assent to legislation retroactively.[31] The Supreme Court of Pakistan under Justice Mohammad Munir upheld the action of the governor-general, arguing that he had the power to disband the Constituent Assembly and veto legislation it passed. This preeminence of the governor-general over the legislature has been referred to as the viceregal tradition in Pakistan's politics. In the first national elections in May 1955 (held by a system of indirect voting) the Muslim League was heavily defeated.

The revived Constituent Assembly promulgated Pakistan's first indigenous constitution on March 23, 1956 and reconstituted itself as the national legislature under the constitution it adopted. Pakistan became an Islamic republic. It provided for a parliamentary form of government with a president elected by the members of the National Assembly and the two provincial assemblies of East Pakistan and West Pakistan and a cabinet of ministers headed by a prime minister appointed by the president. Each province was effectively administered by a governor assisted by a small team of ministers. This constitution remained operative for about two-and-a-half years.

The late '50s and early '60s when this arrangement was in place was perhaps the best period of our history, a period during which the people of this country lived in peace and relative prosperity with nominal unemployment.

The political situation in the country however remained unstable with governments changing one after the other. We had five prime ministers in quick succession: Muhammad Ali Bogra (April 1953-August 1955) followed by Chaudhary Muhammad Ali (August 1955-September 1956), Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardi (September 1956-October 1957), Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar (October 1957-December 1957) and Malik Feroz Khan Noon (December 1957-October 1958). Unabated political instability led President Iskander Mirza (1956-58) with the support of the army to disband the Legislative Assembly on October 7, 1958, and declare martial law.

The Ayub Era (1958-1969)

Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first indigenous army

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[31] *Constitutional Legitimacy: A Study of the Doctrine of Necessity,*Leslie Wolf Phillips (1979)

commander in chief assisted Mirza in abrogating the constitution of 1956 and removing the politicians he believed were bringing Pakistan to the point of collapse. Ayub Khan, as Mirza's chief martial law administrator, then staged another coup 20 days later on October 27, 1958, forced Mirza out of power, and assumed the presidency, to the relief of large segments of the population tired of the politicians' continued machinations. The Army seized power and the martial law regime of Muhammad Ayub Khan banned all political parties. This was the end of the old Muslim League. Even with the abrogation of the constitution and declaration of martial law, no change was made in the federal setup which continued till Gen. Yahya Khan's take-over in 1969.

Ayub Khan combined the offices of president and prime minister, becoming both the head of state and government. He created a cabinet of technocrats, diplomats and military officers. These included Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the future prime minister. In contrast with future military rulers, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Ayub Khan did not seek to hold the posts of president and army chief simultaneously. He appointed Gen. Muhammad Musa as the new commander-in-chief.

Gen. Ayub obtained judicial validation of his move when the Supreme Court of Pakistan validated and legalized his take-over under the "doctrine of necessity". Ayub Khan relied heavily on the country's civilian bureaucrats, who formed the majority of his advisers and cabinet ministers.

His system of Basic Democracies was introduced as a form of local government at the grass roots. It consisted of an interlocking multi-tiered pyramidal hierarchy of elected councils from the village to the provincial levels. The lowest but most important tier was composed of union councils, one each for groups of villages having an approximate population of 10,000. The members of these union councils were called Basic Democrats. The union councils were responsible for local government, including agricultural and community development, maintaining law and order through rural police, and trying minor cases in conciliation courts. In 1960, the Basic Democrats were asked to endorse Ayub Khan's presidency and to give him a mandate to frame a new constitution.

Ayub's constitution, promulgated in 1962, ended martial law, established a presidential form of government with a weak legislature (now called the National Assembly) and gave the president augmented executive, legislative, and financial powers. Adult franchise was limited to the election of Basic Democrats, who constituted an electoral college for the president and members of the National and provincial assemblies. Ayub Khan remained in power for almost a decade until the growing political and economic discontent led the people to come out on the streets against his rule.

Sheikh Mujib's Six Points

During the rule of Ayub Khan, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman came out with his Six-Point[32] formula that was to lead to the severance East Pakistan from the state of Pakistan through India's brutal military intervention. It was at a news conference in Lahore on February 5, 1966 that Sheikh Mujib announced his Six Points:

1. The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in the true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and for a parliamentary form of government based on the supremacy of a directly elected legislature on the basis of universal adult franchise.
2. The Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects; Defence and Foreign Affairs. All residuary subjects will be vested in the federating states.
3. There should be either two separate, freely convertible currencies for the two Wings, or one currency with two separate reserve banks to prevent inter-Wing flight of capital.
4. The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the federating units. The Federal Government will receive a share to meet its financial obligations.
5. Economic disparities between the two Wings shall disappear through a series of economic, fiscal, and legal reforms.
6. A militia or paramilitary force must be created in East Pakistan, which at present has no defense of it own.

Gen. Yahya Khan Interregnum (1969-1971)

A popular agitation compelled Ayub Khan to resign in March 1969 and hand over power to the commander-in-chief of the army, Gen. Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan (1969-71), who became president and chief martial law administrator. Although Yahya Khan established a semi-military state, he introduced changes including abolition of One Unit in West Pakistan that led to the return of parliamentary democracy. Since the late '50s and during the early '60s when this arrangement was in place, the people of Pakistan lived in peace and relative prosperity with nominal unemployment.

Despite political instability and frequent governmental changes, this perhaps was the best period of our history. The radical changes that Gen. Yahya Khan brought into effect ultimately resulted in the break up of the country. He held the country's first 'free and fair' elections in December 1970 on adult-franchise basis to elect the country's democratic parliament. The results of these fateful elections, which again brought the politicians to the fore, led to disastrous consequences for Pakistan. Gen. Yahya had accepted the demand of East Pakistan for representation in the new assembly on the basis of population.

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[32] *http://historypak.com/six-points-of-sheikh-mujib-ur-rehman/*

As a result, Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League won all but two of the 162 seats allotted East Pakistan out of the 300 directly elected seats in the assembly (13 indirectly elected women were added), and Mujib wanted considerable regional autonomy for East Pakistan as per his Six Points. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party (PPP) emerged as the political victors in West Pakistan in the 1970 elections. Politically, the country stood polarized. The popular verdict given in those free and fair elections was rejected by the political leaders in West Pakistan. Negotiations to form a coalition government broke down.

Through his controversial Six Points, Mujib demanded regional autonomy for East Pakistan. Bhutto's refusal to participate in the discussions to frame a new constitution led to the continuation of martial law and the eventual political and military crisis turning into a civil war. Instead of exploring political remedies to the crisis, the politicians in West Pakistan not only encouraged but went along a military solution. A political crisis that should have been addressed politically culminated into a military debacle. India exploited the situation and intervened militarily in East Pakistan bringing about the breakup of the country, the worst that could happen to any country in the world in contemporary history.

The 1971 Tragedy and Bhutto Era (1971-1977)

The real Pakistan disappeared with its tragic dismemberment. On December 16, 1971, East Pakistan proclaimed itself as an independent state of Bangladesh. With Pakistan's military in disarray, Gen. Yahya resigned, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977) as the elected majority leader was appointed president and civilian chief martial law administrator of a truncated Pakistan. Bhutto moved decisively to restore national confidence lifting martial law within months.

After an interim constitution granting him broad powers as president, a new constitution was adopted by consensus in April 1973 that came into effect on August 14 of that year. Bhutto stepped down as president and became prime minister. Domestically, Bhutto pursued a populist agenda and nationalized the country's banks, schools and colleges and major industries. The whole systemic perversity had to be reversed at a cost still being paid by the nation.

While continuing his populist and socialist rhetoric, he increasingly relied on Pakistan's urban industrialists and rural landlords. Over time the economy stagnated as a result of the dislocation and uncertainty produced by Bhutto's frequently changing economic policies.

Earlier in 1972, Bhutto was able to negotiate the Simla Agreement with India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who had been instrumental in dismembering the country through a military aggression, and managed to secure the release of 93,000 Pakistani POWs from India's custody. Bhutto had the opportunity to resolve many of Pakistan's political problems. Though he put the country on a democratic path, he lost this opportunity because of series of measures against the political opposition that made it appear he was working to establish a one-party state. In a final step, he suddenly called national elections in March 1977, hoping to catch the opposition unprepared and give his party total control of the National Assembly.

When Bhutto proclaimed his own victory in the March 1977 national elections, the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) denounced the results as fraudulent and launched mass disturbances demanding fresh elections. Bhutto resisted and later arrested the PNA leadership. He called in the army to restore law and order. As the crisis thickened, Bhutto himself was ousted by the military, which again took control of the country.

Gen. Zia-ul-Haq Era (1977-1988)

Chief of the Army Staff Gen. Zia-ul-Haq became chief martial law administrator in July 1977 and president in September 1978. He suspended the constitution with the stated objective of creating an environment in which new elections could be held. Subsequently, Bhutto, as his primary opponent, was tried and sentenced to death in 1978 on the charge of conspiring to murder a political opponent. The Supreme Court upheld the sentence, and Bhutto was hanged in April 1979. It has subsequently been described as a judicial murder. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq cancelled the promised elections and kept the country under martial law until 1985.

During this time, Zia pressed the policy that Pakistan's survival and progress were dependent on building an Islamic state. A number of measures were taken to implement this policy, including the introduction of a Federal Shariat Court. A referendum held in 1984 confirmed Zia's policy of Islamization. In this referendum, a 98% 'yes' vote was taken also as a vote for Zia to remain in office for another five years.

In 1985, elections were held for both the national and the provincial assemblies, an amended version of the 1973 constitution was reinstated and martial law was lifted. Zia remained president, and the amended constitution, including the controversial Eighth Amendment passed by the National Assembly in November 1985, gave predominant political authority to the president. The president could appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the provincial governors and could dissolve both the National and the provincial assemblies.

A significant feature of the 1973 constitution as amended in 1985 was that the Objectives Resolution, adopted by the first Constituent Assembly in 1949 and made a preamble to the 1956, 1962, and 1973 constitutions, was incorporated as a substantive part (Article 2- A) of this restored constitution. Political parties were not allowed to participate in the 1985 elections, and the PPP led by Benazir Bhutto boycotted them. After the elections, Zia picked Mohammad Khan Junejo as his prime minister.

The Zia-Junejo period lasted three years until Zia dismissed Junejo and dissolved the National Assembly and the four provincial assemblies. Zia cited incompetence, corruption, and failure to further the Islamization process as reasons for his actions.

But there were differences on policy issues, especially Afghanistan that brought Junejo's fall. Zia also announced that new elections would be held. But on August 17, 1988, a plane carrying President Zia, American Ambassador Arnold Raphael, US Brig. Gen. Herbert Wassom, and 28 Pakistani military officers crashed on a return flight from a military equipment trial near Bahawalpur, killing all on board. Zia's sudden death left Pakistan without a president, prime minister, or national or provincial assemblies.

Political Carousel (1988-1999)'

In accordance with the Constitution, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Chairman of the Senate became acting president. Elections were held on party basis bringing in power a PPP-led eight-party coalition government with Benazir Bhutto as the prime minister. Senate Chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan was subsequently elected president.

As expected, it was a weak, tenuously coalesced government under pressure from an establishment-prompted and funded opposition. It faced challenges of differing interpretations of constitutional authority, questions over the powers of the central government relative to those of the provinces, and the antagonistic relationship between the federal government and opposition governments in Punjab and Balochistan which seriously impeded social and economic reform programs. Ethnic conflict, primarily in MQM-dominated parts of Sindh, exacerbated these problems. A fragmentation in the governing coalition and the military's reluctance to support an apparently ineffectual and corrupt government were accompanied by a significant deterioration in law and order.

In August 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, citing his powers under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, dismissed the Bhutto government and dissolved the National and provincial assemblies. Subsequently, questions were raised on the role of military intelligence agencies in political destabilization. New elections in October 1990 confirmed the political ascendancy of the IJI. But differences soon developed within IJI's constituent parties with the largest religious party, Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), abandoning the alliance. The MQM which had entered into coalition with the IJI to contain PPP influence also started having problems with their coalition status. In April 1993, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, again using his powers under 58(2)(b) and citing "maladministration, corruption, and nepotism" and espousal of political violence, dismissed the Nawaz Sharif government.

In the following month, however, the Supreme Court of Pakistan reinstated the National Assembly and the Nawaz Sharif government. In the intervening interim period from April 18, 1993 to May 26, 1993, Mir Balakh Sher Mazari acted as a caretaker prime minister. Continued tensions between the prime minister and president resulted in governmental gridlock and the chief of army staff had to intervene to broker an arrangement under which both the president and the prime minister resigned their offices in July 1993. An interim government, headed by Moeen Qureshi (July 18, 1993-October 19, 1993) was established which held National and provincial assembly elections in October 1993. In those elections, the PPP won a plurality of seats in the National Assembly, and Ms. Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996) once again took over as the prime minister at the head of a fragile coalition.

In those difficult times, the election of Prime Minister Bhutto's close associate, Farooq Leghari, as president in November 1993 gave her a stronger power base. But in November 1996, President Farooq Leghari dismissed the Bhutto government invoking the same notorious Eighth Amendment charging it with corruption, mismanagement of the economy, and implication in extrajudicial killings in Karachi. Elections in February 1997 resulted in an overwhelming victory for the PML-N with Nawaz Sharif (1997-99) becoming the prime minister for his second term. In March 1997, Nawaz Sharif amended the Constitution, stripping the President of the power to dismiss the government and making his power to appoint military service chiefs and provincial governors contingent on the "advice" of the prime minister.

Another amendment prohibited elected members from "floor crossing" or voting against party positions. The Sharif government also engaged in a protracted dispute with the judiciary, culminating in the storming of the Supreme Court by ruling party loyalists and dismissal of the chief justice and the resignation of President Leghari in December 1997. A close associate of the prime minister, Mohammad Rafiq Tarar was elected as the new president. A one-sided, anti-corruption campaign was used to target opposition politicians and critics of the regime. Similarly, the government moved to restrict press criticism and ordered the arrest and beating of prominent journalists.

Nawaz Sharif's second tenure witnessed some momentous developments both on external and domestic fronts. A one-day OIC Special Summit was held in Islamabad on March 23, 1997 to express its solidarity with Pakistan on completion of its 50 years of independence. On this occasion, the Summit adopted the Islamabad Declaration, Special Declaration on Jammu and Kashmir, Special Declaration on Palestine and Pakistan's Golden Jubilee Declaration. The unanimous adoption of the Summit declarations was a tribute to Pakistan's leadership role in the Islamic world and marked solidarity of the Ummah with the people and government of Pakistan. It also reaffirmed support for the fundamental rights of the people of Kashmir, including their right to self-determination.

For the author, it was a matter of great personal satisfaction that within weeks after assuming the office of foreign secretary, a major event of this scale and importance had been organized with singular success. It was also during this tenure of Nawaz Sharif that despite intense international pressure not to respond to India's tests in kind, Pakistan exploded five nuclear devices on May 28 and followed that up with one more on May 30. Pakistan's tests were an act of self-defence; they established our minimum credible deterrence and in fact restored the regional strategic balance serving the larger interest of peace and stability in South Asia. No doubt, it was a difficult but inevitable decision. We were offered monetary packages but no price was sufficient for the country's security and survival as an independent state.

In reaching that decision, the country's elected civilian leadership withstood all pressures and inducements and did not trade off Pakistan's security interests for any monetary package. The other important foreign policy achievement of Nawaz Sharif government during his second term was the restoration of dialogue with India through a process familiarly known as Composite Dialogue on the basis of Islamabad Agreement of June 23, 1997. This was the first time in their 50-year history that India and Pakistan had agreed formally in black and white on pursuing an integrated and structured dialogue with an eight-item agenda and a structured mechanism to address their outstanding issues, including the Jammu and Kashmir issue.

Again, the author as the then foreign secretary negotiated this process with his Indian counterpart and paved the way for the historic Lahore Summit in February 1999 between Prime Pakistan's Minister Nawaz Sharif and India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpaee.

The India-Pakistan 'Composite Dialogue' dialogue was interrupted in 1999 when the two countries faced the Kargil crisis. Internal problems were also aggravated by the Kargil crisis for which Nawaz Sharif attempted to replace Chief of Army Staff Gen. Pervez Musharraf on October 12, 1999, with the then Director General of the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate, Lt. Gen. Ziauddin. Gen. Musharraf was out of the country at the time, but it seems preparations were already in place to respond to any such move by the civilian government with a military coup. After a hijack 'drama' while Gen. Musharraf was in air on his return flight from Colombo, the elected prime minister was overthrown and taken into custody to be later tried on cooked up charges and sent into forced exile.

The 1990s were thus a period of governmental changes in rapid succession with the president exercising his arbitrarily acquired authority under Article 58(2)(b), first dismissing the Benazir government in 1990, then her elected successor Nawaz Sharif's government in 1993, again removing the second Benazir government in 1996, and finally Nawaz Sharif who had been elected as the prime minister in 1997 was overthrown by the then army chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf (October 1999-August 2008).

Gen. Musharraf Era (1999-2008)

Following the October 12, 1999 military coup and subsequent ouster of the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the military-led government stated its intention to restructure the political and electoral systems. On October 14, 1999, Gen. Pervez Musharraf declared a state of emergency and issued the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), which suspended the federal and provincial assemblies, held the Constitution in abeyance, and designated Musharraf as Chief Executive. Musharraf appointed a civilian cabinet, an eight-member civil-military National Security Council and a National Reconstruction Bureau to formulate structural reforms.

On May 12, 2000, Supreme Court of Pakistan unanimously validated the October 1999 coup and granted Musharraf executive and legislative authority for three years from the coup date. On June 20, 2001, just weeks before his visit to India for the Agra Summit, Musharraf named himself and was sworn as president of the country after the incumbent elected head of state, Rafiq Tarar was asked to 'voluntarily' resign. After the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked on September 11, 2001, Musharraf pledged complete cooperation with the United States in the war on terror, which included locating and shutting down terrorist training camps within Pakistan's borders, cracking down on extremist groups and withdrawing support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

In a referendum held on April 30, 2002, Musharraf's presidency was extended by five more years. This period is also known for the beginning of Pakistan's post-9/11 alliance with the USA. In the blinking of an eye, Pakistan became a battleground of the USA war on terror, and is paying a heavy price in terms of human and material losses. Meanwhile, the "transfer" from military to civilian rule came with 'engineered' parliamentary elections in November 2002, and the appointment of a civilian prime minister, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali. In Punjab and Sindh, PML-Q-led governments were established whereas in NWFP and Balochistan, in reaction to 9/11, the JUI (F)-led Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) won majority and formed governments.

Having previously promised to give up his army post and become a civilian president, Gen. Musharraf announced in late 2004 that he would retain his military uniform.

Within two years, Musharraf felt Jamali was not delivering and 'accepted' his resignation to be replaced first by his close 'colleague' the PML(Q) leader, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain a short stint (June 2004-August 2004) as prime minister and then by his finance minister Shaukat Aziz (2004-2007) as the country's 15th prime minister, and got him elected from two constituencies, Tharparkar and Attock where the people did not even have an idea who Shaukat Aziz was. It was all Musharraf's magic wand that worked.

Musharraf also managed to have the Seventeenth Amendment passed giving him powers to dissolve the National Assembly with Supreme Court's approval as he had already done in his own case. In anticipation of his re-election as president, Gen. Musharraf again needed Supreme Court's blessing. When he found the Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry inimical to his ambitions, he tried to illegally dismiss the chief justice on March 7, 2007 through a *mala fide* reference against him, which sparked a severe reaction from the lawyers' community, the media and Pakistan's civil society at large. Musharraf's reference against the chief justice was overturned by the Supreme Court.

This was followed by the May 12 carnage in Karachi and an 'open war" against the media and civil society. Also, as part a foreign power-brokered deal, Gen. Musharraf promulgated the notorious National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) on October 5, 2007 which was meant to provide selective "amnesty" to all "politically-motivated" corruption charges pertaining to the period from January 1986 to October 12, 1999, in the name of "national reconciliation." On October 6, 2007, Musharraf went ahead with his highly controversial "re-election" as president while still in uniform as army chief from the outgoing assemblies that had elected him for his last term and were completing their own term.

Meanwhile, Ms.Benazir Bhutto who had been in exile since the late 90s took advantage of the rising anti-Musharraf public sentiment and returned to Pakistan on October 18, 2007. Musharraf who apparently had agreed on a compromise with Ms. Benazir Bhutto didn't want her to return as lond as the crisis was conning. On November 3, 2007, he imposed emergency in the country in which he, as army chief, not only suspended the country's constitution, promulgating a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) but also illegally removed those judges of the superior courts who refused to take fresh oath under his PCO. A democrat to the core, Ms. Benazir Bhutto realised democracy will not return through dubious deals, and joined the people in their struggle against Musharraf's November 3 assault on the constitution and judiciary.

Addressing the rally at Liaquat Bagh on December 27, 2007, Benazir Bhutto told her supporters:

> *"I put my life in danger and came here because I feel this country is in danger. People are worried. We will bring the country out of this crisis." She also alluded to the dangers she faced, as she had been doing ever since she returned to Pakistan. Within minutes after she left the rally, she was targeted and killed under most tragic and bewildering circumstances. No one knows who killed her and why? The murder still remains uninvestigated.*

Gen. Musharraf relinquished his army chief post on November 28, 2007. On December 15, 2007, the emergency was lifted but nothing was restored. Musharraf took cosmetic measures only to further entrench his November 3 actions by giving them a life beyond the period of emergency through a flurry of unchallengeable presidential orders and decrees.

Democracy's Revenge

In accordance with the agreed script, at the conclusion of the three-month-long state of emergency, legislative elections were held in Pakistan in February 2008. In those elections, the people overwhelmingly voted against Musharraf's government and the system that he represented. Former opposition parties, led by the PPP, were brought to power in a coalition government at the Centre. Yousuf Raza Gilani became prime minister and head of government on March 24, 2008. Musharraf resigned as president on August 18, 2008 and went into exile. He was replaced by PPP co-chairperson Asif Ali Zardari (2008-2013) through his election on September 6, 2008 in the newly elected parliament.

For almost a year, the new government wilfully dithered on the question of the restoration of the Supreme Court judges illegally removed by Musharraf until March 16, 2009 when after the long march from Lahore to Islamabad, the judges were restored. Prime Minister Gilani remained in office until his retroactive disqualification and ouster by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on contempt of court charges on April 26, 2012. He was replaced by another PPP senior member Raja Pervez Ashraf who remained prime minister from June 22, 2012 until completing his designated term on March 16, 2013. The PPP-led political dispensation remained in power for five years, the first-ever elected government in Pakistan's history to complete its full tenure.

The May 2013 elections brought PML-N back to power for the third time. Nawaz Sharif became prime minister for his unprecedented third term. Besides giving an emphatic victory and a popular mandate to the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) as Pakistan's largest political party, the May 11, 2013 election also placed in our political cradle an infantile newcomer in the form of the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) as a potential future player in the country's politics. On the basis of electoral results, PTI established a coalition government in the KPk. While PPP retained its control over Sindh, the PML-N continued its rule in Punjab and also shared its majority in Balochistan with two other partners, namely the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party and National Party (NP) in forming a coalition government headed by National Party's Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch.

Meanwhile, President Asif Ali Zardari, on completion of his five-year term was also replaced by PML-N's nominee Mamnoon Hussain on September 9, 2013. The PML-N with the experience of two previous unfinished terms, a seasoned and mature leadership and an elaborate party manifesto was expected to take on the challenges of its renewed mandate. The country surely needed a strong economic team with a merit-based, professionalized public sector cadre and small but efficient performance-led federal and provincial cabinets for effective handling of the economic and energy crises and dreary law and order situation.

To bring the country out from its abysmal governance crisis and economic chaos was going to be a protracted and painful process; it required hard decisions and a paradigm change in governance patterns. Within less than two years, PML-N found itself in grave economic, political and security crises of unprecedented magnitude. With gross domestic and external challenges facing the country, a new civil-military alliance seemed to be the only answer which the PML-N government under Nawaz Sharif's leadership has been able to build by invoking Article 245 of the Constitution in tackling with the major issues of terrorism and corruption. How this crucial alliance works out will determine the future course of events in the coming years.

Meanwhile, there is a feeling across Pakistan that army chief Gen. Raheel Sharif is a man of action who has not only delivered on counter-terrorism but is also helping the civilian government in acquitting itself of its responsibilities through Apex Committees at the federal as well as provincial levels. Rubbishing politically-motivated rumours regarding a likely extension in his tenure as chief of army staff, Gen. Raheel Sharif recently made it clear that he will "retire on the due date" in November 2015. He said "Pakistan Army is a great institution. I don't believe in extension and will retire on the due date." Given these developments, to an extent, the beginning of the year 2016 promises better times for the country.

OVERVIEW OF PAKISTAN MOVEMENT

712	Muhammad bin Qasim defeated Raja Dahir and conquered Sindh.
997	Mahmud Ghaznavi succeeded his father.
1206	Qutab-ud-Din Aibak became ruler of India. He is considered as the first Muslim ruler of South Asia.
1290	Jalal-ud-Din Khalji became ruler of India and Khalji Dynasty was established.
1320	Ghiyas-ud-Din Tughlug became ruler of India.
1414	Sadat Dynasty was established and Khizar Khan became ruler.
1415	Lodhi Dynasty was established.
1526	The Mughal Empire came into being. • The First Battle of Panipat (1526) was fought between the Mughal emperor Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad Babur and the Delhi Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi.
1556	The Second Battle of Panipat was fought between the Akbar the Great and Samrat Hem.
1564 (June 26)	Hazrat Mujadid Alf Sani Sheikh Ahmed Sarhindi was born.
1600 (Dec. 31)	The East India Company was granted charter.
1703 (Feb. 21)	Shah Waliullah was born at the time of Mughal's downfall. • Shah Waliullah translated the Holy Quran into Persian language and wrote "Hujjat-ullah-al-Baligha", "Khilafat-al-Khulafa", etc. • Shah Waliullah's sons — Shah Rafi-ud-Din and Shah Abdul Qadir translated the Holy Quran into Urdu.
1757	Lord Clive defeated Siraj-ud-Daula in the Battle of Plassey.
1761 (Jan. 14)	The Third Battle of Panipat was fought between the Afghans and the Marathas.
1772-85	Lord Hastings was the first Governor-General of Bengal.
1817	Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was born at Delhi.
1837 (Dec. 9)	Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk was born at Etawah fondly known as Sayed Mehdi Ali.

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1841 (March 24)	Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk was born, who was named Mushtaq Hussain.
1857 (May 10)	War of Independence started from Meerut by Indian soldiers against British.
1858	Soon after the War of Independence, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan started Aligarh Movement. • India became under the rule of British queen. • Government of India Act, 1858 was promulgated.
1859	Sir Syed set up a school at Muradabad and in 1863 at Ghazipur.
1861	Indian Councils Act was passed.
1866	The Scientific Society became 'Aligarh Institute Gazette'. • Deoband Movement was also started by Haji Muhammad Abid and Maulana Muhammad Yaqub. • Sir Syed set up Muhammadan Educational Conference and British Indian Association.
1867	Urdu-Hindi controversy began in Banaras.
1870	Anjuman-i-Taraqi-i-Muslamanan-i-Hind was set up by Sir Syed.
1871	George Campbell, the Lt. Governor of Bengal, ordered Urdu should be scrapped from syllabus.
1874	M.A.O. High School was established at Aligarh.
1876 (Dec. 25)	Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was born.
1877	Aligarh School was upgraded to the status of a college and was inaugurated by Lord Lytton. • Dr. Allama Muhammad Iqbal was born.
1881	Lord Ripon passed a resolution to promote local self- government in India. • First census of subcontinent was conducted.
1884	The foundation of Anjuman–e-Himayat-i-Islam was laid down by Maulana Qazi Hamid-ud-Din.
1885	Indian National Congress was founded by Allan Octavian Hume.
1891	Hunza, remote kingdom bordering China fell into hands of British, bringing an end to the expansion of British Raj.
1892	Indian Councils Act was promulgated.
1893	Durand Line was demarcated.
1894	Nadva-tul-Ulema started in Lucknow.
1898 (March 27)	Sir Syed Ahmad Khan passed away.

1905 (Oct. 16) Bengal was partitioned into two divisions — Assam and Bengal.

- Swadeshi Movement was organised by Hindus in order to protest against the partition of Bengal by boycotting foreign goods.

1906 (Oct. 1) Shimla Deputation met Viceroy Lord Minto comprising 70 Muslim leaders.

1906 (Dec. 30) All India Muslim League was formed at the annual meeting of Muhammadan Educational Conference at Dacca under the chairmanship of Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk.

1907 (Dec. 20) The first regular session of the All India Muslim League was held at Karachi.

1909 Minto-Morley Reforms (also known as Indian Councils Act) were introduced.

1911 Partition of Bengal was annulled.

1913 Quaid-e-Azam joined All India Muslim League.

- Muslim League changed its manifesto in order to remain aloof from Indian politics.
- The Kanpur Mosque tragedy took place creating political awakening among the Indian Muslims.

1916 (Dec.) Lucknow Pact was signed.

- After Lucknow Pact 1916, Quaid-e-Azam was conferred with the title of "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity" by Mrs. Sarojni Naidu.
- Home Rule League was started by an English woman, Anne Besant.
- Quaid-i-Azam was elected president of Muslim League.

1917 (Jan. 27) Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk passed away.

1919 Montague-Chelmsford Reforms were introduced. The system of Dyarchy was introduced at the provincial level.

- Jallianwala Bagh incident took place. The British Commander General Dyer opened fire at the people without warning to disperse while they were protesting against the Rowlatt Act.
- Maulana Muhammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali launched Khilafat Movement.

1920 Khilafat Delegation left Bombay for England

	• Gandhi started Non-cooperation Movement in Farakhabad District with the aim to abandon government taxes and revenues.
	• Quaid-e-Azam resigned from the membership of Congress.
1927	Delhi Proposals were introduced. Congress first accepted and later rejected the proposals.
1928	Simon Commission arrived in the subcontinent.
1928	Nehru Report was published wherein the demand of separate electorates for the Muslims was the declined by the Congress leadership.
1929	Quaid-e-Azam proposed his fourteen points in All India Muslim League meeting held in Delhi.
1930	Allama Muhammad Iqbal gave his famous presidential address to the All India Muslim League at Allahabad.
	• First Round Table Conference was held in London where all parties were present except Congress.
1931 (March 5)	Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed.
1931	Second Round Table Conference was held in London and Gandhi participated.
	• Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar.
1932	Third Round Table Conference was held in London. Gandhi did not take part and started Civil Disobedience Movement.
1932	Communal Award was announced but was rejected by all the Indian political parties. Gandhi managed to win over Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, leader of Untouchable, to renounce the award.
1933 (Jan. 28)	Name of "Pakistan" was suggested by Chaudhry Rehmat Ali. He wrote a pamphlet 'Now or Never: Are We To Live or Perish Forever'.
1934	Quaid-e-Azam reorganised the Muslim League.
1935	The Government of India Act, 1935.
1937	Elections were held and Congress achieved a big victory. Muslim League won 106 seats out of 485 total Muslim seats.
1938 (April 21)	Allama Muhammad lqbal died.
1939	Muslim League was formed in Balochistan.
1939 (Dec. 22)	After the resignation of the Congress ministries the Day of Deliverance was observed by the Muslim League.

- Governor's rule was imposed in the Congress provinces according to the Government of India Act, 1935.

1940 (Jan. 19) "Time and Tide" of London published an article of Quaid-e-Azam under the caption "The Constitutional Future of India." He called Hindus and the Muslims two different nations with different religions and different social codes.

1940 (March 24) In the 27th annual session of Muslim League held in Lahore the Lahore Resolution was passed.

1940 (Aug. 8) August Offer was brought issued. It promised for the establishment of an independent Indian Constituent Assembly with completely indigenous representation and a power to frame the future constitution of the country.

1940 (Oct. 7) Gandhi started Satyagraha Movement.

1942 (March 22) Cripps Proposals were published.

1942 The Muslim League Resolution of 'Divide and Quit' was against the movement of Gandhi's 'Quit India'.

1943 Muslim League formed its first ministry in Sindh.

1944 Gandhi-Jinnah talks failed due to the Two Nation Theory.

1945 Desai- Liaqat Pact was signed.

1945-46 Elections were held. Muslim League won all 30 seats reserved for Muslims for the Central Legislative Assembly and won 425 out of 496 seats in the provincial assemblies.

1946 (March 24) Cabinet Mission arrived from Britain comprising of Lord Pathick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander and put forward its proposals on May 16. Muslim League accepted the plan on June 6.

- Gandhi renounced his formal membership from Congress.

1946 (Oct. 25) Muslim League joined the interim government. Liaqat Ali Khan was finance minister.

1947 (March 24) Lord Mountbatten arrived as the last Viceroy.

1947 (June 3) Lord Mountbatten announced Partition Plan.

- Boundary Commission was created in July 1947 under the chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe. It announced its award on August 16, 1947.

1947 (Aug. 14) Partition of subcontinent into Pakistan and India took placed.

CHAPTER 3

THE LAND, STATE & GOVERNMENT

I. THE LAND AND PEOPLE

The Land

Pakistan located in South Asia is bordered by Afghanistan and Iran in the west, India in the east and China in the far northeast. Tajikistan also lies very close to Pakistan but is separated by the narrow Wakhan corridor linking it with Pakistan's Karakoram Valley. Strategically it is located at the confluence of important regions of South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Pakistan lies along River Indus stretching over 2000 kilometres from the freezing heights of Pamirs in the north to the balmy beaches of Arabian Sea in the south. Its coastline of 1,046 kilometres (650 miles) runs along the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman.

The region forming today's Pakistan was the site of several ancient cultures of the Indus Valley Civilization. Subsequently, it was the recipient of Vedic, Persian, Buddhist, Indo-Greek, Islamic,Turko-Mongol, and Sikh cultures through several invasions and settlements. As a result, the area has remained a part of numerous empires and dynasties including the Persian empires, Islamic sultanates, and the Mauryan, Mongol, Mughal, Sikh and British empires.

Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world with nearly 190 million people. The Northern Areas of Pakistan are the meeting point of three major mountainous ranges: the Karakorams, the Himalayas, and the Hindu Kush, with some of the highest mountain peaks in the world. Every year thousands of trekkers and mountaineers from around the world visit this fascinating region.

The State

Pakistan is an ethnically and linguistically diverse country, with a similar variation in its geography, climate and wildlife. As a regional and global power, Pakistan has the seventh largest standing armed forces in the world and is also a nuclear power as well as a declared nuclear weapons state, being the only nation in the Muslim world, and the second in South Asia, to have that status. It has a semi-industrialized economy which is the 27th largest in the world in terms of purchasing power and 44th largest in terms of nominal GDP.

Pakistan's post-independence history has been characterised by periods of military rule, political instability and conflicts with neighbouring India. The country continues to face challenging problems, including terrorism, poverty, illiteracy and corruption. It is a founding member of the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation and is a member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth of

Nations, the Next Eleven Economies, SAARC, ECO, D8 and the G20 developing nations.

In foreign relations, Pakistan's overarching objective was what the Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had envisioned its foreign policy to be one of "peace with all, and enmity with none." It was aimed at seeking friendship and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the universally recognised principles of peaceful co-existence. The Quaid's foreign policy vision thus stipulated Pakistan's steadfast adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, particularly the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's affairs, and peaceful settlement of bilateral disputes.

The partition in 1947 of British India into the Muslim state of Pakistan in two parts, West and East, and largely Hindu India left behind with a legacy of many problems between the two successor states which fought two wars - in 1947-48 and 1965 - over Kashmir. A third war was imposed by India in 1971 which took advantage of Pakistan's domestic political crisis, capitalizing on the disillusionment of the people in East Pakistan and militarily dismembered Pakistan with its Eastern Wing becoming the separate independent state of Bangladesh.

The Federation of Pakistan has four provinces, namely Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh. The Federal Capital of Pakistan is Islamabad, a new, modern and scenic city. Lahore is the cultural centre famous for its historic monuments and is the capital of the largest province, Punjab. Karachi, the largest city with a population of 12 million people is a cosmopolitan port city and the capital of the Sindh Province. Peshawar is located at the southern end of the historic Khyber Pass and is the capital of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Quetta is the capital of Balochistan, which is Pakistan's largest province in area and rich in natural resources.

Pakistan has been seriously affected by the geopolitical developments of the past three decades in the region. Located as it is at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia and South West Asia, Pakistan has an unparalleled geostrategic importance not only for the region itself but also for the world at large. Regrettably, thanks to poor governance, our geopolitical location has become a liability rather than an asset for the country. We continue to suffer in terms of political instability, socio-economic chaos and protracted violence.

The People

With almost 190 million people, it is the sixth most populous country in the world, and has the second largest Muslim population after Indonesia. It is an ethnically and linguistically diverse country with a similar variation in its geography and wildlife. With a semi-industrialized economy, it is the 26th largest in the world in terms of purchasing power.

The Indo-Pakistan subcontinent has attracted migrants from both the northeast and the northwest from time immemorial. For thousands of years, people have entered through these routes, settling and mixing with the pre-Dravidian stocks. The process lasted a long time and eventually, the Dravidian type emerged. The migrants and invaders came mainly from Central and Western Asia.

The Dravidians were followed by the Aryans, Greeks, Persians, Arabs, Turks, and Mughals, and as could be expected, a mixture of races has resulted. The final blend may be said to be a predominantly Caucasian general type with Mediterranean strains that are also found in the people of Iran, Afghanistan and Arabia. In terms of origin, the dominant racial type in Pakistan is the Indo-Aryan. The people of northwestern Pakistan, the Pathans and the Balochis are mainly an admixture of Turkish and Iranian strains, both being important branches of the Aryan family. Pakistani mind, mannerism, and mindset have all the ingredients of the cultures of Central Asia, Arabia, Persia, Turkey, China, Afghanistan and India.

Of the four provinces, with 25.8 per cent of land area of the country, Punjab has 56.5 per cent of the total population; Sindh, with 17.7 per cent of land area, has 22.6 per cent: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, (including FATA) with 12.8 per cent of land area, has 15.7 per cent; Balochistan, with 43.6 per cent of land area, has 5.1 per cent. Thus, Punjab is the most densely (240 persons per sq km) populated province, followed by Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Balochistan is the least populated province, with 19 persons per square kilometre. The overall population density of the country is 156 persons per square kilometre.

Sindh is the urbanized province with 43 per cent of the people living in urban areas including Karachi city. The urban population of Punjab is 28 per cent followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 21 per cent, and Balochistan 16 per cent. About 67 per cent of the total urban population of the country lives in 28 cities with population of 100,000 and above, while 57 per cent of the total urban population lives in 12 cities with population of 200,000 and above.

Land of Splendours

Pakistan is a land of splendours. The scenery changes northward from coastal beaches, lagoons and mangrove swamps in the south to sandy deserts, desolate plateaus, fertile plains, dissected upland in the middle and high mountains with beautiful valleys, snow-covered peaks and eternal glaciers in the north. The variety of landscape divides Pakistan into six major regions:

(i) The North High Mountainous Region

(ii) The Western Low Mountainous Region
(iii) The Balochistan Plateau
(iv) The Potohar Uplands
(v) The Punjab Plains
(vi) The Sindh Plains

High Mountain Region

Stretching in the North, from east to west, are a series of high mountain ranges which separate Pakistan from China, Russia and Afghanistan. They include the Himalayas, the Karakoram and the Hindu Kush. The Himalayas spread in the northeast and the Karakoram rises on the northwest of the Himalayas and extends eastward up to Gilgit.

The Hindu Kush mountains lie to the north-west of the Karakoram, but extend eastward into Afghanistan. With the assemblage of 35 giant peaks over 24,000 ft. high (7,315m), the region is the climbers' paradise. Many summits are even higher than 26,000 ft.(7,925 m) and the highest K-2 (Mt. Godwin Austin) is exceeded only by Mount Everest. Inhospitable and technically more difficult to climb than even Everest, they have taken the biggest toll of human lives in the annals of mountaineering.

The passes are rarely lower than the summit of Mt. Blanc and several are over 18,000 ft. (5,485 m). The Karakoram Highway traversing through the mountains is the highest trade route in the world. Besides, the region abounds in vast glaciers, large lakes and green valleys which have combined at places to produce holiday resorts such as Gilgit, Hunza and Yasin in the west and the valleys of Chitral, Dir, Kaghan and Swat drained by rivers Chitral, Pankkora, Kunhar and Swat, respectively in the east. Dotted profusely with scenic spots having numerous streams and rivulets, thick forests of pine and junipers and a vast variety of fauna and flora, the Chitral, Kaghan and Swat valleys have particularly earned the reputation of being the most enchanting tourist resorts of Pakistan.

South of the high mountains, the ranges lose their height gradually and settle down finally in the Margalla hills (2,000-3,000 ft.) in the vicinity of Islamabad, the Capital of Pakistan, and Swat and Chitral hills, north of river Kabul. Although the climate of the region is extremely diverse, according to aspect and elevation, yet as a whole it remains under the grip of severe cold from November to April. May, June and July are pleasant months. The southern slopes receive heavy rainfall and consequently are covered with forest of deodar, pine, poplar and willow trees. The more northerly ranges and north-facing slopes receive practically no rains and are, therefore, without trees.

There is a considerable trans-human movement from the mountains to the plains in winter and from plains to the mountains in summer. The permanent settlers grow corn, maize, barely, wheat and rice on the terraced fields and also raise orchards of apples, apricots, peaches and grapes.

Peaks and Glaciers

Eric Shipton, a great mountaineer who perished in Pakistan's Northern Areas, wrote in his account: "To describe this region is to indulge in superlatives, for everywhere you look are the highest, the longest and the largest mountains, glaciers and rivers in the world." Making some allowance for Shipton's tendency towards slight exaggeration, born out of awe and fascination, the fact remains that Pakistan boasts of the largest share of the highest mountain peaks in the world. Its own highest peak, the famed and dreaded **K-2**, is the second highest in the world, being just some `ropes' short of the Everest in Nepal.

With due respect to the Everest, K-2 is regarded far more formidable to climb than its relatively facile superior. Three of the mightiest mountain systems - the Hindu Kush, the Karakorams and the Himalayas - adorn the forehead of Pakistan. The second highest peak of Himalayas, as also of Pakistan, is the Nanga Parbat which literally means the "Naked Mountain".

Pakistan has seven of the 16 tallest peaks in Asia. The statistics are simply baffling: 40 of the world's 50 highest mountains are in Pakistan; in Baltistan over 45 peaks touch or cross the 20,000 ft mark; in Gilgit within a radius of 65 miles, there are over two dozen peaks ranging in height between 18,000 to 26,000 ft. The awe-inspiring beauty provided inspiration to a Pakistani writer to observe lyrically, "in Pakistan's lofty mountain regions, reaching for the sky doesn't seem too ambitious."

Pakistan's Eight Thousanders

There are a total of 14 main peaks soaring above 8000 metres in the world. Out of these, eight are located in Nepal, five in Pakistan and one in China. It has become prestigious to make these peaks as targets by mountaineers every year. In fact, successful climb over these peaks is considered an enviable measure of their attainment. By far, the largest number of mountaineering expeditions visiting Pakistan has been coming from Japan.

K-2 (8611m)

It is the second highest mountain in the world. It was first attempted by Martin Conway's expedition in 1902 which was composed of British, Austrian and Swiss climbers. Ashraf Aman was the first Pakistani climber to climb on top of K-2 with five other climbers of the Jap-Pak expedition in 1977, with Ichire Yoshizawa as its leader and Isao Shinkai as the technical leader.

Nanga Parbat (8125m)

It is also known as the killer mountain. It claimed the life of A.F. Mummery, leader of an expedition and two porters in 1895. Since then Nanga Parbat has cost scores of lives, though quite a few have successfully scaled it. Harmann Buhl was the first to set foot on this formidable peak in 1953. In spite of its bloody past record, Nanga Parbat is still the most sought after target. Its dangerous challenge seems to add spurs to the determination of climbers.

Hidden Peak (8068m)

This peak was first attempted in 1892 by Martin Conway's expedition who gave it this name because it was hidden by the neighbouring peaks of Baltoro glacier. The peak was first conquered in 1958 by an American expedition. Nick Clinch was the leader. The climbing leaders Peter Schoening and Kanfuran were the two summiters.

Broad Peak (8047m)

This peak was also named by Martin Conway and was first attempted by a German expedition headed by Karl Herligk in 1954. The peak was climbed in 1957 when the entire team of four climbers with Marcus Schmuck scaled it.

In the far-north of Pakistan are valleys which are closed within the silent, brooding forts of these mountains and are almost as high as the mountains themselves. Here dwell, from times immemorial, various tribes differing in race and culture. If one tribe has Mongol features, its neighbour is obviously Aryan. Separated by insurmountable obstacles, these tribes very often live a totally land-locked existence blissfully unaware of the world beyond. But, a traveller is simply wonderstruck by one common element - Islam.

Glaciers

Pakistan has more glaciers than any other land outside the North and South Poles. Pakistan's glacial area covers some 13,680 sq. km which represents an average of 13 per cent of mountain regions of the upper Indus Basin. Pakistan's glaciers can rightly claim to possess the greatest mass and collection of glaciated space on the face of earth. In fact, in the lap of the Karakoram of Pakistan alone there are glaciers whose total length would add up to above 6,160 sq. km. To put it more precisely, as high as 37 per cent of the Karakoram area is under its glaciers against Himalayas' 17 per cent and European Alps' 22 per cent.

The Karakoram have one more claim to proclaim; its southern flank (east and west of the enormous Biafo glacier) has a concentration of glaciers which works out to 59 per cent of its area. There is a historical reason for the fact that we, and the world outside, are better acquainted with glaciers in the Nanga Parbat region. It is through this region, hazardous though it is that man has trudged to and for since the beginning of his civilized history of movement and migration. The Siachin glacier is 75 kms. The Hispar (53 kms) joins the Biafo at the Hispar La [(5154.16 metres (16,910 ft)] to form an ice corridor 116.87 kms (72 miles) long. The Batura too is 58 kms in length. But, the most outstanding of these rivers of ice is the 62 kms Baltoro. This mighty glacier fed by some 30 tributaries constitutes a surface of 1291.39 sq. kms.

Western Low Mountains Region

These western low mountains spread from the Swat and Chitral hills in a northsouth direction (along which Alexander the Great led his army in 327 BC) and cover a large portion of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. North of the river Kabul their altitude ranges from 5,000 to 6,000 ft. in Mohmand and Malakand hills. The aspect of these hills is exceedingly dreary and the eye is everywhere met by the dry rivers between long rows of rocky hills and crags, scantily covered with coarse grass, scrub wood and dwarf palm.

South of the river Kabul spreads the Koh-e-Sofed Range with a general height of 10,000 ft. Its highest peak, Skaram, being 15,620 ft. South of Koh-e-Sofed are the Kohat and Waziristan hills (5,000 ft) which are traversed by the Kurram and Tochi rivers, and are bounded on south by Gomal River.

The whole area is a tangle of arid hills composed of limestone and sandstone. South of the Gomal River, the Sulaiman mountains run for a distance of about 483 kilometres in a northsouth direction, Takht-e-Sulaiman (11,295 ft.) being its highest peak. At the southern end lie the low Marri and Bugti hills. The area shows an extraordinary landscape of innumerable scarps, small plateaus and steep craggy out-crops with terraced slopes and patches of alluvial basins which afford little cultivation.

Kirthar Range

South of the Sulaiman mountains is the Kirthar Range which forms a boundary between the Sindh plain and the Balochistan plateau. It consists of a series of ascending ridges running generally north to south with broad flat valleys in-between. The highest peak named Kutte ji Kabar (dog's grace, is 6,878 ft. above sea level. Bleak, rugged and barren as these hills are, they afford some pasturage for flocks of sheep and goats.

The valleys are green with grass and admit cultivation up to a highest of 4,000 ft.

Historical Passes

The western mountains have a number of passes, which are of special geographical and historical interest. For centuries, they have been watching numerous kings, generals and preachers passing through them and the events that followed brought about momentous changes in the annals of mankind.

Climate

Although the country is in the monsoon region, it is arid, except for the southern slopes of the Himalayas and the sub-mountainous tract which has a rainfall from 76 to 127 cm. Balochistan is the driest part of the country with an average rainfall of 21 cm. On the southern ranges of the Himalayas, 127 cm. of precipitation takes place, while under the lee of these mountains (Gilgit and Baltistan) rainfall is hardly 16 cm. Rainfall also occurs from western cyclonic distrubances originating in the Mediterranean.

In the western mountains and the immediate fore lying area the rainfall average ranges from 27 to 76 cm. A large part of the precipitation in the northern mountain system is in the form of snow which feeds the rivers. The all-pervasive aridity over most of Pakistan, the predominant influence on the life and habitat of the people, coupled with the climatic rhythm, characteristic of a monsoon climate, are conducive to homogeneity of the land.

Seasons

Pakistan's four well-marked seasons are:

(i) Cold season (December to March).

(ii) Hot season (April to June)

(iii) Monsoon season (July to September).

(iv) Post-monsoon season (October and November).

The cold season sets in by the middle of December. This period is characterised by fine weather, bracing air-low humidity and large diurnal range of temperature. Winter disturbances in this season accordingly cause fairly widespread rain. Average minimum and maximum temperatures are 4°C and 18°C, though on occasions the mercury falls well below freezing point. The winter sun is glorious.

The hot season is usually dry. Relative humidity in May and June varies from 50 per cent in the morning to 25 per cent or less in the afternoon. The temperature soars to 40°C and beyond. The highest recorded temperature at Jacobabad in June is 53°C. In summer, while the interior is blazing hot, the temperature along the sea Coast Ranges between 25 °C to 35 °C, but the humidity persists around 70 to 80 per cent.

The southwest monsoon reaches Pakistan towards the beginning of July and establishes itself by the middle of the month. The strength of the monsoon current increases from June to July; it then remains steady, and starts retreating towards the end of August, though occasionally, it continues to be active even in September when some of the highest floods of the Indus Basin have been recorded. From the middle of September to the middle of November is the transitory period which may be called the post-monsoon season.

In October, the maximum temperature is of the order of 34°C to 37°C all over Pakistan, while the nights are fairly cool with the minimum temperature around 16°C. In the month of November, both the maximum and the minimum temperatures fall by about 6°C and the weather becomes pleasant. October and November are by far the driest months all over the plains of Pakistan.

PAKISTAN'S HIGHEST PEAKS

S.No	Peak	Height (m)	International. Ranking	Range
1.	K-2	8611	2	Karakoram
2.	Nanga Parbat	8125	9	Karakoram
3.	Gasherbrun I	8068	11	Karakoram
4.	Broad Peak	8047	12	Karakoram
5.	Gasherbrum II	8035	14	Karakoram
6.	Gasherbrum III	7952	15	Karakoram
7.	Gasherbrum IV	7885	20	Karakoram
8.	Distaghil Sar	7885	20	Karakoram
9.	Kunyang Chhish	7852	22	Karakoram
10.	Masherbrum NE	7821	24	Karakoram
11.	Rakaposhi	7788	27	Karakoram
12.	Batura	7785	25	Karakoram
13.	Kanjut Sar	7760	29	Karakoram
14.	Saltro Kagri	7760	29	Karakoram
15.	Trivor	7720	16	Karakoram
16.	Tirichmir	7708	41	Karakoram
17.	Chogolisa	7654	46	Karakoram
18.	Shispare	7619	49	Karakoram

19.	Skyang Kangri	7544	58	Karakoram
20.	Pamuri Chhish	7492	67	Karakoram
21.	Noshaq	7492	68	Karakoram
22.	Tirichmir NW	7487	69	Karakoram
23.	K-12	7468	73	Karakoram
24.	Teram Kangri	7468	73	Karakoram
25.	Malubiting W	7452	76	Karakoram
26.	Sia Kingri	7422	79	Karakoram
27.	Skilbrum	7420	80	Karakoram
28.	Teram Kangri II	7406	84	Karakoram
29.	Haramosh	7406	84	Karakoram
30.	Istro-o-nal	7403	85	Karakoram
31.	Mt Ghent 7400	7400	86	Karakoram
32.	Yukshin Gardan	7400	87	Karakoram
33.	Ultar Sar I & II	7388	88	Karakoram

Trekking in Pakistan

Pakistan is a paradise for trekkers. Most of the trekking routes are in the northern mountains of Hindu Kush, the Karakoram and the Himalayas. For most of the treks, trekking season is between May to October. The Ministry of Tourism, Government of Pakistan, has defined trekking as walking below 6000 m. It has designated three zones for trekking; open, restricted and closed.

II. GOVERNMENT, SYSTEM AND ECONOMY

System

Pakistan is now a Federation of four provinces: Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh, as well as the Islamabad Capital Territory and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in the northwest, which include the Frontier Regions. The government of Pakistan exercises *de facto* jurisdiction over the western parts of the disputed Kashmir region, organised into the separate political entities Azad Kashmir and Gilgit–Baltistan (formerly Northern Areas). The Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order, 2009 assigned a province-like status to the latter, giving it self-government.

Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy with multi-party system. The mainstream politics of the country as evident from the manifestoes and agenda of its major political parties is moderate and focused at least theoretically on economic and social development.

The principles imbibed in the State Constitution emphasize social justice, welfare, equality and equal opportunity, democracy, freedom and progress. Pakistan's bicameral legislature comprises a 100-member Senate and a 342-member National Assembly. Members of the National Assembly are elected through the first-past-the-post system under universal adult suffrage, representing electoral districts known as National Assembly constituencies. According to the constitution, 70 seats reserved for women and religious minorities are allocated to the political parties according to their proportional representation.

President

The president who is elected by an electoral college is the ceremonial head of the state and also the supreme commander of the armed forces and all the military appointments are made by the president on the advice of the prime minister.

The president, in keeping with the constitutional provision that the state religion is Islam, must be a Muslim. Elected for a five-year term by an electoral college consisting of members of the Senate and National Assembly and members of the provincial assemblies, the president is eligible for re-election. But no individual may hold the office for more than two consecutive terms. The president may resign or be impeached and may be removed from office for incapacity or gross misconduct by a two-thirds vote of the members of the parliament.

As customary in parliamentary system, the president generally acts on the advice of the prime minister but has important residual powers.

Parliament and Federal Government

The bicameral federal legislature is the Majlis-i-Shoora (Council of Advisers), consisting of the Senate (upper house) and National Assembly (lower house). Members of the National Assembly are elected by universal adult suffrage (18 years). Seats are allocated to each of the four provinces, Islamabad Capital Territory and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas on the basis of population.

National Assembly members serve for the parliamentary term, which is five years, unless they die or resign sooner, or unless the National Assembly is dissolved. Although the vast majority of the members are Muslim, 10 seats are reserved for minorities, including Christians, Hindus and Sikhs. Elections for minority seats are held on the basis of separate electorates at the same time as the polls for Muslim seats during the general elections.

The prime minister is appointed by the president from among the members of the National Assembly. He is usually the leader of the majority party or a coalition in the National Assembly. He serves as the head of government and is designated to exercise as the country's chief executive. He is responsible for appointing a cabinet consisting of ministers and advisors as well as running the government operations, taking and authorizing executive decisions, appointments and recommendations that require executive confirmation of the prime minister.

The Senate is a permanent legislative body with equal representation from each of the four provinces, elected by the members of their respective provincial assemblies. There are representatives from the Islamabad Capital Territory and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The chairman of the Senate, under the constitution, is next in line to act as president should the office become vacant and until such time as a new president can be formally elected.

Both the National Assembly and Senate can initiate and pass legislation except for finance bills. Only the National Assembly can approve the federal budget and all finance bills. In the case of other bills, the president may prevent passage unless the legislature in joint sitting overrules the president by a majority of members of the both Houses present and voting.

Other offices and bodies having important roles in the federal structure include the attorney general, the auditor general, the Federal Land Commission, the Federal Public Service Commission, the Election Commission, and the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman).

Provincial Governments

Pakistan's four provinces enjoy considerable autonomy. Each province has a governor, a Council of Ministers headed by a chief minister and a provincial assembly. Members of the provincial assemblies are elected by universal adult suffrage. Provincial assemblies also have reserved seats for minorities. Each of the four provinces has a similar system of government, with a directly elected provincial assembly in which the leader of the largest party or coalition is elected chief minister. Chief ministers oversee the provincial government and head the provincial cabinet.

The provincial assemblies have power to make laws and approve provincial budget which is commonly presented by the provincial finance minister every fiscal year. Provincial governors who play role as the ceremonial head of province are appointed by the president. Although the federal government could also legislate in these areas, it only makes national policy and handles international aspects of those services. Under the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution adopted in April 2010, the Concurrent List has been abolished leaving only the two lists.

Unfortunately, the legislative performance of provincial assemblies has never inspired confidence in the functioning of parliamentary system in Pakistan. Although there is a well-defined division of responsibilities between federal and provincial governments, there have been some functions on which both could make laws and establish departments for their execution. These areas were constitutionally identified in the Concurrent List. Most of the services in areas such as health, education, agriculture, and roads, for example, are provided by the provincial governments.

Local government follows a three-tier system of districts, tehsils and union councils, with an elected body at each tier. There are about 130 districts altogether, of which Azad Kashmir has ten and Gilgit–Baltistan seven. The Tribal Areas comprise seven tribal agencies and six small frontier regions detached from neighbouring districts.

Judiciary

The judiciary includes the Supreme Court, High courts, and other lesser courts exercising civil and criminal jurisdiction. The chief justice of the Supreme Court is appointed by the president on the advice of prime minister. The other Supreme Court judges are appointed by the president as laid down in Article 175-A of the Constitution of Pakistan.

The 17-member full bench of the Supreme Court in its ruling of October 21, 2010 referred Article 175-A back to the parliament for a review of the new procedure. It was in response to numerous petitions by a cross section of civil society including the bar associations challenging the provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment concerning the appointment of superior courts judges through a lopsidedly structured judicial commission which were tantamount to blatant infringement of the independence of judiciary.

In a constructive overture, the Supreme Court upheld the appointments of judges under the new procedure already made or likely to be made till such time as the disputed aspects of Article 175-A were reviewed and pending petitions finally settled. In doing so, the Court said "We are mindful of the oath of office, its constraints and the fundamental principles which underpin judicial independence in the constitutional scheme envisaged by the founding fathers."

The ruling acknowledged the Constitution which envisages a structure of governance based on trichotomy of powers in terms of which the functions of each organ have been constitutionally delineated keeping in view the seminal concept of separation of powers. It emphasised that the judges may not be supreme in political matters but constitutionally had their own unassailable obligation "to do right to all manner of people according to law, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will."

The chief justice and judges of the Supreme Court may remain in office until age sixty-five. The Supreme Court has original, appellate, and advisory jurisdiction. Judges of the provincial High courts are appointed by the president as laid down in Article 175-A of the constitution of Pakistan. High courts have original and appellate jurisdiction.

Through this ruling, the Court has indeed made a gracious gesture to the lawmakers that it was not striking down the disputed legislation and challenging their attempted 'judicial trespass' and instead gave them an opportunity to bring Article 175-A in line with the constitutionally anointed concept of 'independence of judiciary.' It also flagged the unmistakable reality that 'sovereignty of parliament' and 'independence of judiciary' were mutually reinforcing and complementary, and not competitive or incongruent of each other.

There is also a Federal Shariat Court consisting of eight Muslim judges, including a chief justice appointed by the president as laid down in Article 175-A of the Constitution of Pakistan. Three of the judges are ulema, that is, Islamic scholars, and are well versed in Islamic law. The Federal Shariat Court has original and appellate jurisdiction. This Court decides whether any law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. When a law is deemed repugnant to Islam, the prime minister, in the case of a federal law, or the chief minister, in the case of a provincial law, is charged with taking steps to bring the law into conformity with the injunctions of Islam.

In addition, there are special courts and tribunals to deal with specific kinds of cases, such as drug courts, commercial courts, labour courts, traffic courts, an insurance appellate tribunal, an income tax appellate tribunal, and special courts for bank offences. There are also special courts to try terrorists. Appeals from special courts go to high courts except for labour and traffic courts, which have their own forums for appeal. Appeals from the tribunals go to the Supreme Court.

A further feature of the judicial system is the office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), which is provided for in the constitution. The office of Mohtasib was established in many early Muslim states to ensure that no wrongs were done to citizens. Appointed by the president, the Mohtasib holds office for four years; the term cannot be extended or renewed. The Mohtasib's purpose is to institutionalize a system for enforcing administrative accountability, through investigating and rectifying any injustice done to a person through maladministration by a federal agency or a federal government official.

The Mohtasib is empowered to award compensation to those who have suffered loss or damage as a result of maladministration. Excluded from jurisdiction, however, are personal grievances or service matters of a public servant as well as matters relating to foreign affairs, national defence, and the armed services. This institution is designed to bridge the gap between administrator and citizen, to improve administrative processes and procedures, and to help curb misuse of discretionary powers.

Systemic Performance

Nation building remains a difficult process in Pakistan. But although the country has undergone a succession of traumatic socio-political experiences since achieving independence in 1947, it continues to demonstrate its resilience and its capacity to survive and adapt to changing circumstances. Joining the comity of nations as a bifurcated state, with its two wings separated by 1,600 kilometres of foreign soil, Pakistan was faced with the immediate task of absorbing large numbers of refugees from India in the months immediately following partition.

The new nation struggled with severe economic disadvantages made acutely painful by a shortage of both administrative personnel and the material assets necessary to establish and sustain its fledgling government. With the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah - the revered Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader) - only 13 months after independence, the nation was dealt a severe blow. Created to provide a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan was heir to a government structure and a political tradition that were essentially western and secular.

The young nation was immediately challenged by a host of other factors affecting national development, including ethnic and provincial tensions, political rivalries, and security considerations. Pakistan has had difficulty in establishing stable, effective political institutions. The country has experimented with a variety of political systems, has endured periods of martial law, and has had four constitutions, one inherited from the British and three indigenous creations since independence. Its political parties have suffered from regionalism, factionalism, and lack of vision.

While power has been shifting between the politicians and civil-military establishment, regional and ethnic forces have kept national unity hostage to their self-serving power-led interests. However, the impulse toward cohesion has been stronger than the impetus toward division, and the process of nation building no matter how arduous has continued.

The return to democracy in 1988, and the peaceful, constitutional transfer of power to new governments in the 1990s and then the post-Musharraf civilian process do testify to Pakistan's quest for political stability. But it is a dream that still remains unfulfilled.

Military Role

The armed forces of Pakistan are the eighth largest in the world in terms of numbers in full-time service, with about 650,000 personnel on active duty as of 2013.[1] The Chairman Joint Chiefs of staff committee is the highest principal officer in the armed forces, whereas the three branches of the armed forces have their own respective chiefs. The three main branches are the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and they are supported by a number of paramilitary forces.

The National Command Authority oversees and looks after the operations of Army, Air Force and Navy's strategic commands along with their functional bases. It is responsible for employment, control of the development of all strategic nuclear organisations and for Pakistan's minimum credible nuclear deterrent under Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. The National Command Authority is headed by the prime minister as its chairman.

The Pakistan Army came into being as a result of the amalgamation of the Muslim troops of the pre-independence British Indian Army. The origin of many of its units dates back to the beginning of the British rule in the subcontinent. This relation, however, is merely of historical nature. With the birth of Pakistan, a hotchpotch of the ill-equipped and ill-organized troops, breaking away from the old and established British Indian Army, had been transformed into a disciplined fighting force in consonance with the national ideals and aspirations.

The military in Pakistan remains one of the country's most cohesive national institutions. Since independence it has oscillated between indirect and direct political control, remaining a major power. The military's sense of mission in defending and preserving the Islamic state of Pakistan has always been strong. For Muslim members of the British Indian Army, the transfer of loyalties from the colonial to the ideological state was not difficult. Armed forces are not only the defenders of the motherland and guardians of the frontiers; they play a vital role in development of Pakistan.

The development arena includes socio-economic and cultural sectors. As part of its infrastructure building programme, the Army has recently constructed a modern road system called Central Trade Corridor (CTC) which not only connects Pakistan with Afghanistan but also provides trade and economic opportunities for the people of

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[1] *International* Institute for Strategic *Studies (IISS), London.*

South Waziristan and North Waziristan agencies in FATA. Armed forces have a well-organized welfare system with organizations like FWO, AWT, NLC, SCO, Fauji Foundation, Shaheen Foundation and Bahria Foundation engaged in the welfare of retired/serving officers and *jawans*, and the families of martyrs and disabled.

The other welfare measures include relief and rehabilitation of the affectless of natural catastrophes (floods, earthquake disasters), establishment of educational institutes, provision of medical assistance, slides clearance, construction of roads, dams, bridges and many more services. Regular systems have been devised for this purpose to ensure timely help to the needy people in trouble. At times, they have been called upon to assist the government in maintenance of law and order, and prevention of crime in the country, especially in large urban centres. Today, Pakistani troops represent a major part of UNs peace-keeping operations in the world.

Article 245(1) Chapter 2 of PART XII of the Constitution defines the 'functions' of the Armed Forces of Pakistan:

> *"The Armed Forces shall, under the directions of the Federal Government, defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so."*

Article 244 of the Constitution requires every member of the armed forces to take oath in the form as set out in the Third Schedule. There have been, occasions,; however, when in breach of their oath, military dictators overthrew the elected civilian regimes. Presidents brought in by military coups ruled the country in 1958-1971, 1977–1988 and 1999–2008. Military rulers always managed to secure legitimacy on the basis of the "doctrine of necessity" that justified their stepping in temporarily when political crisis reached deadlock and threatened the state.

However, a question always asked is whether military interventions in Pakistan could have been avoided had the political system and the civilian governments been functioning in accordance with universally observed norms of democracy and good governance. If our civilian rulers had been steadfast in their own commitment to constitutional supremacy, rule of law, independence of judiciary, separation of powers and institutional integrity, perhaps, there would have been no military takeovers.

One must admit that on vital security-related issues in a perilously-located country as ours, the pivotal role of so-called 'establishment' under the overall supervision of an elected government as anywhere else in the civilised world is indispensable. Even a superpower like the United States cannot afford to do without Pentagon and CIA in matters that affect its overarching security-related global interests and policies. With its peculiar geopolitical location, Pakistan too is confronted with security challenges of exceptional nature that require strong and professionalized armed forces to defend the country against external aggression or threat of war in keeping with their constitutional and professional role.

Foreign Aid and Sanctions

Pakistan has the world's eighth largest armed forces, which is generally well-trained and disciplined. However, budget constraints and nation-building duties have reduced training tempo, which if not reversed, could affect the operational readiness of the armed forces. Likewise, Pakistan has had an increasingly difficult time maintaining its aging fleet of US, Chinese, UK, and French equipment. While industrial capabilities have expanded significantly, limited budget resources and sanctions have significantly constrained the government's efforts to modernize its armed forces.

Until 1990, the United States provided military aid to Pakistan to modernize its conventional defensive capability. The United States allocated about 40% of its assistance package to non-reimbursable credits for military purchases, the third-largest programme behind Israel and Egypt. The remainder of the aid program was devoted to economic assistance. Sanctions put in place in 1990 denied Pakistan further military assistance due to the discovery of its programme to develop nuclear weapons.

Sanctions were tightened following Pakistan's nuclear tests in response to India's May 1998 tests and the military coup of 1999. Pakistan has remained a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The events of September 11, 2001, and Pakistan's agreement to support the United States led to a waiver of the sanctions, and military assistance resumed providing spare parts and equipment to enhance Pakistan's capacity to police its western border with Afghanistan and address its legitimate security concerns.

In 2003, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would provide Pakistan with $3 billion in economic and military aid over five years. This assistance package commenced during FY 2005. In July 2008, Senator Joe Biden presented a bipartisan bill in the Senate involving an annual aid package of $1.5 billion for five years renewable for another five years, with an additional $1 billion as "democracy dividend," and an appropriate "performance-based" military assistance which was to be subjected to rigorous oversight and accountability. After the US presidential election in 2008, the Biden-Lugar bill became the Kerry-Lugar Bill with several changes in its content and wording. The provision on non-security assistance remained the same but the idea of a democracy dividend disappeared.

The major problem with the Kerry-Lugar Bill, formally known as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, was in its provisions on security-related assistance involving pre-disbursement certifications by the US secretary of state. The first and perhaps the most ominously sensitive certification clause was the one on Pakistan's continued cooperation "on the dismantling of nuclear weapon-related supplier networks and providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks."[2] Under Section 203, some badly worded certification conditions were attached to the provision for military assistance to Pakistan. There is nothing unusual with aid-related conditionalities.

In fact, the very concept of foreign aid is predicated on mutually convergent obligations of donor and recipient countries inherent in their political, economic, military, moral, social and now strategic priorities. Even the famous Marshall Plan had its conditionalities to ensure the requisite oversight and accountability. But in term of conditionalities, the donor and recipient always do lot of homework to evolve the needed convergence of mutual obligations. [3]

In this particular case, it seems, no such homework was done. The bill became a crisis for both the PPP government and US policy makers. It was a classic example of flawed decision making on both sides. On the Pakistani side, it was a matter of poor judgment of its own national mood and country's vital interests. The major civilian and military stakeholders in the country, including the parliament, opposition and the army were either kept in the dark or were misinformed about the contents of the bill.

On the American side, it was yet another blatant example of closing their eyes to history, playing games with Pakistan's weak and crumbling democracy, exploiting its vulnerable leadership, and extremely poor public diplomacy in the face of growing anti-Americanism. Joe Biden's realistic approach for a new policy towards Pakistan was woefully distorted and once again circumscribed to Washington's narrowly based and vaguely defined issue-specific priorities. [4] The situation has been aggravating with the US entering into a multidimensional strategic relationship with India.

If the turbulent history of this region had any lessons, policymakers in Washington, should have been working "extra time" to promote a sense of security and balance in this region by eschewing discriminatory policies in their dealings with India-

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[2] *The Kerry Lugar fiasco:* Shamshad Ahmad, *The News*, October 19, 2009.

[3] *ibid.*

[4] *ibid.*

Pakistan nuclear equation, the only one in the world that grew up in history totally unrelated to the Cold War. But this never happened. Today, Pakistan is looking towards China for its legitimate economic and security needs.

The Bureaucracy

The bureaucracy, particularly the higher civil service, has been a continuing source of stability and leadership and a counterweight to political upheaval and government instability. This cadre originated in the pre-partition Indian Civil Service, whose members were well educated, well trained, and dedicated to a tradition of efficiency and responsibility. In time, the British recruited indigenous people, who were among India's best and brightest, into the Indian Civil Service ranks.

At partition, out of more than 1,100 Indian Civil Service officers, scarcely 100 were Muslims, 83 of them opted to go to Pakistan. Because none of them held a senior rank equivalent to that of a secretary (and administrators were urgently needed to staff senior posts in the new state), this initial group was augmented by quick promotions in the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) through ad hoc appointments from other services and through retention, for a time, of some British officers.

In 1947, ICS became Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS). In 1950, PAS became Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). Under Civil Servants Act, 1973, 12 groups were created out of which one was named District Management Group. PAS shouldered the responsibility of nation building and policy making at different tiers and was instrumental in early institution building.

The CSP prided itself on being the backbone of the nation, the "steel frame" as it was sometimes called, and played a key role in Pakistan's survival in the difficult years following independence. Although Jinnah commended its contribution, he also warned CSP cadres to stay out of politics and to discharge their duties as public servants. After Jinnah's death, however, in the subsequent absence of strong political leadership, members of the CSP assumed an extraordinary role in the country's policy-making process. It is not surprising, then, that two of the later presidents of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1988-93) and Farooq Leghari were also once members of the CSP.

When the CSP was disbanded in 1973 and the various services were amalgamated into one administrative system, the CSP cadre was merged into DMG (District Management Group) and Secretariat Groups. These Groups continue to hold critical positions in the country's administrative apparatus, and have dominated all subsequent transitions in government. There is general resentment in other functional groups with the CSP, even after becoming DMG, remaining an influential factor in Pakistan and occupying almost all important administrative positions both at the centre and in provinces.

Pakistan's federal bureaucracy primarily consists of 12 occupational groups, known by the collective name of Central Superior Services (CSS). They are inducted on merit through annual competitive examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission. The persons appearing on the top in the merit list, in each of the federating units of Pakistan, usually opt for the PAS or Pakistan Foreign Service or even the Police Service. Currently, Pakistan Administrative Service, with PAS as its common acronym constitutes the general management cadre of the Pakistan's civil services. The officers of this cadre act as managers at district, provincial and finally at the policy-making levels in the highest echelons of the federal bureaucracy.

Following different types of training are conducted before assuming office:

(a) Common Training Programme (CTP) (6-9 months duration)

(b) Specialized Training Programme (STP) (10 months duration)

(c) Field attachment with a district (22 weeks)

During their career, the following training programmes are a pre-requisite for promotion into next grade:

(i) Mid Career Management Course (MCMC) for promotion into BS-19

(ii) Senior Management Course (SMC) for promotion into BS-20

(iii) National Management Course (NMC) for promotion into BS-21

The Politics

Since independence, the politics and governments in Pakistan have remained hostage to the elite classes which have been inimical to any political liberalization in the country.

Unlike India's Congress Party, the Muslim League, Pakistan's founding party was almost wholly dominated by few feudai families, which the British had patronised before partition and were powerful enough to retain control over national affairs through the bureaucracy and the armed forces. India's Congress on its part already had constitutional, economic, social, and even foreign policy plans in place before independence and was ready to put them into effect when the time came.

While India was born with an intact bureaucratic apparatus in Delhi, Pakistan had to build an entire government in 1947 under a state of emergency. Besides military and the civil bureaucracy which wielded real authority, we saw a number of politicians being 'cycled' through those political and economic crises. Invariably, the politicians proved to be corrupt, interested only in maintaining their political power and securing their own interests or those of their elite fraternity. As "elected" leaders, they never inspired hope for a democratic state that could provide socio-economic justice and fair administration to all Pakistani citizens.[5]

Even after Muslim League's disintegration, the same feudalised oligarchy consisting of different men at different times under different political flags has remained in power with or without military collaboration. The feudal power structure is indeed at the root of Pakistan's political decay. It has also resisted land reforms in the country which it sees will strike at its own roots. Instead of removing our systemic weaknesses and reinforcing the unifying elements of our nationhood, politicians have always succumbed to narrowly-based self-serving temptations.

As a newly independent nation, we just could not cope with the challenges of freedom inherent in our geopolitical and structural fault lines. Language became our first *bête noire*. Our politicians rejected the popular will freely expressed in the December 1970 elections, and instead of exploring political remedies to the resultant crisis went along a military solution that precipitated a humiliating military debacle leaving Pakistan physically amputated; the worst that could happen to any country in the world.

And yet, we learnt no lesson from our mistakes. We are repeating the same mistakes. The very reasons that brought about the 1971 tragedy remained unaddressed in the new constitution which was adopted in 1973 under pressures emanating in the aftermath of the country's break-up rather than on merits of the document itself. Those who had no constitution-making mandate and were in fact responsible for creating a parliamentary gridlock leading to the breakup of Pakistan ironically became the authors of the flawed 1973 constitution.

We are still possessed by the same ghosts in the name of culture, ethnicity and history. No wonder, Pakistan has had difficulty in establishing stable, effective political institutions. Since then, the 1973 constitution has been amended 21 times but no government has ever attempted to correct the systemic anachronisms in our federal structure or to redress provincial grievances. The so-called 'devolution' under the

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[5] *A country study: Pakistan*, US Library of Congress, 1994.

Eighteenth Amendment provides no solution to the core issue of inter-provincial disparities.

The problem is that the overbearing feudal and tribal power structure in Pakistan has been too deeply entrenched to let any systemic change take place. It doesn't suit them. They have always resisted reform in the country which they fear will erode their vested power and influence base. In the process, the country has failed to develop a sustainable democratic system based on constitutional supremacy and institutional integrity. The main casualties have been the state institutions and the process of national integration.

The country is still engaged in a precarious struggle to define an overarching national identity and evolve a political system needed for its ethnically and linguistically diverse population. Pakistan is known to have over 20 languages and nearly 300 distinct dialects. This diversity contributed to chronic regional tensions and provincial disharmony, which not only impeded the process of constitution making but also remained a potential threat to central authority.

No wonder, there are demands now for more ethnic-linguistic provincial units in the country. No one agrees with the logic of these self-serving demands when we need greater societal cohesion, not fragmentation. We cannot afford new controversies reviving the old ethnic and linguistic chasms. But if inter-provincial disparities are to be removed, we can't simply wish them away. A surgical remedy would be indispensable.

Against this challenging backdrop, Pakistan has had considerable difficulty developing stable, cohesive political organizations because they have suffered long periods of political crises. Further, political parties, with rare exceptions, have been founded as vehicles for one person, one family or a few individuals, or to achieve specifically defined goals. Some parties are being run as family dynasties with leadership passing within the family through hereditary rather than democratic system. In some cases, when the party leaders die or abandon their parties, or after party goals have been met, the parties seem to have lost their *raison d'être* and have lacked the ability to carry on.

Most of the political parties in Pakistan lack democratic culture and hardly adhere to their own constitutions and programmes, nor ensure strict observance of party discipline. They also lack proper codes of conduct and ethical standards in keeping with the democratic tradition and values, and have not been able to establish within their hierarchy a credible and foolproof ethics management mechanism to prevent misuse of public office and to ensure accountability in cases of corruption or issues of personal morality and responsible citizenship.

In addition, political parties have been handicapped by regional and ethnic factors that have limited their national appeal and have also been torn by personal and class rivalries.[6] Political-parties were not allowed by Gen. Zia to participate in the 1985 elections. Benazir Bhutto-led PPP boycotted them. After the elections, Zia picked Mohammad Khan Junejo, a politician from Sindh as his prime minister. The Zia-Junejo combination lasted three years until Zia dismissed the prime minister and dissolved the National Assembly.

Zia cited incompetence, corruption, and failure to further the Islamization process as reasons for his actions. In addition, Zia came to regard Junejo as too independent, and the two men clashed on a number of issues including differences on issues related to Afghan policy and promotions in the armed services. In the post-Zia era, Pakistan's politics developed a pattern based on two-party system as reflected in successive four elections in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 with constitutional transfer of power alternating between the PPP and PML (N). In these elections, the two political alliances, the IJI led by Nawaz Sharif and the PDA headed by the PPP became the main contenders for power.

The main political parties in the country today *inter alia* include:

Muslim League

The Muslim League was founded in 1906 as the All-India Muslim League to protect the interests of Muslims in British India and to counter the political growth of the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885. Under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution (often referred to as the "Pakistan Resolution") in March 1940 and successfully spearheaded the movement for the creation of an independent homeland for Indian Muslims.

At independence the Muslim League was the only major party in Pakistan and claimed the allegiance of almost every Muslim in the country. As governor-general, Quaid-e-Azam voluntarily relinquished the Muslim League Party's presidentship on December 17, 1947 and the League elected Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman as its president. However, with the death of its two principal leaders, Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan, shortly after independence and its central goal of creating Pakistan achieved, the party failed to develop a coherent, post-independence ideology. The Muslim League was a party with little grass-roots support, a weak organizational structure, powerful factional leaders, and decisions made at the top.

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[6] *A country study: Pakistan*, US Library of Congress, 1994.

While the provincial arenas continued to be the main centres of political activity, those who set about creating the centralized government in Karachi were either politicians with no real support or civil servants trained in the old traditions of British Indian administration. The inherent weaknesses of the Muslim League's structure, together with the absence of a central administrative apparatus that could coordinate the affairs of the state, proved to be a crippling disadvantage for Pakistan overall.[7]

The Muslim League gradually came to be dominated by West Pakistani, and particularly Punjabi, landlords and bureaucrats, more concerned with increasing their own personal influence than with building a strong national organization. The Muslim League was further weakened by the constitutional impasse in the 1950s resulting from difficulties in resolving questions of language and regional representation as well as the problem of reaching a consensus on Islamic issues. Regional loyalties were intensified during the constitutional debates over the respective political representation of the country's west and east wings.

Although Ghulam Mohammad tried to exercise the "viceregal" power that Jinnah had used so powerfully as governor-general, concern for office and the fruits of power were more important to most of the self-serving politicians than the evolution of ideology or implementation of people-specific mass programmes.[8] The effect of this lack of direction was shown most clearly when the Muslim League was routed in the 1954 election in East Pakistan by the United Front--mainly a coalition of the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party, led by two one-time prominent Muslim League members, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy and Fazl-i-Haq, who ran on an autonomist platform.

Ironically, Fazl-i-Haq had the distinction of moving the "Pakistan Resolution" at All-India Muslim League's historic Lahore session in 1940, and Suhrawardy, subsequently the last chief minister of undivided Bengal, had seconded it. After independence, both were alienated by West Pakistani domination of the Muslim League. Other parties established during this period included the leftist National Awami Party (a breakaway from the Awami League), which also supported provincial autonomy. Islamic parties also made their appearance on the electoral scene, most notably the Jama'at-i-Islami.

Pakistan: A Political History, Asia Society's Encyclopedia of Asian History (2008).

A country study: Pakistan, US Library of Congress, 1994.

In addition, the presence of a larger Hindu population in East Pakistan also had a negative influence on the political situation. The provincial leaders believed their power depended on developing broad-based secular institutions. The Muslim League, however, pressed for provisions to establish Pakistan as an Islamic state. Suhrawardy was elected leader of the opposition in the second Constituent Assembly and in 1956 was appointed prime minister, a further setback to the Muslim League because he was the first non-Muslim League politician to hold this position.

By this time, the Muslim League had lost its influence in both East Pakistan and West Pakistan, having also lost its majority in the West Pakistan Legislative Assembly to the Punjab-centred feudalised Republican Party. The promulgation of martial law in 1958 and the dissolution of all political parties finally resulted in the demise of the Muslim League after its 52 year existence. Between 1958 and 1962, while martial law was in force under Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan, the League was officially defunct.

In 1962, Gen. Ayub Khan while promulgating his constitution recreated a party called the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) which was soon converted into two rival factions: the Convention Muslim League (under Ayub) and the Council Muslim League. This latter group joined a united front with other political parties in contesting the 1965 presidential election against Ayub Khan. Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah as their joint candidate fought the election but lost. The Convention Muslim League ceased to exist when Ayub Khan resigned in 1969.

The Muslim League, which had brought about the founding of Pakistan, was virtually eliminated from the political scene in the elections of 1970. Junejo established a successor party with the same name (PML-J) in 1986, but these two parties had little in common with the 1906 Muslim League in terms of their objectives and composition. The death of Junejo signified the end to an uneasy coalition that had existed between the feudal lobby under Junejo and the representatives of the new industrialist classes who, under the guidance of Nawaz Sharif, were running the Islamic Democratic Alliance (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad--IJI) government of 1990-93.

Pakistan Muslim League (N)

After Junejo died in March 1993, Mian Nawaz Sharif took over the party and it became the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N). After his military coup in October 1999, General Musharraf was able to cobble together another Muslim League by using Quaid-e-Azam's name to give his party the title PML (Q). Even after his ouster, Musharraf has formed another faction of Muslim League naming it All Pakistan Muslim League. Pir Pagara heads his own faction called

Functional Muslim League. Today, the Muslim League remains divided in many factions with no unity of purpose representing nothing of the League that was created in 1906.

History repeated itself again when after Benazir government's dismissal by President Farooq Leghari in November 1996, PML(N)'s chief Nawaz Sharif returned to power with an overwhelming majority in February 1997 elections. This time, he decided to curtail the presidential powers by amending the Constitution in March 1997, stripping the president of the power to dismiss the government and making his power to appoint military service chiefs and provincial governors contingent on the "advice" of the prime minister. Nawaz Sharif further consolidated his powers through another amendment prohibiting elected members from "floor crossing" or voting against party positions.

The Sharif government also engaged in a protracted dispute with the judiciary, culminating in the storming of the Supreme Court by ruling party loyalists and dismissal of the chief justice and eventual resignation of President Leghari in December 1997. His decision to appoint Gen. Pervez Musharraf as the chief of army staff soon landed him in direct conflict with the army. Nawaz Sharif tried to dismiss the COAS on the question of Kargil issue but in the process he was himself ousted from power. After the military coup on October 12, 1999, he was exiled and returned in 2007.

In the 2008 elections, PML(N) took control of Punjab and supported the PPP-led coalition at the Centre. The May 2013 elections brought PML(N) back to power even in Centre for the third time. Nawaz Sharif became prime minister for his unprecedented third term. His PML(N) also retained its control over Punjab and also shared its majority in Balochistan with two other partners, namely the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party and National Party (NP) in forming a coalition government headed by National Party's Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch.

PML(N) had its own nominee Mamnoon Hussain took oath as president of Pakistan in place of Asif Ali Zardari on September 9, 2013. The PML(N) with the experience of two previous unfinished terms and a seasoned leadership was expected to take on the challenges of its renewed mandate. The country surely needed a strong economic team with a merit-based, professionalized public sector cadre and small but efficient performance-led federal and provincial cabinets for effective handling of the economic and energy crises and dreary law and order situation.

But within less than two years, PML(N) found itself in grave economic, political and security crises of unprecedented magnitude. It is now grappling with the multi-dimensional challenges with the help of the armed forces which have been engaged not only in a valiant military operation Zarb-e-Azb in the tribal areas but also in restoring law and order in Karachi as well as in other areas in aid of the civilian authority.

Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) represents another part of Pakistan's political spectrum. Founded in 1967 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as a vehicle to bring down the government of his former political mentor, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the Party came into being with four cardinal principles: Islam is our faith, democracy is our polity, socialism is our economy, and all power to the people. Its slogan has been *Roti, Kupra aur Makkan* or provision of the basic human needs to every citizen of Pakistan. [9]

A left-leaning populist movement, the PPP attempted to blend Islam with socialism. It advocated a just and fairer distribution of national wealth amongst various strata of the society and stood for democratic traditions, liberal values and welfare-oriented policies. The Party also promised the elimination of feudalism in accordance with the established principles of socialism to protect and advance the interests of peasantry.

The PPP was suddenly thrown on the nation's political springboard when it swept the first-ever general elections in the history of the country in December 1970 as the major political power in the Western wing of the country what was today's Pakistan. It won 81 of 138 seats allocated to West Pakistan in the National Assembly (a total of 300 seats were contested for in both wings of the country), coming in as the second largest party after East Pakistan-based Awami League which took 160 of the 162 seats allotted East Pakistan. At the provincial level, the PPP won majority in Sindh and Punjab legislatures.

One year later the Party was handed over power in the truncated Pakistan in the aftermath of 1971 tragedy in which a political crisis was allowed to turn into a military debacle in the form of Pak-India War which resulted in the tragic break-up of the country. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto lifted martial law in April 1972 and in 1973 stepped down as president to become prime minister in accordance with the new Constitution. The PPP did little to advance the first two tenets of its platform, Islam and democracy but did pursue socialism as a political tool, nationalizing the country's large-scale industries, insurance companies, and commercial banks.

A number of public corporations were set up to expand the role of the government in commerce, construction, and transportation. The most significant achievement of the PPP's first tenure in power was the framing of the Constitution in 1973 which provides the legal and the political foundation to the nation even to this day. The PPP espoused such policies as land reform to help the peasants; nationalization of industries to weaken the industrialists; and administrative reforms to reduce the power of the bureaucrats. The party, however, was built on the foundations of the wealthy, landed elite, Pakistan's traditional ruling class. [10]

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[9] *PPP Website*

The heavy hand with which Bhutto and the PPP exerted their power aroused widespread resentment. Matters came to a head in 1977 when the PPP won 155 of the 200 seats in the National Assembly with 58 percent of the total votes cast. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a coalition of nine opposition parties and with 35 percent of the votes, won only 36 seats. The PNA charged widespread electoral fraud, and the resulting PPP-PNA confrontation and the accompanying civil unrest precipitated the imposition of martial law and ouster of the Bhutto regime.

The survival of Bhutto's party after his execution in 1979 was facilitated by dynastic politics. His widow Begum Nusrat Bhutto and his daughter Benazir led the party as co-chairpersons. During Zia's martial law, the PPP joined with 10 other parties in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) to keep pressure on the military government to hold free elections under the 1973 constitution. After Zia's death in 1988, the MRD was dissolved, and the PPP, the largest party in the alliance, contested the 1988 elections on its own.

The PPP emerged as the single largest party with narrow plurality. Benazir Bhutto formed a coalition government with the support of the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) and other parties. After a troubled period in power, the PPP government was dismissed by President Ishaq Khan in 1990. The PPP as the principal component of the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) lost the 1990 elections to the IJI. The PDA blamed its defeat on alleged tampering with the vote. The National Democratic Institute, an international observer team, did note irregularities in the election but declared that the final outcome did generally reflect the popular will.

In the 1993 general elections, the PPP won 86 of the 217 seats in the National Assembly, while Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) won 72. The PPP was successful in forming a coalition with other parties to control a bloc of 121 seats. Benazir Bhutto's government was dismissed for the second time on November 5, 1996 by her hand-picked President Farooq Leghari. She then left the country to remain in exile for almost decade and returned only in October 2007 under the NRO deal but did not live to go through the realisation of her political mission. She was assassinated in Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007.

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[10] *Pakistan: A Political History*, Asia Society's Encyclopedia of Asian History (2008).

Within minutes after she left addressing a rally in Liaquat Bagh, she was killed under most tragic and bewildering circumstances. Her assassination was never investigated by her own party's government. She left behind not only a will that passed on the party leadership to her husband Asif Ali Zardari but also many unanswered questions as to who killed her and why. As a world renowned leader and daughter of the East, Benazir Bhutto also left behind a void that will not be easily filled.[11]

The 2008 elections resulted in a heavy sympathy vote for PPP which came to power through a comfortable coalition. Asif Zardari who chose to become president and instead nominated Yousuf Reza Gilani to be the prime minister. Gilani remained in office until his retroactive disqualification and ouster by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on contempt of court charges on April 26, 2012. He was replaced by another PPP senior member Raja Pervez Ashraf who remained prime minister from June 22, 2012 until completing his designated term on March 16, 2013. The PPP-led political dispensation remained in power for five years, the first-ever elected government in Pakistan's history to complete its full tenure.

Jama'at-e-Islami (JI)

The Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), the largest and most articulate of Pakistan's religious parties, was founded in 1941 by Maulana Abul A'ala Maududi as an ideological movement to promote Islamic values and practices in British India. It initially opposed the Pakistan movement, arguing that Islam was a universal religion not subject to national boundaries. It changed its position, however, once the decision was made to partition India on the basis of religion. In 1947 Maulana Maududi redefined the JI's purpose as the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan.

In order to achieve this objective, the JI considered it necessary to purge the community of deviant behaviour and to establish a political system in which decisionmaking would be undertaken by a few pious people well versed in the meaning of Islam. Maududi's writings also gained a wide audience. Jama'at-i-Islami took a strong position in favour of Pakistan during the 1971 East Pakistan crisis. Maulana Maududi retired as head of the party in 1972. His successors since then have all been elected by the party's membership.

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[11] *An iconic loss*, Shamshad Ahmad, The Nation, December 29, 2007.

The Jama'at-e-Islami's views on Islamization and limited political participation were opposed by those people who saw the party's platform as advocating religious dictatorship. The question of whether the JI was a political party or an organization working to subvert legitimate political processes was raised in the courts. The Supreme Court ultimately decided in favour of the Jama'at-e-Islami as a lawful political organization. Prominent in political life since independence, the JI was the dominant voice for the interests of the ulema in the debates leading to the adoption of Pakistan's first constitution.

The JI envisions a state governed by Islamic law and opposes Westernization--including capitalism, socialism, and such practices as bank interest, birth control, and relaxed social mores. The JI's influence has been far greater than its showing at the polls suggests.

In 1990, the JI was an important component of the IJI though it won only four seats. In the 1993 national elections, the JI and its political umbrella group, the Pakistan Islamic Front, captured only three seats in the National Assembly. In subsequent elections too, the JI has not performed well. In the current scenario, with extremist forces flagging their own version of Islam, the JI stand out as a moderate forward-looking religious party.

Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)

The Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM), a party formed to represent the interests of the *Muhajir* community in Pakistan, had a meteoric rise in the political life of the country. Founded by Altaf Hussain in 1984, the MQM won 13 (out of 207) seats in the National Assembly in the 1988 elections, making it the third largest party in the assembly after the PPP and the IJI. MQM support of the PPP made it possible for Benazir to form a government and become prime minister in 1988.

Shortly after the election, however, the coalition between the PPP and the MQM broke down, and the two parties' subsequently troubled relations contributed greatly to the instability of Benazir's first government. In the 1990 general elections, the MQM won 15 seats in the National Assembly, remaining the third largest party. The MQM boycotted the 1993 National Assembly elections but won 27 seats in the provincial assembly of Sindh.

The MQM's political strength came primarily from the urban areas of Sindh, and its main emphasis was on securing better job opportunities for *Muhajirs*. The MQM played an active role in the ethnic riots in Karachi in the winter of 1986-87. These disturbances brought prominence and notoriety to the MQM and its leader, Altaf Hussain. It was after these riots that the MQM leadership converted the movement into a political party. The MQM's full political weight was first felt in the 1988 elections.

In 1997, the MQM officially removed the term Muhajir (which denotes the party's roots among Urdu-speaking Muslims) from its name, and replaced it with *Muttahida* ("United"). The MQM is one of few socially liberal political parties in Pakistan and has its origin in the All-Pakistan Muhajir Students Organization at Karachi University which its founder Altaf Hussain had established in the 1970s. Today, MQM is the second largest party in Sindh and traditionally the third largest in the country.

Lately, however, MQM has been facing difficulties on account of its alleged role in Karachi's deteriorating law and order situation, target-killings and other criminal activities. The federal government has established a joint redressal committee to alleviate MQM's genuine grievances in return for its withdrawal of resignations from the National Assembly. Meanwhile, it seems to have held ground in the local bodies elections in Sindh.

Awami National Party (ANP)

The Awami National Party was formed in 1986 by the merger of several left-leaning parties including the Awami Tehrik and the National Democratic Party. Khan Abdul Wali Khan was appointed its first president. Wali Khan's political career had been built on the tradition of intense Pakhtun nationalism inherited from his father, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Both men were opposed to the creation of Pakistan, and after partition they were imprisoned.[12]

In 1956, Wali Khan joined the National Awami Party (NAP), led by a charismatic Bengali socialist, Maulana Bhashani. In 1965, the NAP split into two factions, with Wali Khan becoming president of the pro-Moscow faction. In 1972, the party was strong enough to form coalition provincial governments, with its partner the Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan.

These governments were short-lived. Wali Khan was again jailed, and his party was barred from politics when the Supreme Court upheld the finding of Bhutto that the NAP was conspiring against the state of Pakistan. Gen. Zia subsequently withdrew the charges against the NAP. Wali Khan was released, joined the National Democratic Party, and ultimately formed the Awami National Party.

The Awami National Party formed an alliance with the conservative Pakistan Muslim League in early June 1989 which led to a formal split in the party with many activists allying with the

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[12] *A country study, Pakistan,* US Library of Congress; 1994.

PPP. In the 2002 elections, ANP struck up an alliance with the PPP but both parties were electorally routed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by the religion-political alliance Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) riding on a wave of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan.

In the 2008 elections the party contested on its own and won a plurality of votes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as well as winning seats in Balochistan for the first time in 15 years and in Karachi for the first time. The ANP formed its own government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and as a coalition partner with PPP in the Centre and in Sindh and Balochistan provinces. But it was routed in the 2013 elections resulting in the formation of a PTI government in coalition with Jama'at-e-Islami and Sherpao-led Qaumi Watan Party.

Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)

The Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, had its origins in the Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind (JUH), founded by a group of ulema of the Deoband Movement in pre-partition India. The JUH argued that Muslims could coexist with other religions in a society where they were not the majority. In 1945, however, a group of JUH ulema, led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, split off from the JUH, formed the JUI, and gave their support to the movement for an independent Pakistan. Since 1947 the JUI has undergone a number of organizational and programme changes. It developed strong support in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan.

In 1972 it joined the NAP to form governments in those two provinces. In 1977, the JUI contested the National Assembly election as a component of the Pakistan National Alliance. The JUI did not sympathize with Gen. Zia's Islamization programme, and in 1981 the JUI joined the MRD to pressurise Zia to hold free elections. The JUI won six seats in the National Assembly in the 1990 elections. In the 1993 national elections, the JUI was the main component of the Islami Jamhoori Mahaz, which won four seats in the National Assembly. In 2002 elections, it won enough seats to form coalition governments in KPk and Balochistan. In 2013 elections, Jamaat-e-Islami won enough seats to become a partner in PTI-led coalition government in KPk.

Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI)

The Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) is relatively a new entity on Pakistan's political scene. Founded by former Pakistani cricket captain and philanthropist Imran Khan in 1996, PTI today is fastest growing political party in Pakistan, even though with little election success so far. It has established itself as one of the mainstream national parties especially after October 30, 2011 when over a hundred thousand people gathered in Lahore in support of the party.

The party has since organised public meetings drawing large crowds representing what it calls its *tsunami* that will erode the next poll results. It already claims to have enrolled more than ten million workers in Pakistan, popularly called 'Insafiyans'. According to political analysts PTI has built a significant vote bank in central, southern and western Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and upper Sindh and claims to be Pakistan's only non family party. Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (N) are direct competitors of PTI.

In 1999, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was ousted by Gen. Musharraf, Imran Khan supported Gen. Musharraf because he believed the change would usher in a new era for the country but that never happened. Imran then became Musharraf's most vocal critics. Imran Khan boycotted the February 2008 elections held under Gen. Musharraf. He remains deeply critical of the political order in Pakistan and promises to bring changes to free the country of bad governance, economic mismanagement, corruption and violence. In 2013, PTI emerged as a major party winning 30 seats in the National Assembly, 20 in Punjab Assembly and 34 in KPk Assembly. It was able to form a government in KPk in coalition with Jama'at-e-Islami and QWP.

As a relatively new political party in the national arena, PTI wishes to create a modern, democratic Islamic republic which advocates complete political, religious, and economic freedom. Basing his entire political platform as being derived from Jinnah's vision of a harmonious and peaceful country, Imran Khan has consistently spoken out against exploitation, corruption, and prejudices of all kind. As one of the most dynamic political parties, PTI envisages a democratic system ensuring justice, equality and prosperity for all citizens. Lately, Imran Khan has taken his party to new heights on the political horizon by awakening the masses on the need for systemic changes in the country.

Bringing them out on the streets for unprecedented sit-ins (*dharnas*), Imran Khan was able to give a wake-up call, loud and clear. We need a drastic change in our present anachronistic set-up to be able to get rid of the same old usurpers of the country's politics, outmoded social and political structures and elitist-led *status quo* in our country. He called into question the legality of 2013 elections accusing the government of large-scale rigging in the polls. The government denied the allegations and the Judicial Commission established by the government also found the elections by and large fair. However, on PTI's petitions on rigging charges in some constituencies, the Election Tribunals did find irregularities ordering bye-elections in those constituencies in Punjab which have since been held.

III. THE ECONOMY

Pakistan is a developing country. The World Bank considers Pakistan a low-income country. The economy of Pakistan is the 44th largest in the world in terms of nominal GDP, and 26th largest in the world in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). It is South Asia's second largest economy after India, representing about 15 percent of regional GDP. As Pakistan has a population of over 188.6 million (the world's sixth largest), the GDP per capita is $3,149 ranking 140th in the world.

Pakistan's economy is semi-industrialized, with growth poles situated along the Indus River; the diversified economies of Karachi and major urban centres in the Punjab, coexisting with lesser developed areas in other parts of the country. The economy has suffered in the past from internal political disputes, a fast-growing population, mixed levels of foreign investment. Foreign exchange reserves are bolstered by steady worker remittances, but a growing current account deficit – driven by a widening trade gap as import growth outstrips export expansion – could draw down reserves and dampen GDP growth in the medium-term. Pakistan has been-undergoing a process of economic liberalization which includes privatization of all government corporations, aimed to attract foreign investment and decrease budget deficit.

According to State Bank of Pakistan, with almost 20 % increase in remittances from overseas Pakistanis, the country's foreign exchange reserves have crossed $20 billion which has led to its stable outlook on the long-term rating by Standard & Poor's.

According to World Bank estimates, in 2014, Pakistan's population stood at 185 million with a GDP of $272.136 billion showing an average growth of 5.4% and inflation rate of 7.2% in the same year. Last year, the country's Gross Domestic Product had expanded by 4.14 % to $ 236.6 billion. GDP growth rate in Pakistan had averaged 4.92 percent from 1952 until 2014, recording an all time high of 10.22 percent in 1954 and a record low of -1.80 percent in 1952.

Although since 2005 the GDP has been growing an average 5% a year, it is not enough to keep up with fast population growth. To make things even worst, perilous security situation, endemic political instability, acute energy shortage, widespread corruption and lack of law enforcement hamper private investment and foreign aid, imports, decreasing FDI flows and private investment, and unabated circular debt in the energy sector. Pakistan's Gross

Domestic Product growth is expected to edge up to 4.5% in financial year 2016, assuming continued low prices for oil and other commodities, the expected pickup in growth in the advanced economies, and some alleviation of power shortages.

Pakistan's economic expansion for financial year (FY) 2015, which ended on June 30, 2015, was led by services as growth in manufacturing slowed. Industrial growth was hobbled by a slowdown in large-scale manufacturing to 3.3% owing to continued power shortages and weaker external demand. The resilience of small-scale manufacturing and construction sustained industrial growth at 3.6%. Agriculture growth remained modest at 2.9%. Private fixed investment slipped to equal 9.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 10.0% a year earlier because of continuing energy constraints and the generally weak business environment that has depressed investment for several years.

The current account deficit narrowed in FY2015 from 1.3% in FY2014. The reasons were lower oil imports (which had been 35% of the total), larger inflows under the Coalition Support Fund, and robust workers' remittances. The benefit of the 18% decline in expenditures on oil imports was offset to some extent by increased imports of machinery and metal products, as well as of food and transport equipment.

Economic Prospects

Pakistan's economic growth since its inception has been varied. It has been slow during periods of civilian rule, but excellent during the three periods of military rule, although the foundation for sustainable and equitable growth was not formed. Pakistan's current population is nearly 190 million with a 1.81% growth rate. No more than 55.0% of adults are literate, and life expectancy is about 64 years. Inflation is expected to be slightly higher in FY2016 than in FY2015 as oil prices recover. The ADB Update 2015 sees lower inflation than forecast earlier, but inflationary pressures may come from food prices pushed higher by possible supply shortages following floods in July 2015. Monetary policy is expected to remain supportive.

In FY2016, the current account deficit is expected to widen marginally as slightly higher oil prices and stronger growth in the advanced countries translates into an expansion in trade. Nevertheless, exports are expected to increase only slightly after two years of stagnation, as manufacturing continues to suffer under energy shortages and low cotton prices see only a modest increase.

Prospects for large-scale manufacturing remain subject to progress on power supply. Plans to build an economic corridor linking Kashgar in the People's Republic of China to the Pakistani port of Gwadar were announced in April, and this mega project could significantly boost private investment and growth in the coming years. Agriculture sector is responsible for 25% of it economy with cotton, rice, wheat, maize and sugarcane as the major crops. Pakistan is an exporter of fruits, especially citrus, and fish and fish preparations. Industrial sector accounts for 24% of the economy. Textiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, iron and steel, building materials, cement, fertilizers, sports goods, surgical goods, and leather goods are the mainstay of the industrial sector and the country's exports. Energy, IT and small and medium sized industries are among the fastest growing sectors in the country.

Pakistan is one of the largest producers of natural commodities, and its labour market is the 10th largest in the world. Pakistani Diaspora contributed nearly $15 billion to the economy in 2014. The major source countries of remittances to Pakistan include UAE, USA, Saudi Arabia, GCC countries (including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman), Australia, Canada, Japan, UK and EU countries like Norway, Switzerland, etc. According to official claims, Pakistan's economy presents "an upbeat picture of stability and growth. The economic policies are transparent and predictable. Private sector confidence has grown, stock market is buoyant, external balance of payments is in comfortable position, expatriate Pakistanis are bringing capital into the country and FDI has increased."

The reality however does not seem to match this promising description. There are no positive indicators visible anywhere in the country's economy which continues to show downward trend with no macro-economic management. As a result, the country continues to suffer unstable exchange rate, high inflation, growing debt burden, high fiscal and current accounts deficit as well as export stagnation. According to the World Trade Organization, Pakistan's share of overall world exports is declining.

Main inflation drivers include food and utility prices, rupee's depreciation vis-à-vis US dollar, and higher international commodity prices. Low levels of spending in the social services and high population growth have contributed to persistent poverty and unequal income distribution. Pakistan's extreme poverty and underdevelopment are key concerns, especially in rural areas. The country's economy remains vulnerable to internal and external shocks due to internal security concerns and the global financial crises.

Our long-term economic challenges include expanding investment in education, healthcare, and electricity production, and reducing dependence on foreign donors.

Pakistan remains dependent on IMF and other international assistance for budgetary support and to keep the country more or less solvent. The global economic downturn has also had adverse impact on the demand prospects for Pakistan's exports.

Our present economic crisis warrants a deeper structural reform agenda and homegrown solutions to our economic problems, rationalizing GDP targets, restoring macro-economic balance, banning non-essential imports and luxuries, and, as a matter of priority, reviving our industry to reduce the trade gap. For the long term, however, without a resolution of Pakistan's perennial structural challenges, such as raising the level of domestic resource mobilization or promoting higher productivity in the economy, economic growth and investment will continue to be constrained, and the growth prospects remain volatile.

Sustainable economic growth is always contingent upon sound macro-economic policies, optimum utilisation of the country's natural and human resources and full exploitation of its industrial, agricultural and technological potentials. In addition, the energy and water shortages and internal security situation are also constraining growth in the country. However, the economy could benefit from large initial productivity gains as capacity utilization begins to increase from a low base.

Despite serious governance problems, Pakistan remains a rapidly developing country and is one of the Next Eleven, the eleven countries that, along with the BRICs[13], have a high potential to become the world's largest economies in the twenty-first century. However, after decades of war and social instability, as of 2013, serious deficiencies in basic services such as railway transportation and electric power generation are hampering the development process.

Pakistan's Human Development Experience-1980-2010

Pakistan's performance with regard to human development has been a mixed bag. Over the years, some improvements have taken place. For example, life-expectancy at birth improved from 58 to 66 years, adult literacy increased form 26 per cent to 55 per cent, female literacy improved from 15 per cent to 42 per cent, infant mortality rate decreased from 122 per 1000 live-birth to 73, yet in almost all these and other human development indicators, progress has been slow in comparison with developing-country average. Only one half of the country's population is literate. Net enrollment rate and primary school completion rate are far below those achieved by other countries of the region. Infant mortality at 73 is highest in the region, only behind Afghanistan.

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[13] *BRICs is the acronym for world's five major emerging national economies:* ***Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa****. They are distinguished by their large, fast-growing economies and significant influence on regional and global affairs; all five are G-20 members and represent almost 3 billion people which is 40% of world population, with a combined nominal GDP of US$16.039 trillion (20% world GDP) and an estimated US$4 trillion in combined foreign reserves. As of 2014, the BRICs nations represented 18 percent of the world economy.*

In addition, considerable disparities exist across different regions of the country, and along lines of wealth, gender and ethnicity. Unfortunately, government financial capacity or will to improve these low indicators are just not there. Public spending on education stands below South Asian average and among the lowest in South Asia. Pakistan also stands at the bottom in terms of public expenditure on health with less than 1 per cent of GDP.

According to a recently published report[14], over the past three decades, economic growth has been robust in Pakistan. However, the gains of economic growth have not been channeled towards enhancing people's living conditions sufficiently. Pakistan's GDP has increased by 5.1 per cent annually between 1980 and 2010 with positive growth in all the sectors of economy. Yet, employment opportunities tend to remain limited while poverty and hunger continue to prevail at high levels. There are several issues in the growth process, like persistent fiscal and trade deficit, rising debt burden and growing inequality especially between rural and urban areas and amongst the provinces.

Vision 2025

It is essential for Pakistan to improve the character of growth to sustain the growth momentum and to ensure that the benefits of growth improve the lives of people. Pakistan's Planning Commission had launched a policy document 'Vision 2025' regarding the future direction of economic progress. It was meant to provide a framework for the revival of sustainable and inclusive growth. It also sought to address the lack of focus on human development. It envisioned private sector-led growth by limiting government role through institutional reform and better governance. While the government hailed Vision 2025 as a blueprint for economic transformation, it is no different from earlier visions and growth frameworks.

In the last 16 years, Pakistan has produced Vision 2010, Vision 2030 and framework for Economic Growth; all these laid down lofty aspirations with no follow up or success. They only listed targets without providing for any mechanism for their implementation. Some of the high-profile mega-projects being implemented at huge budgets will bring no change in our social indicators.

Agricultural & Natural Resources

Pakistan's principal natural resources are arable land, water, hydroelectric potential, and natural gas reserves. About 28% of Pakistan's total land area is under cultivation and is watered by one of the largest irrigation systems in the world. Agriculture accounts for about 25% of GDP and employs about 42% of the labour force. The most important crops are cotton, wheat, rice, sugarcane, fruits, and vegetables, which together account for more than 75% of the value of total crop output.

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[14] *www.mhhdc.org; Growth without Human Development: Pakistan's experience over the past three decades.*

The economic importance of agriculture has declined since independence, when its share of GDP was around 53%. In recent years, the Agriculture sector's growth rate plummeted to less than 2%, against a target of 3.8%, and earlier year's growth rate of 4%. Pakistan exports rice, fish, fruits, and vegetables and imports vegetable oil, wheat, cotton (net importer), pulses, and consumer foods. Despite intensive farming practices, Pakistan remains a net food importer.

Energy

Pakistan has extensive energy resources, including fairly sizable natural gas reserves, some proven oil reserves, coal, and large hydropower potential but exploitation of energy resources has been slow due to poor governance, shortage of capital and domestic and international political constraints. No wonder, domestic gas and petroleum production totals only about half the country's energy needs, and dependence on imported oil contributes to Pakistan's persistent trade deficits and shortage of foreign exchange. China is building a chain of power projects including a hydro project (Neelum-Jhelum Project) and several gas and coal-based power plants which are likely to be completed by 2018.

Industry

Pakistan's manufacturing sector accounts for about 25% of GDP. Cotton textile production and apparel manufacturing are Pakistan's largest industries, accounting for about 51.4% of total exports. Other major industries include food processing, beverages, construction materials, clothing, and paper products. Manufacturing sector growth has slowed in the last two years due to energy shortages and capacity constraints.

Despite government efforts to privatize large-scale parastatal units, the public sector continues to account for a significant proportion of industry. The government seeks to diversify the country's industrial base and bolster export industries. Net foreign investment in Pakistani industries is only 0.5% of GDP. Pakistan's search for additional foreign direct investment has been hampered by concerns about the security situation, domestic and regional political uncertainties, and questions about judicial transparency.

Foreign Trade

Global economic slowdown and weak world demand for Pakistan's exports as well as domestic political uncertainty have contributed to Pakistan's high trade deficits. With its exports approximately at $ 30 billion imports roughly at over $ 50 and billion, Pakistan's trade deficit has been in the range of over $20 billion. The trade deficit has been widening far more than the official and International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s projections.

The government figures released by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) showed that the country exported $25.2 billion worth of goods compared to imports valued at $45.2 billion, leaving a gap of $19.98 billion in 2013-14 that ended on June 30. Compared to the preceding year, the trade gap contracted by 2.5 per cent, but it was far higher than the official and the IMF's projection of $16.6 billion, suggesting the fixing of an unrealistic target by the government. The problem is that there are no accurate statistic available on Pakistan's economy or trade leaving a credibility gap in governmental claims on the country's growth rate or balance of payments position.

In terms of commodities, textiles account for most of Pakistan's export earnings, but Pakistan's failure to expand a viable export base for other manufactures has left the country vulnerable to shifts in world demand. Other exports include rice, leather goods, sports goods, chemicals, manufactures, carpets and rugs. Pakistan's main export partners include US (15.8%), UAE (7.9%), China (7.3%), UK (4.3%), and Germany (4.2%).

Pakistan's main imports include petroleum, petroleum products, capital goods, industrial raw materials, machinery, plastics, transportation equipment, edible oils, paper and paperboard, iron steel, wheat, fertilizer and tea. Main import partners include China (17.9%), Saudi Arabia (10.7%), UAE (10.6%), Kuwait (5.5%), US (4.9%), Malaysia (4.8%).

Energy imports account for nearly 30% of Pakistan's imports, and the total gap between electricity supply and demand in Pakistan is over 5000 megawatts (MW). The ongoing energy crisis and security concerns, together with a decline in global demand, have hampered Pakistan's textile-reliant export base. Pakistan's exports continue to be dominated by cotton textiles and apparel, despite government diversification efforts.

Nuclear Power

As of 2012, nuclear power in Pakistan is provided by three licensed-commercial nuclear power plants. Pakistan is the first Muslim country in the world to construct and operate civil nuclear power plants. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) is solely responsible for operating these power plants. As of 2012, the electricity generated by commercial nuclear power plants constitutes roughly ~3.6% of electricity generated in Pakistan, compared to ~62% from fossil fuel, ~33% from hydroelectric power and ~0.3% from coal electricity.

Pakistan is one of the four nuclear armed states (along with India, Israel, and North Korea) that is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but is a member in good standing of the International Atomic Energy Agency. With major Western countries following discriminatory policies, China has long been the sole supporter of Pakistan's nuclear power generation programme from the early on. In 2005, both Pakistani government and the Chinese government adopted an Energy Security Plan, calling for a huge increase in generating capacity to more than 160,000 MW by 2030.

Pakistan government plans for lifting nuclear capacity to 8800 MW, 900 MW of it by 2015 and a further 1500 MW by 2020. China is already building Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Project with generating capacity of 1,000 MW to be completed by 2017. In June 2008, the Pakistani government announced plans to build commercial nuclear power plants Chashma III and Chashma IV, each with 320–340 MW and costing PKR 129 billion, 80 billion of this from international sources, principally China.

IV. EDUCATION

The constitution of Pakistan requires the state to provide free primary and secondary education. At the time of independence, Pakistan had only one university, the University of the Punjab. As of 2015 it has 136 universities, of which 74 are public universities and 62 are private universities. It is estimated that there are 3193 technical and vocational institutions in Pakistan, and there are also *madaris* that provide free Islamic education and offer free board and lodging to students, who come mainly from the poorer strata of society.

Education in Pakistan is divided into six main levels: pre-primary (preparatory classes); primary (grades one through five); middle (grades six through eight); high (grades nine and ten, leading to the Secondary School Certificate); intermediate (grades eleven and twelve, leading to a Higher Secondary (School) Certificate); and university programmes leading to graduate and post-graduate degrees. Pakistani private schools also operate a parallel secondary education system based on the curriculum set and administered by the Cambridge International Examinations. Some students choose to take the O level and A level exams conducted by the British Council.

The government launched a nationwide initiative in 1998 with the aim of eradicating illiteracy and providing a basic education to all children. Through various educational reforms, by 2015 the ministry of education expects to attain 100% enrolment levels among children of primary school age and a literacy rate of 86% among aged over 10. As a public sector responsibility, education in Pakistan has remained a most neglected sector both in terms of budgetary allocation and systemic development. It has been among the lowest of our national priorities with scant attention paid to the need for systemic reform and redressal.

Besides low ratio of budgetary allocations, we suffered an attitudinal complacence inherent in governmental as well as societal inertia towards our educational system. Education must be recognised as a high strategic priority with its share in GDP allocation raised from the current less than two percent to at least five percent to start with. Also, for a successful education system in our country, we must do away with multiple systems and evolve uniform curricula.

V. MEDIA

The press, television, and radio are vital forces in Pakistan's political life. The importance of the press was evident even before independence. In pre-partition India, Muslim journalism flourished until the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-58, when many Muslim newspapers were shut down. Between 1857 and the Government of India Act, 1935, which gave a large measure of self-government to Indians, none of the major newspapers were owned or edited by Muslims.

However, when Indian Muslims began to organize and rally to the political platform of the All-India Muslim League, concerted efforts were made to develop a strong press to support the Muslim national cause. A number of Muslim-owned newspapers were established, including Azad, a Bengali-language daily founded in Calcutta in 1936. Two English-language newspapers, *Morning News* in Calcutta and *Dawn* in Delhi, began publishing in 1942. In the late 1930s, the first Indian Muslim news agency, the Orient Press of India, was founded. [15]

On the eve of independence, however, only four major Muslim-owned newspapers existed in the area constituting the new state of Pakistan: the *Pakistan Times*, *Zamindar*, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, and *Civil and Military Gazette*, all located in Lahore. A number of Muslim newspapers also moved to Pakistan. *Dawn* began publication as a daily in Karachi, then the federal capital, on the day of independence in 1947. Other publications were also shifted to Pakistan including the *Morning News* and the Urdu-language dailies *Jang* and *Anjam*.

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[15] *A country study: Pakistan*, US Library of Congress, 1994.

Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (1874-1956), editor of *Zamindar* was one of the most eminent journalists from Punjab who used his pen to fight Pakistan's freedom movement. The man with extraordinary abilities ranging from oratory to poetry and from politics to journalism is also known as the father of Urdu journalism.

The National Press Trust, a non-profit organization established by businessmen as a major newspaper publisher in 1964 was taken over by the government in 1972. There are some private newspaper and journal publishers, notably the Dawn Group and Jang Group and Nawa-i-Waqt Group. The two major news agencies in Pakistan are the Associated Press of Pakistan and Pakistan Press International. The Associated Press of Pakistan was taken over by the government in 1960. Pakistan Press International is a private joint-stock company.

Since the early 1990s, there are over 1,500 newspapers and journals in the country, including publications in Urdu, English, and in regional languages. The major national daily newspapers in Urdu are *Jang*, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, *Express*, *Dunya*, *Nai Baat*, *Jasarat*, *Musawat*, *Mashriq*, and *Hurriyat*. The major national dailies in English are *Dawn*, *The News*, *The Nation*, *The Frontier Post*, *The Pakistan Times*, *Express Tribune*, *Muslim*, *Daily Times* and *Pakistan Today*. *Herald* and *Friday Times* are important English-language magazines. Newspapers and periodicals are owned by private individuals, joint-stock companies, or trusts.

Jahangir's World Times published from Lahore is the largest circulation monthly magazine for the youth of Pakistan with coverage of world affairs and national activities of interest for all.

Radio also has been an effective method of communication because the literacy rate is low and other methods of communication are sometimes not available. The Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation has played a key role in disseminating information and transmitting government policies as well as promoting Islamic principles and their application. Another state-run organization, Azad Kashmir Radio broadcasts in Azad Kashmir.

Television, although newer, has also been increasingly effective with coverage in the mid-1990s reaching more than 80 percent of the population. Until August 1990, the only television channel was the government-owned Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV). At that time, however, another television channel, People's Television Network was established. People's Television Network brought Cable News Network (CNN) to Pakistan. Today, there are more than 100 private television channels in Pakistan including news channels, entertainment channels, sports channels, regional languages channels and educational as well religious channels.

The media in Pakistan has been playing an active role in all national activities including elections, political and economic developments as well as crisis periods in the country. It was a pillar of great strength in the 2007 movement against Gen. Musharraf's assault on the country's judiciary in a bid to secure another presidential term while remaining in uniform. He also targeted the media for being a truthful window to his manipulations for continued "power and authority" and also for mirroring the "hearts and minds" of the nation.

The media was a great support for the civil society comprising judicial fraternity, lawyers' community, intellectuals and academics, writers and poets, human rights activists and students who were all struggling for democracy and rule of law. The movement eventually resulted into general elections in February 2008 and restoration of independent judiciary in Pakistan.

Although the government-owned radio and TV channels always present the government line, the establishment of People's Television Network with large number of private channels has made electronic media an important factor in opinion making as well as in news and information dissemination.

LIST OF THE RULERS OF PAKISTAN (1947-2015)

Governors-General

No.	Name	Tenure		
1.	Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah	15-08-1947	–	11-09-1948
2.	Khawaja Nazimuddin	14-09-1948	–	16-10-1951
3.	Malik Ghulam Muhammad	19-10-1951	–	05-10-1955
4.	Maj. Gen. Iskander Mirza	06-10-1955	–	22-03-1956

Presidents of Pakistan

No.	Name	Tenure		
1.	Maj. Gen. Iskander Mirza	23-03-1956	–	27-10-1958
2.	General Muhammad Ayub Khan	27-10-1958	–	25-03-1969
3.	Gen Muhammad Yahya Khan	25-03-1969	–	20-12-1971
4.	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto	20-12-1971	–	14-08-1973
5.	Fazal Elahi Chaudhry	14-08-1973	–	16-09-1978

6.	Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul- Haq	16-09-1978	–	17-08-1988
7.	Ghulam Ishaq Khan	13-12-1988	–	18-07-1993
8.	Sardar Farooq Ahmad Leghari	14-11-1993	–	02-12-1997
9.	Justice (retd) Muhammad Rafiq Tarar	01-01-1998	–	20-06-2001
10.	General Pervez Musharraf	20-06- 2001	–	18-08-2008
11.	Asif Ali Zardari	09-09-2008	–	08-09-2013
12.	Mamnoon Hussain	09-09-2013	–	

Chief Martial Law Administrators

No.	Name	Tenure		
1.	Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan	07-10-1958	–	08-06-1962
2.	General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan	25-03-1969	–	20-12-1971
3.	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Civilian Martial Law Administrator)	20-12-1971	–	21-04-1972
4.	Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq	05-07-1977	–	30-12-1985

Prime Ministers of Pakistan

No.	Name	Tenure		
1.	Khan Liaqat Ali Khan	15-08-1947	–	16-10-1951
2.	Khawaja Nazimuddin	17-10-1951	–	17-04-1953
3.	Muhammad Ali Bogra	17-04-1953	–	11-08-1955
4.	Chaudhary Muhammad Ali	11-08-1955	–	12-09-1956
5.	Hussain Shaheed Suharwardi	12-09-1956	–	18-10-1957
6.	Ibrahim Ismail Chaundrigar	18-10-1957	–	16-12-1957
7.	Malik Feroz Khan Noon	16-12-1957	–	07-10-1958
8.	Noor-ul-Amin (nominated)	07-12-1971	–	20-12-1971
9.	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	14-08-1973	–	05-07-1977
10.	Muhammad Khan Junejo	23-03-1985	–	29-05-1988
11.	Ms Benazir Bhutto	02-12-1988	–	06-08-1990
12.	Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (caretaker)	06-08-1990	–	06-11-1990
13.	Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	06-11-1990	–	18-04-1993

14.	Mir Balakh Sher Mazari (caretaker)	18-04-1993	–	26-05-1993
15.	Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (reinstated)	26-05-1993	–	08-07-1993
16.	Moin Qureshi (caretaker)	08-07-1993	–	19-10-1993
17.	Ms Benazir Bhutto	19-10-1993	–	05-11-1996
18.	Malik Meraj Khalid (caretaker)	06-11-1996	–	17-02-1997
19.	Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	17-02-1997	–	12-10-1999
20.	Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali	23-11-2002	–	26-06-2004
21.	Ch. Shujaat Hussain	30-06-2004	–	26-08-2004
22.	Shaukat Aziz	28-08-2004	–	15-11-2007
23.	Muhammed Mian Soomro (caretaker)	16-11-2007	–	24-03-2008
24.	Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani*	25-03-2008	–	26-04-2012
25.	Raja Pervez Ashraf	22-06-2012	–	24-03-2013
26.	Mir Hazar Khan Khoso (caretaker)	25-03-2013	–	05-06-2013
27.	Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	05-06-2013	–	

VI. NATIONAL SYMBOLS

(a) The State Emblem



The State Emblem of Pakistan, which was approved by the Central Government in 1954, symbolises Pakistan's ideological foundation, its cultural heritage, the guiding principles and the basis of its economic strength.

The four ingredients of the Emblem are:

- The crescent and star crest at the top is a traditional symbol of Islam.
- The shield in the centre, with four partitions, shows cotton, wheat, tea and jute. These are the main crops of Pakistan and signify the strong agriculture based economy.

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* *Supreme Court disqualified him on June 19, 2012*

قومی ترانہ

پاک سرزمین شاد باد کِشور حسین شاد باد
تو نِشانِ عزم عالی شان ارضِ پاکستان
مرکزِ یقین شاد باد

پاک سَرزمین کا نظام قوتِ اُخوتِ عوام
قوم ملک سلطنت پائندہ تابندہ باد
شاد باد منزلِ مُراد

پرچمِ سِتارہ و ہلال رہبرِ ترقی و کمال
ترجمانِ ماضی شانِ حال جانِ اِستقبال
سایۂ خُدائے ذُوالجلال

Transliteration

Pak sarzamin shad bad
Kishware haseen shad bad

Tunishane azmealishan arze Pakistan
Markazeyaqin shadbad.

Pak sarzamin ka nizam quwate akhuwati awam
Qaum, mulk, Sultanat
Painda ta binda bad shad, bad man zele murad.

Parchame sitarao hilal
Rahbare tarraqio ka mal
Tarjumane mazi shane hal jane istaqbal
Sayyai, khudae zul jalal.

Translation

Blessed be the sacred land,
Happy be the bounteous realm,
Symbol of high resolve,
Land of Pakistan.
Blessed be thou citadel of faith.
The Order of this Sacred Land
Is the might of the brotherhood of the people.
May the nation, the country, and the State
Shine in glory everlasting.
Blessed be the goal of our ambition.
This flag of the Crescent and the Star
Leads the way to progress and perfection,

Interpreter of our past, glory of our present,
Inspiration of our future,
Symbol of Almighty's protection.

Animal: Markhor
Bird: Chakour (August 2001)
Dress: Shalwar Kameez
Floral: Jasmine. It was adopted in July 1961.
Fruit: Mango
Game: Hockey
Insignia: Crescent and Star
Mammal: Indus river dolphin
Monument: National Monument, Islamabad
Mosque: Faisal Mosque
Mountain: K-2
Poet: Dr. Allama Muhammad Iqbal.
Predator: Snow Leopard
Religion: Islam
Reptile: Indus crocodile
River: River Indus
Slogan: Pakistan Zinda Bad
State Bird: Peregrine Falcon
Tower: Minar-e-Pakistan
Tree: Cedrus Deodar (August 2001)

National Monuments of Pakistan

1. Quaid-i-Azam's Birthplace (Wazir Mansion), Karachi
2. Quaid-i-Azam House (Flag Staff House), Karachi
3. Mohatta Place, Karachi
4. Ziarat Residency, Ziarat
5. Khaliq Dina Public Hall and Library, Karachi
6. Javad Manzil, Lahore
7. Mausoleum of Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Lahore
8. Islamic Smmit Minar, Lahore
9. Resident of Prof Dr. Abdus Salam, Jang

VII. PAKISTAN'S BEAUTIFUL, COLDEST, HIGHEST, HOTTEST, LARGEST, LONGEST, SHORTEST & SMALLEST OBJECTS AND PLACES

Beautiful

City	Islamabad
Lake	Saif-ul-Maluk (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
Mosque	Shah Faisal, Islamabad

Valley	Kaghan Valley (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)

Coldest

Place	Skardu (Gilgit-Baltistan). Temperature recorded on January 7, 1995 was -21°C. (-11.4 F)

Highest

Award	Civil (Nishan-i-Pakistan), Military (Nishan-i-Haider).
Dam	Mangla Dam. It has height of 143.83 metres.
Glacier	Siachen (Gilgit-Baltistan)
National Park	Khunjerab National Park, situated more than 4000 metres high in Gilgit-Baltistan
Pass	Muztagh Pass (19030 feet)
Peak	K-2 (Gilgit-Baltistan). Its height from sea level is 28,269 feet (8616 metres)
Radio Station	Gilgit
Railway Station	Kan Mehtarzai (Balochistan)
Road	Shahra-e-Karakoram. It is 10,200 feet high from sea level. Its length is 965 kilometres
Snowfall Place	Skardu
Tower (Minaret)	Shah Faisal Mosque towers. Height of each tower is 286 feet
Battlefield	Siachin Glacier

Hottest

Place	Mohenjodaro (Sindh). Maximum temperature was recorded 53.5°C (128.3°F) on May 27, 2010

Largest

Airlines	PIA (Pakistan International Airlines)
Airport	Jinnah International Airport, Karachi
Bank	Habib Bank Limited
Barrage	Sukkur Barrage
City	Karachi
Crop	Wheat
Dam	Tarbela Dam
Delta	Indus

Desert	Thar (Sindh)
District	Khuzdar (Balochistan)
Fort	Rani Kot (Sindh)
Fruit growing area	Balochistan
Gas field	Sui Gas Field (Balochistan)
Graveyard	Makli (Sindh)
Grid station	Gatti (Faisalabad)
Hospital	Mayo Hospital, Lahore
Hydroelectric power station	Tarbela. Generating 3478 MW
Thermal power station	Guddu
Industry	Textiles
Industrial plant	Pakistan Steel Mills, Karachi
Island	Manora, Karachi
Jungle	Chhanga Manga, Kasur
Lake (man-made)	Keenjhar Lake, Sindh
Lake (natural)	Manchhar, Dadu, Sindh
Library	Punjab Public Library, Lahore (having more than 3 lakh books)
Mausoleum	Quaid-e-Azam Mausoleum, Karachi
Military organisation	Pakistan Army
Mine	Salt Mines Khewra
Mosque	Grand Jamia Mosque, Baharia Town, Lahore. Indoor capacity of 25,000 and outdoor capacity of 70,000. Inaugurated on October.14, 2014.
Museum	National Museum, Karachi
Museum (agriculture)	Faisalabad
Oil field	Mazari production 1,024,137 (bbls)
Park	Ayub National Park, Rawalpindi (area of 2300 acres)
Province (population)	Punjab
Province (area)	Balochistan
Radio Station	Islamabad (1000 KW MW transmitter)

Railway station	Lahore Railway Station
Railway Workshops	Moghalpura (Lahore)
River	Indus
Seaport	Karachi
Shipping Company	Pakistan National Shipping Corporation
Sugar Mill	Premier Sugar Mills, Mardan
Solar Desalination Plant	Mithi, Thar (inaugurated on January 7, 2015 by Asif Ali Zardari)
Stadium (cricket)	National Stadium, Karachi
Stadium (hockey)	National Hockey Stadium, Lahore
Suspension bridge	Gilgit river bridge 600 ft long and six feet wide
Trading and industrial centre	Karachi
TV Station	Islamabad
TV booster	Thandiani (Punjab)
University	Punjab University, Lahore
Water reservoir	Mangla Dam (6.65MAF) (August 25, 2013)
Zoological garden	Lahore (Punjab)

Longest

Coast	Balochistan (771 kms long, out of 1100 km)
Frontier	Pak-Afghan border
Glacier	Siachen
Railway Plateform	Lahore with 9 plateforms
Road	Shahra-i-Pakistan from Karachi to Peshawar
Rail Road	Karachi to Landi Kotal
River	Indus (1800 miles)
Tunnel (railway)	Khojak (Balochistan) — 2.43 miles long
Tunnel (road)	Lowari tunnel (Chitral) — 5 miles long being constructed
Tunnel (water)	Warsak Dam tunnel — 3½ miles long

Populous

City	Karachi
Province	Punjab

Rainiest

City	Rawalpindi .
Place	Murree

Shortest

River	Ravi (710 km long)

Tallest

Building	Baharia Town Icon with 62 floors.
Minaret	Shah Faisal's Mosque four towers, with a height 286 feet (88 metres) each

CHAPTER 4

PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC ISSUES & CHALLENGES

I. CRISIS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan's Dilemma

For any state in the contemporary world, its constitution is its solemn and inviolable "social contract" which guarantees fundamental freedoms and basic rights of its citizens, including their inalienable right to choose or change their government through independently cast ballot, and which establishes the power and duties of the government and provides the legal basis for its institutional structure.

For the people of Pakistan, the challenge remains to find their place in the annals of political history. For our political illiterates, however, 'a good society and a good state' or for that matter 'good methods of government' remain merely philosophical expressions with no practical relevance. To them, the essence of politics today is nothing else but power and bounty, no matter how they achieve these.

The nature and form of our political system has long been the subject of debate in our country with no clarity in the minds of our people as to which system suits them most. At the time of our independence, we inherited, like India, a parliamentary tradition but soon lost track, groping in the maze of political chaos and confusion. Since then, while India has persisted with the basic norms of parliamentary democracy, we have not gone beyond experimenting with distorted versions of almost every form of government ranging from democracy to dictatorship, from civilian to military rule, and from parliamentary to presidential system.[1]

Viewed from this perspective, we must confess, the evolution of the political system in our country has been a tale of woes and wiles. We have been experimenting with different systems at different times and sometime all at the same time. We have done things in the name of democracy that no other country in the world has ever experimented. With an ingrained culture of "political opportunism and ineptitude" we have yet to discover a theory of state and methods of government which will suit the genius of our nation.

After the Quaid's death, we in Pakistan have remained confronted with an endemic leadership crisis, and have been experiencing systemic aberrations with endless political merry-go-rounds and jockeying for power. Consistency has never been a virtue as our history of frequent governmental breakdowns and military coups reflect. For decades, we have had a parliamentary system without parliament ever functioning as a "full sovereign body" or playing a role in the decision-making process. Even today, "legislating" is a business beyond our parliament's purview.

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[1] *The crisis of state & Government*, Shamshad Ahmad, *The Criterion Quarterly*, January/March 2010.

We have also been experimenting with our own version of the presidential system, at times under chief martial law administrators, including a civilian one, with no precedent and no relevance to established models of world republics. Our "neither parliamentary nor-presidential" system also has no parallel in political philosophy or contemporary history. The closest parallel to our system of government is perhaps the Cromwell era of the seventeenth century in England known for its assorted political experiments.

If the history of power game in our country is any guide, and if our political inadequacies have any lesson for us, we need to wriggle out of the parliamentary marshland and look for an alternative form of government that suits our nation's "genius," and in which the sovereign power rests with the people who alone possess the "inalienable will." Cromwell knew that "no system of government, however efficient, can long survive unless it rests upon the consent of the governed."

Governance Crisis

The story of Pakistan is one of remorseless tug and pull between the civilian and military rulers on the one hand, and the liberal and religious forces on the other. In the process, the country has failed to develop a sustainable democratic system based on constitutional supremacy and institutional integrity. The main casualties have been the rule of law, the state institutions and the process of national integration. Ours is the story of a society that has been going round and round in aimless circles for more than 68 years. Absence of democracy, rule of law and good governance is its continuing hallmark.

Quaid-e-Azam, during his last days, not only reminded the people of Pakistan the importance of their responsibilities as citizens of an independent country but also gave a roadmap of what he believed were the biggest challenges for the country's government and lawmakers. The foremost duty of a government, according to him, was "to maintain law and order, and to protect the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects." He also warned against the "evils" of bribery, corruption, black-marketing, nepotism and jobbery which he wanted to be eradicated with an "iron hand."

As a nation, we not only failed to grapple with these challenges but are in fact living remorselessly with these "evils" as an "integral" part of our society. There is no law and order in the country, nor any concept of public safety. Aversion to the rule of law is endemic. Crime and corruption are rampant both in scope and scale. No other country is familiar with the practice of forgiving as a matter of rule the elite loan defaulters and the known highly placed plunderers of the national exchequer. The looters, profiteers, murderers and killers could not have a safer haven anywhere else in the world.

Agonizingly, since independence, Pakistan has been wallowing in political and economic uncertainty and has had neither domestic stability and social cohesion nor peaceful borders. Its post-independence political history has been replete with endemic crises and challenges that perhaps no other country in the world has experienced. Our difficulties were aggravated by repeated constitutional subversions, frequent political breakdowns, long spells of military rule, societal chaos and social discontent, weakened institutions, incessant corruption, and general aversion to the rule of law. Poor governance remained our hallmark.

During the last three decades, Pakistan has also been the 'hotbed' of religious extremism and obscurantism. Proxy wars have been fought on our soil. Sectarian violence has taken a heavy and tragic toll in terms of innocent lives. Even mosques and churches were not spared as scenes of cold-blooded communal and sectarian killings. Religious extremism and terrorism-related problems in our country have only aggravated misperceptions about Pakistan in the world's councils today.

For reasons of domestic political instability and insecurity with a brittle law and order situation and also the volatile situation in our neighbourhood, we have been unable to harness the unique asset of our geographical location for our economic growth. What is important in today's context is the need for Pakistan to be stable politically and strong economically with a moderate, liberal and progressive outlook and impregnable security. We have had enough political and social fragmentation. All these problems that we continue to suffer have nothing to do with our foreign policy. These are all governance failures.

Our problems are all domestic. Even our external problems are extension of our domestic failures which have seriously constricted our foreign policy options. No country has ever succeeded externally if it is weak and crippled domestically. For us at this critical phase in our history, it is not important what we are required to do for other's interests; it is what we ought to do to serve our own national interests. We must convert our pivotal location into an asset rather than a liability. To be at peace with the world, we need to be at peace with ourselves.

REMEDIAL ROADMAP

(a) Governance

- Governance must be based on the rule of law, justice, equality and property rights for all without regard to an individual's family background, religious beliefs, official position or economic status; and safeguarding of contracts, economic transactions and property rights.

- Institutionalized decision making on all matters of national importance including those affecting national security, economy and sovereign independence.
- Governance must be aimed at providing common citizens access to quality social services like education, health, employment opportunities, curbing price hike, and discouraging lavish spending in civil and military establishments which are not only a drain on national resources but also a cause of great resentment amongst the teeming millions.
- Corruption must be rooted out from all segments of our society and at all levels of the government and its institutions, including the political hierarchy, the judiciary, the bureaucracy and the armed forces, through an independent and transparent "accountability process" which will not be used as a tool of governmental blackmail or political victimization.
- The VIP culture including lavish perks and privileges and provision of official transport including luxury cars at government expense to public office-holders, cabinet members, members of National and provincial assemblies, civil and military officers and all other government or semi-government employees must be abolished.
- Professionalization of the country's bureaucracy to let them function without any political interference or duress. They must be provided constitutional guarantees of service security subject to integrity-cum-performance-based evaluation criteria in keeping with the relevant rules on government servants' code of conduct and discipline.
- We need restructuring and reform of the police system of Pakistan to make it more effective and directly relevant to crime prevention, public safety, maintenance of law and order, and facilitation of judicial process. In no country is police used for VIP security or route lining. Our police must be effectively immunized to political control and exploitation.
- No one with foreign or dual nationality should be eligible to hold elected or non-elected public office in Pakistan or seek election to elected assemblies and local councils and also to be appointed in the civil and military services of the country.

- No piece of land in any part of the country should be gifted or leased for any purpose to foreign rulers, *sheikhs*, princes or countries. The sanctity of Pakistan's territorial integrity shall be observed with no relaxation or exemption. No more Shamsi Bases.
- To cope with our national security challenges, we need a coherent national security policy backed by appropriate enforceable laws, institutional structure and functional methodology. There is no such mechanism in our country.

(b) Economic

- Rationalization of national priorities and budgetary allocations with greater focus on social sector, especially education, basic health services and infrastructure facilities as the foremost strategic priorities.
- Promotion of economic growth and modernization through judicious planning and effective strategies that match the national needs and capabilities.
- Five-year development programs should be reinstituted with new focus and priorities encompassing poverty eradication and people-specific development.
- Revival of Pakistan's economy through consistency in macro-economic policies and optimum utilization of country's natural and human resources and development of agricultural, industrial and technological base.
- Home-grown solutions must be pursued to handle economic problems which *inter alia* include tightening of belts to reduce governmental spending and borrowings, controlling inflation, rationalizing of GDP targets, restoring macro-economic balance, banning non-essential imports and luxuries to reduce the trade gap.
- Self-reliance, simplicity and austerity to be the cardinal principles of national life in all its spheres. Loans are not capital; they are a liability. Foreign aid and loans must be dispensed with by harnessing domestic material and human resources.
- Special focus on increased agricultural and industrial output, revival of textile industries, promotion of small and medium industries.
- Financial rules and taxation systems should be simplified and rationalized through bold and wide-ranging changes and modern mechanisms to increase the tax base and ensure maximum collection.

- Improved infrastructure with motorways, modern roads and railway lines connecting the entire country and establishment of industrial zones, along the major motorways, with facility of one-window operation.
- Energy problem should be addressed in a purposeful and measured manner to redress the situation by increasing our generation capacity and ensuring efficient use of electricity through effective management and conservation policy.
- Better communication within the government agencies and between Islamabad and our missions abroad must be ensured on economic matters.

(c) Social

- Promotion of an environment of peace, tolerance, understanding, responsibility, patience and moderation, while curbing extremism, militancy, violence and fundamentalism.
- Gender equality and empowerment of women to be promoted as an effective means of combating poverty, hunger and disease and stimulating sustainable development.
- Special strategies to generate employment opportunities for the country's youth to be developed and implemented.
- Education to be treated as top strategic priority in development planning and budgeting. At least 5% of the GDP should be allocated for education during the next ten years and public sector school system should be upgraded on emergent basis.
- Health insurance in public and private sectors to be introduced for all those whose income is below Rs. 20,000 per month in order to provide proper health cover to those who can't afford it.
- A basic health care crash programme needs to be launched to expand basic health care facilities, particularly in the rural areas. Iranian experience in Basic Health Units may be suitably followed.
- To manage the growing scale of urbanization, the overflow of population be shifted to new, self-contained modern cities to be developed outside the existing major cities. (New Karachi, New Lahore, New Rawalpindi)
- Public welfare related mega projects to pass on the benefits of development to common people shall be implemented with top priority to mass transit subway (metro) projects

for Karachi, Lahore and between Rawalpindi and Islamabad, and to country-wide provision of clean drinking water, better health and educational facilities, provision of electricity and improvement of rural infrastructure.

To project our image as a disciplined and forward-looking nation, balance and consistency in keeping with our religious and cultural values must be reflected in all expressions of national behaviour, including art, music and architecture.

II. CRISIS OF POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FEDERAL STRUCTURE

Systemic Anachronisms[2]

Ever since its birth, Pakistan's quest for survival has been as compelling as it has been uncertain. It has been engaged in a precarious struggle to define a national identity and evolve a political system for its ethnically and linguistically diverse population. Pakistan is known to have over 20 languages and nearly 300 distinct dialects. This diversity contributed to chronic regional tensions and provincial disharmony which not only impeded the process of constitution-making but also remained a potential threat to central authority.[3] The question of provincial autonomy remains the key to addressing the issues of federalism in our country.

There is a strong underlying resentment in Balochistan and in other smaller provinces against what is seen as continued "Punjabi dominance" and inequitable distribution of power and resources. In the former East Pakistan too, the problems started with a similar deep-rooted sense of deprivation and a feeling of political and economic alienation, which over time became a politico-constitutional crisis culminating into demand for larger autonomy and leading eventually to the break-up of the country. We find our provincial system not only fuelling misrule and corruption but also aggravating sense of inequality and deprivation among different parts of the country.

Our Constitution which has been amended umpteen times still does not provide solution to the genuine concerns on the inequality of the size of provinces and lopsided sharing of political and economic power. The need for drastic change in our present anachronistic set-up is urgent to get rid of the same old usurpers of the country's politics, outmoded social and political structures and elitist-led *status-quo* in our country. If any further changes are needed in our Constitution to correct the systemic anachronisms in our federal structure and to redress provincial grievances, they should be made before it is too late.

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[2] *The Tale of Democracy in Pakistan*, Shamshad Ahmad, *Criterion Quarterly*, December 2012.

[3] *Dreams Unfulfilled*, Shamshad Ahmad, JBD Lahore, (2009).

In today's context, what is important for Pakistan itself is the need to be stable politically and strong economically so as to be self-reliant and immune to external constraints and exploitation. The prevailing inequality of wealth and power and the underlying causes of injustice and socio-economic deprivation of the people of the "smaller" provinces are symptomatic of a lopsided situation that warrants the beginning of an end to the current socio-economic disparities and political exploitation of the people by the privileged few of our country.

Looking at the systems of other developed and developing countries, we find ourselves a unique example of a federation with almost no parallel anywhere in the world. No country, roughly equal to Pakistan's geographical and population size has so few and so large provinces. While large unequal provinces are always prone to breed and fuel secessionist mindsets, smaller provinces serve as a safety valve against such tendencies. Nigeria, a large country on its independence had three regions and soon started facing religion-based secessionist war in Biafra Region in the 1960s. It has solved its federal problems by forming smaller provinces and today, in addition to Abuja as the federal territory, it has 36 states subdivided into 774 local government areas.

Most of the large and medium size countries in today's world have divided themselves into small size provinces or states as 'administrative units.' Examples: China 34 provinces, India 29 states and 7 union territories, Iran 30 provinces, Indonesia 33, Egypt 26, France 26, Germany 16, Switzerland 26 cantons, Nigeria 37, Philippines 80, Thailand 78, Turkey 81, UK 114 counties and USA 50 states. In any unequal, parochially defined set-up irrespective of historical identities, no method of governance can work. It is a system designed for paralysis which we are already experiencing. Our present provincial set-up has long been the cause of political instability with an ever-looming threat to the country's further disintegration.

To avert the vicious cycle of known tragedies, we need a serious and purposeful "national effort" involving a holistic review of our governmental system and a parallel discourse among major political stakeholders and key civil society segments including the media and lawyer's community to explore and evolve a national 'remedial and recovery' plan.

It may be a long journey but in the form of these random thoughts, at least the first step is being taken to encourage a dispassionate debate at all levels before it is too late.

Systemic Redressal

We are currently suffering the worst governance crisis of our history. Instead of always blaming "outsiders" for our domestic problems, we should have the courage to admit that there is something fundamentally wrong with our governance patterns. The systemic aberrations are the root cause of our governance failures. Our foremost priority is to fix the fundamentals of our state and governance. Elections alone will not make any difference. The system itself must change. The country needs a surgical operation to root out its systemic fault lines. We cannot afford to remain complacent spectators any longer.

Here are some thoughts for national discourse and debate:[4]

1. Presidential System

- Given our pathetic performance in our political conduct and discipline since our independence, we, like most developing countries, are perhaps not yet fit for the parliamentary system. Britain struggled for centuries to reach its current parliamentary status. For us, it would be too long and too arduous a journey to be indefinitely chasing illusory goals.
- Temperamentally, we are a 'presidential' nation. It is time we abandoned the system that we have never been able to practise, and explored an adult franchise-based 'presidential system' suitably designed for and tailored to Pakistan's needs.
- Even the Quaid-e-Azam had doubts about the practicality of a parliamentary system in Pakistan. We don't have time to be chasing illusory goals. He preferred presidential system for Pakistan.

2. Proportional Representation

We must also adopt the system of **'proportional representation'** that ensures representation of political parties in national legislature proportionate to the percentage of popular vote they receive. It will provide greater access to non-feudal, non-elitist educated middle class people in elected assemblies.

3. Recasting Federal Structure:

- Also needed is rationalization of our federal system by revisiting our current 'provincial architecture' looking for a pragmatic solution to the problems of regional disparities. Reason, not self-serving emotion should be our yardstick.

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[4] *The crisis of state & Government*, Shamshad Ahmad, *The Criterion Quarterly, January/Mach 2010.*

- Looking at the systems of other developed and developing countries, we find ourselves a unique example of a federation with almost no parallel anywhere in the world. No country, roughly equal to Pakistan's geographical and population size has so few and so large provinces. We are also the only country with provinces based on ethnicity and language.
- While large unequal provinces are always prone to breed and fuel secessionist mindsets, smaller provinces serve as a safety valve against such tendencies. (Example: Nigeria had three regions and soon faced religion-based secessionist war in Biafra Region in the 1960s. It solved the problem by forming smaller provinces and today, in addition to Abuja as the federal territory, it has 36 states subdivided into 774 local government areas.)
- In order to separate governance from ethnic-linguistic considerations and to eliminate at least one known tier of redundancy and dirty politics of greed and power, i.e. the present provincial structure, we should remove the inherent flaws in our body politic by recasting our federal architecture and replacing the present four provinces with as many provinces as administratively necessary and feasible, free of ethnic and parochial labels but still keeping their ethnic and national identities constitutionally intact and also ensuring a balance in geographical and population sizes of the new provinces.
- A Sindhi will remain a Sindhi even as part of Karachi, Sukkur, Hyderabad or Larkana province and so would be other nationalities no matter where they reside. By dividing the country into smaller administrative units as provinces, we would not only be eliminating the causes of regional acrimony and discontent but also ensuring effective and efficient governance through elected bodies at local and grass-roots levels.
- To avoid any large-scale fresh re-demarcation of land boundaries and re-channelling of irrigations canals and tributaries, the best solution will be to convert the existing divisional commissionaires into new provinces headed by elected administrators with a suitable title. There should be no assemblies, cabinets, ministers, chief ministers and advisors or even large secretariats at the provincial level. The present administrative structure must be drastically pruned to conform to the functional needs of the new provinces. .
- The newly-designated provinces will have administrations comprising of elected councils headed by an elected

administrator and assisted by professional bureaucracy. The provinces will be responsible for the overall administration within their jurisdiction and also provide, in terms of oversight and coordination, full support to the district governments within their jurisdiction and maintaining liaison with the state and central governments in terms of administrative, judicial, and financial matters.

4. District: The Basic Unit of Governance

The basic unit of governance shall be the present districts; each headed by an elected person with prescribed eligibility criteria, with the help of small elected bodies at all local levels. The district governments shall be strengthened through adequate resources for meeting citizens' basic requirements like food, shelter, education, health, security and justice at the local level, and through a monitoring mechanism' will be made accountable to ensure efficient functioning.

Elected district, *tehsil* and *mohalla*/village/community councils will involve the people as in other democratic societies in the running of their affairs. Common man's problems shall be addressed at the local level with public safety, law and order, and timely justice guaranteed and delivered to them at their doorsteps.

Election to all local councils except district councils should be on two-yearly adult franchise basis and no member will be allowed more than two two-year elected terms to widen the scope of democratic process at the grass-roots' level.

5. Federal Government

- The sanctity of 'separation of powers' should be the basis of the federal system with three organs of the State, each functioning independently with usual checks and balances.
- The federal government should retain only ten to twelve ministries responsible to formulate and implement national policies in important areas, notably defence, economy, education, foreign affairs, national security, trade, communication, justice and law. All other subjects should be transferred to 'states' for effective handling through the new smaller provinces and districts as basic units of governance.
- Bicameral system of legislature should continue with necessary adjustments giving all provinces equal representation in the Senate as at present except that all seats including those reserved for women and minorities should be filled through direct elections.
- Both houses together will legislate as in any presidential system on matters of national importance such as budget and

economy, foreign affairs and national security to help the federal government in formulating and implementing policies on these subjects.

- Election to both houses should be held every four years through 'Proportional Representation' system ensuring representation of political parties proportionate to the actual popular vote they receive in the polls.
- The National Assembly and the Senate will concentrate on their job of legislation, deliberate on national issues to help the government in formulating and implementing sound, well-considered domestic policies including on national security, economy, budget and foreign affairs.

6. Balochistan Quagmire

- Despite its abundance of natural resources, Balochistan remains the most backward province of the country and its legitimate political and economic grievances have long remained unaddressed.
- There is a strong underlying resentment in Balochistan (and in other provinces also) against what is seen as continued "Punjabi dominance", inequitable distribution of political power and resources, and exploitation of province's natural wealth.
- We must genuinely look for fair and permanent solutions. The problems in Balochistan will be resolved only through political and economic means, not by use of military force or through violence and militancy.
- These problems are also rooted in our flawed federal system and will be best resolved by the proposed restructuring of the federation. With smaller units of governance, the issues of governance and availability or distribution of resources shall also be easy to handle.
- The Baloch interests will also be best safeguarded in a strong and stable Pakistan and in an environment of peace and tranquillity free of exploitation, blackmail or duress from any source.
- But like elsewhere in the world, the people of Balochistan also need to be freed of the outdated and exploitative *darbari* and *sardari* tribal system which keeps them backward to sustain its own privilege and power.
- Instead of fuelling self-serving 'nationalist' unrest and obstructing genuine development and security-related projects, the *sardars* and *nawabs* should come out of their exploitative mode and join the country's political mainstream to genuinely work for the socio-economic well-being of their people.

- In implementing development projects, it will also be easier for the local governments to deliver in terms of improved infrastructure and better living facilities, including health and educational services, and access to the use of their natural resources.

Advantages

- The proposal to strengthen district governments, to form small equal provinces with a limited role in governance and a lean central government as outlined above, will bring about following major advantages:
- It will eliminate the cause of acrimony and discontent among the different regions.
- The central government, unburdened from mundane routine affairs will be able to concentrate on formulating and implementing national level policies more effectively.
- It will end duplication of responsibilities between different levels now causing confusion and despondency in governance. Eliminating one tier of assemblies, cabinets and secretariats at provincial level and concentrating the role of legislation at the national level, will help in effective functioning of the country.
- By doing away with the provincial legislative and secretariat structures, we will be saving huge expenses now being incurred on maintaining provincial assemblies, ministers, advisors, parliamentary secretaries and large administrative secretariats.
- It will bring the desired level of political stability. The parties winning national level elections will be able to form stable governments at the centre without having to make compromises to form provincial governments.
- It will meet the demands of sub national group eliminating threats of further breakup of the country as experienced in 1971, by removing causes of discontent, neutralising propaganda themes like hatred against Punjabis, developed by our adversaries for a long time.
- Disturbances and discontent in an area would be isolated, promptly addressed and problems easily resolved without affecting other areas.
- The role of state governor to support the provincial and district governments in maintaining law and order by providing required force and in dispensation of quick justice by maintaining judicial infrastructure at his disposal will establish inherent checks and balances eliminating chances of district governments going overboard.

> Responding to the aspirations and genuine needs of the people of Pakistan, facilitating them in solving their problems at local level and ending acrimony on divisive issues, will act as catalyst to our progress and strengthen us as a nation.

III. BALOCHISTAN & FEDERALISM

Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had a special place in his heart for Balochistan. He not only chose to spend the last days of his life in this province but was also mindful of the injustices of the colonial period that the people of Balochistan had suffered and inherited. Addressing the first Sibi Darbar on February 14, 1948, he said:

> *"Let me assure you that I have not for one moment allowed the affairs of Balochistan to slip out of my mind. I have thought and thought, considered and pondered, over the ways and matters of improving the lot of our people in this province and of enabling them to secure for themselves the same position and the same political status within the polity of Pakistan, which are open to their brethren in other provinces...."*

These words of the Quaid clearly show his farsightedness in grasping the underlying faults of the situation in Balochistan which he felt had to be repaired as a national priority. He was fully conscious of the long-standing grievances of the people of Balochistan and of the need to redress them by giving them a direct say in the administration and governance of their province. In fact, the Quaid did announce some provisional reform measures on the same occasion while also assuring them of a future package of reform to ensure their socio-economic and political well-being.

That package has yet to come. Unfortunately, his vision of the future of Balochistan also remains unfulfilled. Meanwhile, over the years, the situation in the province has been aggravating as a result of larger issues of governance and political instability that have plagued the history of Pakistan since its independence. The reality is that our problems are not confined to Balochistan alone.

Since our independence, the people of Pakistan in all provinces have had no role in determining the course of their history or the direction of their country's political, economic and social policies. They have been exploited in the name of ideology and external threats while the real domestic challenges facing the country have remained unaddressed. Successive governments, elected or non-elected, have been presiding over fateful, and in some cases, painful moments in our country's history without taking the people into confidence or accepting the responsibility for the tragic consequences of their actions or policies.

We have had no national agenda formulated by any government encompassing the political, economic and social well-being of our people. In fact, the original vision of the Quaid's Pakistan woefully remains blurred. For more than 68 years now, Pakistan has been wallowing in political and economic uncertainty and has had neither domestic peace and harmony nor stability on its borders. Balochistan itself is an unending tale of our political and socio-economic lapses. Ironically, despite its abundance in the wealth of natural resources, it remains the most backward province of the country.

A deep-rooted sense of deprivation and frustration has made its people highly suspicious of the policy-makers in Islamabad, raising serious questions about the state of federalism in Pakistan. The current atmosphere is so murky that even genuine development projects initiated by the federal government are suspected and resisted only because there are un-addressed questions in terms of their actual utility and benefit to the people of Balochistan.

Pakistan's federal structure, based as it is on linguistic and ethnic considerations, has no parallel anywhere in the world. No country, roughly equal to Pakistan's geographical and population size has so few and so large provinces. Our provincial system has been not only fuelling misrule and corruption but also aggravating sense of inequality and deprivation among different parts of the country. We never thought of recasting our provincial architecture to be able to improve our governance patterns.

One of the oldest federations of the world, the United States, took more than 200 years of experimentation, and went through phases of flux, trial and tribulation, wars and depressions before it reached its maturation level. Our neighbour, India has also had a tradition of problematic federalism with secessionist ethnic conflicts raging in East Punjab and some of its North Eastern states, not to speak of the liberation struggle in the occupied state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Historically, two methods have been identified to deal with the menace of faction: one by removing its causes and the other by controlling its effects. Then, there are two alternatives of removing the causes of faction: the first by destroying the liberty which sustains its existence, and the second, by giving to every citizen the same opinion, the same cause, the same rights and the same interests. It is a difficult choice. The first remedy is worse than the disease; and the second one is impracticable.

The only solution lies in recourse to debate and dialogue, and mutual adherence to the agreed constitutional framework. Wherever a change or adjustment is warranted, it should be made through political and constitutional means. Force is not a solution. Use of military power within a state and against its own people has never been an acceptable norm. Some people view it as a recipe for intra-state implosions, a familiar scene in Africa. In our own country, we have had very bitter and tragic experiences in the past and must not repeat the same mistakes.

In addressing the question of the basic rights of the people of Balochistan, ad hoc approaches and half-hearted measures will not do. There is a strong underlying resentment in Balochistan (and in other provinces also) against what is seen as continued "Punjabi dominance", inequitable distribution of power and resources, and exploitation of province's natural wealth. In East Pakistan also, the problems started with similar deep-rooted sense of deprivation and a feeling of political and economic alienation which over time became a politico-constitutional crisis involving a demand for larger autonomy, and leading eventually to the break-up of the country.

No doubt, the central government's legitimate authority and writ within the constitutional framework, particularly in terms of its responsibility to maintain the territorial integrity of the federation and to ensure the security of the vital national installations, including gas and communication networks remains unexceptionable. We must, however, genuinely look for fair and permanent solutions. The problem in Balochistan will be resolved only through political and economic means, not by use of military force or through violence by militants. Irrespective of the questions about its role and performance, the parliament remains the competent body to address the issues of federalism in Pakistan.

These are exceptional times warranting exceptional responses to our problems. We must avoid reaching points of no return. The question of provincial autonomy remains the key to addressing the issues of federalism. If any changes are needed in our Constitution, they should be made. Our Constitution has been amended umpteen times for reasons of political power and expediency. It can be amended now to remove the underlying causes of injustice and socio-economic deprivation of the people of smaller provinces.

Balochistan needs economic development which will come only in an environment of peace and tranquillity, free of exploitation, blackmail or duress from any source. With greater share in political power and better economic opportunities, the people of Balochistan could chart for them a new and better place in the federation of Pakistan. In implementing development projects, the government must ensure that the maximum benefit accrues to the province and its people in terms of improved infrastructure and better living facilities, including health and educational services, and access to the use of their natural resources. They must get what is owed to them.

Like elsewhere in the world, the people of Balochistan also need to be freed of the outdated and exploitative *darbari* and *sardari* tribal system which keeps them backward to sustain its own privilege and power. If the universal principles of democracy and equality have any relevance in the context of Balochistan, the *sardars* must understand the new realities of the world. Instead of obstructing genuine development and security related projects, they should welcome any public or private investments in their province which would ultimately bring direct or indirect socio-economic dividends to their people.

IV. SCOURGE OF CORRUPTION

Corruption is today an endemic problem of our times, afflicting all societies and countries regardless of the levels of their social and economic development or the type of their political system. It has become a global challenge with far-reaching social and economic consequences warranting comprehensive remedial strategies both at national and global levels not only to fight this evil but also to establish voluntary standards of behaviour and legal mechanisms to curb and control the causes and effects of corrupt practices.

What do we mean by corruption? The term "corruption" is generally applied to situations or acts of dishonesty, particularly the behaviour on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants in which they 'improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves or those close to them by the misuse of 'public power or property' entrusted to them. In its essence, corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance. Corruption is indeed a complex social, political and economic phenomenon that affects all countries.

On October 31, 2003, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention against Corruption which now constitutes a major instrument of international cooperation in every aspect of the global fight against corruption, including prevention, investigation, and prosecution of offenders. The General Assembly also designated 9 December as International Anti-Corruption Day, to raise awareness of corruption and of the role of the Convention in combating and preventing it.

The UN Convention against Corruption entered into force in December 2005. It obliges countries to criminalise not only the basic forms of corruption such as bribery and embezzlement of public funds but also trading in influence and the concealment and laundering of the proceeds of corruption. The prevention campaign involves generating public awareness of corruption and the remedial measures with the help of non-governmental organisations and relevant parts of civil society.

It would make lot of sense if relevant provisions of the UN Convention against Corruption were also made applicable to the UN itself which in recent years, and under the outgoing secretary-general has suffered acute "credibility, transparency and complacency" problems. The reports on the Iraq Oil-for-Food programme scandals have publicly blamed the UN for "poor governance" and indicted Kofi Annan's UN as guilty of "illicit, unethical and corrupt" practices. According to World Bank estimates, each year, in both developed and developing countries, over $1 trillion is paid in bribes. Corruption constitutes the main source of capital flight from developing countries with their military dictators and political leaders making huge transfers of illicit funds to be stashed away in foreign countries.

"Corruption is a major cause of poverty as well as a barrier to overcoming it," says Transparency International Chairman Peter Eigen. "The two scourges feed off each other, locking their populations in a cycle of misery. Corruption must be vigorously addressed if aid is to make a real difference in freeing people from poverty." Foreign investment is always lower in countries perceived to be corrupt, which further thwarts their chance to develop and prosper.

But corruption cannot be measured in economic terms alone. Corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and contributes to governmental instability. Corruption poses a serious development challenge. In the political realm, it undermines democracy and good governance by flouting or even subverting formal processes. Economic development is stunted because foreign direct investment is discouraged and small businesses within the country often find it impossible to overcome the "start-up costs" required because of corruption.

It also attacks the foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existing is the soliciting of bribes. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies reduces accountability and distorts representation in policymaking; corruption in the judiciary compromises the rule of law; and corruption in public administration results in the unfair provision of services.

Where corruption is present, society at large suffers. It debilitates the judicial and political systems that should be working for the public good by weakening the rule of law and silencing the voice of the people. A corrupt judiciary cripples a society's ability to curb corruption. As a result, citizens' trust in government officials and national institutions dwindles. Corruption is not a natural calamity or disaster; it is simply the cold, calculated theft of opportunity from the men, women and children who are least able to protect themselves.

Although corruption has wide-ranging deleterious effects on society and governance, it's most deadly impact is always on the poor. Corruption also hinders good governance and weakens democratic institutions. It hampers economic growth and sustainable development. When countries improve governance and reduce corruption, they reap a "development dividend."

More generally, corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and public offices are bought and sold. At the same time, corruption undermines the legitimacy of government and such democratic values as trust and tolerance. It aggravates political instability by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law, and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existence is the soliciting of bribes.

In Pakistan, corruption has been a source of serious concern from the very beginning of our independent statehood. In his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, Quaid-e-Azam had warned us against what he called the "evils" of bribery, corruption, black-marketing, nepotism and jobbery. He wanted the government and the Assembly to take "adequate" measures to put these evils down with "an iron hand."

We as a nation have not only failed to grapple with these challenges but are in fact living remorselessly with these problems as an "integral" part of our society. Crime and corruption are rampant and galore both in scope and scale. Aversion to the rule of law is endemic. Poor governance is our national hallmark. There is constant erosion of law and order in the country. Our experience shows that most of our problems are rooted in our feudal power structure and an ingrained culture of "political opportunism and ineptitude."

Transparency International (TI) brings out an index every year based on a composite global survey reflecting the "perceptions" of business people and country analysts drawn on numerous polls conducted by independent institutions. Pakistan has been appearing almost every year in Transparency International's top lists of the most corrupt countries. Pakistan is today the classic example of ingenuities for bribery, exchange of favours and illegitimate perquisites.

Too much of governmental role in everyday life of citizens is also a major factor of power abuse. Forms of corruption in Pakistan also vary, but the most common are abuse of public office, patronage, graft, bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud and embezzlement. In politics, campaign contributions, kickbacks, defaulting bank-loans and soft money constitute a common form of corruption. "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," is the common approach followed by public officials, be they politicians or civil and military officials. Politicians have been at their best in legislating on their perks and privileges.

The difficulties and sufferings of the poor and the underprivileged, on the other hand, remain unabated. They are burdened with liabilities that normally belong to the state. Parents pay teachers illegal fees to have their children educated, patients pay extra to get proper health care, citizens give public officials "gifts" or money to speed up procedures, and drivers bribe police officers to avoid a fine. What many see as simply a way to get things done is, simply and in fact, nothing but a crime.

There is something fundamentally wrong with our patterns and standards of governance. Corruption is endemic to all segments of our society. Justice is inaccessible, slow and selective, encouraging contempt for the rule of law. The national integrity system and its institutional mechanisms inspire no confidence among the people. The accountability processes are also viewed with suspicion as governmental tool for "political blackmail and victimisation." Political institutions and civil society are weak and ineffective. All these shortcomings need remedial action at appropriate levels.

National Accountability Bureau (NAB) was established to combat corruption in our state system. It had identified many causes as the genesis of corruption in Pakistan. With a well-defined legal mandate and operational framework, the NAB has been functioning against heavy odds because of our systemic aberrations, failures of governance, political compulsions and resource limitations. In recent years, NAB has been excessively politicized and used by the government for victimization of its opponents.

Selective "amnesty" to public office-holders facing charges in different corruption and criminal cases between July 1986 and October 1999 in the name of "national reconciliation" and "political harmony" was blatantly discriminatory to the fundamental right of "equality of citizens before law and for protection under law" as guaranteed under Article 25, and any law inconsistent with fundamental rights conferred in the Constitution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void as per Article 8 of the Constitution.

Ironically, while the common man in our country is suffering the worst-ever hardship, the plunderers, profiteers, and the looters, murderer and the killers could not have a safer haven anywhere else in the world. No other country is familiar with the normatic practice of forgiving as a matter of rule the elite loan-defaulters and plunderers of the national exchequer. This also clearly puts us at odds with our international obligations under the UN Convention against Corruption which lays down legally binding international anti-corruption codes and measures and to which Pakistan is a party.

Corruption in our country is most prevalent in our elitist political system, which is dominated by politicians from the feudal or affluent business classes. Distribution of residential plots to parliamentarians as well as civil and military officials and showering undue perks and privileges to parliamentarians, judges and senior civil and military officers in the form of state-provided domestic servants, utilities and chauffeur-driven vehicles are no less than gross misappropriation of state resources and assets. On top of it, hefty bonuses and lavish perks and privileges to state-owned banks chiefs are a huge suck dry load on national exchequer.

Although corruption has wide-ranging deleterious effects on society and governance, it's most deadly impact is always on the poor. It undermines democracy, hinders good governance and weakens democratic institutions. It hampers economic growth and sustainable development. When countries improve governance and reduce corruption, they reap a "development dividend." In every respect, it is a *déjà vu* scenario in our country. The difficulties and sufferings of the poor and the underprivileged have only been aggravating. They are burdened with liabilities that normally belong to the state.

Parents pay teachers illegal fees to have their children educated, patients pay extra to get proper health care, citizens give public officials "gifts" or money to speed up procedures, and drivers bribe police officers to avoid a fine. What many see as simply a way to get things done is, simply and in fact, nothing but a crime.

Corruption must be eliminated and prevented among all segments of our society and at all levels of the government and its institutions, including the political hierarchy, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and the armed forces through an independent and transparent accountability process which should not be used as a tool of governmental blackmail and political victimisation.

No process of accountability can be immune to misperceptions. But with a holistic "national anti-corruption strategy" and an appropriate "anti-corruption toolkit", the NAB must preserve and safeguard its neutrality and credibility as an independent and apolitical accountability mechanism. This requires a "non-selective" approach. Within its own ranks, NAB must establish full transparency as charity always begins at home.

V. OUR NEGLECTED EDUCATION SYSTEM

In a message to All-Pakistan Educational Conference at Karachi on November 27, 1947, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah said:

> *"There is no doubt that the future of our State will and must greatly depend upon the type of education and the way in which we bring up our children as the future citizens of Pakistan. Education does not merely mean academic education, and even that appears to be of a very poor type. What we have to do is to mobilize our people and build up the character of our future generations."*

This was indeed a message of prophetic relevance to our nation's future. The Quaid correctly emphasized the critical role education plays in the over-all health and well-being of a modern nation-state. Unfortunately, with misplaced priorities, we never focused on developing education as a pillar of our nation-building and as an asset for a modern, progressive and prosperous Pakistan.

Historically, as a public sector responsibility, education in Pakistan has remained a most neglected sector both in terms of budgetary allocation and systemic development. It has been among the lowest of our national priorities with scant attention paid to the need for systemic reform and redressal. Besides low ratio of budgetary allocations, we suffered an attitudinal complacence inherent in governmental as well as societal inertia towards our educational system.

With general disdain for academic freedom and scholars, we could not give education the place that it deserved as a major "building-block" in the future of our nation. Corrupt bureaucratic hold over the country's education system has only aggravated the situation. The experiment of nationalization in the 1970s damaged not only the industrial and banking sectors of the country but also radically changed the complexion of our educational system both in quality and output.

Instead of allocating a major share of our own resources to this primary need, we left education to be funded mostly through external "donations." Seventy-six percent of government's educational expenditure is met through foreign grants and assistance and Pakistan still ranks among the 15 worst countries as far as education is concerned. What is even worse is that access to good education in Pakistan is a privilege available only to the very few with affluent feudal and elitist ancestry.

The increasing disillusionment with the public sector educational system led to a phenomenal shift towards private education with mushroom growth of commercially motivated institutions at all levels. However, not all private institutions are for-profit entities. Many philanthropic institutions have been established and are playing a significant role in providing high quality education. There is scope for more provided they are affordable to middle-class children. The low-cost private sector can deliver better performance than the government schools at around a quarter of the unit cost.

Substandard education in Pakistan is at the root of its problems including endemic corruption and poverty, the two main scourges of our society which continue to feed off each other, locking the overwhelming majority of the people in a cycle of misery and hardship. We have remained backward in education only because of our misdirected priorities, perennial leadership miscarriages and governance failures. In the absence of the rule of law, there is no sense of justice and equity in our country.

We remain clueless in determining the quality and content of our education system. The last PPP government engaged Britain's world-renowned educationist, Sir Michael Barber to advise on what to do with our education system. Nobody bothered to know that we already have umpteen red-ribboned reports of several task forces on education lying in our archives. Over the decades under almost all successive governments, numerous studies have been undertaken at the national as well as international levels to identify the long-standing problems in our education system and to recommend remedial measures.

We already have an elaborate 'menu' of creative options available to delineate a pragmatic reform strategy, closely tailored to our country's problems and needs, backed by requisite resources and political will. They all recommend that education must become the highest priority of the state not only in terms of GDP share but also for structural and curricular reforms in our education system to make it more productive, equitable and coherent.

This was also the first recommendation made by Sir Michael Barber after having advised our prime minister to declare the year 2011 as 'Year of Education.' His task force has reached the conclusion that Pakistan population will increase to 350 million by the middle of this century, and without good education, there is no future for this country.

The basic parameters for improving our education system include universal coverage at the schooling level and quality not quantity at the higher education level with adequate resources and efficient management. The foremost benchmark must be the constitutional provision that every child in our country is entitled to a good education.

A determined effort is needed to overcome the barriers to this goal that include "lack of resources, governmental ineptitude and corruption, political patronage of inefficient and unqualified teachers who don't turn up to work, poor quality facilities and poor quality teaching." For a successful education system in our country, we must do away with multiple systems and evolve uniform curricula.

Education must be treated as high strategic priority with its GDP allocation raised from the current less than two percent to at least four percent to start with.

According to Sir Michael Barber, many education systems have made this transition successfully; for example, Korea and Malaysia from the 1960s, Minas Gerais a large province in Brazil and a number of Indian states more recently. Some provinces of China, such as Shanghai, which topped a recent survey of 60 education systems, have also shown what is possible. Why not Pakistan? Woefully, Pakistan's poor and underprivileged people remain burdened with liabilities that normally belong to the state. Parents pay tutors hefty fees to have their children educated. This may be a way of life in our country but simply and in fact, it is nothing but a crime and injustice to the people.

Also the very concept of privilege-based new schools in the name of excellence has no relevance to the needed systemic reform in our country. We don't need any more elite schools to expand the "islands of privilege" that only symbolize the anachronistic culture of elitism in our society. We need genuine structural reform in our education system. The resources allocated to elitist schools would be best utilized for improving the existing government-owned schools.

And finally, education must remain a federal subject as recommended by National Assembly's Standing Committee on Education. We can't afford any devolutionary adventure at the cost of national unity and integration.

VI. CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is indeed a universal phenomenon and an evil that transcends all boundaries, and in recent years has deeply impacted the political, economic and security environment of all regions, countries and societies. It is a faceless enemy which lurks in the shadows of fear and frustration, breeds on despair and disillusionment, and is fed by poverty and ignorance. It has no faith or creed. It is only an ugly and violent manifestation of growing anger, despair, hatred and frustration over injustice, oppression and denial of fundamental freedoms and rights.

Globally, terrorism occurs most often when a state's overwhelming military power is used to occupy a weaker people or country or where it is applied to suppress the legitimate right of a people to self-determination, liberty and freedom. In such situations, terrorism becomes tactical tool of asymmetric warfare by the weak and the desperate. Also, as admitted by UN secretary-general in his May 2006 report on 'counter-terrorism strategy', violent internal as well as inter-state conflicts invariably witness terrorism, both state and non-state terrorism.

According to him, terrorism is the product of "a broader mix of problems" caused by bad governments, opportunistic politicians and militant leaders who exploit grievances. This observation truly sums up the post-9/11 global quandary with a group of cold warriors in Washington using analogy of an act of war for the 9/11 attacks to launch a global war on terror -- potentially a war without an end. What followed is history but everyone now agrees that this decision was a big mistake. Indeed, besides Afghanistan, Pakistan is the worst victim of that historic blunder.

Pakistan has indeed been a victim of both extremism and terrorism ever since its geopolitics made it the pivotal frontline of the two protracted Afghan wars. There is a cumulative historic perspective to this crisis but in essence, it is the legacy of two long spells of military rule in our country. We never had extremism in our country. We also didn't have this scale or intensity of violence before we became the ground zero of the US-led war on terror. The only violence we knew was sectarian in nature.

Today, unfortunately, we are high on the global radar screen as the breeding ground of religious extremism and violence. This dubious distinction has distorted Pakistan's image and decimated its socio-economic, societal, political and strategic potential. We are seen as the "ground zero" of the "war on terror" with a full-fledged military conflict going on within our own country. Pakistan has deployed more than 150,000 troops in the tribal areas and along its Afghan border. It is paying a heavy price in terms of huge military expenses and collateral damages.

According to official estimates, the annual cost of this war is more than $10 billion, and approximately $50-60 billion is said to be the cumulative economic loss since we joined this war. We have also been the main target in an al-Qaeda-led war in our country with almost 50,000 Pakistani civilian and security personnel having lost their lives in terrorist attacks in the last few years. Pakistan continues to suffer protracted violence, massive displacement, trade and production slowdown, export stagnation, investor hesitation, and worsening law and order situation. We have staked everything in this war and are constantly paying a heavy price in terms of huge military expenses and collateral damages.

And yet, one is bewildered at Pakistan's demonization by its friends and allies. The problem is that the world does not even know how to define terrorism. Other than varied descriptions of violence, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism which is today generally viewed as "politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents." A short legal definition used in the UN for an act of terrorism is the "peacetime equivalent of a war crime".

At their UN Summit meeting in New York in September 2005, the world leaders tried to set the tone by unequivocally condemning terrorism "in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes" as one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. They also decided to accelerate the negotiations on a long-outstanding international convention on terrorism. Till now, however, there is no progress in reconciling the differences over the basic issues.

Ironically, with the essence of the challenge including the legal scope of the proposed convention on terrorism yet to be determined, the world is already engaged in what is labelled as a "global war on terror." This US-led war is being fought on Muslim soils with the stated purpose of eliminating the "roots" of violence and religious extremism. But in fact, it is not the root but the symptom which is being targeted. Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan today epitomize the worst case scenario of this botched 'war on terror.'

Unfortunately, in the aftermath of 9/11, the detractors of Islam found an opportunity to contrive stereotypes to malign Islam and to mobilize a climate of antipathy against its adherents by focusing obsessively on the religion of the individuals and organizations allegedly involved in terrorist activities. What was being conveniently ignored was the fact that most of the perpetrators of violence were dissident runaways from their own countries and had a political agenda of their own in their misguided pursuits.

Unfortunately, the war on terror has not gone beyond retribution and retaliation. Nabbing or killing of few hundred individuals or changing the leadership in one or two countries will not bring an end to terrorism which in its deeper sense is a violent manifestation of growing sense of injustice and resultant despair and despondency. Extremist ideologies invariably lead to terrorism. The strategy to address extremism must be different from the one against terrorism. Terrorists we must confront; extremists we should convert.

We can kill or capture terrorists; disrupt their operations; destroy their organizations; but unless we prevent others from following their path, we cannot succeed in eliminating terrorism. Terrorism will not disappear through military campaigns. It is a perverse mindset that needs to be treated like a disease. Only a steady, measured and comprehensive approach encompassing both short-term and long-term political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights strategies that focus on the underlying disease rather than the symptoms would bring an enduring solution to this problem. There can be no two opinions on the need to combat terrorism. But to eliminate this evil, we must address its root causes.

To address the root causes is not to justify terrorism but to understand it and then to overcome it. No strategy or roadmap in the war on terror would be comprehensive without focusing on the underlying political and socio-economic problems. We need reordering of national priorities with greater focus on human development needs and people-centred socio-economic infrastructures. A special remedial effort is needed to address the causes of "injustice and instability" in our country and to purge our society of extremism and militancy which have crept into its ranks due to frequent political breakdowns, bad governance, institutional paralyses and aversion to the rule of law.

Since June 2014, we have been waging a full-scale war in the form of Zarb-e-Azb to root out terrorists and their sanctuaries from our tribal areas. After the Karachi airport terrorist attack, the government abandoned its 'dialogue' policy and launched the military operation which is already in progress with remarkable success against the foreign and local terrorists hiding in this area bordering Afghanistan. The nation stood by its armed forces in this decisive battle against foreign and local militants who had been hiding in our tribal areas for more than a decade now and challenging the writ and authority of the state. The armed forces threw their full weight and strength in this crucial operation to safeguard the country's sovereignty and integrity.

But we cannot also lose sight of a larger reality. To achieve the 'ultimate objective' of Zarb-e-Azb, we will have to go beyond military operations. The armed forces have done their job well. The success of this operation, however, will be predicated not on how many terrorists we kill or capture but on the effectiveness of governmental policies and priorities to ensure people-focused good governance, justice and rule of law, the absence of which is the root cause of the twin challenges of extremism and terrorism in our country. To address the root causes is not to justify or condone terrorism. It is to understand them and then to overcome them. To win the war against terrorism, we must win the hearts and minds of those who are susceptible to follow the path of terrorism. This requires good governance.

Unless we prevent others from following this path, we cannot succeed in eliminating terrorism. In this task, the USA and our Western friends could help promote a socio-economic environment in which we could change the hearts and minds of people in our tribal areas. They could provide market access for Pakistani textiles and products produced in tribal regions on the Afghan-Pakistan border as promised in Washington's policy to develop "Reconstruction Opportunity Zones" (ROZs) in Pakistan's frontier areas bordering Afghanistan.

Education and poverty eradication must be our top priorities. Terrorism will neither flourish nor survive in a moderate, educated and prosperous Pakistan. The government must promote the rule of law, tolerance and mutual respect in the country to overcome the sense of desperation which pushes certain segments of society towards extremism. We need strengthening of the capacity of our law enforcing agencies to detect and control terrorist groups and their supporters and streamlining our efforts towards influencing the groups that directly or indirectly support terrorism through political intermediaries and civil society organizations.

The world community must also find ways and means of promoting peace and stability and addressing the current situations of foreign military occupation and the denial of the legitimate right of peoples to self-determination. To address the underlying causes of this menace, the world community also needs to build global harmony through mutual understanding and inter-faith tolerance, promote peace and stability, pursue poverty eradication and sustainable development and ensure socio-economic justice, political freedom, genuine democracy and respect for fundamental rights of people.

VII. PRIMITIVE GENDER NORMS

Our problem is that the overbearing feudal and tribal power structure in Pakistan has been too deeply entrenched to let any systemic change take place. The empowerment of men and women in the country doesn't suit them. They have always resisted reform in the country which they fear will erode their vested power and influence base. Successive governments in Pakistan have only paid politically motivated lip-service to the cause of women. No government has ever shown the courage needed to grapple with the primitive gender norms inherent in our legal system and customs.

Pakistan remains one of those countries where women even in the twenty-first century remain subjected to primitive gender norms which are at the root of the pervasive political, legal, economic and social inequalities that perpetuate women's lack of access to resources, education, health care, employment, decision making and participation in public life. They are also victims of gruesome forms of gender-based violence, including domestic violence, with pervasive denial of justice. Acid attacks are just a tip of the iceberg. Violence against women in our country is endemic and widespread.

Despite the relative privilege of some elitist women, the majority of women in Pakistan remain structurally disadvantaged as a result of our discriminatory legal system and obscurant norms and attitudes. They are subjected to barbaric and senseless customs and laws. There are systemic, almost insurmountable barriers to justice confronting victims of violence, rape and other excesses. Some of the victims prefer to seek asylum in other countries rather than live under conditions of insecurity in their homeland. The world knows this bleak reality.

Pakistan, as a leading player at international forums making significant contribution to the promotion of global consensus on issues related to social and economic inequalities, is obliged by its ratification of international treaties to ensure respect for women's rights and fundamental freedoms. These include the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) for the advancement of women, which recognised that "equality between women and men is a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice, and is also a necessary and fundamental prerequisite for equality, development and peace."

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Cedaw), to which Pakistan acceded in 1996, requires the government "to take action to eliminate violence against women as a form of discrimination that inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men." Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Pakistan signed and ratified, requires our government "to ensure the rights to life and security of the person of all individuals in their jurisdiction, without distinction of any kind, including sex."

Unfortunately, our performance in implementation of commitments under these international conventions is pathetic. Clear violations of international law on the rights of women occur daily in our country and are regularly chronicled in the reports of international human rights organizations. Laws that discriminate against women remain in the books and are actively enforced while discriminatory access to government resources and services continues unchecked. No wonder, global forums keep flagging Pakistan for its flagrant violation of "women's rights to life and security of the person."

Ironically, in our implementation reports on Beijing Platform of Action, we have been forthright in identifying our systemic failures while showing no capacity for remedial actions. We acknowledge harmful traditions and customary practices rooted in an exploitative feudal and agrarian structure of our society, poverty, lack of education and lack of awareness among women of their rights as the principal causes of exploitation and violence against women in Pakistan.

Widening gender inequalities in our country will not be bridged just by acknowledging what is wrong with us. The gender gaps will be closed only with concrete and sustained actions backed by the requisite allocation of resources to promote literacy and basic health services for women in Pakistan, especially in rural and other backward areas. Effective legal measures, including penal sanctions, civil remedies and compensatory provisions are also needed to protect women against all kinds of gender-based violence and harassment.

Indeed, a lot needs to be done by the government for genuine "gender-mainstreaming and empowerment" of women in our country through the elimination of discriminatory policies and mediaeval practices. Instead of indulging in diversionary antics, we need to focus more on coherent and concrete legal reforms even if we have to resort to reversing some of the existing policies and laws. It is the responsibility of the government and parliament to do so. We should be applying our energies and resources to plugging the gender gap in education, health and employment. It is in these critical areas that Pakistani women need to be included in the mainstream.

In recent years, no doubt, there has been a conspicuous increase in the number of women in our political institutions but merely showcasing the presence of a few privileged and heavily painted females with designer outfits in our cabinet or legislative chambers is neither gender-mainstreaming nor empowering of women. They only aggravate the already acute sense of socio-economic deprivation. Those women who are elected to assemblies or appointed to public offices need to present themselves as an example of austerity and simplicity eschewing at least in public their ostentatious and lavish lifestyle.

The key to our social problems regarding the "betterment and empowerment" of women in Pakistan lies in comprehensive "legislative and budgetary" packages to close the existing gender gaps in our health, education and employment sectors, and to remove all gender-based barriers in our legal system. A nation's interests and capabilities, its problems and disorders, and its operational approach determine its health and inner strength.

VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL FLAWS AND AMENDMENTS

In 1947, we inherited the Government of India Act, 1935 with adaptations as an interim constitutional framework for our newly-independent country. Seven years of debate failed to produce agreement on fundamental issues such as regional representation or the structure of a constitution. This impasse prompted dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on October 24, 1954 in what was the first coup of our history, though a civilian one.

The new Constituent Assembly produced the first Constitution of the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" coming into force on March 23, 1956 (a two-province federation with 'parliamentary' form of government) but it was abrogated with the 1958 military coup. Since then, we have had two constitutions, one promulgated by a field marshal president in 1962, and the other adopted by an "elected" group of people who had no constitution-making mandate and were in fact responsible for creating a parliamentary gridlock leading to the breakup of the country in 1971. The 1973 constitution they authored has since been amended by politicians 21 times mostly for self-serving reasons. It is a different constitution altogether.

No wonder, Pakistan has been described as a laboratory for constitutional experiments. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who put into practice the 1973 constitution also has the distinction of amending it more than any other head of government. He made seven amendments. When Gen. Ziaul Haq dismissed Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, he suspended the constitution and imposed an authoritarian rule. The Supreme Court of Pakistan sanctioned Zia's martial law on the basis of the doctrine of necessity. The Supreme Court on July 7, 1977 also authorized the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) to inculcate necessary amendments in the constitution.

Three amendments (8th, 9th and 10th) were attempted during Gen. Zia's rule but only two were passed including the notorious Eighth Amendment in 1985 that empowered him to dismiss governments and dissolve National Assembly at his will. The Ninth Amendment dealing with Shariah Law did not pass because of dissolution of the National Assembly before its adoption. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's government never had the absolute majority in the parliament to be able to amend the constitution. When Nawaz Sharif came to power in the 1990s, he made six attempts to amend the constitution but succeeded in introducing only five.

The 13th Amendment, adopted with mutual agreement of government ad opposition and took effect on April 4, 1997, revoked the president's powers of dissolving the National Assembly and were vested back in the prime minister. The 14th amendment empowered political parties to terminate the parliamentary membership of their members involved in floor crossing. The 15th amendment sought to introduce the Shariah system in the country giving absolute powers to the prime minister under the banner of an Islamic system. This amendment was passed by the National Assembly but could not be passed in the Senate.

Gen. Musharraf on his election as president in 2002 brought the 17th amendment in 2003 reversing the effect of the 13th Amendment and getting the powers of dissolving the National Assembly back while also incorporating his arbitrary Legal Framework Order (LFO) in the constitution. After February 2008 elections, the unanimous passage of the 18th, 19th and 20th amendments ostensibly restored the parliamentary system and ensured more autonomy to the provinces but in fact, each amendment had a political motive to serve the interests of the country's political hierarchy.

Representation of Women

The fundamental problem in modern version of democracy is how to secure a system of voting that ensures election of representatives who reflect as completely as possible every segment of the electorate. In our case, we are masters in circumventions of all sorts. One of them is the system of reserved seats for women that we have been following for decades in the name of women's empowerment. For self-serving reasons, Gen. Ziaul Haq doubled the number of reserved seats for women in his 1985 Majlis-e-Shoora.

Today, our parliament has 60 seats reserved for women and the total inclusive of those in the four provincial assemblies goes up to 188 seats. The method of filling these seats is highly questionable and amounts to selection through personal likes and dislike or of the kith and kin by the party leaders. There couldn't be greater mockery of democracy. Ironically, all political parties have owned this system as a convenient means of reinforcing their power in the elected houses.

A Supreme Court full-bench while hearing numerous petitions challenging the 18th Amendment did admit that the process of nominating persons to seats reserved for women in legislatures was "selection and not election" made on personal likes and dislikes of heads of parties. Another petition has been pending in Lahore High Court challenging this systemic circumvention of the representative system and calling for its immediate revocation. Even if these seats are to be reserved, they must be filled preferably through adult franchise-based election or at least by secret ballot within the laid down constituencies.

In recent years, no doubt, there has been a conspicuous increase in the number of women in our political institutions but merely showcasing the presence of a few privileged and heavily painted females with designer outfits in our cabinets or legislative chambers is neither gender-mainstreaming nor empowering of women. They only aggravate the already acute sense of socio-economic deprivation. Instead of these antics, we should have been applying our energies and resources to plugging the gender gaps in education, health and employment. It is in these critical areas that Pakistani women need to be included in the mainstream.

It is the responsibility of the government and parliament to do so. But both remain averse to any systemic change that weakens their deeply-entrenched elitist power structure, and have instead created distortions in our political system to further reinforce the *status quo* of power and privilege. Reserving seats for women in our elected assemblies and filling them by nomination is one of those blatant distortions that need to be revisited sooner rather than later. This systemic circumvention has repeatedly been challenged in superior courts but a definitive actionable ruling on the issue is still awaited.

In our privilege-based political system, women mostly come into political limelight riding only on their ancestry or political influence and connection, and are inevitably tempted to brandish their affluence while in public gaze. Most of them are there not because they are qualified to be in that position but only because of the flawed system of election to the seats reserved for women. The system itself smacks of discriminatory gender inequality. Even worse is the presence of these privileged women in our elected houses loaded with glitzy outfit and expensive jewellery.

The 18th Amendment amending several articles of the constitution took effect on April 19, 2010 when President Asif Ali Zardari put his signatures on it. It was the first time in Pakistan's history that a president relinquished a significant part of his powers willingly and transferred them to parliament and the office of the prime minister. These included the power to dissolve the National Assembly. It also repealed the 17th Amendment together with the LFO provision, thus turning the country from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary republic and renaming the NWEP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The 18th Amendment not only repealed several anachronistic provisions included in the constitution in earlier amendments by self-serving rulers but also added some new features into the constitution. The 18th Amendment is also considered to have made the so called 'devolution' but in effect, nothing seems to have changed in terms of redressing the core issue of inter-provincial disparities. The salient features of this Amendment include:

- The name of the former president Gen. Zia has been removed from the text of Constitution.
- North-West Frontier Province has been renamed Khyber Pakhtoonkhawa.
- The 17th Amendment and Legal Framework Order as introduced by Musharraf has been repealed.
- The ban on third time prime ministership and chief ministership has been lifted.
- Holding constitution in abeyance is tantamount to high treason.
- The Council of Common Interest (CCI) has been reconstituted with the prime minister as its chairperson and the body should meet at least once in 90 days.

- A judicial commission will recommend the appointment procedure of superior judges and the final names of judges will be decided by parliamentary commission.
- A Chief Election Commissioner will be appointed through consensus between treasury and opposition.
- Establishment of Islamabad High Court and benches of High Courts in Mengora and Turbat.
- The Concurrent Legislative list has been abolished and more autonomy has been vested in the provinces.

The 19th Amendment affecting Articles 81, 175, 175A, 182, 213 and 246 of the Constitution, came into force on January 1, 2011 setting down a process to install a caretaker set-up and hold free and fair elections in the future. It amends several articles of the Constitution "to ensure free, fair and transparent elections in the country" through an independent Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and impartial federal and provincial caretaker governments for the conduct of general elections in the country.

The 20th Amendment came into effect on February 29, 2012. It amended Articles 48, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 224, (Add 224A) with amendments to Second and Third Schedules of the Constitution of Pakistan. It was ostensibly meant to give the ECP sweeping powers by minimising government's direct role in the appointment of the caretaker governments. Under the new mechanism of choosing caretakers, as envisaged by the amendment, both prime minister and leader of the opposition in the National Assembly would hold a 'consultation' on the matter.

In case they fail to agree on the names, an eight-member parliamentary committee comprising four members from both sides will come up with its suggestions. If this panel also fails to agree the ECP will then be empowered to send names to the president. The ECP itself was supposed to have four members, one from each province, who together with the Chief Election Commissioner will then select the caretaker prime minister through simple majority vote.

Now if we look at the sequence of events during the 2013 election, it seems our political wizards are masters in circumventing democratic and constitutional norms. As one links the loose ends in the recent caretaker selection drama, the last three constitutional amendments seem to have been ingeniously designed with the sole purpose of influencing the election outcome. With no one trusting the outgoing regime, a unique but highly questionable process was devised for selecting the caretaker prime minister and provincial chief ministers to supervise the elections.

This whole process was deceitfully engineered to ensure their own political power and incumbency of the high public offices remained intact. Nowhere in the world are governments appointed by an arbitrarily appointed group of five individuals most of whom are known to carry partisan affiliations. There couldn't even be a bigger farce of democracy. Petitions were moved in the Supreme Court challenging the authority given under 20th Amendment to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to nominate the federal and provincial caretaker set-ups in the event of assemblies failing to do so.

This authority under Article 9(3) of the constitution is repugnant to the constitution itself because the National Assembly has neither the jurisdiction to abdicate or delegate its authority to the ECP. The petitions also made serious allegations of 'partiality' against the ECP. These apprehensions came to the fore again at the time of presidential election when the ECP, contrary to its constitutional mandate, abdicated its powers to the Supreme Court which on a petition from an interested political party and in a controversial manner changed the election schedule.

Similarly, initial handling of the scrutiny, the most important element of ensuring implementation of Articles 62 and 63, was far from satisfactory. It exposed serious planning and decision-making deficiencies in the Commission. With adequately briefed and trained returning officers, the scrutiny process could have been made more meaningful and all the hullabaloo and comic scenes could have been avoided. Instead of testing the candidate's general knowledge, the real scrutiny should have focused on the known and proven cases of constitutional ineligibility.

Apparently, the vacillating ECP did take one good decision. On a suggestion received from the civil society, it announced the addition of a blank box marked 'None of the Above' on the ballot paper giving voters a democratic free choice to reject the entire slate of candidates in his or her constituency. This democratic provision known as NOTA would, indeed, have been a big revolutionary step in freeing the country by ballot of the same old tried and tested corrupt politicians and their rotten *'status quo'*. Regrettably, the ECP did not have the courage to stand by its decision and promptly withdrew it when some ill-advised media persons attacked it.

If experience is any lesson, one thing is clear. No government in our country has ever attempted through constitutional amendments to correct the systemic anachronisms in our federal structure or to redress provincial grievances. The problem is that the overbearing feudal, tribal and elitist power structure in Pakistan has been too deeply entrenched to let any systemic change take place. It doesn't suit them. They make amendments in the Constitution for self-serving reasons only.

The 20th Amendment, for example, shown as a means of ensuring 'free and fair' election, was no more than a political manoeuvre aimed at protecting the membership of 28 lawmakers whose election in bye-polls were suspended by the apex court not being in conformity with the 18th Amendment requirement for full composition of the Election Commission of Pakistan. These amendments were no more than self-serving legislations meant only to manipulate the electoral process to the advantage of the two major political parties. This issue later triggered a huge political crisis questioning the very legality of the 2013 elections. In 2015, the crisis led to bye-elections in some constituencies.

The 21st Amendment Bill to the Constitution of Pakistan was passed by both the National Assembly of Pakistan and Senate on January 6, 2015, and received the assent of the President on January 7, 2015. The Bill amended the Article 175 and the First Schedule of the Constitution. The amendment sought to set up speedy trial military courts for offences relating to terrorism, waging of war against Pakistan and prevention of acts threatening the security of Pakistan. It also has a self-contained sunset clause, which causes the amendments to expire on January 7, 2017.[5]

The 21st Amendment was adopted in the backdrop of the December 16, 2014 Peshawar tragedy as a response to the terrorist menace in the country. A 20-point National Plan of Action consisted of an emergency counter-terror strategy with the first two points involving the creation of military courts and execution of convicted terrorists whereas the remaining eighteen points pertained to the governmental policies and actions needed to win the war against terrorism. These points are no more than normal responsibilities of any functional government and if our successive governments had been functioning properly, perhaps the country would not have reached the present crisis situation.

Ironically, the 21st Amendment was passed by an All Parties Conference (APC) while the parliament stood bypassed. It was used only for rubberstamping the plan.

The table below gives the summary of the constitutional Amendments made to date:

	Amendments	Date of Assent
1st	Redefined the boundaries of Pakistan and removed references to East Pakistan.	May 8, 1974
2nd	Declared the status of Ahmadis as minority and as 'non-Muslim'.	September 17, 1974
3rd	Persons involved in activities prejudicial to the	February 13, 1975

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[5] *Constitution (Twenty-First Amendment) Act, 2015*

	integrity and security of Pakistan have been exempted from safeguards available to other persons as to arrest and detention under the constitution.	
4th	Decreed additional seats for minorities, it also deprived courts of the power to grant bail to any person detained under any preventive detention.	November 21, 1975
5th	Widened the scope of restriction on the High Courts.	September 13, 1976
6th	Provided that Chief Justice of Supreme Court and High Courts may continue his office until he has completed his term.	December 31, 1976
7th	Enables the Prime Minister to obtain a vote of confidence of the people of Pakistan through a referendum.	May 16, 1977
8th	Changed Pakistan's government from a parliamentary system to a semi-presidential system by giving the president a number of additional powers.	November 11, 1985
9th	It provides that the Injunction of Islam shall be supreme law and source of guidance for legislation and policy making. The bill was passed by Senate but could never be passed by National Assembly owing to the latter's dissolution on May 29, 1988.	
10th	It provides the working days in a year of National Assembly and Senate were curtailed from 160 to 130 days.	March 25, 1987
11th	It seeks to restore 20 women seats in the National Assembly. The bill was withdrawn on August 23, 1992.	
12th	It provides for establishment of Special Court for trial of heinous crime.	July 28, 1991
13th	Stripped the President of Pakistan of his power to dissolve the National Assembly, and dismissing the Prime Minister.	April 3, 1997
14th	If a member of a parliamentary party defects he may lose his seat.	July 3, 1997
15th	The Holy Quran and Sunnah of Holy Prophet (PBUH) shall be supreme law of Pakistan. Was never passed in the Senate.	
16th	To extend the quota system for another 20 years.	August 5, 1999
17th	It provides President's power to dissolve National Assemble was restored [Article 58(2)(b)]. The president shall, within 15 days of dissolution, refer	December 31, 2003

	the matter to the Supreme Court and Supreme Court shall decide the reference within 30 days whose decision shall be final.	
18th	The President will have no authority to dissolve the National Assembly and impose emergency rule on his own. Courts will no longer be able to validate suspension of constitution.	April 19, 2010
19th	It mainly deals with appointment of superior courts judges, addition of senior most judges in Judicial Commission of Pakistan and inclusion of Islamabad High Court in Article 81 of the Constitution.	January 1, 2011
20th	It provides the formation of a caretaker set-up with consensus and increment of three years in Election Commission of Pakistan members tenure.	February 28, 2012
21st	It made amendments in Article 175 of the constitution, which deals with judicial affairs as well as the First Schedule of the Constitution, which deals with fundamental rights.	January 7, 2015
22nd	It made changes in criteria for appointment of Chief Election Commissioner, Members of Election Commission.	June 8, 2016
23rd	It purposes the number of seats of minorities in National Assembly shall increase to 14. For the provincial assemblies of Punjab, Sindh, KPk and Balochistan the number of seats for minorities will increase to 10, 12, 4 and 4, respectively.	
24th	It amends the seven articles of the constitution to pave the way for the creation of a new province and proposes that the new province shall comprise territories of Multan, Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, Mianwali and Bakkar districts. It was passed by Senate on March 6, 2013.	

CHAPTER 5

PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY & EXTERNAL RELATIONS

I. FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN

The Quaid's Vision

The Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had envisioned the newly independent Muslim state's foreign policy to be one of "peace with all, and enmity with none". In a message to the nation on August 15, 1948, he elaborated his foreign policy vision as follows:

> *"Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and good-will towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the policy of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our outmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed people of the world and in upholding of the United Nations Charter.*
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> *"There is nothing that we desire more ardently than to live in peace and let others live in peace, and develop our country according to our own lights without outside interference and improve the lot of the common man."*

Especially in the context of India-Pakistan relations, the Quaid had expressed the hope that both countries would adhere to the principles of equity and justice, and build peaceful and cooperative relations to the mutual benefit of their peoples. In his message to the nation on the occasion of the inauguration of the Pakistan Broadcasting Service on August 15, 1947, he said:

> *"Our object should be peace within and peace without. We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the World at large. We have no aggressive designs against any one. We stand by the United Nations Charter and will gladly make our full contribution to the peace and prosperity of the World."*

The Quaid's foreign policy vision thus stipulated Pakistan's steadfast adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, particularly the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's affairs, and peaceful settlement of bilateral disputes.

Based on these principles, like any other nation, the basic goals of Pakistan's foreign policy could be summed up as "preservation of sovereign independence and territorial integrity, socio-economic development, maintenance of Islamic identity while progressing as a modern and forward-looking democratic nation, pursuing in solidarity with the international community, the cause of global peace and security and making Pakistan a strong factor of regional and global stability."

Functionally, the Quaid also expected the nation's irrevocable commitment to the ideals of democracy, pluralism, market economy, social justice, communal harmony and egalitarian order. He visualized a Pakistan that would be stable politically and strong economically where its people could live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from the fear of violence, oppression and injustice, and where they and their future generations could also live free from hunger, disease, and illiteracy.

Geopolitics

Geography is an important determinant of a country's foreign policy having a direct influence on its personality as a state and also conditioning its role and behaviour as a member of the international community. For any country, it is also important who its neighbours are, as their attitude, irrespective of their size or power, has a direct bearing on vital issues of its security and economic growth.

In our case, our geopolitics thus placed on Pakistan the onerous responsibility of careful conduct of its relations not only with its immediate neighbours but also with the rest of the world, especially the major powers. It has always had to respond to exceptional challenges inherent in its ever-volatile regional and global environment which not only had an indelible influence on its conduct as a state but also conditioned its national agenda, state priorities and policy-making processes.

Pakistan's external relations since the very beginning of our independence have been marked by four major constants:

- Quest for security and survival as an independent state.
- Legacy of our troubled relationship with India which in fact constitutes the centre-point of our foreign policy.
- Excessive reliance on the West, especially the US for our economic, political and military survival.
- Total solidarity with the Muslim world, and unflinching support to Muslim causes.

No wonder, Pakistan's foreign policy has remained marked by a complex balancing process in the context of the turbulent history of the region in which it is located, its own geostrategic importance, its security compulsions, and the gravity and vast array of its domestic problems. We could not change our geography, nor escape from its social, cultural, political economic and strategic influences.

The internationally recognised principles of inter-state relations are as immutable as geography. These include non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations; the cardinal principle of self-determination and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Historical Perspective

When we became independent in 1947, we were a house divided not against itself but by more than 1000 miles of hostile India's territory. The world itself was divided in two rival and mutually hostile blocs presenting our foreign policy with a difficult choice; either align with the free world represented at that time by Western democracies or accept subservience to the authoritarian and monolithic Communist system. We were also confronted with the stark reality of our geopolitical environment that made Pakistan's relations with India the "centre-point" of our foreign policy. This equation, with all its ramifications, has had a fundamental impact on our domestic matters, on our security policy, on our international relations, and indeed, on the course of our entire post-independence history.

This has been a troubled relationship, marked by "conflict and confrontation" ever since our independence. In fact, the underlying problems behind this legacy of animosity between India and Pakistan were rooted in their history and the long-standing tradition of mutual distrust and suspicion that they had inherited on their independence. At the core of all their problems is the Kashmir issue, which has kept the relations between the two countries bedeviled, perpetuating mutual tensions and animosity. They have fought wars and gained nothing from the environment of endemic hostility. In the process, however, India did manage to change our geography. It dismembered Pakistan.

In that intensely bi-polar world, we made a deliberate choice of opting for the global pole that we thought stood for freedom and democracy. Also, Pakistan's exceptional strategic location was pivotal to the politics of the Cold War era. In the early '50s, with growing concern about India's designs against our independence, we entered into a "mutual defence agreement" with the USA (1954) and by 1955 we had joined two major Western alliances, SEATO and CENTO in the hope that they will provide strength to us in our quest for survival. In making those alliances, we were obviously guided by our over-riding security and economic interests. Our experience, however, did not match our expectations. When it came to defending ourselves against India in 1965 and then again in 1971, we were left all alone.

In the mid-1970s, we were again disappointed when the US and other Western countries ignored our concerns over India's nuclear ambitions, and instead, cancelled a deal for supply of a French reprocessing plant to Pakistan. In 1979, the US suspended its aid to Pakistan in response to what was alleged as our covert construction of a uranium enrichment facility. But after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, Pakistan again became a key ally of the US and also the front-line state in the last and decisive battle of the Cold War which hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union and its symbol the "Berlin Wall".

Once the war was over and the Soviets pulled out, the US just walked away, leaving Afghanistan and its people at the mercy of their fate. We were also left in the lurch, with a painful legacy in terms of a massive refugee influx and a culture of drugs and guns, commonly known as the *kalashnikov* culture, which has almost torn apart our social and political fabric. In the years that followed, the US not only turned a blind eye on our strategic concerns vis-à-vis India but also started bringing us under greater scrutiny and pressure for our legitimate nuclear programme. We faced an unfair punitive approach under its congressional laws on nuclear proliferation and human rights.

The 1985 Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which banned economic and military assistance to countries engaged in nuclear weapon programmes was used to impose economic sanctions against Pakistan. Since then, the sanctions were waived selectively whenever the US needed us badly for its own regional and global interests. In 1998, after nuclear tests first by India and then by Pakistan, the US engaged both countries in a "strategic dialogue."

After eight rounds of talks with both countries on an equal footing ending in February 1999, a clear parity was established between the two countries. Like India, we accepted no obligation under the global non-proliferation regime that could circumvent the quality and future of our strategic programme. Besides obtaining relief from the much dreaded US sanctions, we were able to develop an implicit "strategic linkage" between Pakistan and India promising them "equality of treatment" in terms of any future concessions, including access to technology.

That linkage is no longer there now. Pakistan has been categorically "de-hyphenated" from India. During his visit to Islamabad in 2006, President Bush left us in no doubt that India and Pakistan were two "different countries with different needs and different histories and could not be compared to each other." He was blunt enough to tell us that Pakistan should not expect a civilian nuclear agreement like the one he had signed with India.

Post-9/11 Era

The events of 9/11 represented a critical threshold in Pakistan's foreign policy. Gen. Musharraf was among the first foreign leaders to have received a clarion call from Washington. "You're either with us or against us," was the message. US Secretary of State Colin Powell telephoned him late in the evening on September 12, asking for Pakistan's full support and cooperation in fighting terrorism.

In Gen. Musharraf's own words, the 9/11 "came as a thunderbolt" presenting acute challenges as well as opportunities. He was right in claiming that he had to "absorb external pressure and mould domestic opinion" in readjusting Pakistan's policies to the new global environment. He chose, perhaps rightly, to avoid the "wrong side" of a "wounded" superpower, and made Pakistan a vital ally in the US-led anti-terrorism coalition. But the quick and unconditional about-turn in Pakistan's established policies surprised even the Americans.

Pakistan's post-9/11 alliance with the US was the beginning of another painful chapter in Pakistan's turbulent political history. In the blinking of an eye, Pakistan became a battleground of the US war on terror, and is paying a heavy price in terms of human and material losses. In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, a move that in all respects was more symbolic than practical. Since then, however, the US lifted all sanctions and has been providing us more aid though conditioned in the form of five-yearly Kerry-Lugar Bill.

It is obvious that Pakistan's post-9/11 "turnaround" was not the result of any considered institutional policy review. There was no parliament in place at that time. There were no consultations at any level, nor did the military government make any visible effort to build a political or quasi-political consensus on abandoning its policy which for more than two decades had constituted the mainstay of its strategic end-game in the region. No matter how necessary or justified the policy turnaround was, it only showed the ad hoc and arbitrary nature of the decision-making process in Pakistan on national security and foreign policy issues during the days following 9/11.

Since then, Pakistan is once again a front-line state, and a key partner of the United States in its war on terror. As a battleground of this war, Pakistan could not escape the fall out of the crisis in the form of a heavy toll on its already volatile socio-economic environment as a result of protracted violence, instability, displacement, trade and production slowdown, export stagnation, investor hesitation, and concomitant law and order situation.

The sum-total of Pakistan's post-9/11 foreign policy is its new identity on the global radar screen as the "hotbed" of religious extremism and terrorism, and its front-line role in the war on terror, which has not only made it the focus of world attention and anxiety but also forced it to make difficult choices in its perennial struggle for security and survival as an independent state.

Domestic Perspective

Foreign policy of a country, and the way it is made and pursued is inextricably linked to its domestic policies, governance issues and socio-economic and political situation. And domestically, Pakistan's post-independence political history has been replete with endemic crises and challenges that perhaps no other country in the world has experienced. The tally of our woes includes costly wars and tensions with India, loss of half the country, territorial setbacks, political breakdowns, economic stagnation, social malaise, societal chaos and disintegration, and a culture of violence and extremism. This is the sum-total of our independent statehood.

All these problems that we continue to suffer have nothing to do with our foreign policy. Our problems are rooted in our domestic failures which have seriously constricted our foreign policy options. No country has ever succeeded externally if it is weak and crippled domestically. Even a superpower, the former Soviet Union could not survive as a superpower only because it was domestically week in political and economic terms.

Role of Military in Foreign Policy

There are many misconceptions about foreign policy making in Pakistan. We often misunderstand the realities of foreign policy, and tend to overplay the role of military or so-called 'establishment' in its formulation and execution. Foreign policy of every country is inextricably linked to its national security, and no foreign policy is complete without the involvement of its national security agencies input.

Given Pakistan's peculiar geopolitical environment and its volatile neighbourhood, most of the foreign policy issues involving vital national security interests have to be addressed through a larger consultative process with the involvement of all relevant governmental agencies and stakeholders including military and intelligence agencies. There is nothing unusual in this process which is followed in every state burdened with national security issues. No foreign office is equipped with intelligence gathering and analyzing capabilities and cannot function in a vacuum of intelligence and security information relevant to the foreign policy goals that it is supposed to be pursuing.

No wonder, in our case, on issues of national security, our GHQ and intelligence agencies have an indispensable role. On issues of trade and commerce with India and transit trade with Afghanistan, the questions having direct bearing on the country's security cannot be dealt with in isolation from the country's concerned departments and agencies. On issues with relevance to national security, the Foreign Office cannot operate without military and intelligence inputs in its normal functioning. This is the case with every country.

Even in the United States, their State Department cannot and does not operate without the support of their intelligence network. For that matter, America too has a so-called 'establishment' represented by Pentagon and CIA which are playing a dominant role in their foreign policy issues involving America's 'national security' interests in the context of its regional and global power outreach. In our case, there is another bleak reality. If there are instances of military dominance in foreign policy issues, it is only because our civilian set-ups are invariably devoid of any strategic vision or talent in their political cadres. They lack the requisite technocratic capability and comprehension of national security issues.

The military's overbearing role in foreign policy formulation and execution is facilitated whenever there is a vacuum of strategic vision. Our problems in foreign policy making therefore are rooted in the strategic bankruptcy of our political cadres which invariably are dominated by the same old class of elitist oligarchs, no more than a bunch of self-serving, feudalist and opportunistic politicians, who since Pakistan's independence have been used to ruling the country in collusion with, if not with total dependence, on civil and military bureaucracy.

II. PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS

(a) Afghanistan

Our relations with Afghanistan are of exceptionally special nature. We share between us not only a long porous border but also common ancestral history, civilizational legacy and deep cultural links. There is also a long tradition of physical contact and mutual influence. Ironically, however, this also remains one of the most troubled relationships in the region. When Pakistan became independent, Afghanistan was the sole negative vote when Pakistan was admitted as a member of the United Nations on September 30, 1947.

Misled by the Indian National Congress leaders who believed Pakistan was economically unviable, the then Afghan government questioned the very validity of the Durand Line boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, an issue that had long been settled between Afghanistan and Britain under their Boundary Agreement of 1893 negotiated at the initiative of Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan and which had repeatedly been reiterated in successive Anglo-Afghan Treaties of 1905, 1919 and 1921.

Three weeks after Pakistan's admission to the United Nations, Afghanistan withdrew its negative vote. Welcoming the changed Afghan position, M. A. H. Ispahani, Pakistan's delegate to the United Nations, expressed the hope that "it reflects more accurately the feeling of friendship and good-neighbourliness that exists between Pakistan and Afghanistan." Since then, despite Kabul's occasional detractions raising the bogey of 'Pakhtoonistan,' Pakistan has maintained a consistent policy of friendship and good-neighbourliness with Afghanistan. It has not only provided uninterrupted transit facilities to its land-locked Muslim neighbour but also over the decades stood by it in its long, unending ordeals including foreign-imposed wars.

The Durand Line

Durand Line is the boundary established in the Hindu Kush in 1893 running through the tribal lands between Afghanistan and British India, marking their respective spheres of influence. Since 1947, it has marked the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

After the British conquered the Punjab in 1849, they took over the ill-defined Sikh frontier to the west of the Indus River, leaving a belt of territory between them and the Afghans that was inhabited by various Pashtun tribes. Questions of administration and defence made this area a problem. Some of the British, members of the so-called stationary school, wanted to retire to the Indus; others, of the forward school, wanted to advance to a line from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandahar. After the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80), the British had established their authority by indirect rule up to the Durand Line, at the cost of a number of tribal wars; the Afghans left their side untouched.

Subsequently, the future Anglo-Afghan treaties of 1905, 1919 and 1921 confirmed the agreed Durand Line through proper demarcation. In the Treaty of Kabul signed on November 22, 1921, Afghanistan formally reaffirmed its acceptance of the boundary west of the Khyber, subject to minor "re-alignment." It was on the basis of this treaty that normal relations between Afghanistan and Britain were established.

The acceptance of this line—which was named after Sir Mortimer Durand, who negotiated the agreement with Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir of Afghanistan—is not only considered to have settled the Indo-Afghan frontier problem for the rest of the British period but also provided an internationally accepted legal framework to the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan after the latter's independence in August 1947.

Pakistan's Position

For Pakistan, the Durand Line is a closed and settled issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan and is the recognised international border by the international community.

Traditionally, the Afghan-Pakistan relationship has traditionally been experiencing difficulties driven by a host of internal and external factors. Both are historically and physically part of a troubled region which was globally important during the Cold War era and remains so even in today's changed environment. The US policy of containment, in its final phase, was enacted on the soil and rugged mountains of this region with Pakistan and Afghanistan playing a decisive role in dismantling what the free world once called the 'evil empire" of the former Soviet Union.

Once the Soviets pulled out in 1989, the US just walked away, leaving Afghanistan in a virtual fratricidal civil war and its people at the mercy of their fate. We in Pakistan were also left in the lurch, with a painful legacy in terms of a massive refugee influx and a culture of drugs and guns, commonly known as the "kalashnikov" culture, which has almost torn apart our social and political fabric. It was a challenging task in coping with the post-Soviet Afghan turmoil. We just could not ignore the ground realities in our backyard with Taliban assuming control over their country.

As immediate next-door neighbour with long common border, Pakistan together with Saudi Arabia and UAE had to recognise the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. Pakistan's Afghanistan-related problems are aggravated by the growing Indo-US nexus giving India not only a strategic ascendancy in the region but also through its overbearing presence in Afghanistan an ominous nuisance potential against Pakistan. (Cross-border subversion in Pakistan's volatile tribal areas and Balochistan province) After September 11, 2001, international pressures prompted Pakistan to reassess its relations with the Taliban regime and support the US and international coalition in Operation Enduring Freedom to remove the Taliban from power.

Since then, Pakistan has supported President Karzai-led regime and is now cooperating with the 'elected' Ashraf Ghani regime as part of its commitment to promoting durable peace in Afghanistan. Both nations must make sincere efforts to build mutual cooperation along their shared rugged border. Both have been the pivotal frontline and battlefield of the global war on terror, paying a price in material losses and human lives that no other country has paid in contemporary history. Our Afghan policy is based on non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and strict neutrality vis-à-vis the Afghan ethnic factions.

The Afghan Conflict

Peace in Afghanistan is long overdue. The country has been in turmoil for over thirty years now. The US may have its own power-driven compulsions but both Afghanistan and Pakistan have already suffered for too long and cannot afford another cataclysm. In fact, Pakistan has suffered more in multiple ways in terms of refugee influx, socio-economic burden, rampant terrorism and protracted conflict in its border areas with Afghanistan. Pakistan is especially perturbed by America's indifference to its legitimate security concerns and sensitivities. As part of its China-driven larger Asian agenda and post-9/11 Central Asia-focused 'great game' in pursuit of its worldwide political and economic power, the US policies have only aggravated the strategic balance of power in this volatile region.

Indeed, the Afghans are not the only victims of the Afghan tragedy. Pakistan has suffered more in multiple ways in terms of refugee influx, socio-economic burden, rampant terrorism and protracted conflict in its border areas with Afghanistan. This is a reality that even Obama's Secretary of State Hilary Clinton acknowledged in a congressional testimony. No wonder, the Afghan crisis, both during and post-Soviet occupation era has had a direct impact on Pakistan's social, cultural, political, economic and strategic interests.

For decades, Pakistan has remained burdened with millions of Afghan refugees and afflicted by a culture of drugs and guns, commonly known as the "kalashnikov" culture, which has constantly been tearing apart its social and political fabric. As a battleground of this war, Pakistan could not escape the fall out of the crisis in the form of a heavy toll on its already volatile socio-economic environment as a result of protracted violence, instability, massive displacement, trade and production slowdown, export stagnation, investor hesitation, and concomitant law and order situation.

Pakistan has already staked everything in supporting this war by deploying over 120,000 troops in its tribal areas and along its Afghan border. In addition to its invisible emotional fall out for the country in terms of tarnished image, continuing political instability and worsening security and law and order situation, this war is causing huge economic costs to the country. We have already paid a heavy price in fighting this proxy war terms of huge military expenses and collateral damage. According to official estimates, the annual cost of this war is more than $12 billion dollars, and approximately $80-90 billion is said to be the cumulative economic loss since we joined this war. Added to this burden should also be the cost of looking after the IDPs in war-affected areas.

Our problems are further aggravated by the complex regional configuration with a growing Indo-US nexus, India's strategic ascendancy in the region and its unprecedented influence in Afghanistan with serious nuisance potential against Pakistan's security interests. We have also been facing America's indifference to our legitimate concerns and sensitivities. We remain victims of US-led military operations and drone attacks in our territory. The US may have its own geopolitical compulsions but Afghanistan and Pakistan have suffered for too long and cannot afford another cataclysm.

The basic objective of our Afghan policy is the preservation of Afghanistan's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and early return of durable peace in the war-ravaged country enabling millions of Afghan refugees in our country to return to their homeland. Unlike other regional players which can only divide and destabilize the war-ravaged Afghanistan, we would like to see a stable, independent and united Afghanistan that is at peace with itself and with all its neighbours. Pakistan has direct stakes in Afghan peace. We have been home for decades to millions of Afghan refugees and have a key role to play in genuine Afghan reconciliation.

It is our view that an Afghan settlement has to be negotiated by the Afghan parties in an atmosphere of mutual trust and credibility. All neighbouring and regional countries must also respect the principle of non-interference in Afghanistan's internal matters. Pakistan is the only country with unmatched credentials to facilitate Afghan peace and reconciliation with no selectivity or exclusivity and help unite the country in its peaceful political transition. It is in Pakistan's interest to have a stable, peaceful Afghanistan and whatever leverage it can have with the Taliban must be directed towards that objective.

No doubt, Pakistan will use whatever influence it can wield in nudging the Afghan parties to agree to dialogue and cannot force the outcome.

Since the 2014 US military drawdown, all eyes have been on Pakistan to bring Taliban to the negotiating table. The Afghan government in particular had been urging Pakistan to use its good offices to persuade the Taliban to engage with the Afghanistan government.

In July 2015, we were not only able to bring the Afghan representatives across the negotiating table but also succeeded in involving the US and China as observers in these talks. Pakistan was at the centre of this unprecedented and constructive move towards Afghan peace. This was the first-ever direct contact between the Afghan government officials and Taliban fighters in 14 years.

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The atmosphere of the talks was good; the prospects for the second round looked promising. But there are forces both in Afghanistan and in the region that remain inimical to any genuine peace in Afghanistan and are sparing no effort to sabotage the dialogue process. But we remain committed to promoting the Afghan peace process. Pakistan has no vested interest in the dialogue except peace, security, stability and prosperity in the region, and will continue its efforts for the revival of this process. In the ultimate analysis, the Afghan peace process has to be Afghan-owned without any outside interference.

Regional rivalries can easily stoke the fires of conflict with regional contenders easily reaching out to rival factions within Afghanistan and fuelling the internal conflict that has now already spread to Pakistan. It is necessary to control and contain these regional rivalries. We would like the US and China to continue to support this peace process. The Afghan government will also have to reset its functional mode and improve governance, limit corruption and augment the rule of law to sustain Afghan public support for any political process. To secure a stable Afghanistan, there is a need for sharp focus on Afghanistan’s economic and social development, including trans-regional development.

The international community should provide for measures supporting a counterterrorism capability during the transition period. Together with China, Pakistan represents a natural partnership from within the region that can bring about the real change in this volatile region. Both can join together in converting Pak-Afghan border into an economic gateway for the region, and as a linkage of peace and cooperation with Central Asian countries. Given their geopolitical location and unparalleled mutuality of interests, both can also contribute in a significant way to Afghanistan’s development process including hydroelectric and infrastructure projects. The proposed ‘economic corridor’ (CPEC) linking Pakistan’s coastal areas with northwest China, on completion, will bring overarching economic and trade connectivity, bilaterally as well as regionally that would be of great benefit to land-locked Afghanistan.

(b) India

Pakistan’s relations with India constitute the centre-point of our foreign policy. Indeed, this has been a troubled relationship, marked by “conflict and confrontation” ever since our independence. In fact, the underlying problems behind this legacy of animosity between India and Pakistan are rooted in their history and the long-standing tradition of mutual distrust and suspicion that they inherited on their independence. The years of independence movement highlighted the irreconcilable nature of the interests and aspirations of the two principal communities of India, the Hindus and the Muslims, which eventually led to the creation of two separate independent countries.

The two countries have fought wars and remained locked in an adversarial relationship with heavy costs in terms of political, economic and social problems and resultant human suffering. With a lingering suspicion that perhaps India had never reconciled to sub-continent's partition and thus to the existence of Pakistan, we have been living since independence in the shadow of India's hostility and its threat to our security and survival. No wonder, this equation, with all its ramifications, has had a fundamental impact on our domestic matters, on our security policy and on our international relations.

In 1971, taking advantage of an entirely a domestic political crisis in our country, India intervened militarily subverting our independence and territorial integrity. It dismembered Pakistan. This tragedy, indeed, was the worst that could happen to any independent country. Any objective assessment of this region's turbulent political history and its current volatile environment will reveal that South Asia's issues of peace and security, in their essence, emanate from India-Pakistan hostility and conflict.

The root cause of these problems is the unresolved Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan which not only invokes intense feelings in their peoples but is also inextricably linked to peace and security of the region. The India-Pakistan clash in 1948, their 1965 war, the Kargil crisis, the volatile Line of Control, the recurring skirmishes at the "Working Boundary", frequent war-like military deployments and resultant tensions, mutual suspicions and apprehensions of threat to each other's sovereignty and security, are all directly related to Kashmir.

The historical experiences, cultural differences, religious fervor, scars of partition, wars and conflicts, Indian desire for regional domination and hegemony, liberation struggle in Kashmir and resurgence of violence and terrorism all come together in a curious convergence in the unresolved dispute of Kashmir. In recent years, Kashmir, no doubt, has taken the global centre stage, if not as an issue of the unimplemented right of self-determination but as a "nuclear flash point" with worrisome implications for global peace and security. On its part, the UN has been unable to resolve this dispute which essentially is a question involving the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people as enshrined in its Charter and pledged to them by both India and Pakistan and the international community through several Security Council resolutions.

The Composite Dialogue

The two countries have a history of unfruitful peace processes. In the '50s, as a follow-up to the UN Security Council resolution, the UN special representative Sir Owen Dixon tried to negotiate a settlement on his "partial plebiscite and partition" plan. In the early '60s, Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks were held without any significant headway.

After the 1965 war and in the post-1971 period, internal problems kept Pakistan focused domestically. The 1972 Simla Agreement created its own dynamics which India has always used to assert its own version of "bilateralism" in its relations with Pakistan. Under the Simla Agreement, the two countries agreed "to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them."

In the '90s, the Kashmir resistance added a new dimension to the struggle there and brought renewed international focus on this issue especially in the context of human rights situation and the enormous cost of the struggle in human life and limb. During 1990 and 1994, seven rounds of foreign secretary level talks were held without any major breakthrough.

in March 1997, the talks were again resumed at foreign secretary level. In all, four rounds were held. The Pakistan side in these negotiations was led by Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad. At the second round of their talks in Islamabad, the foreign secretaries reached an agreement on June 23, 1997, laying down an eight-item agenda and a structured mechanism of working groups to carry forward the process of India-Pakistan dialogue. This agreement is the basis of the present India-Pakistan composite dialogue.

The eight items of the agreed agenda included Jammu and Kashmir as a key issue along with peace and security to be addressed at the level of foreign secretaries, while the remaining six issues (Siachin, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation, and promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields) were to be dealt with at other appropriate levels.

This was the first time in their 50-year history that the two countries had agreed formally on pursuing an integrated and composite dialogue to address their outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. The period from 1997 to 1999 saw significant developments in the India-Pakistan peace process in the form of several summit-level meetings between the two countries on the sidelines of the UN annual sessions and other regional and international conferences.

These high-level contacts between India and Pakistan led to the Lahore Summit in February 1999, at which Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Prime Minister Vajpayee signed the historic Lahore Declaration as a genuine breakthrough in the history of the two countries. In this declaration, the elected leaders of the two countries provided the needed political impetus to the peace process by deciding to "intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir" through an accelerated process of their "composite and integrated dialogue".

They also recognized that "an environment of peace and security" was in their supreme national interest and the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, was essential for this purpose. This indeed was a high watermark in India-Pakistan bilateral relations. But the peace process initiated at Lahore was soon interrupted when the two countries faced the Kargil crisis.

Even after Kargil, the region remained under dark war clouds. While the world was focusing on the post-9/11 campaign against terrorism, India, in what appeared to be a show of brinkmanship, moved all of its armed forces to borders with Pakistan and the Line of Control in Kashmir. Intense diplomatic pressure by the US and other G-8 countries averted what could have been a catastrophic clash between the two nuclear-capable states.

A cease-fire at LoC in November 2003 with several mutual confidence building measures, including Pakistan's assurances of not letting its territory to be used for any terrorist activity or cross-border infiltration as well as constant pressure from influential outside powers led to the resumption of the stalled India-Pakistan dialogue in January 2004 on the basis of what is called the "Islamabad Joint Statement of January 6, 2004."

This agreement was however based on two divergent assumptions for sustained dialogue: for India, it was the prevention of "violence, hostility and terrorism" that was to sustain the "composite dialogue"; and for Pakistan, it was the "positive results and simultaneity of progress" on all issues. Since then, the peace process has gone through usual ups and downs. Some confidence building measures, including the Kashmir bus service and commercial exchanges were taken but their implementation remained half-hearted. Visa policies are still stringent.

In recent years, the peace process appears to be getting bogged down because both sides were spinning different interpretations on the "composite" theme. Pakistan wants "progress on Kashmir" before it will open up the track on trade and transit routes. India wants to go slow on Kashmir and push trade and transit instead. Beyond atmospherics, one has yet to see any movement from 'conflict management" to "conflict-resolution."

During the last couple of years of his rule, Gen. Musharraf made unprecedented but unreciprocated gestures of flexibility. He proposed a four-point "out-of-box" solution of the Kashmir issue which involved dividing Kashmir in ethnic regions, their demilitarization, self-rule and a joint mechanism. But none of his gestures elicited, at least publicly, any matching response from India.

Unfortunately, the peace process was stalled again when after the November 26, 2008 terrorist attacks, India suspended the "composite dialogue" process. Both countries were back to their traditional confrontational mode. But with US efforts, at a meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2009, an agreement was reached for resumption of the dialogue.

Later, India changed its mind, and backed out once again from a solemn commitment. The dialogue remains suspended because it suits India to keep Pakistan under pressure while it is facing serious challenges on its western frontier as a partner in the USA war on terror. Despite all the attempted illusions of forward movement, there are no signs of any progress or serious focus on the major issues of Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek and Wullar Barrage.

Notwithstanding the persistence of contradictory signals from the two sides and India's opportunities attitude, the positive aspect of the present situation is that dialogue and diplomatic engagement today are an accepted global norm, and should become a culture of candid consultations to eliminate any chances of military confrontation between the two nuclear-capable neighbours.

Depending on progress on Kashmir and in mutual confidence building through nuclear and conventional restraint, the two countries in due course could also explore a long-term mutually agreed mechanism for conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peaceful settlement of disputes. This would be the sum total of visionary statesmanship that we need in our region to enable our two peoples to live together in peace and harmony.

Both countries must recognise that in today's world, there will be no military solution to their problems. They must reduce mutual tensions and encourage forums in media and civil society to reinforce the lobbies in both countries for peace and stability. Kashmir remains the overarching factor casting shadow on the prospects of peace in the region. A solution of the Kashmir dispute will have to be pursued in a manner that is acceptable to both India and Pakistan and to the people of Kashmir.

This requires continuation of the "composite dialogue" to build up trust and confidence and develop mutually beneficial cooperation which would facilitate progress towards the resolution of disputes.

They must work together on developing nuclear risk reduction measures (RRMs) and seriously consider adhering to a joint strategic restraint regime (SSR) as proposed by Pakistan involving three interlocking elements, namely conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint and conventional balance.

(c) Iran

Because of geostrategic situation and deep historical, cultural and religious links, Iran is a key element in our foreign policy considerations. On its part, Iran also seeks friendly relations with Pakistan on the same grounds. This sense of mutual need, strengthened by manifold commonalities, lays down the foundations of a close, mutually beneficial relationship between the two neighbours, both of great regional and global weight. Pakistan is a nuclear state whereas Iran too has been pursuing a nuclear programme for decades.

Iran is indisputably the most powerful and strategically important country in the region comprising the Persian Gulf, central and southwest Asia. With a population of over nearly 75 million and nearly a $200 billion GDP, Iran lying at the nexus of the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and South Asia has one of the most strategic locations in the world. It holds 10% of the world's proven oil reserves. It is OPEC's second largest exporter and the world's fourth biggest oil producer. It also has the world's second largest reserves of natural gas.

Pakistan and Iran have a geopolitical complementarity providing to each other the much needed strategic depth in times of crisis or aggression. They share deep affinities of history, religion and culture providing a solid basis and rationale for close and cooperative relations between the two countries. Their geography gives them special geopolitical and strategic importance that has often also put them at odds not only with each other but also with major outside powers. No wonder, both Iran and Pakistan have been paying an inescapable price for their geography during and after the Cold War era.

Officially, though, Pakistan and Iran have good relations, but in practice, it has been an uneasy relationship. The historical and multiple linkages between Pakistan and Iran ranging from the strategic to the cultural commonalities and their long common border should have led to a more vibrant and more durable relationship, wide in scope and substantive in nature. This regrettably is not the case.

The reasons for this gap between the potential and the existing reality lie in multiple restraints inherent in their incompatible geo-strategic interests and priorities. Iran had serious problems with Pakistan's Taliban policy in the '90s which produced an extremely negative impact on their bilateral relations. Iran has also been unhappy with Pakistan's recent Afghan strategy which it saw a collusive effort with CIA and Saudi Arabia.

Iran, like Pakistan, has direct stakes in Afghanistan's security, and does not see the current US-led military operation as a solution to the Afghan problem. Like us, Iran also wants to see a stable and independent Afghanistan, with a Tehran-friendly government in Kabul, reflecting the ethnic diversity of the country. But both are also driven by their narrow strategic interests that have occasionally put them in adversarial modes leaving others to exploit the situation.

Interestingly, despite its problems with the US, Iran has at times found itself sitting with the US on the same side of the fence. In the '90s, when Taliban were in control of Afghanistan, Iran and the USA were seen sharing an identical anti-Taliban approach in the 6+2 mechanism at the United Nations. If history is any lesson to them, both Iran and Pakistan, despite divergences of systems and policies, should have been building complementarities for mutual benefit. Otherwise, outside powers will continue to exploit the situation. In fact, the game is already going on. Foreign meddling in the region has been a serious negative factor in the otherwise cordial and cooperative Iran-Pakistan equation.

A major limitation was posed by the radical transformation of the regional and global landscape on account of internal and external developments, especially the emergence of Afghan civil war and a sectarian proxy war in Pakistan as serious irritants in Pak-Iran relationship. It was this divergence in the foreign policy direction of the two neighbours, both in the region and globally, that has over the years cast shadows on Pakistan-Iran relations.

However, despite ups and downs and even simmering suspicions, this relationship has remained intact, and keeps evolving at its own pace. This is reflected in several joint cooperative frameworks including a ministerial commission on security, a joint border commission, a joint ministerial commission for promotion of defence production, a ministerial joint economic commission, a preferential trade agreement, a joint stock company, a Pakistan-Iran Cultural Agreement, and an agreement on Iranian gas pipeline to Pakistan.

Parallel to these bilateral arrangements, a raft of multilateral agreements also exists within the framework of the OIC, D8 and ECO, with some salutary effect on this bilateral relationship. All these multifaceted agreements notwithstanding, one must admit there is no substance in Pak-Iran ties. Both countries need to build up on the rich cultural affinities between their peoples. The ECO possesses great potential, but suffers from under-utilization. All this and much more constitute a wide canvas on which both countries can work profitably.

But first and foremost they both need to put their own respective houses in order. Both have remained afflicted with serious internal problems. Iran has its problems, partly inherent in its systemic peculiarities, and partly because of externally engineered pressures. On our part, our problems are complicated not only by our governance failures and leadership miscarriages but also by the current regional configuration with Americans sitting in Afghanistan, the growing ominous Indo-US nexus and India's unprecedented influence in Afghanistan with serious nuisance potential against Pakistan.

India has traditionally had good multidimensional relations with Iran both during and after the Shah era. It was initially for India that Iran had planned its gas pipeline, a project which was to pass through Pakistan, and thus became important to us as well. Now called the **Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline**, also called the **"Peace Pipeline,"** has special significance for both economic and political reasons. Not only was this project to benefit India and Pakistan, both energy deficient countries, but it also could have contributed to greater regional stability.

Were this pipeline to be constructed, Pakistan's role between Iran and India would have been very similar to that of Ukraine between Russia and the European Union. But India abandoned the project in return for a nuclear deal with the US. The United States has been opposed to this project citing various self-serving concerns, especially its security concerns over Iranian nuclear ambitions. Washington is also fearful that a situation might emerge where these countries would directly or indirectly confront the United States and other Western countries for the control of energy bases.

In any case, Pakistan's legitimate energy needs fully warrant implementation of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project which must be pursued by our government with sincerity of purpose, not politically-motivated designs. Since Iran has already laid its portion of the pipeline, we only need to construct our own side of the pipeline to receive the Iranian gas. Any transaction that does not involve investment in Iran is not covered by any US or UN sanctions.

We should also not overly be concerned with Iran-India relations. For Iran, India is important as a major global player and a large market for its oil and gas, and we should not expect it to sacrifice for our sake its vital economic and political interests. We should be working to strengthen our own bilateral relations with Iran through mutually beneficial cooperation and good-neighbourly geopolitical complementarities. For Iran, India cannot substitute Pakistan, politically, geographically, strategically, culturally and even ideologically. We have our own importance for Iran just as Iran has its own importance for Pakistan.

Meanwhile, with its recent nuclear deal with the US and other major Western powers, Iran is now all set to return to the regional and global mainstream. If the deal works, Tehran's economy will see a massive boost in terms of trade and new investments which will have a sweeping impact on the people of Iran and potentially on the geopolitics of the entire Middle East. The whole region might see new realignments. A nuclear-disciplined Iran could perhaps be America's potential regional partner in its current strategies in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and South Asia including Afghanistan. For Pakistan, there is an opportunity as well as a big challenge in reviving its close and cooperative relationship with Iran as a factor of peace and stability in their troubled region.

(d) China

Friendship with China constitutes the cornerstone of our foreign policy. China has been Pakistan's steadfast friend and a partner not only in its legitimate security needs and economic development but also in contributing to regional peace and stability. This friendship embedded in the hearts and minds of their peoples spans almost the entire period of their independent statehood. They share civilizational affinities and common values binding the two countries in a close and cooperative relationship which is rightly described as an all-weather friendship.

Pakistan's need for maximum geopolitical balance and diversification in its external relations has also led to close relations with China — a valuable geopolitical connection. Pakistan was among the first countries to recognize the new government in China soon after its proclamation on October 1, 1949 as People's Republic of China, the third non-communist state and the first Muslim country to do so. In 1950, it opened its diplomatic mission in Beijing. Since then, close and cooperative relationship with China constitutes the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy.

Following the Sino-Indian hostilities of 1962, both countries have placed special importance on the maintenance of a mutually supportive relationship and reached agreement on the border between them. The world famous road named Karakorum Highway was built linking China's Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region with the Northern Areas of Pakistan. China supported Pakistan diplomatically in both its 1965 and 1971 wars with India and provided Pakistan with valuable economic and military assistance.

In fact, in 1971, Pakistan made a seminal contribution to the US-China rapprochement by facilitating the visit of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Beijing and subsequently making possible the 1972 President Nixon visit to China. China and Pakistan have pursued their friendship with the objective of mutual benefit and never at the cost of their relations with any other country or countries. They are against hegemony or exploitation, and are committed to regional peace and security. In their external relations, China and Pakistan are guided by the eternal principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation. Both share common perceptions on major regional and global issues.

Based on common interests, this relationship has withstood all tests of time and remains immune to any adverse impact of readjustments and realignments necessitated by changing regional and global geostrategic dynamics. They do not subscribe to the concepts of unilateralism or pre-emption, and believe in strengthening the UN system to address and resolve all regional and global issues. They are against hegemony or exploitation, and are committed to regional peace and security. Both countries have supported each other in their just causes, which include for Pakistan a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue and preservation of its independence and territorial integrity, and for China the issues of Taiwan, human rights, Tibet and Xinjiang.

At the United Nations, we have been working together on many issues of common interest, including the question of UN reform. We also have common position on the question of enlargement of the UN Security Council. No doubt, significant global changes in the direction of international politics have proved the permanence of Sino-Pak friendship.

Another special feature of Pakistan-China friendship is that it is not based on transient interests or expediencies, and is above personalities or any changes in domestic or international situation. At their bilateral level, mutual support and cooperation, common perceptions and convergence of strategic interests provide a special depth to their relationship.

The unmatched special feature of this relationship is the mutual trust and confidence based on convergence of strategic interests that the two countries have built over the decades as an asset of their friendship. It is this aspect that spontaneously evokes mutual goodwill and support between their peoples. What the people of Pakistan admire most about this relationship is that unlike the conditionality-based aid programmes from other countries, everything that China has done or is doing in this country is people specific and meant only for their benefit. Economic cooperation is indeed the bedrock of this multidimensional relationship.

•From Karakoram Highway reviving and revitalizing the old silk route to the newly completed Gwadar port a whole string of industrial plants, factories, electrical and mechanical complexes, and power projects stand testimony to this cooperation. A strong strategic dimension of their partnership not only serves their mutual interest but also ensures stability and security of our region. Specific joint production projects such as the JF-17 fighter aircraft, K-8 trainer aircraft, Al-Khalid and Zarrar tanks are some of the tangible outputs of this cooperative relationship which also includes increasing cooperation in the field of defence-related research and development.

Another significant area of ongoing cooperation between Pakistan and China has been the harnessing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under international safeguards for the production of electricity. The Chinese help has always been selflessly unconditioned involving sacrifices in terms of many Chinese lives. Even today, thousands of Chinese engineers and workers are engaged under most difficult conditions in building roads, bridges, tunnels, dams, schools, universities and hospitals for the people of Pakistan. A tradition of regular high-level exchanges and governmental contacts helps them keep their relationship strong and enduring with ever-growing cooperation in all areas of mutual interest.

Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Pakistan in 2006 marking the occasion of the 55th anniversary of our relations. His visit gave a new turn to the bilateral relations with special focus on expanded economic cooperation. Nearly thirty groundbreaking agreements and MoUs were signed on that occasion. In December 2010, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and in May 2013, the current Prime Minister Li Keqiang also visited our country. A large number of agreements and MoUs were signed during their visits further reinforcing and expanding the multi-dimensional cooperation between the two countries.

In July 2013, Pakistan's newly-elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also visited China where he firmed up commitments with the Chinese leadership on some of the mega projects linked to Gwadar Port besides having groundbreaking discussions on their follow-up with major Chinese construction companies as well as investment and financial institutions. At least eight agreements were signed in Beijing, including the one on the 'economic corridor' linking Pakistan's coastal areas with northwest China which will not only boost their transport connectivity but also bolster bilateral and regional trade. It is in fact an overarching long-term plan covering connectivity, construction, economic and technical cooperation, and people-to-people and cultural exchanges.

During his landmark visit to Pakistan in April 2015, the first by a Chinese head of state in nine years, President Xi Jinping signed more than 50 agreements involving trade and investment deals worth $28 billion as part of the proposed $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, which envisions Chinese investment funding road, rail, electricity and other projects that would create a trade route from the western Chinese city of Kashghar to the southern Pakistani port of Gwadar. The top priority will be given to energy-related projects which will be completed by 2018.

This indeed is a huge agenda with mutual interests rooted in their common vision for a better future for their own peoples and for peace and prosperity of the region itself. For China, it is the 'national rejuvenation' through accelerated development of its backward western regions, whereas for Pakistan, it is the imperative of converting its geopolitical location into an asset rather than a liability. The real challenge for both now remains how vigorously and faithfully they can translate this common vision into reality. On their part, the Chinese have always delivered on their commitment. The question is are we ready to deliver on our part? Our rulers must ensure timely implementation of the CPEC projects.

Also, China does affirm its support for Pakistan's efforts in safeguarding its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and promoting peace and stability in South Asia but this does not mean that we absolve ourselves of our own responsibilities to ensuring our country's sovereign independence and our people's socio-economic well-being.

III. PAKISTAN AND MAJOR POWERS

(a) The United States

The United States and Pakistan established diplomatic relations in 1947. From the very beginning after its independence, Pakistan had a direction clearly charted for its future relationship with the US by the value system that it cherished, and indeed by Quaid-e-Azam himself. Speaking to the first US ambassador to Pakistan on February 22, 1948, Quaid-e-Azam described Pakistan and the US as equal partners in defence of democracy and freedom.

Emerging from the trauma of subcontinental turmoil, the young state of Pakistan, imbued with Islamic values and a moderate and progressive outlook, gravitated naturally to the pole that stood for freedom and democracy in that intensely bi-polar world. In making that deliberate choice, Pakistan was guided not only by the Quaid's vision but also by its over-riding security and economic interests. On its part, the US looked at Pakistan and its special geo-political importance as a strategic asset in its "containment" policy against Soviet expansionism.

It has been a curious relationship which never had any conflict of interest and yet remained marked by interruptions in its intensity as well as integrity. The "hinge" was purely one of mutual expediency as both sides were always aiming at different goals and objectives to be derived from their relationship. No wonder, for much of its history, this relationship has lacked continuity, a larger conceptual framework, and a shared vision beyond the "narrowly based and vaguely defined" priorities that each side pursued for its own reasons.

For Pakistan, the issues of security and survival in a turbulent and hostile regional environment and its problems with India were the overriding policy goals in its relations with Washington. The US policy interests in Pakistan, on the other hand, traditionally encompassed a wide range of regional and global issues, especially nuclear and missile proliferation, India-Pakistan hostility, drugs trafficking, democracy, human rights, and economic reform.

This unusual relationship has, no doubt, seen ups and downs with rotating phases of "engagement and estrangement" depending on the nature of regional and global dynamics. This tradition has generated its own anti-Americanism, which is triggered by a perception that the United States has not been a reliable ally and has not helped Pakistan in its problems with India. The first of the three major US "engagements" with Pakistan occurred during the height of the Cold War, from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s; the second was during the Afghan *jihad* in the 1980s, again lasting about a decade; and the third engagement dates to September 11, 2001, and relates to the ongoing war on terrorism.

And every US "engagement" with Pakistan was issuespecific and not based on shared perspectives. The spells of close ties between the two countries have been, and may continue to be, single-issue engagements of limited or uncertain duration. (Cold war, Afghanistan and now terrorism) Interestingly, during each engagement or "honeymoon" period, we in Pakistan had either a military or military-controlled government, whereas in Washington, the policy direction on Pakistan was in the hands of a Republican White House with Pentagon and the CIA playing a central role. Most of the "estrangement" phases of the US-Pakistan relationship happened when they had a Democrat Administration and we had a civilian elected government.

Unpredictability has been another consistent feature of this relationship. The US would lose interest in remaining engaged in any cooperation once it achieved its objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan. "Pakistan was either consigned to benign neglect or hit with a succession of punitive sanctions that left in their trail resentment and a sense of betrayal." History seems to be repeating itself again. As Pakistan was faithfully engaged in fulfilling its post-9/11 obligations, the US entered into a long-term defence pact with India in 2005 as part of its evolving multidimensional "strategic partnership" which it values for various reasons, including India's phenomenal market size and its great unrivalled potential as a "counterweight" against China.

This was an ominous development which would not only destabilize the critical balance of power in the region but also reinforces the prevalent public perception in Pakistan of traditional US insensitivity towards Pakistan's genuine security concerns. The deepening Indo-US strategic partnership with all its ramifications has raised serious fears in Pakistan about its impact on the overall regional security environment, including prospects of durable peace in South Asia.

What the US never understood was that its flawed policies on Pakistan have been leading to its total alienation from the people of this country just as it alienated itself from the people of Iran in the late '70s. A people's trust once lost can never be regained. One historic lesson that the US must not have "unlearnt" is that its excessive reliance on undemocratic regimes and authoritarian dictators will not serve its long-term interests nor promote regional and global stability.

What both sides now need is to set a better bilateral perspective for this relationship to make it a mutually beneficial, normal and functional relationship with a policy focus on the people of Pakistan rather than on one man. US-Pakistan relations will stand or fall depending on whether they benefit the people of Pakistan or any particular regime or ruler.

It is time for both sides now to set a better bilateral perspective for this relationship on the basis of mutuality and sovereign equality. The objective must be not to weaken this important equation but to strengthen it by infusing in it greater political, economic and strategic content. It must no longer remain a "transactional" relationship. The US engagement with Pakistan must go beyond the war on terror. We have many assets other than terrorism. Extremism has never been our creed. If anything, we are victims of terrorism. Our sacrifices are unparalleled.

We are today the only country in the world waging a full-scale war on its own soil and rightly or wrongly against its own people. Pakistan has been the main target in an al-Qaeda-led war with almost 50,000 Pakistani civilians and security personnel having lost their lives in terrorist attacks in the last few years. We have staked everything in this war and are constantly paying a heavy price in terms of violence, massive displacement, trade and production slowdown, export stagnation, investor hesitation and a worsening law and order situation.

And yet, one is bewildered at Pakistan's demonization by its friends and allies. We are accused of not doing enough. In recent years, we are also being targeted with military incursions and drone attacks in our tribal areas. This is a clear breach of UN Charter, and is also enraging the people of Pakistan, fuelling anti-American sentiment among them.

It is time to correct this approach. It is important that Pakistan, as a partner and an ally, is treated with dignity and sovereign equality. It is time both sides made an earnest effort in remaking of their relationship as a normal mutually beneficial functional relationship with a policy focus on the people of Pakistan rather than on one issue or one problem.

(b) The Russian Federation (Former Soviet Union)

There is a historical perspective to Pakistan's relations with today's Russia which till its dissolution in December 1991 was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) known more familiarly as Soviet Union. Diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union were established on May 1, 1948. In June 1949, our acceptance of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's invitation to our prime minister to visit Moscow was quickly matched with a similar invitation for Liaquat Ali Khan to visit Washington. We immediately got sucked into the Cold War struggle, and thanks to the old imperial connections at the civil-military official level, Liaquat Ali Khan set aside the invitation to visit Moscow and chose instead to go to Washington in May 1950. What followed that fateful decision is history.[1]

The real reason why the US was chosen over Soviet Union later became apparent in a background paper written by the Study Group of Pakistan Institute of International Affairs in 1956: "There are important divergences of outlook between Pakistan, with its Islamic background, and the Soviet Union with its background of Marxism which is atheistic ... Pakistan had noticed the subservience which was forced upon the allies of the Soviet Union ... Furthermore, there was the question whether Russia could supply the aid, both material and technical, which Pakistan so urgently needed."[2]

The main reason, however, for Pakistan to have preferred friendship with the US and joining the American camp during the Cold War was its need for economic and technical assistance.

In the 1950s, the Soviet-Pak relations did witness high-level official contacts between the two countries. In March 1956, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Anastas I. Mikoyan visited Pakistan on the occasion of Pakistan's proclamation as a republic. From the Pakistani side, a number of ministerial visits to the Soviet Union took place during those years. Among them was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who visited Moscow for the first time in 1960 in his capacity as the minister of Fuel Power and Natural Resources.

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[1] *The State of Martial Rule*, Ayesha Jalal, 1999, p.110

[2] *Recap of Pak-Soviet Relations*, Ardeshir Cowasjee, *Dawn*, March 12, 2011.

The 1960s witnessed ups and downs in our relations with the Soviet Union. The famous U-2 incident occurred during the peak of the Cold War on May 1, 1960, during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower and during the leadership of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

The US U-2 spy plane that had taken off from the Badaber air base in Peshawar was shot down over Soviet airspace. The United States government at first denied the plane's mission, but then was forced to admit its role as a covert surveillance aircraft when the Soviet government produced its remains and the surviving pilot, Francis Gary Powers.

Coming just over two weeks before the scheduled opening of an East–West summit in Paris, the incident seriously embarrassed the United States bringing marked deterioration in its relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, this incident set in motion a pattern of mistrust that culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis, a time when US-USSR relations reached an all time low. No one can predict if the Cold War might have ended sooner had the U-2 incident not occurred.

The U-2 incident was no doubt also a setback in Soviet-Pakistan relations. It severely compromised Pakistan security and worsened relations between the two countries. Soviet Premier Khrushchev even sent a threatening message to Pakistani warning that Badaber was now a targeted city in case of a hot war between the US and the USSR. In the following years, the relations between the two countries however took an upward turn with President Ayub Khan visiting Moscow twice, in 1965 and 1967 and then President Yahya Khan also visiting Moscow in 1970. Earlier in 1968 and 1969, Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin visited Islamabad. A number of important agreements were signed during those visits paving the way for progressive development of trade and economic ties, including an agreement on the construction of a Steel Mills (1971).

The USSR also played a pivotal role in the settlement of the 1965 armed conflict between Pakistan and India. Soviet good offices led to the signing of the famous Tashkent Declaration in January 1966 at a tripartite Summit in Tashkent attended by Premier Kosygin, President Ayub Khan and India's Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. In 1971, however, Soviet support to India in its aggression against Pakistan seriously affected the relations between the two countries.

Z. A. Bhutto's two visits to Moscow, the first as president in 1972 and then as prime minister in 1974 gave a new momentum to this relationship. The Soviet-Pakistani trade almost tripled in 1970-1979. Soviet Union built not only the Pakistan Steel Mills but also Guddu Thermal Power plant, both put into operation in early 1980s. After a decade of another low because of the Afghan war, the Soviet-

Pakistan relations were revived with Pakistan being the first state to recognize Russia in 1991 as a legal successor of the USSR.

In April, 1999, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Moscow which was the first visit to Russia by a Pakistani Head of Government after 25 years and the first ever between Pakistan and the Russian Federation. During the visit many important bilateral issues, as well as a whole range of regional and global issues of common concern, were discussed.

Besides signing a number of agreements on trade and economic cooperation, a Joint Inter-governmental Ministerial Commission was established to streamline bilateral cooperation on economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation.

President Musharraf's visit to Moscow in 2003 further strengthened the relations. Both countries now have a common position on many regional and global issues. Pakistan now attaches great importance to its relations with Russia, which it feels has an important role to play in peace and stability in Asia and particularly in South Asia. It is desirous of expanding mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia in all spheres, which can contribute to the peace and stability of region.

Russia shares this desire and also recognizes the importance of Pakistan in peace and stability of South Asia and South Central Asia. Both countries, with convergence of interests in maintaining stability in the region, believe that regional conflicts pose a serious threat to the security of the entire region, and need early settlement. Based on their keenness for close and cooperative relations, the two countries are moving towards a more fruitful relationship. Moscow is now also selling useful military hardware to Pakistan, including helicopters and other equipment.

Pakistan welcomes the fact that Russia is in the process of evolving a more even-handed approach towards the major countries in South Asia and believes that Russia could act as a mediator for the establishment of a congenial atmosphere in South Asia conducive to the economic development of the region. Bilateral trade has increased to more than $650 million. In recent years, a new six-member organization called Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has emerged with China and Russia playing the lead role. Four of its members, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are also members of ECO.

Likewise, two of ECO's founding members Iran and Pakistan are also associated with SCO. While Pakistan is now a full member of SCO, Iran has an observer status. There is a tremendous overlap between the two organizations in terms of their natural and human resources. These developments provide further common ground for mutually beneficial cooperation between Pakistan and Russia. Moving beyond unpalatable history, this hitherto neglected relationship can be a major factor of regional peace and stability.

There has recently been a remarkable turnaround in our relations with Russia. Moscow not only openly endorsed Pakistan's full membership of SCO but also has offered help to modernize the Karachi Steel Mills that it had established in the 1970s. It has also pledged large investment to bring electricity from Tajikistan to Pakistan. Since the transmission lines are to pass through the non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, the ethnic groups there will now have a stake in this relationship. It is a major initiative toward Tajikistan as well, and falls under the orbit of Putin's "Eurasia Union" project.

(c) The United Kingdom

Pakistan's relations with UK have traditionally been warm and close. Historically, this is the oldest relationship that Pakistan has with any country in the world. Almost 400 years of chequered history depict its unique character. When the British came to India as traders in the sixteenth century, India was already at the peak of its civilizational ascendency, and when they left in 1947, the two successor states began their independent statehood with almost a century of selective political experience that the British had tried to infuse in Indian body politic as part of their governance strategy in dealing with their largest colonial estate.

The failure of the War of Independence had disastrous political, economic and social consequences for the Muslims as the British placed all responsibility for this event on them. They attributed the 1857 uprising to the Muslims alone who were considered the "main culprits" and thus bore the brunt of British wrath. In order to prevent recurrence of any uprising, the British for nearly a century deliberately followed a repressive policy against the Muslims who were also kept out of responsible government jobs.

The newly introduced English system of education had many drawbacks for the Muslims, mainly because it made no provisions for religious education. As a result, they stayed away from it. Thus, within a few years of loss of political power, the Muslims lost all avenues of employment, were dispossessed of their estates and deprived of the benefits of education. A highly cultured community turned into a backward and poor people. In their place, British-educated Hindus began to occupy positions in governments offices formerly held by the Muslims.

As the nineteenth century proceeded to its close, political developments gathered pace, due largely to the growing sense of impatience with foreign rule and Hindu-Muslim differences. The Hindu leaders perceived the advantages of close cooperation with the ruling power and remained in touch with British public opinion through friendly Britons who had retired from public services in India. The Indian National Congress, created in 1885 with overwhelming Hindu membership by a retired British civil servant A. O. Hume, flourished also with British material and political support.

In fact, the Hindu community as a whole derived the maximum advantages from the change of masters, and made the largest gains—political, educational and economic—under British suzerainty. On its part, the Muslim community victimized for their 'share' in the 1857 War of Independence and subjected to discriminatory negligence by the British rulers, was beginning to realise that they were doomed if they did not organise themselves politically. The Hindu-dominated Congress politics evoked no enthusiasm among them.

In that atmosphere of despair, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) launched his movement known as Aligarh Movement to revive the spirit of progress within the Muslim community of India. No doubt, on their emergence as two independent states on the map of the world as a result of a democratic political process, both India and Pakistan inherited a parliamentary tradition and began their independent statehood with a democratic path clearly charted out for them.

To start with, however, there was no level-playing field for the state of Pakistan which not only had a colonial legacy of its own to reckon with but also had to build an entire government from the scratch in 1947 under a state of emergency whereas India was born with an established political tradition and a fully intact bureaucratic apparatus in Delhi. Besides the difficulties of any newly-independent state, Pakistan was also confronted with a legacy of post-independence problems threatening its unity and very survival in the aftermath of its independence.

The biggest setback that Pakistan suffered at that critical stage was that in an almost frantic, cruel rush, the Boundary Commission headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe divided districts, villages, farmlands, water and property. Not only that, last minute dubious changes were made in the agreed demarcation lines depriving Pakistan of Muslim majority districts of Ferozepur and Gurdaspur, both of vital strategic importance to Pakistan's future security and well-being. Likewise, in Bengal, contrary to the majority population rule, Calcutta was allocated to India.

Incontrovertible evidence is available that Mountbatten was very keen to see that the whole Gurdaspur district, which had a Muslim majority, should not be assigned to Pakistan. Mountbatten's strategy was that Punjab may be divided in such a manner that the state of Jammu and Kashmir could join either India or Pakistan. The genesis and history of the Kashmir dispute will remain incomplete unless the *mala fide* role played by Sir Cyril Radcliff, apparently at Mountbatten's behest, is recalled.

At the time of its creation, Pakistan had already been squeezed as much as possible as a result of an unholy collusion between Mountbatten and the Indian Congress leaders. However, the Radcliff award was the meanest cut. This perfidious award paved the way for India's military intervention in Kashmir. Thanks to the last minute British dishonesty, the inhabitants of Kashmir, a valley of indescribable beauty, are unfortunately still locked in a life and death struggle for their survival and their inalienable right to self-determination. They remain under India's military occupation since 1947, suffering atrocities and waiting for liberation from terror and injustice.

In today's context, however, Pakistan's relationship with United Kingdom in its multiple dimensions is considered a major constant of its foreign policy and socio-economic pursuits. We are said to be friends and partners in good causes. We have been cooperating in many areas. We also appreciate UK's special interest in promoting democracy in our country, and its special attention to our development needs. These rightfully include education, poverty eradication, health, social uplift, human resource development, democracy and human rights.

These relations are further reinforced by the presence of a large community of Pakistan origin in UK as British citizens. Education remains the centerpiece of British engagement in Pakistan which hopefully will lay the foundations for a better future for our people.

An Enhanced Strategic Dialogue instituted in recent years provides a structured forum to the two countries for further enhancing the level and scope of their bilateral cooperation, especially in promoting trade and human resource development. Britain is Pakistan's largest trading partner within the European Union, and third largest trading partner in the world. The bilateral trade volume is expected to increase to £3 billion by 2015. Besides being a major source of foreign investment and development cooperation, Britain has also shown interest in helping Pakistan in energy sector.

Both countries have a tradition of frequent exchange of high-level visits that serve to promote not only bilateral cooperation but also greater understanding of each other's viewpoint on major regional and global issues, including Afghanistan.

(d) France

Pakistan and France established diplomatic relations on, July 31, 1950 and soon thereafter opened their embassies in each other's capital. Since then, the two countries have maintained a multidimensional close and cooperative relationship covering economic, political, cultural and military cooperation. A tradition of high-level visits has kept this relationship strong and enduring. There have been ups and downs too as is normal in any relationship. In the mid-1970s, after Pakistan had been dismembered by India through a military aggression in 1971, France, like other Western countries, failed to appreciate our apprehensions from India's unchecked nuclear ambitions. Under pressure from the US, France cancelled an agreed deal for supply of a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan.

During the Cold war, France considered Pakistan as "state deserving attention", and was a major foreign supplier of Pakistan's defence needs, particularly for Pakistan Air Force and Navy. In 1967, France sold first batch of its Mirage fighters as well as the submarine technology to Pakistan. The PAF bought second-hand batch of Mirage fighters in 1990; followed by a contract signing in 1996 for the acquisition of 40 reconnaissance aircraft. The PAF has been the largest customer of France's aerospace industry with numbers of fighter and civilian aircraft having being sold to Pakistan since 1967 till 2000s. The Navy has also an established defence connection with France, the best known purchasing of Daphné class submarine and the submarine technology transfer of the Agosta class which was signed in 1994.

No doubt, French military cooperation has significantly contributed to Pakistan's defence capability and built close links between the navies and air forces of the two countries. In recent years, their armies, and law and order forces have also been cooperating together against terrorism through training programmes for Pakistan's military and security personnel and joint exercises.

France as a member of Aid to Pakistan Consortium has long been extending financial assistance to Pakistan. Since 1961, Pakistan has been a beneficiary of French Development Assistance directed towards 'emerging markets', focused on its capacity building and improved management of global public goods and infrastructure. The loans under this programme have financed water, sanitation and solid waste management projects in Pakistan. The French Development Agency (AFD) is also helping Pakistan solve its energy crisis, by providing financing to hydropower and energy efficiency projects, especially in its northern areas, Malakand division, Gilgit Baltistan, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

The first trade agreement between the two countries was signed in 1966, and today the bilateral trade has crossed US$ 400 million. Though the trade between the two countries has been generally increasing, its full potential has yet to be harnessed. The balance remains in Pakistan's favour and given more market access, there are promising opportunities not only for more trade but also for more partnerships on joint-venture cooperation basis. Already, large French companies, including some world leaders in their field, have invested in Pakistan. These include Total, Alcatel, Sanofi-Aventis, Areva, Lafarge, Hyperstar, Sofitel, and L'Oreal.

(e) Germany

Germany and Pakistan have a tradition of amicable and cooperative relations, formally established in 1950 and remaining steady through all these years, based on mutual cooperation in social, education, and economic fields. Since '60s, West Germany has been helping Pakistan in its industrialization growth as "an example of successful development policy in a developing country." In 1961, President Ayub Khan's state visit to West Germany marked the beginning of close and cooperative relations between the two countries. Today, Pakistan is one of Germany's most important partners in South Asia.

The economic and commercial cooperation between Pakistan and Germany also goes back to 1961, with trade investment exceeding 2.3 billion euros. Germany is now Pakistan's fourth largest trading partner. In recent years, the Pakistan-German trade, and scientific and technological cooperation has been developing significantly with Germany investing in and trading with Pakistan.

Germany is actively involved in Pakistan's socio-economic development and is an active member of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan Forum. Both countries have also started a regular Strategic Dialogue on matters of mutual interest including the situation in Afghanistan. Germany appreciates Pakistan's sacrifices in counter-terrorism and the constructive role it has been playing in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan. There is convergence of views on the need to accelerate the peace process in Afghanistan.

(f) Japan

Pakistan and Japan have steadily evolved close and cooperative bilateral relations since 1952, when the two Asian countries established diplomatic relations. Despite having been through various phases and having witnessed some vicissitudes, Pakistan-Japan relations have kept growing to the mutual benefit of the two countries. During the Korean War in the early 1950s as well as during the early years of Cold War, Pakistan and Japan found themselves on the same side.

In the early years, the relationship was essentially that of two developing countries. Pakistan, being the main source of raw cotton for Japan's textile industry, was one of its major trading partners. Japanese spindles, on the other hand, helped build Pakistan's textile industry. In the 1960s, Japan, however, re-emerged as a modern industrialized nation and started extending yen loan assistance to Pakistan. The Japanese assistance was doubled to Pakistan following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Japan, since then, has been Pakistan's major source of economic assistance, a leading trading partner and an important source of foreign investment. Today, Japan is one of our largest trading and investment partners.

Nevertheless Japan imposed economic sanctions against Pakistan following our nuclear tests in 1998. But it now recognizes Pakistan's crucial role in the global anti-terrorism campaign and expressed its complete understanding of the difficult economic and domestic situation that confronted Pakistan in the aftermath of September 11 events. It lifted these sanctions in October 2001. It rescheduled Pakistan's loans of yen 64.7 billion (around $ 550 million), under the Paris Club Agreement. It contributed funds to IMF's PRGF Trust Loan Account to help IMF accommodate Pakistan's request for an increased PRGF package. Japan continues to be our major economic and trading partner.

The Pakistan resident office of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was established in April 1983, and of Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), the former body of what is now Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)) in October 1989 . Since then Japan has consistently played an important role in Pakistan's social and economic development as a major trade and investor as well as a major donor, in fact the top donor since 1990. Pakistan ranks the seventh position among all the recipients of Japan's ODA in terms of total volume of ODA.

The major projects, which have been funded by the Government of Japan, include the Indus Highway Project, a number of power projects in Pakistan, Rural Roads Construction Project and the Children Hospital, PIMS Islamabad Project, Kohat Tunnel Project, Ghazi Brotha Dam Project.

IV. PAKISTAN AND MAJOR REGIONS

(a) The European Union (EU)

Pakistan enjoys close and cordial relations with the countries of Europe in diverse fields. Meaningful trade relations have been established with a number of European countries. Substantial foreign investments in Pakistan come from European countries, which are also a source of important development assistance programmes in Pakistan. This relationship in its multiple dimensions has been a major constant of Pakistan's foreign policy.

The EU-Pakistan cooperation dates back to 1974, but there has been a marked upswing in this relationship since 2001 with EU's policy of staying constructively and strongly engaged with Pakistan, both in political and ec[illegible] important measures taken in this direction include resumption and upgrading of political dialogue, signature of a Third Generation Cooperation Agreement, as well as additional development assistance.

No doubt, these important policy parameters reflected a positive change in the attitude and outlook of European countries towards Pakistan. Two important developments, i.e. an agreement on trade concessions coming into effect and the signing of the Third Generation Cooperation Agreement in 2004 were the concrete manifestation of this new approach. No wonder, the EU today is Pakistan's single largest trading partner accounting for 22% of its external trade and a major source of foreign investment and development cooperation.

The EU has also taken the unprecedented step of obtaining a WTO waiver for Pakistan in view of its exceptional difficulties giving it greater access to European markets. Pakistan has already benefited substantially from GSP for some years and discussions on the new GSP regulation are currently underway.

The Third Generation Cooperation Agreement has paved the way for EU's greater focus on Pakistan's economic development needs through promotion of trade and investment. The areas being given special attention rightfully include education, poverty eradication, social uplift, human resource development, democracy and human rights.

The EU Commission has already committed more than €500 million to its development projects and programmes. In March 2012, a new political framework – the EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan – was endorsed by both sides. The Plan is intended to take relations to a new strategic level by intensifying dialogues across priority areas, including political cooperation, security, governance and human rights, trade, energy and a range of sectoral cooperation areas. The EU-Pakistan link today has shifted from what had been a traditional, more trade-oriented relationship to one that is more political.

This special focus could perhaps be seen as EU and the US now looking at Pakistan more through the 'Afghanistan prism' rather than its own stand-alone priority. The EU is said to have recently proposed to the Pakistani authorities action plans to counter violent extremism and support rule of law and facilitate access to justice while also exploring how to tackle migration and organised crime.

What must be understood in this connection is that Pakistan itself is a victim of the war in Afghanistan and has deep stakes in Afghan peace and stabilisation. It is in our common interest to promote a peaceful, secure Afghanistan and a prosperous region as a whole. Pakistan would welcome any helping hand that facilitates the process of ensuring peace, security and development in Afghanistan.

The US and EU's engagement with Pakistan must, however, go beyond the war on terror. Pakistan has many assets other than its role in the war on terror. We were promised market access for Pakistani textiles and for products produced in tribal regions on the Afghan-Pakistan border called as "Reconstruction Opportunity Zones" (ROZs). Nothing has been done to redeem those promises. The problem of the militancy in FATA needs a well-coordinated strategy involving coercive approach as well as socio-economic and political engagement in addressing this problem.

In this task, the US and EU could help us by facilitating an environment in which we could change the hearts and minds of our people. To address these problems, the world community also needs to build global harmony through inter-faith tolerance and understanding, promoting peace and stability, as well as sustainable development, and protecting political freedom, genuine democracy and respect for fundamental rights, particularly the inalienable right of self-determination.

(b) The Middle East

Since its inception, promotion of close brotherly relations with Islamic countries and strengthening Islamic solidarity has been the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy. Besides playing an active role in the promotion of greater unity and cohesion among the countries of the Muslim world, Pakistan has been making every effort to strengthen, consolidate and deepen our relations with the Islamic countries, especially those in our neighbourhood and Central Asia.

Pakistan's relations with the countries of the Middle East also remain close and cordial. There exists wide-ranging cooperation with all of them. They have always supported Pakistan in its legitimate concerns for its security and survival. The Middle East region is also our major trading partner accounting for annual exports of around US$ 1.5 billion, and is host to 1.5 million expatriate workers from Pakistan who send substantial home remittances.

Pakistan maintains close relations with the Islamic countries of the Middle East. These ties are important for religious, strategic, political, and economic reasons. In 1955, Pakistan, together with Iran, Iraq and Turkey, joined the Baghdad Pact, a security arrangement later called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after Iraq's withdrawal. CENTO was buttressed in 1964 by a regional arrangement among Pakistan, Iran and Turkey called the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), and economic cooperation activities overshadowed the security aspects of the countries' relations. CENTO was disbanded in 1979 with the overthrow of Shah

Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's government in Iran, and the RCD dissolved. The RCD was effectively revived in 1984 as the ECO.

Pakistan's foreign policy fostered stronger ties with the Middle East through expanded trade. In addition, Pakistani workers employed in the Persian Gulf states, Libya, and Iran provided remittances to Pakistan that were a major source of foreign exchange earnings. The loss of remittances caused by the 1991 Persian Gulf War was a serious concern to Pakistan. During the war, Pakistani units were sent to Saudi Arabia as components of the multinational forces. Pakistan has also contributed to the defense systems of several Arab states, supplying both officers and men. Pakistan has strengthened its Islamic ties by playing a leading role in the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and has also supported the Palestinian cause, withholding recognition of Israel.

Pakistan's ties with Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states were strained during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. Although a member of the United States-led international coalition, Pakistan played only a limited role, sending a force of 11,000 troops tasked with "protecting" religious sites in Saudi Arabia. Following the Persian Gulf War, Pakistan undertook diplomatic efforts to recover its position in the region. In addition, many Pakistani expatriate workers returned to their jobs, and cooperative defense training activities continued. As a result, Pakistan largely restored its position as an influential player in the region.

Pakistan on its part as a leading Islamic country has also been in total solidarity with the Muslim world and its legitimate causes including the Palestinian issue, and has always been ready to contribute to the peace efforts in the Middle East. Pakistan has been playing an active role at the United Nations in support of the need and urgency for addressing the Palestinian issue and the Middle East situation to avert an explosive situation endangering global peace.

Pakistan has always supported the Palestinian cause, advocating full implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State as al-Quds as its capital living side by side with Israel in security and peace.

Pakistan also supports the Arab Peace Plan based on the principle of 'Land for Peace' as proposed by the then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in March 2002 commonly known as the "Beirut initiative" calling for Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 and return of the Palestine refugees to Israel in return for recognition of Israel and normal relations. No one denies the importance of peace in the Middle East. A durable peace in the Middle East has always been seen predicated on Israel's compliance with the

UN Security Council resolutions on this issue. Israel, like India on the question of Kashmir, continues to defy the UN resolutions.

The Muslim Ummah is indeed in turmoil. Though some of them are sitting on world's largest oil and gas reserves, the majority of Muslim countries are among the poorest and most backward in the world. With the exception of very few countries, they are all bankrupt politically with no institutions other than the authoritarian rule. What aggravates this dismal scenario is the inability of the Muslim world to take care of its problems or to overcome its weaknesses. It stands fragmented and divided against itself.

There is no unity of purpose in its responses to global challenges. Its leaders are too self-centred to reorder their political and strategic priorities, and remain averse to allowing institutional and attitudinal transformation of their societies to genuine pluralism and democracy.

The key to reshaping the destiny of the Muslim world lies in the political, economic and social stability and strength of individual Muslim nations. Each one of them at the national level will have to revamp its existing mindsets and priorities to opt for peace and democracy, and for "good and accountable" governance rooted in the will of the people. Things will not change unless each Muslim country fixes its own fundamentals and puts its house in order. Each country must regain its sovereignty and independence, and take control of its own political and economic destiny through self-esteem and self-reliance.

(c) Central Asia

Pakistan is a close neighbour of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and, in many ways, well placed to establish strong relations with them. Since their independence in 1992, Pakistan has been helping these republics in their political and economic reforms facilitating their integration with the outside world. We have maintained close and cordial relations with CARs and have established resident diplomatic missions in all the six former Soviet Republics of Central Asia and Caucasus, namely Azerbaijan (Baku), Kazakhstan (Astana), Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek), Tajikistan (Dushanbe) Turkmenistan (Ashgabat) and Uzbekistan (Tashkent).

Pakistan wants to cultivate friendly relations with the Central Asian Republics based on shared history, culture and traditions, faith and regional proximity. Pakistan provides the shortest route to sea to these land-locked countries, if secure overland road and rail links are established in Afghanistan. Most of the Central Asian countries are keen on this development at the earliest possible. Also, we have exchanged frequent high-level visits with these countries and are pursuing collaboration with them bilaterally as well as within the framework of ECO in the fields of transit routes, credit facilities, banking and training and technical assistance programmes.

One must acknowledge, however, that our opening to Central Asia is hindered by the continuing Afghan crisis. Unfortunately, our relations with these states could also not flourish as desired due to divergent views on Afghanistan and Pakistan's relations with the Taliban regime. Therefore, despite many high level visits and agreements signed, we were not able to lay down a solid foundation to intensify our economic and political relationship.

Nevertheless, the things are on the mend. A number of agreements have been signed with these states, covering various spheres of cooperation. Pakistan and Uzbekistan signed an Extradition Treaty in addition to a Consular Agreement and an Agreement on Cooperation in Custom Administration. Two agreements with Kyrgyzstan regarding Consular Assistance and Mutual Assistance on Civil, Criminal and Family Affairs are in the offing. Defence and military cooperation agreement with Azerbaijan is in the pipeline.

Agreement on avoidance of Double Taxation with Tajikistan is also being considered. A quadrilateral agreement including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan was signed in 1995. It still awaits implementation on account of a dispute by Kazakhstan on the number of road permits and transit fee. Efforts are underway to resolve the issue. In the meantime, a trilateral agreement has also been formalized under the Quadrilateral Agreement provisionally between Pakistan, China and Kyrgyzstan to start trade and other related economic activity between the three countries.

The importance of Central Asia, both for its resource rich character as well as its strategic location, cannot be underestimated. It is therefore essential that we continue to further consolidate our relations with CARs both at bilateral and multilateral levels. These states, in particular Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have immense potential for producing hydropower. Tajikistan being the closest to Pakistan among all the CARs can be most beneficial due to its proximity. Pakistan and central Asian countries signed the CASA-1000 project on November 26, 2015.

Pakistan and the region have developed a commonality of views on important international and regional issues, particularly regarding regional security, peace and sustainable development. All the CARs recognize Pakistan's regional and international importance as being a large Muslim country with strong indigenous defence capabilities, and its central role in resolution of Afghan imbroglio.

(d) Latin America

The term Latin America refers to the Spanish, Portuguese and French-speaking countries in Southern America, also including such small island countries as Suriname, Jamaica, Belize, Haiti and Guyana, due to their similar linguistic, economic, political and social histories and present-day conditions. Almost all Latin American countries have sizeable population of indigenous peoples. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Chile are the main players in Latin America while Cuba despite its small size globally has its own political importance.

In today's world, geography no longer divides nation apart. Distances are immaterial. What matters is friendship and cooperation. Latin American countries are playing an important role not only in their own region but also at the global level. We have always valued our friendship with these countries and have also been working very closely with them in international forums in pursuit of our common goals of peace and development.

Pakistan has diplomatic relations with almost all countries in Latin America but has resident diplomatic missions only in Argentina (Buenos Aires), Brazil (Brasília), Chile (Santiago), Cuba (Havana) and Mexico (Mexico City).

We are partners with Latin American states in Group of 77 and Non-Aligned Movement. We share each other's moments of joy and grief. They have been helping us in our moments of natural disasters including the earthquake tragedy in Azad Kashmir in October 2005 and successive floods in recent years. We appreciate their generous relief and recovery assistance for the victims of these tragedies. We also appreciate that Latin American countries have been following with concern the current geopolitical situation in our region.

Most of them, like Pakistan, believe that there will be no military solution to the Afghan problem and want an end to the Afghan war sooner rather than later. They also appreciate Pakistan's role in facilitating a political solution based on the wishes of the Afghan people who are the final arbiters of their destiny. The foreign forces must leave the region and let the Afghans solve their problems.

We need to build greater economic and political cooperation with Latin American countries to our mutual benefit. We should also try to enhance trade and economic ties and people-to-people contacts. There are, however, certain handicaps in building our relations with this region. These include long distance between Pakistan and the region, language barriers, absence of any sizeable Pakistani diaspora, limited inter-linkages and people-to-people contacts, lack of diversity of Pakistani exports, lesser market access for Pakistani products and limited frequency of high level bilateral visits.

(e) Southeast Asia

Pakistan's 'Look East' policy has been a constant in its external relations from the very beginning of its statehood. No wonder, Pakistan today enjoys close and cooperative relations with countries of Southeast Asia or ASEAN as they are now grouped together (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) as well as Northeast Asia (China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea) and perhaps also Russia because of its geographical extension in Far East.

Pakistan was one of the leaders and organizers of the Bandung Conference in 1955. In the 1950s we also entered into an alliance/ partnership arrangement with Thailand and the Philippines as members of SEATO. We developed a special bond in our relations with Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, as members of the Islamic fraternity. We have traditionally enjoyed friendly and cordial relations with the ten ASEAN member states, and have diplomatic relations with all of them.

Our bilateral relations with all of them are progressing significantly in mutually beneficial areas, especially trade, industry and energy. Malaysia besides importing Pakistani manpower for its growing industry is also investing in Pakistan in the areas of petroleum, agro-industry, real estate, construction and tourism. It is also associated with the building of physical infrastructure in Pakistan.

Ongoing cooperation between Pak-ASEAN countries includes many areas like human resource development, narcotics, tourism, trade, science and technology, industry and investment, and drug. There are also many possible opportunities for further cooperation between Pak-ASEAN, i.e. liberal visa policy, education and technology, sharing of expertise in energy sectors, industrial development and exports of surgical items, agriculture and infrastructure and tourism.

Pakistan-ASEAN Partnership

Though Pakistan was accorded a 'sectoral dialogue' status by ASEAN in July 1993, the very inaugural meeting to establish the ASEAN-Pakistan Sectoral Dialogue Relationship was held on November 5-7, 1997 in Islamabad. The cooperation areas earlier designated to be included in the dialogue included trade, industry, investment, environment, science and technology, drugs and narcotics, tourism and human resources development. Pakistan's ambassador in Indonesia is concurrently accredited to ASEAN.

Besides pursuing the bilateral track for friendly relations with each ASEAN country, Pakistan has been engaged in developing ASEAN-Pakistan cooperating relationship since June 1997.

Pakistan's sectoral dialogue partnership with ASEAN was institutionalized at the inaugural meeting on the establishment of ASEAN-Pakistan Dialoguer Relations in Islamabad co-chaired by ASEAN Secretary-General Dato' Ajit Singh and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad during the visit of an ASAN delegation on November 5-7, 1997.

The meeting adopted the Terms of Reference of the ASEAN-Pakistan Joint Sectoral Cooperation Committee (APJSCC) and also agreed that ASEAN-Pakistan Sectoral Dialogue will initially cover the sectors of trade, industry, investment, environment, science and technology, drugs and narcotics, tourism and human resource development. Several proposals made by Pakistan in the areas of cooperation were discussed during the meeting. These, *inter alia*, included:

(i) Setting up of Joint Working Group on Trade Facilitation and Export Financing;

(ii) Establishment of ASEAN-Pakistan Trade and Investment Promotion Centre;

(iii) Promotion of foreign investment and joint ventures; and

(iv) Close collaboration in the fields of textile technology, palm oil, electronics, and automobile industry.

At the first formal meeting of ASEAN-Pakistan Joint Sectoral Cooperation Committee (APJSCC), held in Bali on February 5, 1999, the two sides agreed to intensify their efforts to make their Sectoral Dialogue mutually beneficial and substantive. The ASEAN delegation was led by its Secretary-General Rodolfo C. Severino, whereas Pakistan was represented by Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad Khan. As part of its "Look East" policy, Pakistan underlined its keen desire to enhance mutually beneficial collaboration with ASEAN and underscored the important contribution that it could also make to regional peace and security on admission to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The then Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad had served as secretary-general of ECO at its headquarters in Tehran. Pakistan thus responded positively to the proposal of the ASEAN secretary-general to act as a catalyst in facilitating cooperation between ASEAN and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), of which Pakistan is a founding member. It was noted that Pakistan with its large population and strategic geographic location, provides a bridge for closer economic collaboration between the 700 million people in ASEAN and ECO combined.

The process of sectoral dialogue partnership continues but with slow follow-up on the projects in the areas of ASEAN-Pakistan cooperation. At the 4th ASEAN-Pakistan Joint Sectoral Cooperation

Committee in Jakarta on June 3, 2008, Pakistan reiterated its interest in becoming ASEAN's full dialogue partner. A Full Dialogue Partner (FDP) involves a political level interaction. It is given to those who can contribute to political and economic stability of ASEAN region and in turn benefit from ASEAN.

At present, ASEAN has 12 Full Dialogue Partners which include China, Japan, South Korea, Papua New Guinea, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, European Union, India and Mongolia. All ASEAN countries except Singapore are supportive of Pakistan's bid for Full Dialogue Partnership. We are not only an aspirant of full dialogue partner status with ASEAN but also want a seat in the East Asia Summit, a major regional process of global importance.

Pakistan acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) at the 11th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Jakarta on July 2, 2004 during which Pakistan officially became the 24th member of ARF. Besides ASEAN and ARF, Pakistan also attaches importance to other organizations in the region that include Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Indian Rim Organization (IOR).

The main focus of Pakistan's "Look East Policy" is based on two principles, i.e. aiming at enhancing trade and attracting investment. In pursuance of this objective, Pakistan has been making efforts to expand bilateral relations with Southeast Asian states and reinforce multilateral frameworks within the region. Towards this end, necessary support can be provided by the respective governments of ASEAN states by signing the Free Trade Agreements (FTA), Preferential Trade Agreement individually and collectively.

Despite these efforts, the trade between Pakistan and ASEAN countries has not registered any appreciable increase and the full potential still remains far from being harnessed. Our exports to ASEAN countries are still far less than imports from those countries.. Our lopsided westward focus seems to have blurred our Vision East Asia. Despite the proximity of ASEAN countries to Pakistan and their phenomenal economic growth, we could not commensurably multiply our trade with this region. Domestically, we have done nothing to revive our economy and moribund industry.

Pakistan needs to take full advantage of opportunities created by expanded trade bloc in the Asia-Pacific region by concluding bilateral FTAs with ASEAN countries and entering into multilateral arrangements. This would require creation of business and investment-friendly atmosphere in the country which itself would be predicated on redressing the perilous security situation and energy crisis in the country. Pakistan will also have to keep its factories running if it has to generate exportable surplus on sustainable basis.

The future prospects of this relationship will depend on how and to what extent Pakistan remains steadfast in its own efforts to combat terrorism, and succeeds in improving law and order situation in the country and comes up with good performance in the economic field.

(f) Northeast Asia

Pakistan's relations with all countries in Northeast Asia are also an integral part of its 'Look East' policy with special focus on China as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. We established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) on May 21, 1951. Since then, China has been Pakistan's steadfast friend and a partner not only in its legitimate security needs and economic development but also in contributing to regional peace and stability. Likewise, we have long enjoyed cordial relations with another major country in Northeast Asia, Japan which too has been playing an important role in the development of Pakistan's economic and social infrastructure. Pakistan is also one of the very few countries that maintain good relations with both North and South Korea.

This relationship in fact dates back to eight Century when a Korean monk, Hye Cho had travelled to our region to study the Buddhist Gandhara art. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1983, what started as a link in distant history has fast developed into strong bonds of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation. Our trade with South Korea has gone up manifold and is now reaching $ 1.5 billion figure.

In the post-World War II era, the real Cold War was enacted on Asian soils which witnessed some of the violent eruptions of the East-West struggle, and even some of the longest wars of the last century. Northeast Asia still remains the venue of the same Cold War and a region of "high tension" as a result of the remnants of the Cold War in this part of Asia. Diverse sources of tension have been complicating the situation among the nations of this region which includes not only China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Russia but also the USA.

Russia is a global power in its own right but its geographical outreach in Far East makes it an Asian power too. The USA has its own longstanding interests in this region and is a party to some of the issues involved. The ramifications of continuing tensions and instability in this part of Asia for global peace and security are immense. The main specific issues remain those of unresolved territorial disputes in the region, including those between Japan and its neighbours, Russia, China and South Korea as well as America's concerns over North Korea's nuclear and missile programme. These are complex issues and need dialogue and confidence-building measures at multilateral level to find a solution through peaceful means.

The major impediment for a successful multilateral diplomacy to defuse tensions and resolve lingering contentious issues in Northeast Asia is the trust deficit between major players. Security order in East Asia is currently in a transition. Still dominated by the USA, it is gradually being balanced by the rapid rise of China which is now using its economic, political and military influence as a major factor of regional and global stability. Given the recent deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations, the triangular relations among the United States, Japan, and China will shape the new security order emerging in East Asia. Relations among the three nations are of key strategic importance because they are at the heart of the balance of power in Asia.

China has been pursuing a proactive and dynamic economic and security policy for engaging its East Asian neighbours and expanding relations with them through economic route. China's policy of engagement is focused on all including the USA, Russia and India which shows its interest in stabilizing rather than destabilizing this part of the world. The USA on its part also has bilateral strategic dialogue mechanisms with all the states of Northeast Asia which in fact are gradually being converted into multilateral dialogue mechanisms involving all stake-holders in peace of Northeast Asia. The multilateral forums could perhaps facilitate a dialogue on the security issues and enable the stakeholders in peace to evolve a mechanism for sustaining peace and resolving disputes.

(g) Africa

After Asia, Africa is the world's second largest and second most populous continent which is also bestowed with massive natural resources such as gold, copper, diamond, uranium, coal and fossil fuel. With its vast resources of raw materials and potential market, it is the focus of attention of global economies, i.e. EU, United States, China, Japan, India and Turkey. No wonder, Africa is witnessing healthy economic growth, quadrupling its global trade turn-over from US$ 350 billion in early 2000 to US$ 1350 billion in 2011. It is today seen as *"the continent of the future"*.

Pakistan attaches great importance to its relations with African countries and has been expanding its political and economic dealings with them. Pakistan has historically [illegible] independence movements in Africa, and made [illegible] contribution in technical assistance and institution building of many African states. Pakistan [illegible] resident Missions (Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, [illegible]

Nigeria, Niger, South Africa, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia) and 39 concurrent accreditations.

Out of 57 members of OIC, 27 are from Africa with whom we have been closely coordinating. Their support has been instrumental to Pakistan's success at international fora especially at the United Nations. The level of our interaction with Africa is minimal and summit level exchanges are few and far between. High-level contacts between Pakistan and Africa are almost non-existent. Pakistan has institutional mechanism with 16 African countries at the Joint Commission level but in the past seven years JMC/Joint Commission's meetings have been held only with three countries i.e. Algeria, Tunisia and South Africa.

Pakistan trade with African countries stood at $3.2 billion (2011-12). This trade is on the upward trajectory with 8 to 10% annual increase, and mostly in favour of Pakistan, but there is still a lot of room and space to improve upon the current tendency. Textiles, cement, pharmaceuticals, food items, light machinery, agriculture implements, surgical and sports goods, and leather products are our major export products. Pakistan needs to further expand its trade and economic cooperation with African countries which requires enhanced interaction both at political and official levels.

Pakistan's vision for Africa must seek to develop robust relations with African countries, i.e. to increase contribution to Africa development, enhance economic and trade relations, establish Joint Ventures and public-private partnerships, and institutionalize relations with civil society, media and cultural community. Africa has around 500,000 Pakistanis: South Africa has the largest, with around 100,000 Pakistan's nationals. This is no less an important factor in reinforcing our economic relations with these countries.

CHAPTER 6

INDIA-PAKISTAN GRIDLOCK

I. INDIA-PAKISTAN GRIDLOCK

A Conflictual Legacy

The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 itself was a traumatic experience with lot of blood-shedding and perhaps, one of the largest migrations in world's history, manifesting mutual hatred and animosity. The years of independence movement had brought out the irreconcilable nature of the interests and aspirations of the two principal communities of India, the Hindus and the Muslims. Despite Mohammad Ali Jinnah's efforts for Hindu-Muslim unity, the beginning of the twentieth century saw a line being drawn, making it impossible for Hindus and Muslims to live together in India.

What brought the simmering Muslim nationalism in the open was the character of the Congress rule in the Muslim minority provinces during 1937-39. The Congress policies in these provinces hurt Muslim susceptibilities leaving them with no doubt that in the Congress 'scheme of things', they could live only on sufferance of Hindus and as "second class" citizens. They were convinced that it was impossible to live in an undivided India after freedom from colonial rule because their interests would be completely suppressed.

That is why, Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent, having lived together for centuries, remained poles apart eventually becoming two separate entities in 1947. A new era began with the emergence of two independent, sovereign states — India and Pakistan. Both nations searched for their place in the world order and aspired to leadership roles beyond the subcontinent. India and Pakistan became adversaries at independence and have so remained. In fact, the underlying problems behind this legacy of animosity are rooted in their history and the long-standing tradition of mutual suspicion and fear that they inherited on their independence.

Last minute *mala fide* territorial adjustments by the British complicated the agreed partition plan and created a sense of injustice and discrimination in Pakistan. A host of other problems including unfair division of assets, withholding of Pakistan's share of cash in the state treasury, massive refugee crisis, disputed borders, water dispute and disputed accession of states constituted the sore points in the nascent relationship between the two newly-independent states. With a lingering suspicion that India had never reconciled to subcontinent's partition and thus to the existence of Pakistan, we have been living since independence in the shadow of a fear of India's hostility and its threat to our security and survival.

Our fear was not exaggerated when we saw Sikkim, Goa, Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir falling to Indian avarice. The aspirations of the people of Kashmir were stifled by force when

India militarily occupied it and brutally violated the partition plan. Against this backdrop, Pakistan's foreign policy has been marked by a complex balancing process — the result of its history, religious heritage, and geographic position. The primary objective of that policy has been to preserve Pakistan's independence, territorial integrity and security, which have been in jeopardy since the state's very inception. This brings us face to face with the stark reality of our geopolitical environment that made Pakistan's relations with India the "centre-point" of our foreign policy.

South Asia is an enigmatic region. Home to one-fifth of humanity, it is a region that offers so much to the world; yet, it is held back by poverty and underdevelopment. The serious economic and social challenges that it faces have been compounded by long-standing intra-regional tension and unresolved inter-state disputes. The security challenges confronted by South Asia have assumed an ominous dimension with India and Pakistan, two nuclear capable states, always remaining in a confrontational mode.

Conflict, however, is the last thing the region needs. Given the unique political history of South Asia and the particular social and cultural proclivities of its inhabitants, this region needs stable peace, not confrontation. It needs a co-operative approach towards the resolution of contentious issues through dialogue and not the perpetuation of hegemonic ambitions, which generate disputes. This approach requires responsibility, restraint and statesmanship.

A Troubled Relationship

The partition of the sub-continent in 1947 itself was a traumatic experience with lot of blood-shedding and perhaps, one of the largest migrations in world's history, manifesting mutual hatred and animosity. Last minute *mala fide* territorial adjustments by the British complicated the agreed partition plan and created a sense of injustice and discrimination in Pakistan. A major focus in Pakistan's foreign policy thus has been its continuing quest for security against India, its large, more powerful, and generally hostile neighbour.

No wonder, Pakistan's relations with India have remained the centre-point of its foreign policy. With lingering suspicion that India had never reconciled to subcontinent's partition, Pakistan has been living since independence in the shadow of India's hostility and threat to its security and survival. The two countries have fought wars and remain locked in an adversarial relationship. The first conflict erupted in Kashmir where the people rose against the Hindu ruler who contrary to the Partition Plan was succumbing to Indian pressure for illegal accession. The people of Jammu and Kashmir, assisted by their brethren in Pakistan's tribal areas forced him to flee from Srinagar and formed their own government in Kashmir on October 24, 1947.

On 27 October (which became a Black Day in Kashmir's history), the Government of India announced that the Hindu ruler had acceded to India. This claim was made on the basis of a fraudulent instrument of accession that it had obtained from the Hindu ruler. India sent its forces into the State and occupied a large part of Jammu and Kashmir. India took the matter to the United Nations where the Security Council adopted resolutions that the future of Kashmir shall be decided by the people of Kashmir through an impartial and free plebiscite under UN auspices. Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Viceroy Lord Mountbatten, solemnly declared that the people of the State would decide the final status of Jammu and Kashmir. This commitment was never honoured.

Indeed, this has been a troubled relationship, marked by "conflict and confrontation" ever since our independence. This equation, with all its ramifications, has had a fundamental impact on our domestic situation, our national priorities, our security agenda, our external relations, and indeed, on the course of our entire post-independence history. In fact, the underlying problems behind this legacy of animosity between India and Pakistan are rooted in their history and the long-standing tradition of mutual distrust and suspicion that they inherited on their independence.

At the core of all their problems is the Kashmir dispute, which has kept the relations between the two countries bedeviled, perpetuating mutual tensions and animosity. In the early '50s, as a young state, with growing concerns about India's designs against its survival as an independent state, Pakistan was gravitated naturally to Western alliances which represented at that time the pole that stood for freedom and justice.

It entered into a "mutual defence agreement" with the USA in 1954 and then in 1955 joined two major Western alliances, SEATO and CENTO in the hope that they will provide strength to its quest for survival. This was a clear expression of our choice for freedom and for security. Our experience, however, did not match our expectations. Its experience, however, did not match its expectations. When it came to defending itself against India in 1965 and then again in 1971, Pakistan was left all alone, and in the process lost half the country.

India-Pakistan Peace Efforts

India-Pakistan dialogue has been an "off-again on-again" process. Over the years, the two countries have tried to engage in peace efforts at different levels for resolving their disputes. In the early '50s, and the '60s, we had high-level political contacts (Liaquat-

Nehru and Bhutto-Swaran Singh Talks). The major problems remained unresolved.

In early 1950s, India-Pakistan tensions kept mounting as a result of the Kashmir situation and unabated communal riots in India unleashing a fear of another war between the two countries. At that critical juncture, Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan proposed talks to his Indian counterpart Jawaharlal Nehru. [1] The two prime ministers met in Delhi on April 2, 1950, and after lengthy discussions, signed an agreement (Liaquat-Nehru Pact) on April 8, 1950.

This pact provided a 'bill of rights' for the minorities of India and Pakistan. Its aim was to end the communal strife on both sides of the border and to create an atmosphere in which the two countries could resolve their other differences. The two governments solemnly agreed to ensure to the minorities complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion; a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour. This pact was broadly acknowledged as an optimistic beginning to improve relations between India and Pakistan.[2]

In a bilateral context, Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks in 1962-63 were the only high level India-Pakistan negotiations dedicated to exploring "a political solution" of the Kashmir dispute, which, as both sides agreed, was to be "honourable, equitable and final" taking into account the need for: i) delineation of an international boundary in Jammu and Kashmir; and ii) disengagement of the forces of India and Pakistan in and around Kashmir, and the removal of all tensions.

Both countries also agreed that the settlement should embody, in a solemn declaration, their determination 'to live side by side in peace and friendship and to solve all other problems peacefully and to their mutual benefit; and that ways and means should be considered for removing major irritants between the two countries.' It is important to recall that in their reaction to Sir Owen Dixon's proposals as well as during Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks, both Pakistan and India were prepared to accept less than their basic positions and a partition plan based on geographic and ethnic lines.

In September 1965, the long-standing border dispute, communal tensions, and conflict over the question of Kashmir flared up in a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. The **6th September (Defence Day)** is one of the most important events of Pakistan's history. On September 6, 1965, Indian army crossed the international borders of Pakistan without a formal declaration of war. It was a time when not just our brave soldiers but the whole nation was cast into the mould of a cohesive unit to defend our home land and defeated the Indian army and made them retrieve on all fronts.

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[1] *http://storyofpakistan.com/liaquat-nehru-pact*

[2] *ibid.*

Fearing that this regional conflict within the boundaries of Indo-Pakistan would escalate into a conflict of global dimensions, the Soviet Union and the United States pressurized the United Nations. to arrange an immediate ceasefire. The diplomatic efforts of the United Nations resulted in a ceasefire that came into effect on September 23, 1965.

The Soviet Union, which had remained neutral when India and Pakistan went to war in September 1965, later played a role in formally bringing the conflict to an end through **Tashkent Declaration**[3] signed on January 10, 1966 at Tashkent, the capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan, then in the Soviet Union by Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in the presence of the host Soviet Premier Kosygin.[4] The Tashkent Declaration provided for restoration of the India-Pakistan international boundary and the Kashmir cease-fire line but did not result in a permanent solution to the problem.

In 1971, taking advantage of an entirely a domestic political crisis in our country, India intervened militarily and dismembered Pakistan. This tragedy, indeed, was the worst that could happen to any independent country. Although this war was fought over East Pakistan, heavy fighting also occurred along the Kashmir cease-fire line. Consequently, under the **Simla Agreement of 1972**[5] following the end of that war, the cease-fire line in Kashmir was redefined as the Line of Control with both countries undertaking not to alter it militarily. India however surreptitiously was already using force and occupying several key posts in Kashmir while the Simla Agreement was being signed.

In 1984, India again violated the Simla Agreement by launching a surreptitious military operation in Siachen codenamed "Meghdoot" and occupying unmanned positions overlooking key passes in the Saltoro Range. Since 1947, this undelineated area west of Point NJ 9842 of the Cease-fire Line/Line of Control and the Karakorum Pass had been under Pakistan's control with mountaineering and trekking expeditions always obtaining authorization from the government of Pakistan. All world maps and atlases clearly showed the Line of Control running northeastwards straight from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass with the Siachen Glacier inside Pakistan.

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[3] *Annexure I*

[4] *http://storyofpakistan.com/the-tashkent-declaration*

[5] *Annexure II*

The Simla Agreement signed by India and Pakistan in 1972 clearly states that "in Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line." India's move into Siachen was a flagrant violation of this agreement.

The move was not without a precedent. India had made similar "tactical intrusions" across the Line of Control on several occasions in the past in clear violation of the Line of Control and had occupied huge territories on the Pakistani side. But it got away with those violations. In fact, in addition to Siachen, other lost grounds also remain in India's forcible custody, including a large chunk of Pakistan's territory in Chorbat La sector which it occupied in 1972 and several other posts in Qamar sector in 1988. All these facts are known to the world and yet India's military muscle is being bolstered only as a counterforce against China.

India's repeated aggressions remained unchecked but one day the areas it has militarily usurped in violation of the Simla Agreement as well as the State of Jammu and Kashmir that remains in India's illegal military occupation in violation of the June 3, 1947 Partition Plan and UN Security Council resolutions will have to return to Pakistan.

In 1972, the Simla Agreement, which closed a tragic and painful chapter of Pakistan's history, generated its own dynamics which India continues to assert as an instrument of its own version of bilateralism in its relations with Pakistan. Under this agreement, the two countries had agreed "to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them."

In the '90s, the Kashmir resistance added a new dimension to the struggle there and brought renewed international focus on this issue especially in the context of human rights situation and the enormous cost of the struggle in human life and limb. During 1990 and 1994, seven rounds of foreign secretary level talks were held without any significant headway on the main issues.

The Composite Dialogue

In March 1997, the talks were again resumed at foreign secretary level. In all, four rounds were held. The Pakistan side in these negotiations was led by Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad. At the second round of their talks in Islamabad, the foreign secretaries reached an agreement on June 23, 1997, laying down an eight-item agenda and a structured mechanism of working groups to carry forward the process of India-Pakistan dialogue. This agreement is the basis of the present India-Pakistan composite dialogue.

In a **Joint Statement signed in Islamabad on June 23, 1997**[6], the two countries agreed to address all outstanding issues of concern to both sides including *inter alia:*

1. Peace and security, including CBMs
2. Jammu and Kashmir
3. Siachen
4. Wullar Barrage Project/Tulbul Navigations Project
5. Sir Creek
6. Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
7. Economic and Commercial Cooperation
8. Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields

The first two items were to be addressed at the level of foreign secretaries, while the remaining six issues (Siachin, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Sir Creek, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, Economic and Commercial Cooperation, and Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields) were to be dealt with at other appropriate levels.

This was the first time in their 50-year history that India and Pakistan had agreed formally in black and white on pursuing an integrated and structured dialogue to address their outstanding issues, including the Jammu and Kashmir issue. The period from 1997 to 1999 witnessed significant developments in the form of several summit-level meetings between the two countries on the sidelines of the United Nations annual sessions and other regional and international conferences.

These political efforts culminated in the **Lahore Summit** in February 1999 resulting in the historic **Lahore Declaration of 21 February 1999**,[7] which recognized the supreme importance of "an environment of peace and security" for the two countries and the region. The two countries also agreed to "intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir through an accelerated process of "their composite and integrated dialogue for an early and positive outcome of the agreed agenda" as per the Islamabad Agreement of June 23, 1997.

This indeed was a high watermark in India-Pakistan bilateral relations. But the peace process initiated at Lahore was soon interrupted when the two countries faced the Kargil crisis. While the post-9/11 world was focused on the USA military campaign in

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[6] *Annexure III*

[7] *Annexure IV*

Afghanistan, India thought it could also take advantage of the global anti-terror sentiment.

After the attacks on the Kashmir State Assembly building on October 1, 2001 and the Indian parliament building in Delhi on December 13, 2001, India moved all its armed forces to Pakistan's borders as well as along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. Pakistan was blamed for both incidents without any investigations or evidence. South Asia was dragged into a confrontational mode that served no one's interests, not even India's. Intense diplomatic pressure by the USA and other G-8 countries averted what could have been a catastrophic clash between the two nuclear states.

Since then, the India-Pakistan peace process has remained hostage to India's opportunistic mindset and the vagaries of the region's geopolitics. A cease-fire at the LoC in November 2003 with several mutual confidence-building measures, including Pakistan's assurances of not letting its territory to be used for any terrorist activity or cross-border infiltration led to the resumption of the stalled India-Pakistan dialogue in January 2004.

The January 6, 2004 "Islamabad Agreement" between President Gen. Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee thus became the basis for the new bilateral approach which in larger measure was pursued under pressure from Washington. There was nothing "joint" in that statement as it was based on two divergent assumptions and undertakings. While Prime Minister Vajpayee made it clear that the dialogue process will go forward only if Pakistan prevented violence, hostility and terrorism from its territory, President Gen. Musharraf reassured to do so and undertook not to permit Pakistan's territory for any cross-border activity of any sorts.

This was not only an implicit acceptance of India's allegations of Pakistan's involvement in cross-border activities but also a solemn undertaking not to allow any cross-border terrorist activity in future. It was this very 'affidavit' by Gen. Musharraf that eventually became the determining factor and a stumbling block in continuation of India-Pakistan dialogue process. No wonder, since 2006, India has sought to implicate Pakistan in every act of terrorism on its soil, and has kept the dialogue process hostage to its policy of keeping Pakistan under constant pressure.

Gen. Musharraf for self-serving reasons (America's continued support for him to remain in power) went beyond all limits in making unilateral gestures of flexibility on Kashmir. The USA knew that as long as Pakistan remained focused on Kashmir, it would not pay full attention to its 'role' in its war on terror. It therefore urged Musharraf to settle the Kashmir issue no matter on what terms. Accordingly, Gen. Musharraf during his last two years went out of the way through a dubious 'back channel' offering to India an 'out of the box' solution of the Kashmir issue which amounted only to legitimization of the Line of Control.

Since then, the India-Pakistan peace process has remained hostage to India's opportunistic mindset and the vagaries of the region's geopolitics. In complicity with Washington, India wanted to keep Pakistan under global pressure in the context of its alleged role in militant or terrorist attacks inside India. In fact, since 2006, India has been implicating Pakistan in every act of terrorism on its soil, and has kept the dialogue process hostage to its policy of redefining the India-Pakistan issues. It blamed Pakistan for attacks first on a train in Mumbai in July 2006 then on Samjhota Express in February 2007, then on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008 and finally for the Mumbai attacks on November 26, 2008. Whosoever perpetrated the Mumbai attack, Pakistan certainly was not the beneficiary.

This was the time when the indigenous Kashmiri freedom movement was attracting maximum global sympathy and attention. Indian government was worried over the Kashmiri freedom movement gaining momentum with increasing external support. Barrack Obama, in the final stages of his presidential election campaign, understood the delicacy of the situation linking it with his own post-election challenges in Afghanistan. He publicly undertook to encourage India to solve the Kashmir dispute so that Islamabad could freely cooperate with the USA on Afghanistan. In his view, "the sources of Afghan instability are in Pakistan; those in turn are linked to Islamabad's conflict with New Delhi, at the heart of which is Jammu and Kashmir."

In November 2008, immediately after Obama's election, curiously enough, the thinking in Washington was rocked by the Mumbai attacks shaking the very fundamentals in Obama's Af-Pak strategy. The then ongoing freedom movement in Kashmir and the prospect of American "activism" on Kashmir were a source of growing concern and anxiety in India. The Mumbai "terrorist attacks" created a new situation in the region, instantly shifting the global focus from both the Kashmiri struggle and Obama's Kashmir agenda. India was the sole beneficiary of the 26/11 attacks which it used not only to stall the peace process but also to shift global focus from Kashmir by having the "K word" expunged from Obama's Af-Pak strategy. India using the pretext of the Mumbai attacks on November 26, 2008 completely stalled the peace process by suspending the "Composite Dialogue." process.

With USA efforts again, the Composite Dialogue was resumed with foreign secretaries of the two countries meeting in Delhi in June 2011 and their foreign ministers also meeting there in July 2011. The Indian foreign minister visited Pakistan in September 2012. In all these meetings, on Kashmir, the two sides did not go beyond reiterating their respective positions and agreeing to continue discussions for a "peaceful negotiated" settlement of this issue. It appears the talks remained focused only on consolidation of mutual CBMs. But even on CBMs, there has not been any meaningful progress. The operationalisation of the new Visa Agreement signed in Islamabad on September 8, 2012 between the Indian minister of external affairs and Pakistan's interior minister also ran into difficulties.

For durable peace in the region, the India-Pakistan "composite dialogue" or whatever nomenclature the two countries mutually agree to use for their dialogue process must continue as an uninterruptible engagement. The purpose must be not only to build trust and confidence but also to develop normal bilateral relations on the basis of peaceful settlement of their disputes. Both countries need to develop a clearer framework of principles on the basis of which to address their outstanding issues and organize their future relations. For this purpose, regular agenda-specific and result-focused contact between the political leadership of the two countries would be needed.

But for this process to be purposeful there has to be visible progress at least in some areas. The areas in which some forward movement can be expected include issues of peace and security including CBMs, Siachen, Sir Creek, water issue, economic and commercial cooperation, including the Iranian gas pipeline, promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields, visa liberalization and terrorism. A significant progress in these areas could set in motion an irreversible process of detente which would not only reinforce the constituencies of peace in both countries but would also promote an atmosphere conducive for future progress on the major issues, especially the Kashmir issue.

The Composite Dialogue and CBMs

At the historic Lahore summit in February 1999, representing a high watermark in the Composite Dialogue process, several important confidence-building measure (CBMs) were taken between India and Pakistan which *inter alia* included signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at the level of the two foreign secretaries on February 21, 1999 identifying various measures for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries. Besides establishing communication links between their DG Military Operations, the two countries also agreed on periodical expert-level contacts to finalise new CBMs and to review the implementation of existing CBMs. As part of the Composite Dialogue, the two countries also agreed on various other confidence-building measures including:

- Regular meetings at foreign minister level,
- Liberalization of the visa and travel facilities,
- Renewal of sports exchanges
- Commencement of a bus service between Lahore and New Delhi
- Appointment of a joint committee to examine humanitarian issues relating to civilian detainees and missing POWs.

Depending on progress on Kashmir and in mutual confidence-building through nuclear and conventional restraint, the two countries in due course could also explore a long-term mutually agreed mechanism for conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peaceful settlement of disputes. Pakistan's long-standing proposal for Strategic Restraint Regime involving nuclear and missile restraint, conventional balance and conflict resolution will go a long way in promoting nuclear and conventional restraint and mutual stabilization. Likewise, non-induction of ABMs and other destabilizing systems could also serve as an arms limitation measure. India and Pakistan also need to agree on a formal undertaking on 'non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes'. Arms reduction could follow in due course later as the two sides build up trust and confidence.

II. INDIA-PAKISTAN ISSUES

The Kashmir Issue

At the heart of all India-Pakistan problems lies the unresolved Kashmir dispute. While all other issues are amenable to easy solution, the Kashmir dispute invokes intense feelings in the peoples of both India and Pakistan as well as the Kashmiri people. Historically, the clash in 1948, the 1965 war, the Siachin dispute, the Kargil crisis, the volatile Line of Control, frequent war-like military deployments, the water disputes, including Wullar Barrage, Kishan Ganga and the Baglihar Dam, and Pakistan's strategic fears and apprehensions are all directly related to Kashmir.

Kashmir issue remains the overarching factor in the context of durable peace in the region. It is a question involving the fundamental right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people, pledged to them by the international community as well as by both India and Pakistan. Kashmir issue was taken to the United Nations by India in January 1948 and remained active in the United Nations Security Council till the late '50s. The Indian complaint was filed under Chapter VI of the

UN Charter and not [illegible] hich requires mandatory enforcement of the UN Security Council's decisions.

The UN Security Council adopted several resolutions calling for the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan to be decided by its people through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. The issue remained active in the UN Security Council till 1957. In the '50s, as a follow-up to the UN Security Council resolutions, the UN special representative Sir Owen Dixon tried to negotiate a settlement on his "partial plebiscite and partition" plan." It didn't work. In time, this dispute and the UN's involvement in its solution got embroiled in the Cold War politics and the Russian vetoes killed any further prospects of useful consideration by the UN Security Council.

The Kashmir dispute however remains on the UNSC agenda as one of the key outstanding global issues and invokes intense feelings in the peoples of both India and Pakistan as well as the Kashmiri people. Their historical experiences, cultural diversities, religious fervor, scars of partition, wars and conflicts, Indian desire for regional domination and hegemony, liberation struggle in Kashmir and resurgence of violence and terrorism in recent years all come together in a curious convergence in the unresolved dispute of Kashmir.

There have also been suggestions that in view of the complexities involved, the Kashmir issue may be put on the back burner, while the process of India-Pakistan normalization can move on in all areas, especially trade, tourism, people-to-people contact and friendly exchanges. This cosmetic approach can never work as normalization between India and Pakistan will take place only if the root causes of their conflicts and tensions are eliminated through a peaceful settlement of the outstanding disputes.

Status quo in any form is a non-starter. Pakistan believes that status quo is part of the problem and not a solution. Plebiscite remains the only viable approach to which both India and Pakistan had committed themselves in terms of the UN Security Council resolutions.

The possibility of partition of the State of Kashmir with adjustments across the LoC has been discussed as a serious option on many occasions in the past with both India and Pakistan showing conditional amenability. As a follow-up to the UN Security Council Resolution 80(1950) of March 14, 1950, the UN Representative for India and Pakistan, Sir Owen Dixon had proposed some formulas departing from the principle of the overall plebiscite. He proposed partial plebiscite by sections or areas and their allocation according to the result of the vote.

to their mutual benefit; and that ways and means should be considered for removing the major irritants between the two countries.' It is important to recall that in their reaction to Sir Owen Dixon's proposals as well as during Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks, both Pakistan and India were prepared to accept less than their basic positions and a partition plan based on geographic and ethnic lines.

More recently, the Kashmir Study Group (KSG), a US-based think-tank under the chairmanship of a Kashmiri businessman, Farooq Kathwari, and with the obvious encouragement of the American establishment, has launched a proposal called 'Kashmir - A Way Forward' for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. This proposal was also, in essence, based on the "partial plebiscite-cum-partition" concept which India and Pakistan had almost accepted multilaterally (Dixon Plan) and discussed bilaterally (Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks).

The KSG proposal in its original version envisaged partition of Kashmir in three parts: one comprising the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir to stay with Pakistan and the other consisting of Jammu and Laddakh remaining with India whereas the Valley of Kashmir will be reconstituted, through a plebiscite, as a sovereign entity (but one without an international personality). Since this proposal came under severe criticism in India, the KSG came forward with a modified version recommending that "a portion of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir be reconstituted as a sovereign entity (but one without an international personality).... through an internationally supervised ascertainment of the wishes of the Kashmiri people on either side of the Line of Control."

"This ascertainment would follow agreement among India, Pakistan and representatives of the Kashmiri people to move forward with this proposal. The sovereignty of the new entity would be guaranteed by India, Pakistan and appropriate international bodies.

"The new entity would have its own secular, democratic constitution, as well as its own citizenship, flag, and a legislature, which would legislate on all matters other than defence and foreign affairs. India and Pakistan would be responsible for the defence of the Kashmiri entity, which would itself maintain police and gendarme forces for internal law and order purposes. India and Pakistan would be expected to work out financial arrangements for the Kashmiri entity, which could include a currency of its own.

"The borders of Kashmir with India and Pakistan would remain open for the free transit of people, goods, and services in accordance with arrangements to be worked out between India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri entity.

"While the present Line of Control would remain in place until such time as both India and Pakistan decide to alter it in their mutual interest, both India and Pakistan would demilitarize the area included in the Kashmir entity, except to the extent necessary to maintain logistic support for forces which could not otherwise be effectively supplied. Neither India nor Pakistan could place troops on the other side of the Line of Control without the permission of the other state."

The KSG proposals have not found any sympathy in India, nor would they be readily acceptable to Pakistan. The political leaderships of both continue to stick to their long-held declaratory positions and are reluctant to publicly endorse any plan that would be seen as a whittling down of their respective stated positions. Meanwhile, a view has emerged that the Kashmiri people now prefer what is commonly known as third option - independence. Many Kashmiri political leaders only talk of freedom and make no public reference to their desire for accession to Pakistan.

Both Pakistan and India are averse to this option but if the people of Kashmir are the final arbiters of their destiny, their will and choice must remain supreme. It would be premature for either India or Pakistan to indicate a preference for any of the options available or proposals made or discussed at any level in the past. But if India and Pakistan take a fresh look at the proposals which they discussed at early stages of the dispute under UN-sponsored negotiations or high-level bilateral talks, they could find a common ground to evolve a mutually acceptable road map for a possible solution.

In recent years, India and Pakistan have been claiming "flexibility of approach and sincerity of commitment" in their quest for a peaceful settlement of all outstanding bilateral issues, including the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. They have also been talking of the need to move beyond their respective stated positions and to find a "practical and achievable" solution of the Kashmir issue which would not be based on conversion of the LoC into a permanent international border and which would take into account the legitimate interests of India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people.

If these are not platitudes and clichés, both countries must start reversing the tide of their adversarial history by mutual consolidation of CBMs, maintenance of an atmosphere free from "violence and terrorism", and substantive progress towards a peaceful settlement of all outstanding problem, including the Jammu and Kashmir issue. The "linkage and simultaneity" of progress in all these areas would be of crucial importance.

Pakistan's Position on Kashmir

Pakistan's principled position on Jammu and Kashmir is based

While none of them, however, is practical, Pakistan believes that the establishment of durable peace in South Asia hinges on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute only in light of the Security Council resolutions and the wishes of the Kashmiri people. We must not abandon our principled position in support of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people, nor should we abdicate the authority to decide the future of the Kashmiri people to a third party.

Kashmiris alone are the arbiters of their future, and the only other parties to this dispute in terms of the UN Security Council resolutions are Pakistan and India. In recent years, India has been seeking to redefine the Kashmir issue by branding the Kashmiri struggle as an issue of "cross-border terrorism", and keeping Pakistan under pressure on its alleged involvement in acts of terrorism most of which are now proven to have been engineered by India itself in an attempt to exploit the prevailing anti-terrorism sentiment in the world.

The Kashmir dispute cannot be brushed aside as a case of separatism or terrorism, and will have to be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people as called for in UN Security Council resolutions. No matter what the Indians claim, there is but one fair, just, legal and moral solution to Kashmir which was provided by the United Nations, and which both India and Pakistan mutually accepted. This is the crux of the Kashmir issue.

The task ahead is not going to be easy given the complexity of the issues involved. There will be no quick fixes nor should we be rushing into hasty decisions that amount to compromising on our principled position on an issue that concerns the very survival of Pakistan and its vital legitimate security and strategic interests.

The Siachen Issue

The Siachen saga began on April 13, 1984, with the Indian army surreptitiously launching a military operation codenamed "Meghdoot" and occupying unmanned positions overlooking key passes in the Saltoro Range. Since 1947, this undelineated area west of Point NJ 9842 of the Cease-fire Line/Line of Control and the Karakorum Pass had been under Pakistan's control with mountaineering and trekking expeditions always obtaining authorization from the government of Pakistan. All world maps and atlases clearly showed the Line of Control running northeastwards straight from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass with the Siachen Glacier inside Pakistan.

The Simla Agreement signed by India and Pakistan in 1972 clearly states that "in Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line." India's move into Siachen was a flagrant violation of this agreement.

The move was not without a precedent. India had made similar "tactical intrusions" across the Line of Control on several occasions in the past in clear violation of the Line of Control and had occupied huge territories on the Pakistani side. But it got away with those violations. In fact, in addition to Siachen, other lost grounds also remain in India's forcible custody, including a large chunk of Pakistan's territory in Chorbat La sector which it occupied in 1972 and several other posts in Qamar sector in 1988. All these facts are known to the world and yet India's military muscle is being bolstered against China.

Once India militarised the region, Pakistan had no choice but to maintain its own military presence there. Pakistan's efforts to wrest control of the occupied area could not succeed because, being at relatively lower altitudes, it was at a handicap to retake the occupied positions. Since then our army has been able to ensure that that the Indians do not advance any further. There is no question of unilateral withdrawal while the enemy holds 1000 square miles (2,600 square kilometres) of Pakistani territory under its unlawful occupation and has plans to capture more in order to complete the strategic goal of cutting off Pakistan from China.

The only solution to this problem is for both sides to demilitarize Siachen and delineate the region on the basis of principles stipulated in bilateral agreements of 1949, 1972 and 1989 for demarcation of the Line of Control and demilitarisation of the glacier. In the June 1989 agreement, both sides had agreed on the basic parameters of a Siachen solution involving the relocation of forces to the positions away from the glacier, but not unilaterally. Pursuant to this understanding, both sides were to work towards a comprehensive settlement based on redeployment of forces to the July 1972 positions.

This framework is the only agreed basis available for a Siachen settlement to which Pakistan remains committed. India, however, true to its tradition, subsequently backed out of the 1989 agreement insisting that withdrawal would be subject to 'recognition' of ground realities or in other word, authentication of the present position. The issue remains unresolved because India is obstinately maintaining that line beyond NJ 9842 must be delineated before disengagement and negotiations. Obviously, Pakistan cannot oblige India since that would mean legitimisation of Indian aggression and giving India reason to make illegal claims over the territory in future negotiations.

The Sir Creek Issues

Sir Creek dispute is over the interpretation of maritime boundary line in the Rann of Kutch between Kutch and Sindh. Before independence, the provincial region was a part of Bombay Presidency of British India. After independence of India in 1947, Sindh became part of Pakistan while Kutch remained part of India. Pakistan claims the entire creek as per paras 9 and 10 of the Bombay Governmnet Resolution of 1914 signed between the then Governmnet of Sindh and Rao Maharaj, the ruler of the princely state of Kutch.

During the arbitration proceedings in the Rann of Kutch dispute, India had accepted the 1914 Resolution together with its attached B 44 Map as delimiting the boundary between Kutch and Sindh. In keeping with its tradition, India resiled from its original position and now claims that the boundary should be demarcated on the basis of Thalwag principle, running through the middle of the Creek. Pakistan rejected this claim on the ground that the boundary had already been delimited under the Government of India Resolution of 1914 as depicted on B 44 Map.

The Thalwag law states that river boundaries between two states may be, if the two states agree, divided by the mid-channel. Pakistan maintains that the doctrine is not applicable in this case as it only applies to bodies of water that are navigable, which the Sir Creek is not. Another point of concern for Pakistan is that Sir Creek has changed its course considerably over the years. If the boundary line is demarcated according to the Thalweg principle, Pakistan stands to lose a considerable portion of the territory that was historically part of the province of Sindh.

Water Issue

After Independence, a serious problem arose between India and Pakistan over the distribution of water. Rivers flow into Pakistan territory from across India's occupied areas. In 1947, the distribution of Punjab left many of the canal head-works with India.

On April 1, 1948, India stopped the supply of water to Pakistan from every canal flowing from India to Pakistan. Later on Pakistan's protests, India agreed on May 4, 1948 for provisional release of waters. Pakistan approached the World Bank in 1952 which after protracted negotiations brokered the Indus Waters Treaty in September 1960. This treaty divided the use of rivers and canals between the two countries.

Pakistan obtained exclusive rights for the three western rivers, namely Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. And India retained rights to the three eastern rivers, namely Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. The Treaty also guaranteed ten years of uninterrupted water supply. During this period Pakistan was to build huge dams, financed partly by long-term World Bank loans and compensation money from India. Three multipurpose dams, Warsak, Mangla and Tarbela were built. A system of eight link canals was also built, and the remodelling of existing canals was carried out. Five barrages and a gated siphon were also constructed under this Treaty.[8]

A permanent Indus Waters Commission was constituted to resolve the disputes between the parties. The Treaty sets out the procedure for settlement of the differences and disputes. It also provides for settlement of disputes through the International Court of Arbitration. Thus, future prospects persuaded the two countries to agree to a partition of the Indus Basin waters. Both countries were expected to exploit their respective water shares with the help of an Indus Basin Development Fund to be administered by the World Bank.

Safeguards were also incorporated in the Treaty to ensure unrestricted flow of waters in the Western rivers. But in total breach of the relevant provisions of the Treaty, India has been constructing reservoirs and dams on these rivers in the Occupied Kashmir. In 1985, Pakistan discovered that India was planning to build a barrage that it called 'Tulbul Navigation Project' at the downstream end of Wullar Lake on River Jhelum. Pakistan immediately conveyed its concern to India seeking details of the project. The matter was also taken up at the Permanent Indus Commission for its resolution under Article IX (I) of the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960. Subsequently, several rounds of secretary-level talks have failed to resolve the issue.

The Indian position is that the various meetings held since 1987 have addressed all technical and legal aspects concerning the project. India also maintains that certain changes in the design and structure of the barrage can address Pakistan's reservations. On its part, Pakistan contends that the barrage is in violation of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) and if a satisfactory settlement is not reached or India goes ahead with its planned project, it will have no choice but to go to an international court of arbitration.

Wullar Barrage is not the only water issue. Lately, India is building a number of other dams and reservoirs on Pakistani rivers which include Baglihar dam (Chenab), the Kishanganga dam (Neelum), Nimo Bazgo Dam and Chutak hydroelectric plant (both on Indus). Water wars are likely in the future as India's Prime Minister Vajpayee during the Indo-Pakistan standoff threatened to walk away from the Indus Basin Treaty.

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[8] *http://storyofpakistan.com/indus-water-treaty*

A former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan said: "Should we not consider measures to deprive the Pakistanis of the water they need to quench their thirst and grow their crops? Should we not seriously consider whether it is necessary for us to adhere to the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty... extraordinary circumstances demand extraordinary responses."[9]

The Issues of Peace and Security

With overt nuclearization of the subcontinent, South Asia's problems are no longer an exclusive concern of the region itself. They now have a worrisome global dimension, which raises major powers' stakes in the issues of peace and security in this region. But one thing is clear. It is India, not Pakistan, which "inducted" the nuclear dimension into the volatile security environment of South Asia. In the absence of any assurances or security guarantees, we had no choice but to take measures for our own security.

Pakistan exploded five nuclear devices on May 28 and followed that up with one more on May 30. No doubt, it was a difficult but inevitable decision. Our tests were an act of self-defence; they established our minimum credible deterrence and in fact restored the regional strategic balance serving the larger interest of peace and stability in South Asia. We had proven our capability. There were no doubts left any more. The era of ambiguity was behind us. Nuclear capability is now an essential element of our security in the form of credible minimum deterrent.

The formal reaction of the international community, especially the major powers, to South Asian nuclear tests was set out in the UNSC Resolution 1172 of 6 June 1998, which *inter alia*, condemned the tests and called for a roll back by both countries of their nuclear capabilities, signature of the CTBT, progress on FMCT, and restrictions on missile delivery systems. The UN Security Council resolution, besides clearly recognising that the tests were conducted first by India and then by Pakistan, also had a significant operative clause (Para 5) urging India and Pakistan to resume their dialogue "on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security" in order to remove the tensions between them, and encouraging them "to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir."

Yes, in those difficult times, we remained under extraordinary pressures and economic sanctions for having demonstrated our nuclear capability. But as a matter of challenge to our foreign policy, we were able to engage the world in a constructive dialogue establishing the rationale of our security interests. The USA engaged both India and Pakistan in a "strategic" dialogue on an equal footing. After eight rounds of talks with both countries ending in February 1999, a clear nuclear parity was established between the two countries in the form of an implicit "strategic linkage" promising them "equality of treatment" in terms of any future concessions including access to technology.

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[9] *The Hindustan Times*, December 23, 2012.

That linkage is no longer there now. Pakistan has been "de-hyphenated" from India. It was in this perspective that India and Pakistan also resumed their stalled dialogue in 1998, with priority attention being given to the two major issues on their agenda, namely peace and security, including CBMs and the peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue.

The Lahore Declaration of February 21, 1999 signified Pakistan and India's desire to manage the nuclear standoff in South Asia in a responsible and mature manner. They knew that the costs of seeking unilateral advantage have become prohibitive. They signed a memorandum of understanding on February 21, 1999 agreeing on basic risk reduction measures (RRMs) as a mutually agreed framework of "restraint and stabilization."

Pakistan declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and offered a regional test-ban treaty to India. It also offered to join in good faith the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material treaty, and solemnly declared its commitment to build a mutually acceptable and verifiable Strategic-Restraint Regime with India. The post-9/11 world however has altered the fundamentals of global relations.

As we fulfil our obligations as a partner and an ally in the war on terror, the USA has entered into a long-term defence pact with India, introducing a new and ominous dimension to the already volatile and unstable security environment of the region. The USA-India nuclear deal and the subsequent *carte blanche* that India has received in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for access to nuclear fuel and technology in violation of equitably applicable criteria undermine the international non-proliferation regime and detract from its credibility and legitimacy.

The USA driven by its own China-specific agenda is further building up India's nuclear capability which creates serious strategic imbalance in the region. Pakistan's apprehensions are further aggravated by the complex regional configuration with a growing Indo-USA nexus, India's strategic ascendancy in the region and its unprecedented influence in Afghanistan with serious nuisance potential against Pakistan's security interests.

III. THE KARGIL EPISODE (1999)

In his biography *Ghaddaar Kaun?*, the former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, had given his version of the Kargil crisis reiterating his contention that the army leadership did not take him into confidence in planning the operation and he was kept in the dark until the situation got out of hand. According to him, the army then pleaded with him to seek American intervention to obtain a Kargil cease-fire. Nawaz Sharif then did go to Washington and had a meeting with President Clinton on July 4, 1999, which resulted in Pakistan's withdrawal from the Kargil heights.

But in his book In *the Line of Fire*, Gen. Musharraf did admit that preparations for the 'Kargil Operation" had indeed started several months earlier in response to what he alleged "activities on the Indian side" and that it was only a "defensive manoeuver" plan aimed at "plugging the gaps between our positions in the Northern Areas" which he claimed was formally presented and approved by the political leadership towards the middle of January 1999.

Both versions have been publicly stated, refuted and restated before in the electronic as well as print media in the form of interviews and statements. Pakistan's official position during the crisis was that only the *mujahideen* groups were involved in the taking over of the forward Kargil posts. The world however never accepted our version of the Kargil episode and believed all along that the Kargil conflict was the result of a large-scale infiltration of "Kashmiri militants" and Pakistani soldiers into high-altitude positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control, which has served as a *de facto* border in Kashmir between the two countries.

Interestingly, Musharraf tells out his real mind when he claims (pages 95-96) that "there was no deliberate offensive operation planned, and moving to the unoccupied gaps along the Line of Control was not a violation of any agreement, and was well within the purview of the local commander." He is perhaps right. The operation might indeed have been planned by the army purely as a "tactical and defensive move" with a limited objective of temporarily occupying some of the high altitude posts in the Dras-Kargil sector which the Indians had been vacating every year for the winter.

The move was not without a precedent. India had made similar "tactical intrusions" across the Line of Control on several occasions in the past in clear violation of the solemnly agreed Line of Control, and had occupied huge territories on our side. But it got away with those violations. In fact, the lost grounds are still with India, including a large chunk of Pakistan's territory in Chorbat La sector which we lost in 1972, Siachin lost in 1984 (which is now one of the major outstanding issues between India and Pakistan), and several posts lost in Qamar sector in 1988.

The limited objective of our Kargil operation, in military terms, surely must have been to secure a strategically commanding position at the heights overlooking the Dras-Kargil road which would have given us an edge in preventing any likely "offensive" from the other side and also interdicting the Indians in response to what President Musharraf claims their "continuous artillery shelling" at the Neelam Valley Road on our side of the Line of Control. But once launched without 'political blessing' and with extremely limited strategic interaction within the army, Musharraf's Kargil operation soon got out of hand.

He questions the claim that the operation was launched without taking the political leadership into confidence, and also without informing the military hierarchy or senior army leaders. He insists (page 97) that all parties, including the civilian authority, were on board. According to him, even within the military hierarchy "information was shared on need-to-know basis." Musharraf denies that the military situation on the ground ever became precarious enough for him to request the prime minister to go to the USA to get the army out of it.

Even some of our independent military analysts, who have researched and written extensively on the subject, are of the view that the "operation was never intended to reach the scale that it finally did", and once we found ourselves occupying more than a hundred posts of various sizes, we could not militarily handle the situation. The operation also misjudged the Indian ability and the will to fight back and had assumed that India would never retaliate with an all-out offensive against Pakistan. In other words, the operation never anticipated what Musharraf describes "the unreasonably escalated Indian response."(page 97)

The biggest flaw of the plan was that it had not catered for the global 'environment.' Our claims to the contrary notwithstanding, it was an aberration to the global environment, and the international reaction soon left no doubt about it. In the given situation, no political leadership or diplomatic strategy could have changed the global perception of the crisis or reversed the deteriorating situation on the ground. The government did its utmost on the political and diplomatic fronts to counter the adverse reaction from the world community. But the world saw it as a Pakistan-sponsored deliberate act of intrusion of the internationally acknowledged Line of Control. The major powers, with all the latest satellite monitoring means, blamed us for the "intrusion" and were getting restless over the prospect of a wider conflict in a nuclearised region.

With this ominous global dimension, it was no longer an India-Pakistan affair. The major powers were worried and asked us to back off. Even our friends publicly urged the need for de-escalation of the crisis and prevention of a wider war. By any standard of world diplomacy, it was a very difficult and unusual diplomatic war in which we tried to convince the world that there would be eruption of more Kargils if the Kashmir dispute was not urgently addressed through a just and fair settlement. Whatever we may say, the world remained more sympathetic to India's position. In the ultimate analysis, the political leadership did play an appropriate role in defusing the situation and averting the risk of a larger conflict.

Gen. Musharraf claim that the "military victory" was turned into a "political surrender" will never be sustained by history. Whether we achieved anything from Kargil is a question to be best answered by history. In whatever way one looks at the Kargil events, the episode did mark a "watershed" in India-Pakistan relations. Indeed, the biggest casualty of the Kargil War, apart from more than a thousand lives lost on both sides of the LoC, was trust and confidence in Indo-Pak relations and the prospect of a Kashmir settlement. India resumed dialogue with us in 2004 not to resolve the dispute but only to seek an end to "cross-border terrorism."

What is surprising is the claim in Musharraf's book that "whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir issue is owed considerably to Kargil conflict." Which movement? The only movement on Kashmir that we saw since October 1999 was in the reverse direction. In fact, since after the resumption of the "composite" dialogue on the basis of the January 6, 2004 Islamabad "joint statement," we did not see any meaningful direction or genuine sustainability in the "composite" dialogue, which is now inextricably linked to our ability to free India of terrorism — a task we have not been able to accomplish within our own country and are still paying a heavy price in terms of material and human losses in fighting this scourge on our own soil.

IV. INDIA-PAKISTAN TRADE ISSUE

Regional Perspective

Because of common colonial experience, South Asian economies have relied on export of raw material and agricultural products and import of machinery and industrial product. Therefore, economic complementarities are enormously low and the economies can best be described as competitive. For instance, Pakistan and India compete for the export of rice, Bangladesh and India compete for jute goods, India and Sri Lanka compete in the world market in respect of tea, and Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka compete in cotton textiles.

For a long time Pakistan was focused on establishing external trade relations with ECO and Sri Lanka with ASEAN. Furthermore, internal trade relations are impeded by the sheer economic disproportion of the region. Structural differences among SAARC countries make them competitive instead of complementary. ASEAN states addressed this problem in the region through programmes of trade complementation and vertical integration.

It took 10 years for SAARC members to agree upon SAPTA and another 10 to come round to a consensus on South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), which became operational in 2006. It was viewed with immense promise and potential for increasing intra-regional trade which is currently stuck at less than 2% of GDP. If implemented, SAFTA was expected to have raised the current level of intra-regional trade from $6 billion to $14 billion.[10] SAFTA's actual performance, however, remains far from satisfactory.

Until recently SAARC had made only marginal efforts at opening up to international market and attracting trade and investment. In fact, trade in services, within and without, and drawing and promoting investment are still among the most overlooked areas of SAARC. This was highlighted at the 2008 Colombo summit when leaders expressed their hope to increase development of the service and investment sectors. But there are no signs of any visible increase in intra-SAARC trade which is almost stagnant between 4 and 5%.

The complexities around questions relating to legitimate concerns of LDCs including the scope and areas of technical assistance needed by them, size of the negative list, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, mutual opening up of economies and harmonization of customs rules and procedures are indicative of the magnitude of the uphill task that lies ahead for SAFTA.

This is because of high tariff and non-tariff barriers, weak trade and transit links and inadequate infrastructure development and a lack of commitment. Reluctance to lower tariff rates and reduce non-tariff barriers is a genuine issue in a region where economic inequalities are disproportionately high. India's outsized and resilient economy is perceived as a threat by the much smaller economies of the region. Hence, the demand for a formula for equitable and fair trade without which progress on SAFTA will remain stalled.

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[10] *Towards Stronger Linkages and Growth:* A study by South Asia Trade & Investment Network (SATIN), July 2008.

India-Pakistan MFN Issue

Under Washington's pressure, Pakistan in principle had agreed to grant MFN status to India by the end of 2012. In India-Pakistan context, there is never room for over-optimism. At a time when so many things are going wrong in our region, any positive development between the two estranged neighbours does seem to bring a ray of light in an otherwise darkening scene. But given the history of India-Pakistan relations and complexity of the issues involved, one would be better off being cautious in proceeding with liberalization of trade with India as long as there is no genuine level-playing field for mutual trade.

There is, of course, a strong case for trade with India on a mutually beneficially basis in accordance with the principle of comparative advantage. Such an approach would require the liberalization of trade with India in a manner that does not erode our own industrial and economic potential. Before moving ahead with MFN for India, we must undertake thorough studies of different aspects of each other's trading policies including tariff and non-tariff barriers and also industrial and agricultural potential of both countries.

Trade with India must not undermine our own industrial base. We must identify in advance what likely effects of a liberalized trade regime with India would be on different components of our own economy. A comparative study of the tariff and non-tariff barriers in Pakistan and India should be made to ensure that our producers and exporters are assured of a level playing field in trade with India.

MFN status will certainly enable India to tilt trade balance completely in its favour since even now when Pakistan enjoys MFN status since 1996, its exports to India are worth $200-$350 only and that of India without MFN status are $2.3 billion. If India is bestowed the MFN status in an unguarded manner, we would not only find our markets flooded with Indian goods but would also be facilitating India's access to Afghanistan and Central Asian markets through Pakistan, thus fulfilling its dream of monopolizing the economics of South Asia and Central Asia.

Interestingly, a recent study by ADB suggests that contrary to popular intuition, India and Pakistan are not the most important markets vis-à-vis each other. More than 60% of the increase in their intra-regional exports is directed towards Bangladesh. If correct, this revelation raises serious questions on the very complementarities that are needed for a level-playing field.

V. PAKISTAN'S INDIA POLICY

For obvious reasons, our relationship with India remains one of the main determining factors of our foreign policy. On its part, Pakistan has always sought tension-free and good-neighbourly relations with India on the basis of sovereign equality and peaceful settlement of disputes, including the Kashmir issue. This has been the position of successive governments in Pakistan, more so of the present PML-N government which has traditionally sought peace with India on equitable terms. It was this government that initiated the 'Composite Dialogue' process in 1997 and developed a roadmap for peace at the Lahore Summit in February 1999.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on assuming his office in June 2013 renewed his peace initiative offering resumption of dialogue with India. Unfortunately, despite repeated initiatives on our part, India remains adamant in its opportunistic policy seeking to keep Pakistan under constant pressure for its alleged involvement in terrorist activities on its soil, most of which were engineered with this specific purpose.

Taking advantage of global anti-terror sentiment, it has managed to redefine the Kashmir issue as one of terrorism. It has been escalating tensions along the Line of Control only to blame Pakistan for them. Ironically, our attitude in response has been one of complacency if not implicit confession. We will have to preserve our dignity and only pursue a peace that is honourable, equitable and based on peaceful settlement of all issues including Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek and Water issue.

Peace in South Asia

In the ultimate analysis, however, the success of India-Pakistan peace process would depend entirely on the freshness of political approach that both sides would themselves be prepared to bring in with sincerity of purpose by taking into account the legitimate aspirations of the Kashmiri people. This would require them to move beyond their respective stated positions and to find a "practical and achievable" solution of the Kashmir issue which would not be based on conversion of the LoC into a permanent international border and which would take into account the legitimate interests of India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people.

As for Kashmir, there is but one fair, just, legal and moral solution to Kashmir which was provided by the United Nations, and which both India and Pakistan mutually accepted. The wishes of the Kashmiri people must be ascertained impartially, in conditions of freedom from military coercion. This is the crux of the Kashmir issue. India must end its illegality in Siachen and Sir Creek and its ongoing water terrorism in Occupied Kashmir where it is building dams and reservoirs on Pakistani rivers in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty. Trade with India also requires a level playing field.

Both sides must recognise that peace between them is a strategic imperative. They must renounce the use of force for settlement of their bilateral disputes. Steady improvement of relations between Pakistan and India requires further changes in the way they deal with each other. India, being the biggest country in South Asia, must lead the way by removing fears and apprehensions among its neighbours. The "composite dialogue" must be continued to build up trust and confidence, and develop mutually beneficial cooperation. Tangible progress in conflict resolution should be visible to the people on both sides, particularly on the doables: Sir Creek; Siachen; Water issue; Trade expansion; and Visa liberalization.

Both India and Pakistan once at peace with each other could also jointly capitalize on their geography and location to build regional networks of gas and oil pipelines and an infrastructure of transport and communication that could bring immeasurable economic dividends to them. Durable peace between India and Pakistan would not only be a factor of regional and global stability but would also enable the two countries to divert their resources to improving the lives of their peoples and eradicating poverty from the region. Above all, peace would be a "win-win" situation for the Kashmiris.

The policies that create strategic imbalances in the region and fuel an arms race between the two nuclear-capable neighbours with an escalatory effect on their military budgets and arsenals are no service to the peoples of the two countries. There is a three-dimensional challenge now confronting regional as well as global stakeholders to manage the magnitude of this region's political, economic and social problems by working together in:

- Promoting democracy, peace and the rule of law within and among the region's states through universally acknowledged norms and principles.
- Promoting durable peace in South Asia through the elimination of the root causes of instability and conflict in the region and a peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the modalities prescribed in the Charter of the United Nations.
- Bringing stability to the region by encouraging restraint and responsibility as well as mutual confidence building on the part of India and Pakistan, both nuclear-capable states, for avoidance of conflict.

Role of International Community

Meanwhile, the world community must also realize that durable peace and stability in South Asia will be crucial to making our world more peaceful and more secure, and genuine and lasting peace in South Asia will come only through elimination of the root causes of instability and conflict in the region. Our friends also need to realize that people in both India and Pakistan have suffered for too long as a result of continuing tensions and conflicts between the two countries, and now want an end to the region's confrontational legacy.

Suggested India-Pakistan Roadmap

1. India and Pakistan need a clearer framework of principles on the basis of which to organize future relations. Adoption of a short-and long-term approach in addressing the outstanding issues in contrast with efforts in the past to find an immediate solution. Regular contact between the political leadership.
2. Recognition by both sides that peace between them is a strategic imperative. They must renounce the use of force for settlement of their bilateral disputes. Cease-fire must be upheld through more effective communication between the local commanders.
3. Steady improvement of relations between Pakistan and India requires further changes in the way they deal with each other. India, being the biggest country in South Asia, must lead the way by removing fears and apprehensions among its neighbours.
4. The "composite dialogue" must be continued to build up trust and confidence, and develop mutually beneficial cooperation. Tangible progress in conflict resolution should be visible to the people on both sides, particularly on the doables: Sir Creek, Siachen, Wullar Barrage, Trade expansion, and Visa liberalization. Mutual cooperation in counter-terrorism should be reinforced and the Joint Anti Terrorism Mechanisms be made more effective. Blame game in public must be avoided.
5. Kashmir remains the overarching factor casting shadow on the prospects of peace in the region. A solution of the Kashmir dispute must be pursued in a manner that is acceptable to both India and Pakistan and to the people of Kashmir. Meanwhile, progress on implementation of Cross LoC CBMs must be ensured.
6. Strengthen SAARC to make it more effective and result oriented particularly in areas such as trade, energy, food security, counter-terrorism, and environment. Cooperation must be conducted on a level-playing field so as to facilitate removal of restrictive trade barriers and creation of an environment that allows the "free and fair" trade in the region.
7. Promote closer cooperation in energy including sharing of power surpluses and shortages.

ANNEXURE I

Text of the Tashkent Declaration (Signed on January 10, 1966)

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.

I. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent and, indeed, the interests of the people so India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.

II. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 24 February, 1966, to the positions they held prior to 5 August, 1965, and both sides all observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line.

III. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

IV. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

V. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Government shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse.

VI. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.

VII. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

VIII. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue the discussion of questions relating to the problems of refugees and eviction/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.

IX. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan recorded their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality.

ANNEXURE II

Text of the Simla Agreement (July 2, 1972)

1. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.

In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:

(i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries.

(ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peace and harmonious relations.

(iii) That the prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful coexistence respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty and noninterference in each others internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

(iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means.

(v) That they shall always respect each others national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality.

(vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

2. Both governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information

as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.

3. In order to progressively restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that:

(i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land, including border posts, and air links, including over flights.

(ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.

(iii) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.

(iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted. In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.

4. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the governments agree that:

(i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.

(ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

(iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.

5. This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

6. Both governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that in the meanwhile the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Sd/-
(Indara Gandhi)
Prime Minister
Republic of India

Sd/-
(Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto)
President
Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Simla, 2 July 1972.

ANNEXURE III

Joint Statement between Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad and Indian Foreign Secretary Salman Haider on June 23, 1997 at Islamabad

1. The Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad and Shri Salman Haider met in Islamabad on 19-23 June, 1997.

2. During his stay in Islamabad, the Indian Foreign Secretary was received by the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Indian Foreign Secretary also called on the Foreign Minister Mr. Gauhar Ayub Khan.

3. As decided at their meeting in New Delhi in March 1997 and as directed by their respective Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan continued their wide-ranging and comprehensive dialogue on all outstanding issues between the two countries with each side elaborating its respective position. The discussions were held in a cordial and constructive atmosphere. It was also agreed that both sides would take all possible steps to prevent hostile propaganda and provocative actions against each other.

4. With the objective of promoting a friendly and harmonious relationship between Pakistan and India, the Foreign Secretaries have agreed as follows:-

   (i) to address all outstanding issues of concern to both sides including, *inter alia:*

      (a) Peace and security, including CBMs

      (b) Jammu and Kashmir

      (c) Siachen

      (d) Wullar Barrage Project/Tulbul Navgation Project

      (e) Sir Creek

      (f) Terrorism and drug-trafficking

      (g) Economic and Commercial Cooperation

      (h) Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields

   (ii) to set up a mechanism, including working groups at appropriate levels, to address all these issues in an integrated manner. The issues at (a) and (b) above will be dealt with at the level of Foreign Secretaries who will also coordinate and monitor the progress of work of all the working groups.

5. The two Foreign Secretaries also had a preliminary exchange of views on the composition of the working groups and their methodology. It was decided to continue the consideration of this matter through diplomatic channels.
6. The next round of Foreign Secretary level talks will take place in New Delhi in September 1997.

June 23, 1997, Islamabad

ANNEXURE IV

The text of the Joint Statement issued at the end of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Lahore

In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan from 20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan received the Indian Prime Minister at the Wagah border on 20th February 1999. A banquet in honor of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Minar-e-Pakistan, Mausoleum of Allama Iqabal, Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in honor of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor's House.

The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that:

1. The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues.
2. The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions.
3. The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology, in particular for tackling the problems of Y2K.
4. The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalizing the visa and travel regime.
5. The two sides shall appoint a two member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWs.

They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a Bus Service between Lahore and New Delhi, the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports.

Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries.

The two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.

Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee extended an invitation to Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, to visit India on mutually convenient dates.

Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, thanked Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit.

Text of the Memorandum of Understanding

Signed by the Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Raghunath, and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, in Lahore on February 21, 1999

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan:

- Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter;
- Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit;
- Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23rd September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;
- Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries;

Have on this day, agreed to the following:-

1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each, other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war

between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two side shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.

4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests.
5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.
6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.
7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors-General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.
8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.

Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid 1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements.

Done at Lahore on 21st February 1999 in the presence of Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

(K. Raghunath)

Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India

(Shamshad Ahmad)

Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Text of the Lahore Declaration

Signed by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on February 21, 1999.

The Prime Ministers of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of India:

Countries,

- Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress and prosperity for their peoples,
- Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the people of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future,
- Recognizing that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries add to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;
- Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence;
- Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit;
- Committed to the objectives of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
- Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment;
- Recalling their agreement of 23 September 1998, that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Have agreed that their respective Governments:

1. Shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
2. Shall refrain for intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.
3. Shall intensify their compositor and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.
4. Shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.

CHAPTER 7

THE UNITED NATIONS & INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

I. THE UNITED NATIONS

The term "United Nations", coined by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was first used in the "Declaration by United Nations" of 1 January 1942, during the Second World War, when representatives of 26 nations pledged their governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers. Declarations signed at wartime Allied conferences in 1943 espoused the idea of the UN, and in 1944, representatives of the major Allied powers met to elaborate on the plans at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Those and later talks outlined the organization's proposed purposes, membership, organs, and ideals in regards to peace, security, and cooperation.

Dumbarton Oaks Conference

The principles of the world organization-to-be were thus laid down at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference private mansion in Washington, D. C. The conference attended by representatives of China, Great Britain, the USSR and the United States were completed on October 7, 1944, and a proposal for the structuring of the world organization was submitted by the four powers to the governments and to the peoples of all countries for their consideration.

According to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, four principal bodies were to constitute the organization to be known as the United Nations. There was to be a General Assembly composed of all the members, an eleven-member Security Council, five of them designated as permanent members and the other six to be chosen from the remaining members by the General Assembly to hold office for two years. The third body was an International Court of Justice, and the fourth a Secretariat. An Economic and Social Council, working under the authority of the General Assembly, was also provided for.

The essence of the plan was that responsibility for preventing future war should be conferred upon the Security Council. The General Assembly could study, discuss and make recommendations in order to promote international cooperation and adjust situations likely to impair welfare. It could consider problems of cooperation in maintaining peace and security, and disarmament, in their general principles.

But it could not make recommendations on any matter being considered by the Security Council, and all questions on which action was necessary had to be referred to the Security Council. The actual method of voting in the Security Council -- an all-important question -- was left open at Dumbarton Oaks for future discussion.

Another important feature of the Dumbarton Oaks plan was that member states were to place armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council in its task of preventing war and suppressing acts of aggression. The absence of such force, it was generally agreed, had been a fatal weakness in the older League of Nations machinery for preserving peace. The provision for putting armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council was considered a notable improvement over the Covenant of the League of Nations.

States first established international organizations to cooperate on specific matters.

The forerunner of the United Nations was the League of Nations, an organization conceived in similar circumstances during the World War I, and established in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles "to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security." The International Labour Organization was also created under the Treaty of Versailles as an affiliated agency of the League. The League of Nations ceased its activities after failing to prevent the World War II.

In April 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States, in August-October 1944. The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 by the representatives of the 50 countries. Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the original 51 member states.

The UN officially came into existence on October 24, 1945 upon ratification of the Charter by the five permanent members of the Security Council — France, the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States — and by a majority of the other 46 signatories. The first meetings of the General Assembly, with 51 nations represented, and the Security Council, took place in Westminster Central Hall in London in January 1946. United Nations Day is celebrated on 24 October each year.

The organization is financed from assessed and voluntary contributions from its member states, and has six official languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. The United Nations is central to global efforts to solve problems that challenge humanity. Cooperating in this effort are more than 30 affiliated organizations, known together as the UN system.

II. THE WORKING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations was established on October 24, 1945 by 51 countries committed to preserving peace through international cooperation and collective security. Due to its unique international character, and the powers vested in its founding Charter, the Organization can take action on a wide range of issues, and provide a forum for its Member States to express their views, through the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and other bodies and committees. Today, nearly every nation in the world belongs to the United Nations: membership totals 193 countries.

When States become Members of the United Nations, they agree to accept the obligations of the UN Charter, an international treaty that sets out basic principles of international relations. The United Nations is not a world government and it does not make laws. It does, however, provide the means to help resolve international conflicts and formulate policies on matters affecting all of us. At the United Nations, all the Member States — large and small, rich and poor, with differing political views and social systems — have a voice and a vote in this process.

According to the Charter, **the United Nations has four purposes**: to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights; and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. The United Nations also provides a platform for discussing international economic and social issues to evolve consensus on their solutions. The work of the United Nations reaches every corner of the globe. Although best known for peacekeeping, peace building, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance, there are many other ways the United Nations and its System (specialized agencies, funds and programmes) affect our lives and make the world a better place.

The Organization works on a broad range of fundamental issues, from sustainable development, environment and refugees protection, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, to promoting democracy, human rights, gender equality and the advancement of women, governance, economic and social development and international health, clearing landmines, expanding food production, and more, in order to achieve its goals and coordinate efforts for a safer world for this and future generations.

The United Nations has six main organs. Five of them — the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat — are based at UN Headquarters in New York. The sixth, the International Court of Justice, is located at The Hague in the Netherlands.

1. The General Assembly

All United Nations Member States are represented in the General Assembly — a "parliament of nations" which meets regularly and in special sessions to consider the world's most pressing problems. Each Member State has one vote. Decisions on such key issues as international peace and security, admitting new members and the UN budget are decided by two-thirds majority. Other matters are decided by simple majority. In recent years, a special effort has been made to reach decisions through consensus, rather than by taking a formal vote. The Assembly cannot force action by any State, but its recommendations are an important indication of world opinion and represent the moral authority of the community of nations.

2. The Security Council

The United Nations Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Council may convene at any time, whenever peace is threatened. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to carry out the Council's decisions.

There are 15 Council members. Five of these — China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States — are permanent members. The other 10 are elected by the General Assembly for two-year term. Member States continue to discuss changes in Council membership and working methods to reflect today's political and economic realities. Decisions of the Council require nine yes votes. Except in votes on procedural questions, a decision cannot be taken if there is a no vote, or veto, by a permanent member.

When the Council considers a threat to international peace, it first explores ways to settle the dispute peacefully. It may suggest principles for a settlement or undertake mediation. In the event of fighting, the Council tries to secure a ceasefire. It may send a peacekeeping mission to help the parties maintain the truce and to keep opposing forces apart.

The Council can take measures to enforce its decisions. It can impose economic sanctions or order an arms embargo. On rare occasions, the Council has authorized Member States to use "all necessary means," including collective military action, to see that its decisions are carried out. The Council also makes recommendations to the General Assembly on the appointment of a new secretary-general and on the admission of new Members to the United Nations.

3. The Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council, under the overall authority of the General Assembly, coordinates the economic and social work of the United Nations and the United Nations family of organizations. As the central forum for discussing international economic and social issues and for formulating policy recommendations, the Council plays a key role in fostering international cooperation for development. It also consults with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), thereby maintaining a vital link between the United Nations and civil society.

The Council has 54 members, elected by the General Assembly for three-year term. It meets throughout the year and holds a major session in July, during which a high-level meeting of ministers discusses major economic, social and humanitarian issues.

The Council's subsidiary bodies meet regularly and report back to it. The Commission on Human Rights, for example, monitors the observance of human rights throughout the world. Other bodies focus on such issues as social development, the status of women, crime prevention, narcotic drugs and sustainable development. Five regional commissions promote economic development and cooperation in their respective regions.

4. The Trusteeship Council

The Trusteeship Council was established to provide international supervision for 11 Trust Territories administered by seven Member States and ensure that adequate steps were taken to prepare the Territories for self-government or independence.

By 1994, all Trust Territories had attained self-government or independence, either as separate States or by joining neighbouring independent countries. The last to do so was the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands — Palau — which was administered by the United States and became the 185th United Nations Member State. Its work completed, the Trusteeship Council now consists of the five permanent members of the Security Council. It has amended its rules of procedure to allow it to meet as and when the occasion may require.

5. The International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, located in The Hague is the main judicial organ of the UN. Its 15 judges are elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council, voting independently and concurrently. The Court decides disputes between countries, based on the voluntary participation of the States concerned. If a state agrees to participate in a proceeding, it is obligated to comply with the Court's decision. The Court also gives advisory opinions to the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

6. The Secretariat

The Secretariat carries out the substantive and administrative work of the United Nations as directed by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the other organs. At its head is the secretary-general, who provides overall administrative guidance. The Secretariat consists of departments and offices with a total staff of about 7,500 under the regular budget, drawn from some 170 countries. Duty stations include United Nations Headquarters in New York, as well as United Nations offices in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi and other locations.

III. THE UN SYSTEM

The **United Nations System** consists of the United Nations, its subsidiary organs (including the separately-administered funds and programmes), the specialized agencies, and affiliated organizations. Besides the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group, there are 13 other independent organizations known as "**specialized agencies**" and linked to the UN through cooperative agreements.

These agencies, among them the World Health Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization, are autonomous bodies created by inter-governmental agreement. They have wide-ranging international responsibilities in the economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related fields. Some of them, like the International Labour Organization and the Universal Postal Union, are older than the United Nations itself.

In addition, a number of United Nations offices, programmes and funds — such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) — work to improve the economic and social condition of people around the world. They report to the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. All these organizations have their own governing bodies, budgets and secretariats. Together with the United Nations, they are known as the United Nations family, or the United Nations system. Together, they provide technical assistance and other forms of practical help in virtually all economic and social areas.

The executive heads of some of the United Nations System organizations and the World Trade Organization, which is not formally part of the United Nations System, have seats on the **United Nations System Chief Executives' Board for Coordination** (CEB). This body, chaired by the secretary-general of the United Nations, meets twice a year to coordinate the work of the organizations of the United Nations System.

Specialized agencies may or may not have been originally created by the United Nations, but they are incorporated into the United Nations System by the United Nations Economic and Social Council acting under Articles 57 and 63 of the United Nations Charter. There are many other intergovernmental organizations that have concluded cooperation agreements with the United Nations.

In terms of cooperation structures, some agreements come very close to the relationship agreements concluded under Articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter with the specialized agencies, but due to Charter requirements that the agencies deal with "economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields", organizations with such agreements are not formally specialized agencies of the United Nations. The IAEA established such an agreement with the UN in 1957, and the OPCW and the CTBTO used this model for agreements of their own with the United Nations. The United Nations System now consists of the following autonomous institutions, specialized agencies and affiliated organizations:

(a) Autonomous Institutions

1. **IMF (International Monetary Fund):** Facilitates international monetary cooperation and financial stability and provides a permanent forum for consultation, advice and assistance on financial issues.

2. **World Bank Group:** Provides loans and technical assistance to developing countries to reduce poverty and advance sustainable economic growth. The World Bank Group consists of five legally separate but affiliated institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Development Association (IDA), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

(b) Specialised Agencies

1. **FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):** Works to improve agricultural productivity and food security, and to better the living standards of rural populations.
2. **ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):** Sets international standards for the safety, security and efficiency of air transport, and serves as the coordinator for international cooperation in all areas of civil aviation.
3. **IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development):** Mobilizes financial resources to raise food production and nutrition levels among the poor in developing countries.
4. **ILO (International Labour Organization):** Formulates policies and programmes to improve working conditions and employment opportunities, and sets labour standards used by countries around the world.
5. **IMO (International Maritime Organization):** Works to improve international shipping procedures, raise standards in marine safety and reduce marine pollution by ships.

6. **ITU (International Telecommunication Union):** Fosters international cooperation to improve telecommunications of all kinds, coordinates usage of radio and TV frequencies, promotes safety measures and conducts research.
7. **UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):** Promotes education for all, cultural development, protection of the world's natural and cultural heritage, international cooperation in science, press freedom and communication.
8. **UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization):** Promotes the industrial advancement of developing countries through technical assistance, advisory services and training.
9. **UPU (Universal Postal Union):** Establishes international regulations for postal services, provides technical assistance and promotes cooperation in postal matters.
10. **WHO (World Health Organization):** Coordinates programmes aimed at solving health problems and the attainment by all people of the highest possible level of health. It works in such areas as immunization, health education and the provision of essential drugs.
11. **WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization):** Promotes international protection of intellectual property and fosters cooperation on copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs and patents.
12. **WMO (World Meteorological Organization):** Promotes scientific research on the Earth's atmosphere and on climate change, and facilitates the global exchange of meteorological data.
13. **WTO (World Tourism Organization):** Serves as a global forum on tourism policy issues and a practical source of tourism know-how.

(c) Affilitaed Organisations

1. **IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency):** An autonomous inter-governmental organization established in 1957 under the aegis of the UN. Based in Vienna (Austria), it works for the safe and peaceful uses of atomic energy. Due to historical reasons and political nature of its work which is outside the purview of Articles 57 and 63 of the United Nations Charter, the IAEA is not a specialized agency. Instead, its relationship to the United Nations is governed by a special agreement as well as by its statute that commits the IAEA to report annually to the General Assembly and, when appropriate, to the Security Council.

2. **OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons):** The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is an inter-governmental organization, located in The Hague, Netherlands. The organization promotes and verifies the adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention which prohibits the use of chemical weapons and requires their destruction.
3. **WTO (World Trade Organization:** Established in Geneva, Switzerland, WTO deals with global trade issues.

IV. THE UNITED NATIONS MANDATES

Conflict Resolution

Preserving world peace is a central purpose of the United Nations. Under the Charter, Member States agree to settle disputes by peaceful means and refrain from threatening or using force against other States.

Over the years, the United Nations has played a major role in helping defuse international crises and in resolving protracted conflicts. It has undertaken complex operations involving peace-making, peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance. It has worked to prevent conflicts from breaking out. And after a conflict, it has increasingly undertaken action to address the root causes of war and lay the foundation for durable peace.

The United Nations claims to have achieved dramatic results which include helping defuse the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the Middle East crisis in 1973. In 1988, a UN-sponsored peace settlement ended the Iran-Iraq war, and the following year UN-sponsored negotiations led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In the 1990s, the United Nations was instrumental in restoring sovereignty to Kuwait and played a major role in ending civil wars in Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mozambique, and resolving or containing conflict in various other countries.

The United Nations also played an important role in facilitating the right of self-determination for the people of East Timor in 1999 and overseeing their transition to independence on May 20, 2002 as an independent state of Timor-Leste. And when terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, the Security Council acted quickly – adopting a wide-ranging resolution which obligates States to ensure that any person who participates in financing, planning, preparing, perpetrating or supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice.

Disarmament

Halting the spread of arms and reducing and eventually eliminating all weapons of mass destruction are major goals of the United Nations. The United Nations has been an ongoing forum for disarmament negotiations, making recommendations and initiating studies. It supports multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and in other international bodies. These negotiations have produced such agreements as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996) and treaties establishing nuclear-free zones.

Other treaties prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons (1992) and bacteriological weapons (1972); ban nuclear weapons from the seabed and ocean floor (1971) and outer space (1967); and ban or restrict other types of weapons. The United Nations encourages all nations to adhere to this and other treaties banning destructive weapons of war. The United Nations is also supporting efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons — the weapons of choice in the vast majority of conflicts worldwide.

The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, through a system of safeguards agreements, ensures that nuclear materials and equipment intended for peaceful uses are not diverted for military purposes. And in The Hague, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons collects information on chemical facilities worldwide and conducts routine inspections to ensure adherence to the chemical weapons convention.

Peace Building

The United Nations is increasingly undertaking activities that address the underlying causes of conflict. Some of these activities, such as the UN's supervision of the 1989 elections in Namibia, mine-clearance programmes in Mozambique and police training in Haiti, take place within the framework of a United Nations peace-keeping operation and may continue when the operation withdraws. Others are requested by governments — as in Guinea-Bissau, where the United Nations maintains a peace-building support office.

Development assistance is a key element of peace-building. In cooperation with United Nations agencies, donor countries, host governments and NGOs, the United Nations works to support good governance, civil law and order, elections and human rights in countries struggling to deal with the aftermath of conflict. At the same time, it helps these countries rebuild administrative, health, educational and other services disrupted by war.

Pace-keeping

The Security Council sets up United Nations peacekeeping operations and defines their scope and mandate in its efforts to maintain international peace and security. Most operations involve military duties, such as observing a cease-fire or establishing a buffer zone while negotiators seek a long-term solution. Others may require civilian police or other civilian personnel to help organize elections or monitor human rights. Operations have also been deployed to monitor peace agreements in cooperation with the peace-keeping forces of regional organizations.

Since the United Nations first deployed peacekeepers in 1948, nearly 130 countries have voluntarily provided up to one million soldiers, police officers and civilians. They have served, along with thousands of civilians, in some 60 peace-keeping operations. As of August 2015, 121 countries were contributing nearly 67,000 uniformed personnel — a record number. Pakistan is one of the major contributors to UN's peace-keeping operations.

Peacekeeping operations may last for a few months or continue for decades. The United Nations operation at the cease-fire line (Line of Control) between India and Pakistan in the disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir, for example, was established in 1949, and United Nations peace-keepers have been in Cyprus since 1964. In contrast, the United Nations was able to complete its 1994 mission in the Aouzou Strip between Libya and Chad in a little over a month.

Peace-making

The United Nations peace-making brings hostile parties to agreement through diplomatic means. The Security Council, in its efforts to maintain international peace and security, may recommend ways to avoid conflict or restore or secure peace — through negotiation, for example, or recourse to the International Court of Justice.

The secretary-general plays an important role in peacemaking. The secretary-general under Article 99 of the UN Charter may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that appears to threaten international peace and security, use *good offices* to carry out mediation or exercise *quiet diplomacy* behind the scenes — either personally or through special envoys. The secretary-general also undertakes *preventive diplomacy* aimed at resolving disputes before they escalate. The Charter's Chapter VI lays down the various modalities of peaceful settlement of disputes.

Two longest-outstanding disputes on the United Nation's agenda, namely, the Arab-Israeli conflict over the Palestine Issue and Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan over the Kashmiri people's right of self-determination, however, continue to remain unresolved. In both cases, the United Nations concern over the need for settlement spans more than six decades with five wars in the Middle East and three wars on Kashmir.

The Middle East Issue

The United Nations has defined principles for a just and lasting peace, including two benchmark Security Council resolutions — 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) — which remain the basis for an overall settlement. The United Nations has supported other initiatives aimed at solving underlying political problems, and has dispatched various peacekeeping operations to the region. The United Nation's first military observer group was set up in 1948 and maintains its presence in the area to this day. The United Nation's first peace-keeping force was also set up there, during the Suez crisis of 1956.

Two peace-keeping forces are currently in the region. One, established in 1974, maintains an area of separation on the Golan Heights between Israeli and Syrian troops. The other, established in 1978, contributes to stability in southern Lebanon and in 2000 verified the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area.

On the diplomatic front, the United Nations actively participates in efforts to reach a negotiated solution as a member of the "Quartet" — comprising the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and the Russian Federation. In 2003, a "Road Map" to a permanent two-State solution, presented by the Quartet, was accepted by both parties but has not yet been implemented. Meanwhile, the United Nations continues, through the actions of the Security Council and other bodies, as well as of the secretary-general and his Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, to promote a peaceful resolution of the situation.

In Iraq, following the most active phase of the war there, the Security Council, on August 14, 2003, established the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Its aim was to coordinate humanitarian and reconstruction aid and assist with the political processes aimed at establishing an internationally recognized sovereign Iraqi government. Days later, on August 19, the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad was the target of a terrorist attack that resulted in 22 deaths, including the head of mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and more than 150 injured.

Following the attack, the secretary-general withdrew most United Nations international personnel based in Baghdad, maintaining only a small team to provide essential humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, the UN continues to provide assistance from both within and outside Iraq, including the delivery of food, water and health care throughout the country — relying principally on its Iraqi staff.

The end of occupation and the formal restoration of Iraqi sovereignty on June 28, 2004 marked a new phase in Iraq's transitional process, leading to direct elections on January 30, 2005.

With the support of UNAMI, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division, and despite the constant threat of violence, Iraqis turned out to exercise their political rights. .

The Kashmir Issue

The Kashmir dispute is the oldest unresolved international conflict in the world today. In fact, it was India which took the issue to the UN Security Council after the Kashmiri people revolted against the Hindu ruler's illegal accession to India in violation of the June 3 Partition Plan. The UN Security Council in its resolutions of 1948 and 1949 established self-determination as the governing principal for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. This is the world body's commitment to the people of Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan had agreed that the Kashmiri people will exercise their right to self-determination through a fair and impartial plebiscite to be held under the United Nations auspices.

The Council explicitly and by implications, rejected India's claim that Kashmir is legally Indian territory. The issue remained active in the UN Security Council till 1957. In the '50s, as a follow-up to the UN Security Council resolutions, the UN special representative Sir Owen Dixon tried to negotiate a settlement on his "partial plebiscite and partition plan." It didn't work. In time, this dispute and the United Nation's involvement in its solution got embroiled in the Cold War politics and the Russian vetoes killed any further prospects of useful consideration by the UN Security Council.

Pakistan upholds the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self-determination in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. On the other hand, India has been perpetrating atrocities against the Kashmir people and by now more than 10,000 Kashmiris have been killed by the Indian occupation forces. Indian state terrorism in Occupied Kashmir has become even more pronounced in the post-September 11 phase. India has tried to use the global sentiment following the September 11 events to paint the Kashmiri freedom struggle as terrorism and its own repression of that indigenous freedom struggle as a means to fight against terrorism.

In an attempt to malign Pakistan and the Kashmiri freedom movement, India has stepped up its propaganda of cross LoC infiltration from Pakistan and our involvement in so-called cross border terrorism. These allegations are nothing but a ploy to shift focus from the massive violation of human rights being perpetrated by the Indian Security Forces in IOK. While making such baseless allegations, India refuses to allow a neutral mechanism to investigate these charges. Pakistan has all along emphasized the need to further strengthen and enhance the monitoring of the LoC by the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). UNMOGIP is the United Nation's oldest peace-keeping operation.

Human Rights and International Law

Through United Nations efforts, governments have concluded many multilateral agreements that make the world a safer, healthier place with greater opportunity and justice for all of us. This comprehensive body of international law, including human rights law, is one of the United Nation's great achievements.

Human Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly in 1948, sets out basic rights and freedoms to which all women and men are entitled — among them the right to life, liberty and nationality; right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; the right to work and to be educated; the right to food and housing; and the right to take part in government. These rights are legally binding by virtue of two international covenants, to which most States are parties. One covenant deals with economic, social and cultural rights and the other with civil and political rights. Together with the Declaration, they constitute the International Bill of Human Rights.

The Declaration laid the groundwork for some 80 conventions and declarations on human rights, including the two international covenants; conventions to eliminate racial discrimination and discrimination against women; conventions on the rights of the child, against torture and other degrading treatment of punishment, the status of refugees and the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide; and declarations on the rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, the right to development, and the rights of human rights defenders.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who coordinates The United Nations human rights activities, works with governments to improve their observance of human rights, seeks to prevent violations, and works closely with the United Nations human rights mechanisms. The UN Commission on Human Rights which since 2006 has been replaced by UN Human Rights Council as an inter-governmental body within the United Nations system is now responsible for strengthening the promotion of and protection of human rights around the world and for addressing situations of human rights violations and make recommendations on them.

Promoting respect for human rights is increasingly central to United Nations development assistance. In particular, the right to development is seen as part of a dynamic process which integrates civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, and by which the well-being of all individuals in a society is improved. Key to the enjoyment of the right to development is the eradication of poverty, a major United Nations goal. The Human Rights Council meets at the United Nations Office at Geneva and is made up of 47 United Nations Member States which are elected by the UN General Assembly.

International Law

The United Nations Charter specifically calls on the United Nations to undertake the progressive codification and development of international law. The over 500 conventions, treaties and standards resulting from this work have provided a framework for promoting international peace and security and economic and social development. States that ratify these conventions are legally bound by them.

The International Law Commission prepares drafts on topics of international law which can then be incorporated into conventions and opened for ratification by States. Some of these conventions form the basis for law governing relations among States, such as the convention on diplomatic relations or the convention regulating the use of international watercourses. The UN Commission on International Trade Law develops rules and guidelines designed to harmonize and facilitate laws regulating international trade. The United Nations has also pioneered the development of international environmental law.

The Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which addresses the problem of global warming, went into effect on February 16, 2005. It requires industrialized countries to reduce their combined emissions of six major greenhouse gases during the five-year period from 2008 to 2012 to below 1990 levels. As of its entry into force, 140 countries had ratified the accord.

The Convention on the Law of the Sea seeks to ensure equitable access by all countries to the riches of the oceans, protect them from pollution and facilitate freedom of navigation and research.

The Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs is the key international treaty against drug trafficking.

The United Nations remains at the centre of international efforts to create a legal framework against terrorism. More than a dozen global conventions on the issue have been negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations, including the 1979 Convention against the Taking of Hostages, the 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and work is in progress on a comprehensive anti-terrorism treaty.

In 2001, following the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States, the Security Council adopted a wide-ranging anti-terrorist resolution, under the enforcement provisions of the UN Charter. It included provisions to prevent the financing of terrorism, criminalize the collection of funds for such purposes, and to immediately freeze terrorist financial assets.

Massive violations of humanitarian law during the fighting in the former Yugoslavia led the Security Council in 1993 to establish an international tribunal to try persons accused of war crimes in that conflict. In 1994, the Council set up a second tribunal to hear cases involving accusations of genocide in Rwanda. The tribunals have found several defendants guilty and sentenced them to prison. The Rwanda Tribunal in 1998 handed down the first-ever verdict by an international court on the crime of genocide, as well as the first-ever sentence for that crime.

A key United Nations goal — an international mechanism to impose accountability in the face of mass violations of human rights — was realized in 1998 when governments agreed to establish an International Criminal Court. The Court provides a means for punishing perpetrators of genocide and other crimes against humanity.

Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian disasters can occur anywhere, at any time. Whether the cause be flood, drought, earthquake or conflict. A humanitarian disaster means lost of lives, displaced populations, communities incapable of sustaining themselves and great suffering. In the face of disaster, the United Nations family of organizations supplies food, shelter, medicines and logistical support to the victims — most of them children, women and the elderly.

To pay for this assistance and deliver it to those in need, the United Nations has raised billions of dollars from international donors. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is the executive organ of humanitarian machinery and is headed by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, who also serves as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs who chairs a committee of all the key humanitarian bodies that include UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP) and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Other United Nations agencies are also represented, as are major non-governmental and inter-governmental humanitarian organizations, including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Promoting Development

One of the United Nation's central mandates is the promotion of higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development. As much as 70% of the work of the United Nations system is devoted to accomplishing this mandate. Guiding the work is the belief that eradicating poverty and improving the well-being of people everywhere are necessary steps in creating conditions for lasting world peace.

The United Nations has unique strengths in promoting development. Its presence is global and its comprehensive mandate spans social, economic and emergency needs. The United Nations does not represent any particular national or commercial interest. When major policy decisions are taken, all countries, rich and poor, have a voice.

The United Nations has played a crucial role in building international consensus on action for development. Beginning in 1960, the General Assembly has helped set priorities and goals through a series of 10-year International Development Strategies. While focusing on issues of particular concern, the Decades have consistently stressed the need for progress on all aspects of social and economic development.

The United Nations continues formulating new development objectives in such key areas as sustainable development, the advancement of women, human rights, environmental protection and good governance – along with programmes to make them a reality. A series of major international conferences and summits held in the 1990s contributed to developing a global consensus on multi-sectoral issues of development and on the need to address them through global partnership.

Three major United Nations conferences of the new century: Millennium Summit (September 2000), Financing for Development Conference at Monterrey Mexico, (March 2002) and World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (September 2002) brought the development agenda into sharper global focus. At the Millennium Summit in September 2000, world leaders adopted a set of Millennium Development Goals through a set of measurable targets to be achieved by the year 2015. Among these are: halving the proportion of those who earn less than a dollar a day; achieving universal primary education; eliminating gender disparity at all levels of education; and dramatically reducing child mortality while increasing maternal health. The principal **MDGs** are as listed below:

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.
2. Achieve universal primary education.
3. Promote gender equality and empower women.
4. Reduce child mortality.
5. Improve maternal health.

6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.
7. Ensure environmental sustainability.
8. Develop a global partnership for development.

Close coordination between the United Nations and the specialized agencies is ensured through the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), comprising the secretary-general, the heads of the specialized agencies, funds and programmes, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Trade Organization. The United Nations programmes and funds work under the authority of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to carry out the United Nation's economic and social mandate.

The UN Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nation's largest provider of grants for sustainable human development worldwide, is actively involved in attaining the Millennium Development Goals. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is the leading United Nations organization working for the long-term survival, protection and development of children. Active in nearly 160 countries and territories, its programmes focus on immunization, primary health care, nutrition and basic education.

The World Food Programme (WFP) is the largest international food aid organization for both emergency relief and development. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) is the largest international provider of population assistance. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) works to promote environmental practices everywhere, and the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) assists people living in health-threatening housing conditions.

To increase the participation of developing countries in the global economy, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) promotes international trade. UNCTAD also works with the World Trade Organization (WTO), a separate entity, in assisting developing countries' exports through the International Trade Centre.

V. SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

No.	Name	Country	Tenure
1.	Trygve Lie	Norway	Feb. 1, 1946 - April 10, 1952
2.	Dag Hammarskjöld	Sweden	April 10, 1953 – Sept. 18, 1961
3.	U. Thant	Burma	Nov. 30, 1961 – Dec. 31, 1971
4.	Kurt Waldheim	Austria	Jan. 1, 1972 – Dec. 31, 1981
5.	Javier Pérez de Cuéllar	Peru	Jan. 1, 1982 – Dec. 31, 1991
6.	Boutros Boutros-Ghali	Egypt	Jan. 1, 1992 – Dec. 31, 1996

7.	Kofi Annan		[illegible] – Dec. 31, 2006
8.	Ban Ki-moon	South Korea	Jan. 1, 2007 -

VI. UNITED NATIONS' CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Is the United Nations heading the League way or will it survive the ongoing onslaught on its credibility and authority? A look at the rationale and history of the United Nations and its performance in terms of the Charter obligations, since its inception 70 years ago, might facilitate an answer to this two-in-one question.

Mankind's last best hope

Born out of the three great upheavals that gripped the world in the first half of the twentieth century—the two great wars and the great depression—the United Nations was meant to save the world from such disasters. It was established to pursue the twin goals of peace and prosperity. For the realization of these goals, it was hailed as "mankind's last best hope". The United Nations was also meant to provide a moral edifice for the re-ordering of the global system, which would be based on justice and equity and which would be governed by rules, laws, values and cooperation. Unfortunately, the world that ensued was neither just nor equal.

The United Nations, with its universal recognition and authority, was to imprint what is "good" and combat what is "evil". Multilateral cooperation was to be the norm for resolving "all" global problems. The way to a new and better world was to be pioneered by the United Nations, which had to be based on certain fundamental definitions and assumptions. First and foremost, the United Nation's worldview was to be "universal" and "pluralistic". Concepts of "sovereign equality of states, self-determination, human rights, fundamental freedoms and collective security" were integral to the Charter of the United Nations, heralding the dawn of a peaceful, democratic and egalitarian age.

The United Nations also signified the dawn of the era of decolonization, as the age of empires and colonialism had run its course. Europe, devastated by the great wars had lost its historic ability to shape the world. In the western hemisphere, the centre of power had shifted across the Atlantic from the "old" to the "new" world. As a universal organization, the United Nations came to be regarded as an instrument of international legitimacy because of the "belief" in its ideals by the nations of the world.

Hard realities, however, soon intervened to interrupt the rebuilding of the world on a moral edifice. The exigencies of the

Cold War became new imperatives in the realm of realpolitik. In a polarized world, the United Nations became another arena for the clash of ideologies and political confrontation between the two hostile military alliances. In those years of "chilling" confrontation between the US and the USSR, the developing and non-aligned countries bore the torch of the United Nations. The defence of its principles and pursuit of its ideals for the next fifty years were to be in the hands of the newly emergent nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America, which were imbued with the idealism that had charged their struggle for deliverance from the dark days of colonialism.

Self-determination

In the early decades of the '50 and '60 , the people of Kashmir, Palestine, South Africa and Namibia and scores of others won legitimacy through political and moral endorsement at the United Nations for their just causes. Self-determination was the cardinal principle of the United Nations that shaped the world in those decades. The UN General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council were important bodies that made a deep imprint on the geopolitics of the world. The Security Council, responsible under the Charter for maintenance of international peace and security, fell victim to the Cold War. Political and strategic expediencies of the major powers kept it from taking positions based on principles.

Major global issues on which the United Nations had taken a clear position through Security Council resolutions remained on its agenda without any follow-up action. The unresolved questions of Palestine and Kashmir continue to pose threat to global peace and security. The veto power blocked any meaningful progress towards implementation of the Security Council's resolutions. For all practical purposes, it was the major powers and not the United Nations that called shots in matters of peace and security.

From Moral to a Nuclear Order

Global security order came to be shaped by nuclear weapons, which proliferated vertically and laterally to give the erstwhile imperial powers a sense of "destiny" and "invincibility". The old practitioners of power politics re-emerged on the global political scene, stamping out the "idealism" of the United Nations, which became an instrument for these strategic players to be used for their own narrow ends. Ironically, the defence of the idealism and moral values remained with the developing and non-aligned countries.

Over the years, through the United Nations forums, they demanded an end to the arms race, nuclear disarmament, general and complete disarmament. They wanted the primacy of the "moral" order reshaped and restored and looked at the United

Nations as an instrum [illegible] ty'. They genuinely believed in its purpose.

The major powers, on the other hand, sought to monopolize the international security order by basing it on nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was the first effort to build a legal regime that would eventually be used to legitimize possession of these weapons by the five, while denying them to others. In that sense, the NPT was a quasi moral/political expedient. Nuclear weapons became the cornerstone of the global security architecture.

Of Poverty and Wealth

The '70s were still heady days for the United Nations or for those who actually believed in its vision. The poor and dispossessed nations, emerging from centuries of exploitation of their lands by the colonial powers, sought to assert their stakes in the global economy by demanding a new international economic order. The resource rich countries, producers of raw materials and primary products realized the inefficacy of political rhetoric and their claims for justice as virtually nothing came out from the United Nation's economic agenda. The debate and the acrimony only proved that pious hopes and idealism were no substitute for pragmatism and power.

Despite scores of resolutions on global economic inequalities and the need to redress them; on removing the barriers to markets and for transfer of technology; to build a partnership for universalizing affluence and elimination poverty, hunger and disease, nothing could be done to realize a new egalitarian economic order. The United Nations development programmes were poorly funded and in most cases heavily dependent on major donors for their strategic direction, accomplished little in reducing poverty. The UN system developed its own institutional interests that also materially coloured its development programmes.

With UNDP in the lead, the United Nations family of agencies, bodies and programmes, made their presence felt in capitals of the developing countries. In most cases, their capacity in programme delivery remained at levels, which were less than optimum. Their performance was not really reflected at the national or global levels. Bureaucratic procedures and vested institutional interests dictated subservience to donor guidance, encouraged corruption by local functionaries and took out merit and objectivity from the United Nation's developmental assistance philosophy. At the same time, the United Nations bodies of great importance to the developing countries continued to face budgetary and resource problems.

The Bretton Woods System had an existence of its own. It had its own philosophy and own logic, which had very little to do with the United Nations. But in recent years, the United Nations has been able to develop close cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF as major institutional stakeholders in United Nation's global development pursuits.

Humanitarian Burden

In their formative phase, the United Nations bodies and agencies responsible for humanitarian work accomplished their mandates. The UNHCR, in particular, played an extremely important role in caring for refugees. While the human rights machinery was imbued with idealism, its inter-governmental forums fell victim to the all-pervasive politicization of the system.

The specialized agencies, such as the WHO, ITU, ILO, WMO, FAO, etc. also did commendable work in their respective areas of competence but always remained vulnerable to manipulation by major donors for their political ends.

Era of Unipolarity

The end of the Cold War had provided an opportunity to revert to the concept of collective security. But the Security Council after having been used to punish Iraq for its aggression against Kuwait has remained totally ineffective in dealing with other major issues including the aggression and genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina and conflicts in Kosovo, Kashmir, Rwanda, Somalia and other places in Africa and Asia.

Subsequently, it was completely bypassed for the military adventure against Iraq, and stood paralyzed in the face of the recent Israeli aggression against Lebanon. Besides inter-state conflicts, the recent years have also seen intra-state implosions, involving terrible human suffering and dislocation. The Security Council has not been able to respond to these crises and conflicts in an objective manner. The "overriding" vested political and economic interests of the more influential and powerful players limit its role in conflict prevention and dispute resolution. Today, the United Nations is no longer the sole meaningful arbiter on issues of global relevance and importance.

The post-9/11 world has witnessed unprecedented erosion in the role, authority and credibility of the United Nations. Besides inter-state conflicts, recent years have seen intra-state implosions, involving terrible human suffering and dislocation. The Security Council has not been able to respond to these crises and conflicts in an objective manner. The "overriding" vested political and economic interests of the more influential and powerful players limit its role in conflict prevention and resolution.

But no Alternative to United Nations

No doubt, the United Nations has not fulfilled its promise of peace and prosperity. The critics of the United Nations would even say that it has failed to live up to the lofty ambitions enshrined in its Charter. It has resolved no major disputes; nor has it prevented any conflicts. But one must accept that there is no alternative to United Nations. The United Nations has indeed served the purpose of saving humanity, during the second half of the twentieth century, from the recurrence of the great disasters of the first half. Despite its failures and constraints, it may not be fair to blame the United Nations for what it has not been able to accomplish. The onus for its "failures" rests on its members, especially the veto-wielding five permanent members of the Security Council.

One area in which United Nations stands out with distinction is the peace-keeping operations, deployed to monitor and observe peace process in conflict areas. (Pakistan tops the list of troop contributors.)

Major Achievements

The United Nations, however, is much more than a peace-keeper and a forum for conflict resolution. The United Nations and its family of agencies are invisibly engaged in a vast array of work that touches every aspect of people's lives around the world. These notably include:

1. Peace, security and peacemaking
2. Sustainable development and poverty alleviation
3. Environment protection
4. Disarmament and non-proliferation
5. Human rights
6. Elimination of Racial Discrimination (apartheid in South Africa)
7. Self-determination and independence
8. Strengthening of International Law (Over 300 international treaties, on topics as varied as human rights conventions to agreements on the use of outer space and seabed, have been enacted through United Nations efforts.)
9. Humanitarian aid to victims of conflict. More than 30 million refugees have received aid from the UNHCR since 1951. More than 19 million refugees, mostly women and children, are receiving food, shelter, medical aid, and education and repatriation assistance
10. Alleviating chronic hunger and rural poverty in developing countries. (Over 230 million people in nearly 100 developing countries have benefited)

11. Focusing on conflict prevention and sustainable development in Africa
12. Women's rights. Women empowerment (UN Development Fund for Women-UNIFEM and the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women-INSTRAW have supported programmes and projects to improve the quality of life for women in over 100 countries).
13. Promoting democracy: United Nations has enabled people in many countries to participate in free and fair elections, including those held in Cambodia, Namibia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Mozambique, Nicaragua, South Africa, Kosovo and East Timor. It has provided electoral advice, assistance, and monitoring of results.
14. Child survival and development.
15. Health and medical research.
16. Agricultural development and fisheries, education, family planning, emergency and disaster relief, air and sea travel, labour and workers' rights. And the list goes on.....

United Nations' global Conferences

In the economic and social fields, the United Nations can claim some real credit. It may not have freed the world of poverty and want, but through a series of its major international conferences and summits since the 1990s, a significant contribution has been made to promoting greater awareness of the multi-sectoral issues of development and of the need to address them through global partnership. In particular, three major United Nations conferences of the twentieth century: Millennium Summit (September 2000), Financing for Development Conference at Monterrey, Mexico (March 2002) and World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (September 2002) have brought the development agenda into a sharper international focus, and given it a new political momentum.

No comparison with the League of Nations

It may not be realistic to draw parallels between the United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations. No doubt, the two were born out of the Great War ashes and had commonalities in terms of their purposes. Both also symbolized the principle of common interest in the maintenance of peace and security. But the League lacked universal recognition and authority and some of the major powers, including the US never joined it.

Unlike the UN Charter, which has its own legal status and in which all member states believe, the Covenant of the League of Nations was part and parcel of another treaty (it comprised of the first 26 articles of the Treaty of Versailles), which was the basis of a fragile peace between the victors and the vanquished of the First World War and which was never ratified by the USA. With its incomplete personality and credentials, the League was doomed to fail from the very beginning.

No doubt, the United Nations has not fulfilled its promise of peace and prosperity. But its supporters and defenders claim that the United Nations has served the purpose of saving humanity, during the second half of the twentieth century, from the recurrence of the great disasters of the first half. An objective assessment would also support the view that despite its failures and constraints, it may not be fair to blame the United Nations for what it has not been able to accomplish. If anything, the onus for its failure or inability to carry out its Charter role rests on its membership.

Adapting United Nations to the 21st century

Despite its constraints, the United Nations has kept the hopes of the humanity alive. It remains the only forum with universal recognition and membership for recourse to addressing global challenges, regional issues and bilateral problems. The vision that inspired the creation of the United Nations still remains valid and should be the central objective of the endeavours of member states. The United Nations of the twenty-first century should continue to be guided by the purposes and principles of its Charter. Sovereign equality of states must be the bedrock of United Nation's multilateralism. Poverty eradication, socio-economic development and maintenance of international peace and security should remain the main priorities of the United Nations system in the new millennium.

The world leaders, meeting in September 2000, as the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations, reaffirmed their faith in the United Nations and its Charter as indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous, and just world. They recognized their "collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level" and reaffirmed their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which have proved timeless and universal.

The Millennium Declaration was a global vote of confidence in the United Nations. It provided a blueprint of fundamental values and principles and a framework of precise goals and priorities with time-bound and measurable targets in the form of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that would guide the United Nations into the twenty-first century. It also called for strengthening of the

United Nations to make it a more effective instrument for pursuing the global fight against the common challenges of "poverty, ignorance, disease, injustice, violence, terror and crime, and degradation of our common home."

VII. PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Pakistan joined the United Nations on September 30, 1947, just over a month after its independence. Pakistan is committed to a world in which upholding human dignity is the highest value and maintaining global peace a sacred duty. Pakistan envisages a world which is free of want, hunger and deprivation, a world, where justice and fair play govern the affairs of human beings and inequality, oppression and war are abhorred.

Over the last 67 years, Pakistan has put this vision into practice by making significant contributions to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, in particular the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security, as a member of the Security Council and through its contribution to United Nations Peace-keeping. It has been an ardent advocate of multilateralism and the primacy of the United Nations in international affairs.

Pakistan's commitment and participation in the United Nations is across the board. It has actively participated in discussions at the United Nations on a host of issues, including human rights, development, environment and climate change, and international law.

Pakistan is currently an elected member to the following Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (2012-17); Commission for Social Development (2013-2017); Commission on the Status of Women (2013-2017); United Nations Committee on Contributions (2013-16).

Pakistan seeks resolution of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. Our principled position on the dispute remains a bed-rock of our foreign policy. We will continue to support the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and to choose their destiny in accordance with UNSC resolutions.

As the largest troop contributing country to the United Nations peace-keeping operations, Pakistan's commitment to international peace and security is well established. It deployed its first ever contingent in Congo in 1960. Pakistan has since participated in 41 peace-keeping missions in 23 countries, with over 150,000 peace-keepers, some deployed in most difficult and trying conditions. A total of 137 Pakistani peace-keepers have embraced martyrdom. Currently, Pakistan is one of the largest troop contributors, with

8,230 peacekeepers, constituting over 9% of United Nation's total deployment. Pakistan is also the sixth largest police contributor.

Pakistan is actively working with the global community in the campaign against international terrorism. It has extended maximum cooperation and support to the international community to fight this scourge. No country in the world has suffered as much as Pakistan because of this menace. The entire Pakistani nation is determined to eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

Pakistan considers arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as vital tools to promote the goals of peace and security at the global and regional levels. Accordingly, Pakistan has always advocated the need for inclusive forums for deliberations and negotiations, taking into account the security interests of all states.

As part of its efforts to contribute to the global discourse on disarmament and non-proliferation, Pakistan presents four resolutions annually in the United Nations General Assembly. These resolutions are aimed at reinforcing the global norms on conventional arms control, regional disarmament, confidence-building measures in the regional context and the continuing importance of providing Negative Security Assurances to non-nuclear weapon states.

Pakistan's election to the Security Council for a two-year term from January 2012 was the seventh time that it was serving on the Security Council. Pakistan brings to the Security Council the aspirations of the general membership, developing countries, OIC and Asia. Pakistan delegation was engaged in the Council on the full spectrum of the agenda ranging from Africa to the Middle East to Central Europe to Latin America as well as a number of thematic issues. Peace and stability in Afghanistan, counter-terrorism and peace-keeping are the areas of special interest for Pakistan.

Pakistan is also an active member of the Human Rights Council, and has participated actively and constructively in its two Universal Periodic Reviews before the Council. The democratic government of Pakistan is committed to and is making every endeavour to protect and promote the human rights of the people of Pakistan particularly those of women, children and minorities.

Pakistan continues to support the need for dialogue, diplomacy and international cooperation to address existing and emerging international challenges, in an effective and credible manner on the basis of consensus and concerted collective actions. Pakistan has also been a leading voice for the reform of the Security Council to make it more democratic, inclusive and accountable through reform of its membership and improvement in its working methods.

United Nations in Pakistan

On its part, the United Nations has a close, strong and vibrant relationship with the government of Pakistan focusing on the promotion of development and progress of the nation. In Pakistan, the United Nations has been working closely with the government and its development agencies to strive to fulfil the promise of the MDGs.

October 2005 saw a living example of the strength of the humanitarian assistance and contribution of the United Nations in face of the devastating earthquake. The United Nations agencies came, together with its development partners to support the government to fulfil its promise to the people affected by the earthquake of "building back better".

In May 2006, the secretary-general constituted a High level-Panel System-wide Coherence at the global level of which the then prime minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz was one of three chairpersons. The report of the High-level Panel made a strong case for reform to reduce fragmentation and improve efficiency and effectiveness. A key recommendation was to establish a 'One UN' at the country level with one leader, one programme, one budgetary framework, one management practice, and whenever appropriate, one office. This concept will bring together the strengths of all United Nations agencies to increase efficiency and efficacy in a transparent and accountable manner for better service delivery to the beneficiaries.

In consultation with the government and key stakeholders in Pakistan, joint programmes have been developed in five thematic areas of health and population, education, environment, disaster risk management, and agriculture, rural development and poverty reduction with four cross cutting themes of gender, refugees, civil society, and human rights or right to development.

In Pakistan, The One Fund, managed by UNDP as the administrative agent, has already commenced its activities with the contribution of the government of Norway. This Norwegian funding has made UN Pakistan the highest endowed United Nations pilot in the world. There are still many steps that need to be climbed; however experience thus far tells us that the future is brighter for the United Nations in Pakistan and its development partners and most importantly for the people of Pakistan. The One Leader or the United Nations Country Team led by the Resident Coordinator is steering the piloting process to ensure that a comprehensive and all encompassing effort is made.

The One Office has worked to produce common business practices to support the execution of the joint programmes including human resource, information technology, finance, procurement, etc. The process has been challenging not only because of the size of the pilot, but also because of the political and security situation of the country. However, these challenges have helped to make the pilot realist and in line with the changing environment of the country.

Around 19 United Nations entities are operational in the country, supporting the government's development initiatives in health and population, education, environment, governance, disaster risk management, agriculture, rural development and poverty reduction while ensuring attention to gender equity, refugees, civil society and right to development.

VIII. STRENGTHENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Need for UN Reform

Since its founding, there have been many calls for reform of the United Nations, although little consensus on how to do so. Some want the United Nations to play a greater or more effective role in world affairs, while others want its role reduced to humanitarian work. There have also been numerous calls for the UN Security Council's membership to be increased, for replacing the Veto System by democratic decision making, for different ways of electing the UN's secretary-general, and for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly.

No wonder, the United Nations today is engaged in a continuous process of change and reform to strengthen its ability to meet new demands and deliver its vital services in the most effective and efficient ways. This means constant emphasis on transparency, accountability, integrity, efficiency and flexibility. Efforts towards change and reform continue but there is still a long way to go before the United Nations can really claim to be the mankind's last best hope.

The need for a strong multilateral institution capable of meeting its Charter obligations and other challenges of the new age has never been greater than it is today. What is needed most is the reform of the United Nations that makes it stronger, more representative and more effective inter-governmental organization where one-state-one-vote principle should underpin its democratic and participatory character. This requires restoration of the primacy of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative policy-making organ of the United Nations through its involvement in all decisions of global relevance and impact, and democratization of the Security Council through rationalization of the veto power and permanent membership and increase in the number of non-permanent members.

While the working methods of the United Nations system also need to be reviewed and streamlined to ensure greater efficiency and coordination in implementation of the decisions and internationally agreed goals and commitments, the reform has largely remained focused on expansion of the Security Council which is a complex issue and has been the subject of protracted discussions at the United Nations for over two decades now. The vast majority of the United Nations membership would like to see the Security Council democratized through comprehensive reform encompassing its enlargement, decision making including the question of the veto and the Council's working methods.

Security Council Expansion

In 1945, with total membership of the United Nations being 51, the Security Council had 11 members. Article 23 of the UN Charter was amended in 1963 to increase the membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15 by adding four non-permanent seats. Since then the United Nations membership has increased to 193 today but the composition of the Security Council (five permanent and ten non-permanent members) remains the same. There has been a growing demand to enlarge the Security Council to make it more representative of the United Nations membership and to bring its functioning in conformity with the new challenges.

In 1993, the UN General Assembly established an Open-Ended Working Group on the question of "Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters." The Working Group began its work in January 1994 focusing on two main areas of its mandate: Cluster I issues (expansion in the membership and the question of veto), and Cluster II issues (transparency and working methods of the Security Council).

While some progress was achieved over the past decade in **Cluster II** issues, there was no forward movement on **Cluster I** issues because of the reluctance of the veto-wielding powers to part with their privilege, lack of consensus on size and categories of expansion and the undetermined criteria for selection of new permanent members.

Proposals made over the years sought to find a "quick-fix" to the problem and were too controversial to be acceptable to all members. In 1998, the UN General Assembly adopted a consensus resolution making it necessary for any decision on the Security Council reform and expansion to be approved by two-thirds majority. This reduced the chances of any "quick-fix" discriminatory move by the aspirants of permanent membership.

The process of Security Council reform then remained in cold storage until the UN secretary-general established a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in November 2003 to examine the gravity of the current and future threats to global peace and security and to identify and recommend the changes and measures needed to strengthen the existing multilateral institutions and processes.

In September 2004, four principal contenders for permanent seats, namely Brazil, Germany, India and Japan formed their group called **G-4** and issued a joint declaration asserting their claim to permanent membership of the Security Council. The **G-4** launched a two-step approach: (i) to influence the High-Level Panel to specifically refer to expansion in permanent category as an option for consideration by member-states, and (ii) to introduce a framework resolution in the General Assembly calling for expansion in the permanent category.

High-level Panel Report

The High-level Panel, in its report presented in 2005, proposed two alternative models for consideration by United Nations member-states, both of which sought to expand the membership of the Security Council from 15 to 21, one involving six new permanent members without veto and three new non-permanent members divided among the major regions, and the other suggesting eight new four-year term renewable seats, two each for Asia, Africa, Europe and Americas and one two-year term non-permanent seat.

In both models, countries would be elected by the General Assembly, taking into account established regional consultation, with preference being given for permanent or longer term seats to states that are among (i) the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional areas to the regular United Nations budget, or (ii) the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or (iii) the top three troop contributors from their regional area to the UN Peace-keeping missions. Other main features of the Report were: (a) Review of composition of the Security Council in 2020, (b) No expansion of the veto under any reform arrangement, and (c) A system of "indicative voting" to be introduced whereby members could call for public positions on a proposed action.

The United Nations General Assembly held in depth informal discussion on the Report of the Panel on February 22-24, 2005. On the basis of these consultations, UN secretary general presented his report, entitled "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All". On Security Council reform, the report called upon member-states to choose either of the two options presented by the High-level Panel "as well any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either model."

Secretary-General's report received a mixed response from member-states. The **G-4** welcomed it and expressed the hope that a decision would be reached on Council reform by summer 2005. While giving a qualified welcome, the United States cautioned against a hasty decision. Most members, however, felt that no decision should be taken without consensus on the key issues of reform, including expansion of the Council.

Deadlock Situation

A deadlock situation now prevails with a large number of United Nations member-states opposing any expansion in the permanent category while calling for increase only in non-permanent seats. Pakistan and many other important like-minded countries working in the form of an informal group called "Coffee Club" have for years been engaged in a campaign against expansion in the permanent category. They have consistently maintained that the objective of reform and expansion of the Security Council should be to make it more transparent, participatory and democratic. In response to secretary general's report, they launched a "Uniting for Consensus (UfC)" strategy opposing creation of new centres of privilege and proposing elements of their own formula for expansion and reform in the Council.

On the other hand, four major contenders for permanent membership of the Council, namely Brazil, India, Germany and Japan which had formally designated themselves as **G-4** have been pursuing their own campaign for increase in both categories involving addition of six permanent and four non-permanent seats. They also want veto power for the new permanent members.

The present five permanent members known as **P-5**, with the exception of China,, are not opposed to the creation of new permanent seats but are not ready to share or give up their veto power with them. They have divergent positions on the number and criteria for filling new seats. With the exception of **Africa**, all regional groups are also divided because of deep differences between the main contenders and their regional rivals (Pakistan and China vis-à-vis India, Republic of Korea and China vis-à-vis Japan, Italy and Spain vis-à-vis Germany and Argentina and Mexico vis-à-vis Brazil).

The OIC and Arab countries have taken a joint but somewhat vague position stating that any proposal neglecting representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of members in an expanded Security Council would not be acceptable to the Islamic countries. Beyond this declaratory stance, however, the **OIC**, in keeping with its tradition remains divided. Several OIC countries have individually promised support to India, Japan and Germany. Meanwhile, Egypt makes no secret of its own ambition for a permanent seat.

The overwhelming majority of the United Nations membership, as reflected in the official NAM position, is against expansion in the permanent category and wants an increase only in the non-permanent category to make it more representative of the current United Nations membership. Similarly, there is strong opposition to the continuation of the veto power which is considered anachronistic to the Charter's principle of sovereign equality of states.

The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) strategy supports a comprehensive reform of the Security Council based on the need to make it more representative, more democratic and more accountable, whereas the pretenders' position (**G-4** approach) is rigid and self-serving focused only on grabbing the "status" that comes with the entry into the "elitist club" of the Council. **G-4** proposal aims at creating a system impermeable to change and does not ensure "adequate" regional representation because permanent members will represent their own interests. They want early decision or a time-bound commitment for expansion in both categories involving new permanent seats which they hope to occupy by virtue of their own perceived criteria.

The **UfC** approach, on the other hand, takes into account the larger interests and main concerns of the broadest membership. Under this proposal, all states, particularly small and medium states which constitute the vast majority of United Nations membership, can enjoy a significantly improved access to the Council by doubling the ratio of permanent members to elected ones from 1:2 to 1:4. In this manner, all states will have the possibility of shaping through their vote 80% of the Security Council membership. The regional groups will have the authority to make their own specific arrangements with regard to their representation on the Council.

Rotation is the ideal means to ensure regional interests as envisioned under the UfC proposal. Periodic election and re-election would enhance accountability on the part of states seeking frequent or continuous representation whereas permanent seats will make accountability impossible. The **UfC** proposal envisages enlargement of the Council membership from 15 to 25 with no increase in the permanent category.

In this manner, the revised composition of the Council will comprise the existing five permanent members (France, China, Russia, UK and USA) and 20 non-permanent members to be elected by the General Assembly for a renewable term of two (or three) years ensuring equitable geographic representation paying due regard, in the first instance to the contribution of members to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization.

India's Claim

India has never hidden its aspiration for a permanent seat in the Security Council. It has been using its demographic size, democratic system, and its growing economy with large market potential to advance its claim to the permanent membership. In fact, until this year, for more than a decade, it didn't even seek election as a non-permanent member of the Council. The primary concern for Pakistan in this whole process has been to prevent India's entry into the Security Council as a permanent member or at least to be treated at par with India in any modified dispensation of enlarging the Council's membership.

Pakistan argues that population alone cannot be the criteria for permanent membership and that India is also in violation of the United Nations Security Council's resolutions on Kashmir.

Since India is now part of G-4, Pakistan's opposition extends to other aspirants (Brazil, Japan, and Germany) as well.

Pakistan's Position

Pakistan has played an active and constructive role throughout the United Nations reform process, including in the negotiations that led to the adoption of the World Summit Outcome in September 2005.

Pakistan has always maintained that the objective of the reform and expansion of the Security Council should be to promote greater democracy, participation, transparency and accountability in the work of the Council. This objective can be achieved only by increasing the number of elected non-permanent members for a specified tenure with eligibility for re-election subject to regional endorsement.

Pakistan is opposed to any increase in the permanent category which in its view would only serve to accommodate the interests of a few countries and alienate the overwhelming majority of United Nations membership. Pakistan also favours a comprehensive debate covering all aspects of reform including the question of veto which has become anachronistic.

No Ideal Solutions

The reform of Security Council has been a complex issue and has remained the subject of protracted discussions at the United Nations for over a decade now. The vast majority of the United Nations membership would like to see the Security Council democratized through comprehensive reform encompassing its enlargement, decision making including the question of the veto and the Council's working methods. The current veto-wielding powers, however, will not give up their "veto power", nor permit any move for abolition of their permanent status.

The suggestion to create a new category of "veto-less" permanent members makes a mockery of the Security Council and the UN Charter. The very concepts of permanent membership and veto power, remnants of World War II, negate the principles of democracy and sovereign equality. An ideal solution would be the abolition of both the anomalies which only represent the vestiges of power and privilege.

But in today's world, there is no room for ideal solutions. Instead of creating new permanent seats, a new category involving an appropriate number of "semi-permanent" (renewable three or four-year term) seats could be created to be filled through regional rotation. Similarly, if the veto power cannot be rescinded altogether at this stage, at least the use of this prerogative should be rationalized by subjecting it to at least two concomitant negative votes of non-permanent members or one-fifth of whatever is the revised number of Council's elected members and restricting its application only to decisions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

IX. PAKISTAN'S POSITION TOWARDS UNITED NATIONS REFORM ISSUES

1. The Security Council Reform

The Security Council has primary responsibility under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, reform of the Security Council is an issue of vital interest for all member states. Pakistan supports reform of the Security Council to make it more representative, democratic, effective, legitimate and accountable to the general membership.

Pakistan supports a comprehensive reform of the Security Council encompassing all five key issues: Categories of membership; the question of veto; size and working methods; regional representation; and relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. The complex inter-linkages of the five issues warrant comprehensive reform in a single undertaking.

Although there is a general desire amongst the membership to reform the Council, there is yet no agreement on the modalities to achieve that. Most controversial and divisive is the question of adding new permanent members. We strongly believe all major issues in the reform process, including the issue of Security Council reform, must be decided by consensus or broadest possible agreement.

Pakistan is against addition of permanent members without any exception. We have maintained this position over the years. Accordingly, we oppose the G-4 (Brazil, Germany, Japan and India) quest for individual permanent membership and unequal status. As a member of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group, Pakistan advocates a just and equitable reform based on consensus that corresponds to the interests of all member states, not just a few states.

No reform proposal has so far garnered the requisite two-thirds support in the General Assembly. Besides, the vital support of each of the P-5, needed for ultimate ratification of Charter amendment to bring into effect any Security Council reform, is not assured. The discussions in the General Assembly on the issue of Security Council reform clearly indicate that there is no shift in positions of major groups.

UfC has not deemed it appropriate to submit again its draft resolution on the reform of the Security Council at this stage of the United Nations reform process. UfC favours a constructive, inclusive and bottom-up approach, through dialogue, in order to find a non-divisive solution based on the principle of equal participation of all member states, be they big, medium or small in size. Any preconceived formula or forced vote is unlikely to lead to successful reform. Therefore, we reiterate the need for a consensus approach and the broadest possible agreement, through negotiations involving all concerned parties, to arrive at a solution that can pass the test at the General Assembly and subsequent ratifications by the national parliaments.

Pakistan along with its partners in the UfC favours expansion in non-permanent category only. Notwithstanding the original position, we have proposed a compromise formula — Italy-Colombia paper, which offers to create a set of long-term electable seats, along with reforms in other four areas. We believe that long-term electable seats can be a basis of a solution. It can meet aspirations of states who want to "play a leading role on matters of international peace and security" without squeezing space from small states or comprising principles of accountability and democratization of the Security Council or concept of sovereign equality of all states.

The UfC compromise proposal has clear merits. It has the flexibility to accommodate the positions and interests of all member states, large and small. We do not support the expansion of permanent membership. However, our proposal can accommodate the aspirations of some large states to play a bigger role on the Security Council, e.g. through more frequent re-election if supported by their regional groups.

Moreover, it addresses all five key issues in a single undertaking – thereby preserving the spirit of relevant General Assembly decisions. The UfC proposal is equitable, fair and democratic. It provides for a greater role of the regions in determining their representation on the Council. It has the necessary flexibility to accommodate the interests of all states and groupings in terms of their representation on the Council through rotation and re-election.

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UfC proposal and the African position

We recognize that Africa has a strong and legitimate case for redressing the historic injustice and seeks its rightful representation on the Security Council. The African common position has commanded respect and understanding. It has placed the African continent in a key role in the ongoing inter-governmental negotiations (IGN) in New York. Africa's demand for permanent seats is made on behalf of entire region/continent, not for individual countries. It is fundamentally different from the G-4 countries who are seeking seats for themselves.

Despite our principled opposition to permanent membership, the UfC has evolved its position, and as a special exception for Africa, and supporting the African position on the basis of continent-specific seats. Pakistan, as member of the UfC, wishes to engage more closely with Africa, to share and understand each other's perspectives, and to pursue our common objectives.

African Union and UfC have common interests that no proposals are marginalized during the negotiations and all proposals are treated equally and reflected in the negotiating document in their entirety. The UfC and African positions are compatible in many ways, most notably on regional representation, rotation and consensus. Considering the Ezulwini Consensus, UfC proposal has the flexibility to respond to the principles stated in the African Union position, i.e. the African Union should be responsible for selection of African representatives in the Security Council and for determination of the criteria for such a selection. UfC model can accommodate representation for all five sub-regions of Africa at the same time. We believe similar approaches for other regions can build wider consensus around a reform model.

1. Peace-building Commission

Establishment of the Peace-building Commission, an inter-governmental advisory body to assist countries emerging from conflict, was a major achievement of the 2005 World Summit. As a founding member of the Peace-building Commission (PBC), Pakistan attaches great importance to the work of the Peace-building Commission and is deeply committed to its success. Pakistan will continue to participate actively in the meetings of the Commission in New York.

Pakistan was among the pioneers of the idea of a dedicated United Nations institutional mechanism for peace building. In 2004, Pakistan first proposed the idea of ad-hoc composite committees (with membership drawn from the principal organs, major troop contributing countries and donors, relevant United Nations agencies, etc.) to address complex crises, particularly in Africa. Building on that. Pakistan actively participated in the discussions on the Peace-building Commission, during the 2005 World Summit and the subsequent negotiations on and adoption of the General Assembly resolution (60/180). The Commission's country specific formats resemble closely our concept of ad-hoc composite committees.

Pakistan has a constructive, balanced and pragmatic approach in the Commission: i.e. work with other like-minded countries from NAM to promote greater participation and inputs from the countries concerned; encourage fuller engagement of all members of the PBC and of all principal organs and relevant actors in its work; attach great importance to the role of the Organizational Committee as the nucleus of the Commission and call for utilizing its full potential (Pakistan has been serving in the Organizational Committee in its capacity as the top troop contributor. Five TCCs are selected from among the list of 10 top contributors). Pakistan also took part in review of the PBC done in 2010 and its ongoing follow-up. We have also contributed to the UN Peace-building Fund.

2. Pacific Settlement of Disputes

The Charter of the United Nations offers vast possibilities for pacific settlement of disputes and conflict prevention. Unfortunately, these possibilities remain grossly under-utilized, with the Security Council, the General Assembly and the secretary-general not playing their due roles. Good offices, mediation and other means for peaceful settlement could be applied in a range of situations from pre-conflict to post-conflict. We support efforts for enhancing the role of the 'good offices' of the secretary-general as provided for in 2005 Summit outcome. Other provisions of the Charter for pacific settlement should also be operationalized and institutionalized.

The Security Council should reinforce the Charter obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force, to avoid war and to seek and build peace, through the vast spectrum of modalities envisaged in Chapter VI and other provisions of the Charter. Requests to the International Court of Justice for advisory opinions to clarify legal questions may be considered, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. The Council should make optimal use of advisory opinions, once rendered, to further the efforts for pacific settlement.

The Secretariat and the Security, Council in particular should take initiatives when situations so require. Impartiality, neutrality and non-selective application of means of pacific settlement should always be observed in doing so. The Mediation Support Unit of the United Nations Secretariat, is well positioned to provide logistic support for such endeavors. Special attention should be paid and initiatives for good offices taken in case of intractable and long-outstanding situations. The secretary-general should make greater use of his prerogative under Article 99 and bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Pakistan considers arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as vital tools to promote the goals of peace and security at the global and regional levels. Accordingly, Pakistan has always advocated the need for inclusive forums for deliberations and negotiations, taking into account the security interests of all states. Even as existing challenges to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime remain unaddressed, some new challenges have emerged. Pakistan believes that cooperative multilateralism, underwritten by the time-tested instruments of diplomacy and dialogue, represents the best way forward in addressing old and new challenges.

Pakistan shares the concerns arising from the potential misuse of WMD materials and technologies by non-state actors. Pakistan is therefore part of global efforts and processes to establish effective barriers against this common threat. The ongoing growth and sophistication in several types of technologies has added further complexity to the disarmament and non-proliferation discourse and institutions. The increasing reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles, the deployment of missile defence systems and the hostile use of ICT require responses in view of their potentially negative impact on global peace and security.

Excessive production and proliferation of some conventional weapons has understandably caused a great degree of unease in the international community. Pakistan supports efforts that seek to promote a comprehensive reform and regulation of the entire cycle of global trade in conventional arms. In doing so, a balanced approach is needed that addresses humanitarian concerns and protects legitimate defence needs of all states. As part of its efforts to contribute to the global discourse on disarmament and non-proliferation, Pakistan presents four resolutions annually in the United Nations General Assembly.

These resolutions are aimed at reinforcing the global norms on conventional arms control, regional disarmament, confidence building measures in the regional context and the continuing importance of providing Negative Security Assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. As a member of the UN Security Council, Pakistan has underlined the need for dialogue, diplomacy and international cooperation to address non-proliferation issues as well as the sanctions regime. A Pakistani expert is member of the Group of Experts assisting the 1540 Committee.

Over the years, the global consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation has eroded. The multilateral disarmament machinery is in a state of limbo. The reasons for differences in perspectives and modalities are primarily political. Pakistan has therefore consistently called for renewing the international consensus on these important subjects.

4. Terrorism

The September Outcome Document contains two important recommendations regarding terrorism: the conclusion of the draft comprehensive convention and the development and adoption of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. We support efforts for the early conclusion, by consensus, of the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism. Pakistan will continue to play a constructive role in these efforts.

In March 2005, the secretary-general identified certain elements of counter terrorism strategy. We believe these elements need to be refined and elaborated further. The co-chair of the plenary working group has evolved, through consultations, a draft strategy document. This draft requires further work in a number of areas of crucial importance. A comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy should include measures for international cooperation against terrorism and building States' capacity to counter terrorism.

The international response to terrorism has so far focused largely on treating the symptoms. There continues to be a strong emphasis on adherence to the 12 counter-terrorism conventions, stricter law enforcement, stronger police action, denial of financial resources to terrorist groups, etc. There is, as yet, no comprehensive strategy that recognizes the need to address and resolve the "root causes" of terrorism. This would not imply justifying terrorism; it would help in understanding that terrorism does not take place in a vacuum.

The continued foreign occupation and non-resolution of long-standing political disputes, as well social inequity and political exclusion and suppression, are among the major factors forcing people to resort to violent means. Poverty, dispossession and hopelessness create a propitious environment for the so-called 'breeding grounds' of terrorism. A successful and sustainable international campaign against terrorism must recognize these critical factors and rest on certain fundamental principles, such as:

(i) defining terrorism to provide legal clarity to the term, including state terrorism; (ii) distinguishing terrorism from the right of peoples to self-determination so as to forestall the abuse of this terrorism to justify political suppression and foreign occupation; (iii) provision of assistance to all states needing capacity building for counter terrorism; (iv) addressing the underlying causes to prevent the emergence of terrorism, including by promoting political and economic justice; (v) ensuring that counter-terrorism measures remain consistent with the principles of human right and international humanitarian law; and (vi) promoting a culture of harmony and understanding across religious and cultural identities.

In accordance with the 2005 Summit's decision, the strategy cannot exclude acts of terrorism perpetrated by states. It is also important to maintain a distinction between terrorism and peoples' right to self determination and to resist foreign occupation and alien domination. The strategy should dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic by addressing the underlying causes of terrorism. We will have to eliminate the threat of terrorism by winning the minds and hearts of potential terrorists.

There is also a need to adopt short-and-long term strategies to address terrorism and extremism. It is essential to promote the just resolution of political disputes, and to promote socio-economic revival in developing countries, specially the Muslim world. We believe that conflict resolution, socio-economic revival, and dialogue and cooperation among religions, faiths and cultures should constitute an essential part of the comprehensive strategy against terrorism.

X. KASHMIR ISSUE AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The oldest dispute at the UN agenda

The Kashmir dispute is the oldest unresolved international conflict in the world today. Pakistan considers Kashmir as its core political dispute with India. So does the international community, except India.

India's forcible occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 is the main cause of the dispute. India claims to have 'signed' a controversial document, the Instrument of Accession, on October 26, 1947 with the Maharaja of Kashmir, in which the Maharaja obtained. India's military help against popular insurgency. The people of Kashmir and Pakistan do not accept the Indian claim. There are doubts about the very existence of the Instrument of Accession. The United Nations also does not consider Indian claim as legally valid: it recognizes Kashmir as a disputed territory.

The fact is that all the principles on the basis of which the Indian subcontinent was partitioned by the British in 1947 justify Kashmir becoming a part of Pakistan: the State had majority Muslim population, and it not only enjoyed geographical proximity with Pakistan but also had essential economic linkages with the territories constituting Pakistan.

History of the Dispute

The State of Jammu and Kashmir has historically remained independent, except in the anarchical conditions of the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century, or when incorporated in the vast empires set-up by the Mauryas (3rd century BC), the Mughals (16th to 18th century) and the British (mid-19th to mid-20th century). All these empires included not only present-day India and Pakistan but some other countries of the region as well. Until 1846, Kashmir was part of the Sikh empire.

In that year, the British defeated the Sikhs and sold Kashmir to Gulab Singh of Jammu for Rs. 7.5 million under the Treaty of Amritsar. Gulab Singh, the Maharaja, signed a separate treaty with the British which gave him the status of an independent princely ruler of Kashmir. Gulab Singh died in 1857 and was replaced by Rambir Singh (1857-1885). Two other *mahrajas*, Partab Singh (1885-1925) and Hari Singh (1925-1949) ruled in succession.

Gulab Singh and his successors ruled Kashmir in a tyrannical and repressive way. The people of Kashmir, nearly 80 per cent of who were Muslims, rose against Maharaja Hari Singh's rule. He ruthlessly crushed a mass uprising in 1931. In 1932, Sheikh Abdullah formed Kashmir's first political party—the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (renamed as National Conference in 1939). In 1934, the Maharaja gave way and allowed limited democracy in the form of a Legislative Assembly. However, unease with the Maharaja's rule continued.

According to the instruments of partition of India, the rulers of princely states were given the choice to freely accede to either India or Pakistan, or to remain independent. They were, however, advised to accede to the contiguous dominion, taking into consideration the geographical and ethnic issues. In Kashmir, however, the Maharaja hesitated. The principally Muslim population, having seen the early and covert arrival of Indian troops, rebelled and things got out of the Maharaja's hands. The people of Kashmir were demanding to join Pakistan.

The Maharaja, fearing tribal warfare, eventually gave way to the Indian pressure and agreed to join India by, as India claims, 'signing' the controversial Instrument of Accession on October 26, 1947. Kashmir was provisionally accepted into the Indian Union pending a free and impartial plebiscite. This was spelled out in a letter from the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, to the Maharaja on October 27, 1947.

In the letter, accepting the accession, Mountbatten made it clear that the State would only be incorporated into the Indian Union after a reference had been made to the people of Kashmir. Having accepted the principle of a plebiscite, India has since obstructed all attempts at holding a plebiscite.

In 1947, India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir. During the war, it was India which first took the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations on January 1, 1948. The following year, on January 1, 1949, the United Nations helped enforce cease-fire between the two countries. The cease-fire line is called the Line of Control. It was an outcome of a mutual consent by India and Pakistan that the UN Security Council (UNSC) and UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) passed several resolutions in years following the 1947-48 war.

The UNSC Resolution of 21 April 1948 - one of the principal United Nations resolutions on Kashmir — stated that "both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite." Subsequent UNSC Resolutions reiterated the same stand. UNCIP resolutions of August 3, 1948 and January 5, 1949 reinforced UNSC resolutions.

The current agitation in Indian-held Kashmir is rooted in the struggle of the people for the exercise of the right of self-determination. Peaceful processions chanting demands for freedom were fired upon by Indian army and police. Thousands of men, women and children have been killed or wounded. New Delhi's allegation of assistance to the Kashmiri people from the Pakistan side is unfounded. Objective reports in foreign media testify that the Kashmiri agitation is indigenous.

Pakistan upholds the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self-determination in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. These resolutions of 1948 and 1949 provide for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite for the determination of the future of the state by the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The basic points about the United Nations resolutions are that:

- The complaint relating to Kashmir was initiated by India in the Security Council.
- The Council explicitly and by implications, rejected India's claim that Kashmir is legally Indian territory.
- The resolutions established self-determination as the governing principal for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. This is the world body's commitment to the people of Kashmir.
- The resolutions endorsed a binding agreement between India and Pakistan reached through the mediation of UNCIP, that a plebiscite would be held, under agreed and specified conditions.

- The Security Council has rejected the Indian contention that the people of Kashmir have exercised their right of self-determination by participating in the "election" which India has from time to time organized in the Held Kashmir. The 0.2% turn out during the 1989 "elections" was the most recent clear repudiation of the Indian claim.
- Pakistan continues to adhere to the United Nations resolutions. These are binding also on India.
- The Simla Agreement of July 2, 1972, to which Pakistan also continues to adhere, did not alter the status of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory. Para 6 of the Agreement lists "a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir" as one of the outstanding questions awaiting a settlement.
- Para 4 (ii) talks of a "Line of Control" as distinguished from an international border. Furthermore, it explicitly protects "the recognized position of either side." The recognized position of Pakistan is the one, which is recognized by the United Nations and the world community in general.
- Article 1(iv) obviously refers to the Kashmir issue when it talks of "the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years."

KASHMIR IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

1. **Resolution 38 (1948):** Called upon India and Pakistan to "take measures within their power calculated to improve the situation, and to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation."
2. **Resolution 39 (1948):** Established a three-member Commission of the Security Council to (i) investigate the facts (situation) pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter of the UN, and (ii) to exercise any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties and to carry out the directions of the security Council.
3. **Resolution 47 (1948):** Noting that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, the Council expanded the Commission to include five members and instructed the Commission to proceed to the subcontinent and place its good offices at the disposal of the governments of India and Pakistan "with a view to facilitating the taking of necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of

peace and order and to holding of a plebiscite by the two governments, acting in cooperation with one and another and with the Commission."

It also laid down guidelines for both India and Pakistan to facilitate "restoration of peace and order and a mechanism to prepare for a plebiscite." These included for Pakistan "to secure withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan's nationals and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State" and for India "to put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order."

4. **Resolution 51 (1948):** Directed the Commission to proceed to India and Pakistan and to accomplish the duties assigned to it." The UN Commission for India and Pakistan adopted several resolutions in 1948 and 1949, proposing a framework for cessation of hostilities in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and for the formulation of a "Truce Agreement". Both India and Pakistan reaffirmed "their wish that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement, both governments agreed to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable condition" for plebiscite.

   The Commission in its resolution adopted on January 10, 1949, having received acceptance from the two governments of the principles for holding a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, announced that the UN secretary-general will nominate a Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir to make necessary arrangements for plebiscite.

5. **Resolution 80 (1950):** Security Council called upon India and Pakistan to prepare and execute within a period of five months a programme of demilitarization preparatory to plebiscite. The basic principle will be the "reduction of armed forces on either side of the cease-fire Line by withdrawal and disarmament in orderly stages."

   The programme of demilitarization included the "withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the forces of Pakistan and India" not required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of law and order on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.

6. **Resolution 91 (1951):** The Council noted Sir Owen Dixon's report giving the main points of difference preventing agreement between the two parties on an amicable solution of the Kashmir dispute, accepted his resignation and decided to appoint a new UN Representative for India and Pakistan (Dr. Frank Graham).

7. **Resolution 96 (1951):** Directed the UN Representative to continue efforts for effecting demilitarization and for resolving points of difference

between the two sides.

8. **Resolution 98 (1952):** Urged India and Pakistan to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the Cease-fire Line at the end of demilitarization. This number was to be between 3000 and 6000 on the Pakistan side while 12,000 and 18,000 on the India side of the Cease-fire Line.

9. **Resolution 122 (1957):** Reaffirming Resolution 91, decided to continue its consideration of the dispute.

10. **Resolution 123 (1957):** Invited India and Pakistan to cooperate with the President of the Council in his mission to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute.

11. **Resolution 126 (1957):** Authorized the UN Representative to visit the subcontinent to make any recommendations to the parties for further appropriate action with a view to making progress towards the implementation of the resolutions of the UN Commission on a peaceful settlement.

CHAPTER 8

GLOBAL ECONOMIC ISSUES & CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT

I. GLOBAL ECONOMIC SCENARIO - AN OVERVIEW

During the chilling Cold War era, East and West represented the bipolarity of the world. The Cold War has ended. East-West rivalry is no longer dividing the world. In fact, there is now a visible strategic convergence between the two with NATO admitting as its members some of the former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe, and with Russia becoming a member of the US-sponsored Partnership for Peace, G-8, G-20 and other multi-lateral frameworks.

Today's world is now divided between the "West and the Rest" and as before, between two unequal halves, one embarrassingly rich and the other desperately poor. The income gap between the rich and the poor has never been so wider in human history. While the West is endowed with abundance of wealth and affluence, the "Rest" which includes developing countries of all sorts and regions representing the overwhelming part of humanity languishes in poverty and backwardness.

The top 20% of the world's people, living in the richest countries, account for 86% of the world's GDP, 82% of its export market, and 68% of all foreign direct investments (FDIs). While the per capita income of 80 developing countries had fallen significantly during the last two decades, the net worth of the world's 200 richest people has grown more than five times from $400 billion in 1994 to over $2.7 trillion, about the size of the gross domestic product of France, the fifth-biggest economy on the planet.

No wonder, the number of LDCs (least developed countries so categorized on the basis of their low GDP, human resources and economic diversification indices) has more than doubled from 24 in 1971 to 50 today. The "grotesque inequalities" in the world are regularly highlighted in the United Nation's annual human development reports. According to the last report, the wealth of the three richest persons of the world is greater than the combined GNP of the 50 least developed countries (LDCs) with 600 million people.

More than a billion people, one in every six human beings, live on less than a dollar a day. At least 80% of humanity lives on less than $10 a day. The poorest 40% of the world's population accounts for 5% of global income. The world's richest 20% account for three-quarters of world income. And yet, nearly a billion people entered the twenty-first century unable even to read a book or sign their names. According to UNICEF, 22,000 children die each day due to poverty.

Less than one 1% of what the world spent every year on weapons was needed to put every child into school. But it never happened. If current trend continued, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target of halving the proportion of underweight children will be missed by 30 million children, largely because of slow progress in Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Infectious diseases continue to blight the lives of the poor across the world. An estimated 40 million people are living with HIV/AIDS, with three million deaths in 2004. Every year there are 350–500 million cases of malaria, with one million fatalities:

For every $1 in aid a developing country receives, over $25 is spent on debt repayment. The poorer the country, the more likely it is that debt repayments are being extracted directly from people who neither contracted the loans nor received any of the money. These are, no doubt, staggering figures. The Third World has had no *belle époque* to signify its better times, if any. It has experienced no industrial revolution, no economic miracle, no educational upsurge, no social renaissance, no political emancipation, and no workers' movement. Today, with few exceptions, poor countries are poorer and rich richer.

The poor and dispossessed nations, emerging from centuries of exploitation of their lands by the colonial powers find themselves totally marginalized in the global economy. With economic disparities increasing, the overwhelming majority of developing countries remains deprived of the benefits of economic growth and continues to suffer abject poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy and larger socio-economic asymmetry.

Globalization has not helped the situation; it has actually aggravated global economic disparities, worsening conditions for the poor. The fact of the matter is that the market-driven process of globalization, integrating national economies into the world economy, is an asymmetric one, with some winners but many losers. Growth and development have not and cannot automatically bring about reduction in inequality. The growing size of the pie does not ensure that everyone will get his or her piece of the pie.

One may ask why there are so many poor people in the world at a time of such abundance of wealth. Absence of level-playing field is one of the major reasons, and level playing is not possible between strong and weak economies unless international regulatory measures are in place to control the predatory policies of the more powerful players. The signs of a resurgence of the nineteenth century economic adventurism through military force are no less alarming for the developing world.

While the developing world is treated with sermons about the advantages of deregulation and liberalization, the developed countries hardly apply these principles to their own markets which in most cases are almost like closed fortresses. Major areas of export interest to developing countries are either closed or protected through subsidies and other [illegible] yet to establish what the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002) envisaged as "a universal, rule-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system."

Meaningful trade liberalization through removal of trade barriers as well as trade-distorting subsidies, particularly in sectors of special export interest to developing countries, including agriculture, also remains as elusive as ever. Since the world's poor people, those living below the international poverty line of $2 per day, work mostly in agriculture and labour-intensive manufactures; these sectors present the greatest trade barriers, putting the world's poor at a particular disadvantage.

All this notwithstanding, there is no denying the fact that the basic ownership of development rests with each developing country. Instead of remaining dependent on the "largesse" of industrialized nations, the developing countries need to forge closer trade links and genuine cooperation among themselves to build their mutual capacity for sustainable development and sustained economic growth. They are rich in terms of resources, talent, skills and manpower and have the necessary technological base as well as an unparalleled market of their own.

What they need is enough space to harness their own resources and to capitalize on their overall potential. Unfortunately, all is not well with the Third World. Most developing countries suffer serious governance and rule of law problems rooted in their authoritarian and non-representative political culture. Democracy is distorted and misused. Corruption is a way of life in most Third World countries. Some of them are mired in perpetual intra-state or inter-state conflicts. There is something fundamentally wrong with the Third World's approach in striking a balance between its problems, its remedial needs and its impulse for change.

In order to put their house in order, the developing countries, be they in Africa, Asia or Latin America or in the equally backward Muslim world, must own and fulfil their responsibility to improve their system of governance and rule of law and to re-order their national priorities. They must create a domestic socio-political environment that helps, not impedes, a healthy transformation of their societies.

Despite all the contributions that G-77 and NAM have made through their negotiating skills on the economic and political causes of the developing world in global forums and within the UN system, there is very little to credit them with any substantive or perceptible socio-economic change on the global horizon. The debate and acrimony in multilateral forums on behalf of the developing countries notwithstanding, nothing has come out of the UN's development agenda that could build a genuine partnership for universalizing affluence and elimination of poverty, hunger and disease.

Both G-77 and NAM have limited operational capacity in the absence of any organizational structure or a permanent secretariat. They had neither the means to change the political and economic systems of developing countries, nor could they redress the global economic inequalities by enabling the resource-rich countries among them to capitalize on their natural wealth.

At best, they have maintained group discipline in formulating common positions on major global issues. On the other hand, the traditional triad of affluence and power comprising the European states, the USA and Japan has been building upon its economic as well as technological gains and monopoly, despite all that talk about fairness and equity, remain the sole determinant in global trade and finance.

With the East and West no longer being strategic rivals, the notion of non-alignment has become more or less anachronistic. The relevance of non-alignment and the Non-Aligned Movement is being questioned both within and outside its membership. Today's unipolarity has given rise to new strategic alliances with some of the stalwarts and founding fathers of the Non-Aligned Movement becoming aligned with the unrivalled "pole of power." While on global economic issues, G-77 retains its relevance, NAM needs to redefine its role in the post-Cold War world.

The Cold War has ended but most of its legacies are still there which notably include "foreign occupation, foreign military bases, the use or threat or use of force, pressure, interference in internal affairs and coercive sanctions." Global peace and stability are facing new threats. Developing countries remain under pressures to conform to an agenda "which is being defined and driven by others."

The role of NAM as a movement and as an organization, therefore, acquires even greater importance. It can serve as a balancing factor in the unipolar world and help promote a new system of international relations based on peace, justice, equality, democracy and development. Perhaps the only change that it needs is in its name. Understandably, and for historical reasons, its acronym, NAM is irreplaceable but it should now stand for "New Age Movement" rather than timeworn and rusty "Non-Aligned Movement." This would neither alter the historical outlook and rationale of the organization nor dilute its importance or relevance as a movement and as a process.

II. CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT

(a) Global Development Agenda

Plus ca change, plus c'est la même chose. (The more it changes, the more it's the samething) This French aphorism perhaps best describes the uncertainties surrounding the global development agenda aimed at bringing about a change in the socio-economic condition of the world's poor and disadvantaged. Despite scores of UN's major conferences and summits convened in the 1990s to evolve common strategies on economic, social and related issues, the overall outlook on the global horizon offers very little hope for a real or rapid change in terms of sustainable development and poverty eradication.

The close of the last millennium, unfortunately, did not close the ugly chapters of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy, which continue to be the most daunting challenges of our times. The world remains divided between two unequal halves, one embarrassingly rich, and the other desperately poor. The income gap between the rich and the poor has never been wider in human history. The top 20% of the world's people, living in the richest countries account for 86% of world's GDP, 82% of its export market, 68% of all foreign direct investments (FDIs) and 74% of all telephone lines.

What is even more disturbing is that the world's two largest regions, Africa and South Asia, both rich in natural and human resources, are the biggest victims of poverty and violence. Both continue to be the scene of endemic instability as a result of unabated inter-state and intra-state conflicts and hostilities. No development strategies in these regions would work as long as the hunger of the gods of war remains unsatiated and until the underlying causes of conflicts are addressed. Most countries in these regions are also suffering governance problems rooted in an authoritarian and non-representative political culture.

There are many questions that keep agitating our minds. Why are there so many poor people in today's globalizing world at a time when there is such abundance of wealth and affluence? Why is capital hesitant of moving in the direction of developing economies? Why are the developed markets closed to the products of developing countries? For decades, the world has been looking at the United Nations for answers to these questions and for articulating a global consensus on how to address the issues of development and poverty.

Through inconclusive North-South dialogue and four successive "development decades" undertaken at the United Nations in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, an effort was made to sensitize the international community on the imperatives of development. The underlying objective of these initiatives was to explore the possibility of a new international economic order and to mobilize support for development.

A new international development strategy adopted in the third development decade sought to establish a target of 0.7% of GDP for ODA by the developed countries. The international development strategy approved by the UN General Assembly in December 1990 was aimed at accelerating economic growth through enhanced emphasis on human resource development, entrepreneurship and innovation, while also recognising the importance of democracy, and respect for human rights as well as social and economic rights.

All these years, the developing countries, on their part, have been seeking an international economic environment that would promote a genuine global partnership for combating poverty and facilitating development. It has been an uphill task. For many nations, globalization unleashed enormous opportunities of spectacular economic growth and unprecedented income levels. But for the majority, globalization has been a sheer disenchantment and worrisome marginalization.

Expected benefits of globalization have not been realised universally. The economic polarization has only further deepened. There is no denying the fact that the basic ownership of development rests with each developing country. But the development capacity and the potential of each developing country is also inevitably conditioned by the enabling environment for mobilization of the needed resources through **aid, trade, investment, debt relief, technical know-how, and global economic management.**

Developing countries do not have to look for charity. What they need is enough space to harness their own resources and to capitalise on their potential. Macro-economic stability, market access, debt relief, capital flows, ODA and, above all, fair and just treatment by international financial and monetary institutions are of great relevance and importance to their capacity building as the principal means of poverty eradication and sustainable development.

Despite continuing problems and disappointments, the 1990s saw an eventful period for international efforts in evolving a global direction on multi-sectoral issues of development. As a result of the UN's major conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields during the last 15 years, poverty eradication and sustainable development have emerged as the overarching goals of the global development agenda and are today an integral part of economic activity at the national, regional and international levels.

At the turn of the century, the world leaders, in their Millennium Declaration, recognised the importance of making progress on the three pillars of sustainable development, namely economic growth, social development, and environmental protection, in an integrated manner. They also resolved to make the "right to development" a reality for everyone and to free the entire humanity from want and misery. The roadmap set out in the Declaration identified a set of quantifiable goals, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to be achieved by 2015.

When the world leaders, gathered at the Millennium Summit in September 2000, were defining the MDGs, the world economy was at its best in over a decade and a half. The steep rise in world GDP from $11.7 trillion in 1980 to around $20 trillion in 2000 had given the world leaders the hope that through better global economic governance a big leap forward could be made in pursuit of poverty eradication. The hope seemed real and the target achievable. But since then, the world has undergone a sea change in priorities casting ominous shadows on the global economic scene.

The world economic growth, which had soared to all-time highs, suffered a serious downturn as a result of the global fallout of the 9/11. The terrorist attacks not only left a profound imprint on the economic nerve of the world's largest economy, the United States, but also caused ripple effects on other economies of the world. The war on terror unleashed an overbearing "security agenda" replacing the global development priorities. The resultant slowdown in the global economy has seriously undermined the process of implementation of the MDGs as well as other internationally agreed development goals.

The spillover effect of the slowdown in the major economies may further damage the fragile economies of developing countries, which are already experiencing the negative impact of globalization. The foremost challenge for the world community is to ensure that these developments do not precipitate what many have termed "globalization of under-development".

The Millennium Declaration recognised the centrality of this challenge and sought "to make globalization a positive force for the entire world's people" and emphasised "shared responsibility of all nations of the world for managing worldwide economic and social development."

In the ultimate analysis, development will have to be pursued as a shared goal and common agenda in a meaningful and mutually supportive partnership between the developed and developing countries through coherent multi-lateral cooperation which must be managed in an open, democratic, transparent and participatory manner.

The developed countries, on their part, should contribute to global macro-economic stability, prevent the kind of financial crisis that hit East Asia in the late 1990s, assist developing countries through capacity building and technology transfer, and help better manage the global trading and financial systems. They must also stop propping up the unpopular and undemocratic régimes in developing countries.

In this context, special emphasis was also laid on good governance within countries and at the international level through "transparency in the global trading and monetary systems", which should be "equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory".

The developing countries must recognise the need to reform their fiscal and monetary policies, improve governance and reinforce democratic system, follow pro-poor growth and invest in the social sector.

Amartya Sen rightly argues that development and freedom are twins. It is time to cut down military expenses without any exceptions and opt for peace through dialogue and cooperation. Without durable peace within and between countries, and in the absence of good governance within countries and at the international level, the goal of sustainable development will remain elusive. Peace, democracy and development are mutually reinforcing and must, therefore, be pursued together in all developing countries.

(b) United Nations and Global Development Agenda

The United Nations, being the only representative body with universal recognition and authority, has an obligation under its Charter to address the twin challenges of peace and development. While its performance in terms of global peace and security has been held hostage by power politics and political expediencies, its activities in the area of economic and social development have made a difference.

Through a series of its major conferences and summits, the United Nations has built a normative framework of internationally agreed development goals and commitments and established its role in global macro-economic policy-making. It is also seeking to address the challenges of globalization by evolving new norms of international cooperation and forging a partnership for poverty eradication and sustainable development among all relevant governmental, non-governmental and institutional stakeholders.

In this pursuit, the United Nations provides an inter-governmental forum for dialogue and decision on the whole range of global development agenda. In this process, it has been able to engage not only the member governments but also all relevant non-state actors including multi-lateral institutions and civil society. This multi-lateral approach has been followed through the relevant organs and bodies of the UN, namely, the General Assembly in regular and special sessions and its Second Committee, and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) along with its subsidiary bodies.

The UN's global conferences have essentially served a dual purpose: first, addressing global issues that could not be dealt with from a national perspective alone, and second, establishing a pattern of pluralistic diplomacy, which has not only supplemented conventional diplomacy but also set in motion what could be described as "new multilateralism". In both cases, the United Nations, in its universally representative capacity, assumes a special role and importance in the process of transformation of the global consensus on development into reality.

The major United Nations conferences of the 1990s included the World Summit on Children (New York, 1990), the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), the UN Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), the UN Conference on Habitat (Istanbul 1996) and the World Food Summit (Rome, 1996).

Most of these conferences were followed by their five-year reviews, which highlighted the need to give new impetus to the realization of the agreed goals and objectives. Since the beginning of this millennium, the development agenda has been brought into sharper focus through the Millennium Summit (New York, 2000), the International Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey, 2002) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002). The goals and objectives emanating from these three landmark events are closely linked with the key objectives agreed upon at other major United Nations conferences and summits.

The Millennium Summit in September 2000 provided a new direction to the United Nations for adapting this organization to the needs of the twenty-first century. In their Millennium Declaration, the world leaders, while reaffirming their faith in the United Nations and its Charter, committed themselves to certain fundamental values (freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility) in pursuit of a better world in the new century. They acknowledged that the responsibility for "managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among all nations of the world and should be exercised multi-laterally." In this regard, they recognized the centrality of the UN's role.

The International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) at Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002 (the author then serving as Pakistan's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN co-chaired the preparatory process for this conference on behalf of the developing world whereas the then Swedish Ambassador to the UN, Ruth Jacoby served as co-chair on behalf of the developed countries) was a timely initiative to help mobilize international cooperation in six key areas of development finance: **aid, trade, debt, investment, domestic resources and international financial, monetary and trading systems.** This was the first- ever international conference under UN auspices on global macroeconomic policy development which for years had been seen as the exclusive domain of the Bretton Woods's institutions and WTO.

The conference outcome, known as Monterrey Consensus, presented a comprehensive framework of global response to the challenges of financing for development. The document was neither a charter of demands from the developing world, nor a list of conditionalities by the developed countries. It was essentially meant to evolve a new development paradigm based on mutually beneficial cooperation through partnership and interdependence.

The WSSD in Johannesburg (August 26 - September 4,2002) was meant to review the 10-year performance in implementing sustainable development since the 1992 Rio Summit and to develop a new action-oriented plan for meeting the challenges of poverty and environmental degradation. It was not expected to produce any miracles and, as an implementation-focused summit, was essentially aimed at reinforcing the international will and commitment for attainment of the agreed sustainable development goals. It adopted a 50-page "plan of implementation", proposing practical and sustained steps to address many of the world's most pressing problems.

From the outcomes of these major three UN conferences, it is evident that trade and development are inseparable. This was also acknowledged at the fourth session of the WTO ministerial conference in Doha in November 2001. The work programme established in Doha sought to bring more specific focus on issues of direct concern to developing countries in the WTO's trade negotiations and other activities. These included implementation of previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO agreements, decisions and understandings, particularly on non-discriminatory access to products of developing countries (agriculture, textiles and clothing).

At the United Nations, in recent years, there has been widely shared anxiety about the slow progress in implementation of the outcomes of the major UN conferences and summits. The era of promise must now yield to the performance phase lest the momentum of international engagement is lost. To ensure this transition from promise to performance, the follow-up process would require: recognition of the country-ownership both for implementation and capacity-building and coordinated measures at the national, regional and global levels.

Also needed is well-integrated and coordinated monitoring of progress at inter-governmental and organizational levels, effective and coherent inter-governmental oversight supported by efficient secretariat machinery throughout the UN system, and innovative ways of engaging development actors outside the UN system, particularly civil society, non-governmental organizations and the private sector.

While governments have put in place national implementation and follow-up strategies, there is no regional effort for coordination in the follow-up processes. At the global level, the follow-up processes are somewhat staggered in various parts of the UN system. Even the inter-governmental deliberations in various United Nations forums are duplicative, unfocused, and sometimes inconsistent and incoherent.

For instance, the issue of poverty eradication is discussed and dealt with in various inter-governmental bodies and by various parts of the system. Most of the times, same positions are repeated resulting in avoidable overlap and redundancy. Similarly, hard-core economic issues like trade, external debt and investment are spread all over the place. This not only causes dissipation of United Nations resources but also dilutes the message and impact on the outside world.

Since 1995, an effort has been made in the ECOSOC to promote an integrated and coordinated approach in the follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits by focusing on crosscutting thematic issues common to the outcomes of all major United Nations conferences and summits. A set of key crosscutting issues was identified on the basis of their overarching scope and has since been used by the ECOSOC for thematic consideration of the follow-up and implementation of the conference outcomes in its coordination and high-level segments.

A coordinated approach built around common themes and goals would help avoid duplication and overlap and also contribute to mutual reinforcement through joint actions at the national, regional and international levels. Sectoral approaches do not capture the full picture of development. Contrary to ill-founded apprehensions on the part of Group of 77 (developing countries and China), a coordinated approach is neither an attempt to promote any "super-agenda" over and above the existing agendas emanating from the major United Nations conferences, nor an exercise in setting priorities other than those established within the framework of the conferences themselves.

In order to promote system wide coordination and integration in the conferences' follow-up, the UN General Assembly established in December 2002, an open-ended working group (consisting of the entire UN membership), which after long discussions completed its work. . On the basis of its recommendations, the General Assembly has adopted a comprehensive resolution, which only partially addresses the requirements of coordination and integration in the follow-up mechanisms and procedures within the UN system.

There are no quick fixes in meeting the challenges of development and sustained efforts through coordination at all levels are needed to pursue the agreed goals and targets. In pursuing implementation of the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits, an effective, focused and result-oriented follow-up is critical. It is also important that all governmental, non-governmental and institutional stakeholders honour their commitments and the international community engages itself, with sincerity of purpose, in the global partnership for sustainable development and poverty eradication.

Every country, developed or developing, must contribute to creating an environment, at the national and global levels alike, which is conducive to development. However, the developing world must recognize that without durable peace within and between countries, and in the absence of good governance "within countries and at the international level" the goal of their sustainable development will remain elusive. Peace, democracy and development are mutually reinforcing and must, therefore, be pursued together in all developing countries.

In recent years, there has also been a growing concern in the developing countries on the deep damage done to their societies and economies by corruption of officials and public leaders and movement of illicitly acquired funds across borders. Besides corruption, crime, including the drug trade and human trafficking, is another source of funds that are being laundered in large scales. Mostly, banking facilities in the developed world and their offshore affiliates are benefiting from these funds. To cope with the increasing corruption and organised crime all over the world, the UN General Assembly approved in 2003 UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).

The UNCAC is the most recent of a long series of developments in which experts and politicians have recognized the far-reaching impact of corruption and economic crime that undermine the value of democracy, sustainable development, and rule of law. They also recognized the need to develop effective measures against corruption at both the domestic and international levels. International action against corruption has progressed from general consideration and declaratory statements to legally binding agreements. The convention deals with all forms of corruption that had not been covered by many of the earlier international instruments, such as trading in influence, abuse of function, and various types of corruption in the private sector.

A further significant development was the inclusion of a specific chapter dealing with the recovery of stolen assets, a major concern for developing countries that pursue the assets of their former leaders and other officials accused or found to have engaged in loot and plunder of their own country's wealth. There is now a well-defined legal framework at the global level with its applicability to corruption in all its aspects within its signatories. It seeks, *inter* *alia*, to prevent and combat the transfer of funds of illicit origin derived from acts of corruption, including the laundering of funds, and returning such funds to the countries of their origin. Developing countries have a direct stake in their strict adherence to the provisions of this convention and are expected to play an active role in freeing the world of this man-made scourge.

(b) Challenge of Sustainable Development

At the beginning of this century, our leaders in the historic Millennium Declaration, had recognized the importance of making progress on the three pillars of sustainable development, namely economic growth, social development and environmental protection in an integrated manner as a resolve to make the "right to development", a reality for everyone and to free the entire humanity from want and misery. This right is indeed predicated on creation of an environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.

The road-map set out in the Millennium Declaration identified a set of quantifiable goals called the "Millennium Development Goals" (MDGs) to be achieved by 2015. Success in meeting this and other development goals and objectives was essentially predicated, *inter alia*, on good governance within each country. According to the Millennium Declaration, the realization of these goals depended on "good governance at the international level and on transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems as well as on an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial system."

The world leaders pledged "to spare no efforts to free the humanity from the threat of living on a planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose resources would no longer be sufficient for their needs."[1] They also resolved to make every effort to ensure the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and to embark on the required reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases. They reaffirmed their support to the principles of sustainable development including those set out in Agenda 21 agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)[2] held in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, familiarly called Earth Summit which had sought to help governments rethink economic development and find ways to halt the destruction of irreplaceable natural resources and pollution of the planet.

It was at this Summit that Agenda 21 was adopted as a wide-ranging blueprint for action to achieve sustainable development worldwide. Hundreds of thousands of people from all walks of life were drawn into the Rio process. They persuaded their leaders to go to Rio and join other nations in making the difficult decisions needed to ensure a healthy planet for generations to come. The Agenda 21 was the most comprehensive and effective programme of action ever sanctioned by the international community and placed people at the centre of any development strategy.

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[1] The Millennium Declaration (2000).

[2] *ibid.*

No other document provides better guidance than Agenda 21 itself, for initiating efforts to stamp out the causes which adversely affected progress on the three pillars of sustainable development. Unfortunately, fragmented approach towards sustainable development, unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, biased international trade and investment policies and non-implementation of the pledges made at Rio for provision of financial resources have been the major impediments towards the implementation of Agenda 21.

Chapter 2 of Agenda 21 touches the nerve-centre of the problem. It says that policies that affect trade and flow of global finances have a major impact on sustainable development. This impact has eroded the fragile economic and social base of developing countries. More perceptive is the conclusion of Agenda 21 that major cause of environmental degradation is unsustainable pattern of consumption and production. Such patterns widen resource gap, aggravate poverty and sustain imbalances among nations. As the world globalizes, these disparities are becoming even more unmistakable.

Globalization with its unequal benefits has emerged as a great challenge in the last two decades. Developing countries with lesser capacities and underdeveloped infrastructure were the prime victims of the unbridled consequences of globalization. The cumulative impact of all these factors is deterioration of socio-economic environment in the developing countries and perpetuation of disparities between and among nations worldwide. It is a pity that in the twenty-first century, more than 1.2 billion people live on less than a dollar a day and 2.8 billion on less than two dollars a day.

More than a billion people still lack safe drinking water and about 2.4 billion adequate sanitation. More than 113 million primary-school-age children in developing countries are out of school. Although global food production has continued to expand more rapidly than population in the last decade, around nearly one billion people in the world are undernourished. Equally disappointing is our record in environmental protection. No other document provides better guidance than Agenda 21 itself, for initiating efforts to stamp out the causes which adversely affected progress on the three pillars of sustainable development.

No doubt, the conservation of the natural resources is our common responsibility. We must acquit this responsibility in a differentiated manner as propounded in Agenda 21. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities requires removal of biased trade regimes, reliable flow of funds to developing countries for building their institutional capacities and transfer of environment-friendly technologies to them on preferential terms. These ideas are neither new nor unfamiliar. These are the agreed fundamentals to promote sustainable development worldwide. Their relevance and, if implemented, efficacy remains undisputed.

The importance of sustainable development is now also widely acknowledged by the countries at domestic levels. Several countries have initiated national programmes for implementation of Agenda 21. In Pakistan, too, efforts have been made to increase economic growth and eradicate poverty, and to improve social conditions and reverse environmental degradation. We have developed a National Conservation Strategy, by *inte alia*, promulgating an Environmental Protection Act and establishing various institutions at national and provincial levels to address environmental problems.

Like Pakistan, in other developing countries, too, increased awareness of the benefits of sustainable development has resulted in a calculated and comprehensive response to the problems emanating from un-sustainability. National efforts, although commendable and noteworthy, cannot cope with these problems in isolation. There is a need to complement these efforts with equally energetic efforts with a view to establishing an enabling international environment that eases economic and financial pressures on developing countries. This entails a new partnership in pursuit of development.

Greater efforts have to be made for creation of new and additional resources for developing countries by, *inter alia*, lessening their debt burden and allowing greater access to their products in developed markets. Agenda 21 largely focuses on capacity building of those who have lagged behind in economic and social competition. It is about helping them reach a decent level of economic growth, social development and improved environmental conditions.

The problem of un-sustainability begins when resources are not evenly distributed. It can end when efforts would be made to spread resources and share opportunities for the common good of humanity. Official Development Assistance (ODA) should have been an important vehicle to bridge the resource gap between developed and developing countries and to create an enabling environment. Profit-driven private capital flows may play a role in the development of any country but have little interest in creating an enabling environment.

External debt has increased manifold and exchange of knowledge and information has been restricted by the intellectual property regimes. Any genuine effort to strengthen the implementation of Agenda 21, the reversal of these trends is a prerequisite. Macro-economic stability, market access, debt relief, capital flows, ODA and, above all, fair and just treatment by international financial and monetary institutions are of great relevance and importance to their capacity building as the principal means of poverty eradication and sustainable development.

Unfortunately, most of the developing countries lack the requisite infrastructure for an integrated progress on all three pillars of sustainable development. ODA and technology transfer through improvement in institutional and human resources could help developing countries create an environment that is conducive for the private flows and encourages a workable, productive and development-oriented public-private partnership to reinforce efforts for sustainable development. The significance of ODA notwithstanding, it has sharply declined since 1992, and despite an agreed minimum benchmark, the developed countries remain indifferent to their obligations.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 have only accentuated the need for a global remedy to address the evil of terrorism by eradicating its root causes, which include poverty and ignorance. The year 2002 saw two important summit-level meetings to address key development related issues, namely the International Conference for Financing for Development held in Monterrey[3] and the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg. Both events represented unique opportunities for the developed and developing countries to evolve synergies in pursuit of sustainable development.

While follow-up action on both conferences' outcomes remained largely unproductive, the world leaders in yet another ritual adopted another document titled as Post-2015 Development Agenda at the 70th annual session of the UN General Assembly in 2015 as a new 'collective response' to the challenges of development. The new Agenda contains 17 broad and cross-cutting Sustainable Development Goals and the 169 associated Targets charting a development-centric and growth-oriented pathway earlier approved at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development held in July 2015 in Addis Ababa .

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[3] *The author in his capacity as Pakistan's Ambassador to the UN co-chaired the Preparatory Process on Financing for Development that culminated into the Monterrey Consensus adopted at the International Conference on Financing for Development at Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002.*

The Agenda posits itself on the three dimensions of sustainable development: social justice, environmental stewardship and economic well-being. The world leaders once again using the United Nations platform committed themselves to what they called "a shared vision of inclusive growth and development" ensuring that no one is left behind'. The focus as indeed in all earlier similar outcomes of global conferences is on transforming the economies and livelihoods, building cohesive, just and peaceful societies, and protecting our planet. Poverty eradication remains at its core. It is thus, an agenda for change. The scope and magnitude of this new development framework is enormous.

Delivering on it would require unwavering political will, both at the national and the international levels. Its implementation requires a paradigm shift in the political, social, economic, and developmental outlook at the global level. And most importantly, meaningful implementation of this agenda warrants matching resources. It remains to be seen how a new global framework for financing sustainable development will align the needed financing flows and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities. A comprehensive set of policy actions by member-states, with a package of over 100 concrete measures that draw upon all sources of finance, technology, innovation, trade and data in order to support mobilization of the means for a global transformation to sustainable development and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Financing is considered the linchpin for the success of the new sustainable development agenda, which will be driven by the implementation of 17 sustainable development goals.

However, the overbearing "security agenda" unleashed by the war on terror seems to have replaced the global development priorities. The resultant slowdown in the global economy has seriously undermined the process of implementation of the MDGs as well as other internationally agreed development goals. The spillover effect of the slowdown in the major economies may further damage the fragile economies of developing countries, which are already experiencing the negative impact of globalization.

In the absence of peace stability, the implementation of sustainable development strategies at national and regional levels will remain elusive. This assessment cannot be truer for our own region, South Asia which continues to be a scene of conflict and tensions as a result of long-outstanding conflicts and disputes. It is tragic indeed that a region that is home to one-fifth of humanity and that has immensely contributed to the human civilization continues to wallow in deprivation and dehumanizing poverty. And yet the hunger of the gods of wars and conflicts remains unsatiated. Peace and development are indivisible. Only a sustainable peace based on justice and international law can provide a durable basis for sustainable development in South Asia.

(d) THE ISSUE OF FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT (FFD)

The issue of financing for development has been on the global agenda for decades. But it was the financial crisis of 1997 that brought the issue of finance to the forefront. The issue of financing was also a recurring theme in reviewing the implementation of the outcomes of major United Nations conferences and summits in the '90s. It was becoming increasingly clear that the challenges of development could not be managed in a globalizing world without a holistic approach, particularly to the issues of financing.

The final push came through the Millennium Declaration that led to the adoption of time-bound concrete goals. The word "holistic" in this particular context was used to cover many aspects of global development agenda emerging from the United Nations conferences of the 90s. **It meant coherence and consistency in the policies governing trade, finance, external debt, ODA and technology**. These should be geared towards financing development. It also meant a balance in national and international obligations, which should lead to a new compact between developing and developed countries.

The International Conference on Financing for Development at Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002 was a timely initiative to help mobilize international cooperation in six key areas of development finance: aid, trade, debt, investment, domestic resources and international financial, monetary and trading systems. This was the first-ever international conference under United Nations auspices on global macroeconomic policy development which for years had been seen as the exclusive domain of the Bretton Woods's institutions and WTO.

The conference outcome, known as **Monterrey Consensus**, presented a comprehensive framework of global response to the challenges of financing for development. The document was neither a charter of demands from the developing world, nor a list of conditionalities by the developed countries. It was essentially meant to evolve a new development paradigm based on mutually beneficial cooperation through partnership and interdependence. It stood for inclusion of all the relevant institutions and stakeholders. It also meant that the financing should not be focused on selective agendas like the green agenda, blue agenda, social agenda or brown agenda. It should cover all aspects.

Lastly, it also meant a holistic outcome that would promote financing for development in its totality. The holistic approach adopted in the Consensus is being increasingly pursued at the national level as well as in the governing bodies of the BWIs. Flowing from these explicit or implicit meanings of the "holistic approach," there were six major expectations from the International Conference on Financing for Development. I can mention these with some degree of certainty because as Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, I was very closely engaged (as co-chair of the Prep Com) with the preparatory process for the FfD Summit:

- **Firstly**, it created a policy framework to deal with the issues of financing at the national, regional, international and systemic levels.
- **Secondly,** it brought coherence and consistency in a whole range of policies impacting internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration.
- **Thirdly,** a common platform was provided for various institutional stakeholders like the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organization to work closely to promote financing for development.
- **Fourthly**, improvements in international governance by enhancing the participation of developing countries in the governance of various financial institutions.
- **Fifthly,** active involvement of relevant actors, particularly the private sector by introducing innovative modalities.
- **Finally,** significant and tangible increase in resource flows to developing countries, particularly ODA with the aim of achieving the target of 0.7%.

The Monterrey Conference, to a large extent, met these expectations. The Monterrey Consensus provides a comprehensive framework for putting development at the centre of financial policies. An important achievement of the Monterrey Consensus was to keep all actors engaged. United Nations has, so far, provided an effective forum to bring all actors together both from national and international levels. Systemic issues, particularly the need to enhance the participation of developing countries in the decision making on financial, economic and trade issues have also received adequate attention. The Monterrey Consensus has made some headway on these aspects of global governance.

There has also been progress on other aspects of international development cooperation like enhancing aid efficiency and effectiveness. The pledges to increase ODA made at the Monterrey Conference, if honoured, would have greatly contributed in reversing the downward trend in ODA flows. But there is still a long way to go before the agreed target is achieved. A large majority of small and vulnerable developing countries rely on ODA flows but the levels have not risen as rapidly as it was expected. Nor are the investment flows likely to increase in the near future.

Similarly, there are provisions in the Monterrey Consensus, which if implemented, could have alleviated the unsustainable debt burden. Despite some progress made in the area of external debt management, there are still many poor countries whose debt burdens are unsustainable. The worsening fiscal deficits in many economies create risks of instability, as does the increase in household debt to high levels in a number of countries. The economic recovery is still precarious, particularly for developing countries.

The issue of market access was duly acknowledged in the Consensus. Yet, international trade imbalances continue to widen. The large fluctuations in the exchange rates among major currencies have also revealed an inherent weakness in the international monetary system. The latest developments warrant serious measures to ensure that trade which is the engine of growth and development is not undermined. Trade is unquestionably a central pillar of the financing for development endeavour. Trade liberalization is not an end in itself but a means to finance development and it should be strengthened if we are serious in implementing the Monterrey Consensus.

Another disturbing trend on the global economic scene has been net outflow of resources from developing countries. According to the World Bank estimates, developing countries need about $40 billion to $50 billion annually to meet their Millennium Development Goals. Yet, the loss of revenue as a result of outflow of resources from these countries amounts to about $850 billion a year. If businesses and multi-nationals paid their taxes in a more responsible manner, and there was less trade and transfer mispricing, the improved tax collection from this source alone could amount to about $160 billion a year.

The long-term goal of developing countries should be to replace foreign aid dependency with tax self-reliance, and to stem the outflow through illicit means by businesses, politicians, and others. If even 10% of the annual capital outflow of about $850 billion is retained in developing countries, it could have a dramatic impact on their future.

The funds, if available, could be used for increased investments in education, job creation, healthcare, a cleaner environment, access to water, and the resources to fight infectious diseases. But the needed action has been slow. Why? The truth is that much of the money ends up in Western financial institutions and in tax havens, and those institutions have more of clout than the person on the street in a developing country.

Sustainable development is all about ensuring that the costs of one generation's activities do not compromise the opportunity of future generations. When we use up our capital through acts of war, excessive spending, or pollution of the environment, we create an added burden for our children's generation who then needs to make up for our actions. Similarly, when we take away resources in our lifetime that our children's generation could use for hospitals, schools, roads, or infrastructure, we deprive them of assets that are essential for their future. In doing so, we contribute to a pattern of unsustainable development.

Often the elite in these developing countries take advantage of power or connections, their opportunity to negotiate with multinationals on terms favourable to themselves, and seek to receive the proceeds for themselves in tax havens abroad. A number of multi-nationals welcome such a scenario as it reduces their global costs of operations and their global tax costs. And there is no international system today which can effectively stop them or hold them accountable. In fairness, not all multi-nationals act in such a manner. Many act responsibly and are accountable to the markets in which they do business. But there are others that do not.

On the geopolitical front, some tensions have been significantly reduced, but uncertainty still surrounds a number of issues. These pose major challenges for policymakers, both in developed and developing countries. But developing countries are more vulnerable to external forces and they need action for creating an enabling environment. From these developments, one message is very clear that selective or piecemeal implementation of the commitments made at Monterrey would not yield the desired results. In some cases, it might help in propagating a certain preferred agenda but the overall goals of development would remain elusive.

There are many substantive questions for policymakers of the world to address as part of their deliberations at the United Nations on implementation of the Monterrey Consensus in letter and spirit. Some of these are:

(a) How can the UN General Assembly provide leadership in bringing the Doha Work Programme of trade negotiations back on track?

(b) How can the UN promote international approaches to orderly debt workouts?

(c) How can UN and BWIs work together in promoting reforms in the governance of various institutions?

(d) How to promote greater coherence in trade, finance, ODA and technology policies? Is there a need to establish a global steering group at the ministerial level? Such a group could help in bringing together these strands of policies.

(e) How to promote advocacy for the "holistic approach" of the Monterrey consensus and for the expeditious implementation of the ODA commitments?

The achievements of the United Nations Conferences of the 1990s, Monterrey, Johannesburg and Doha should not be allowed to be squandered by very narrow and short-term interests. We all share the same planet and the newly emerging threats have proved that we all need to act together to banish poverty and to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of security threats posed by underdevelopment.

Development is a very complex pursuit and needs to be pursued consistently and with a coherent policy framework. The General Assembly resolution on the integrated follow-up and implementation of the outcomes of the United Nations conferences and summits provides us with a very broad-based framework and Monterrey is just one pillar of that framework but a crucial one. The General Assembly, as the most universal body, needs to ensure that this framework is effectively used to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, which will change the lives of hundreds of millions of people.

II. TRADE- ECONOMY RELATED ISSUES[4]

Global Financial Crisis

Following a period of economic boom, a financial bubble — global in scope — burst, even causing some of the world's largest financial institutions have collapsed. With the resulting recession, many governments of the wealthiest nations in the world have resorted to extensive bail-out and rescue packages for the remaining large banks and financial institutions while imposing harsh austerity measures on themselves. Some of the bail-outs have also led to charges of hypocrisy due to the apparent socializing of the costs while privatizing the profits.

Furthermore, the institutions being rescued are typically the ones got the world into this trouble in the first place. For smaller businesses and poorer people, such options for bail out and rescue are rarely available when they find themselves in crisis. Plummeting stock markets at one point wiped out 33% of the value of companies,

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[4] *http: www. Globalissues.org/issue/1/trade-economy-related issues-2013*

$14.5 trillion. Taxpayers bailed out their banks and financial institutions with large amounts of money. US taxpayers alone have spent some $9.7 trillion in bailout packages and plans. The UK and other European countries have also spent some $2 trillion on rescues and bail-out packages.

Such numbers, made quickly available, are enough to wipe many individual's mortgages, or clear out Third World debt many times over. Even the high military spending figures are dwarfed by the bail-out plans to date. This problem could have been averted (in theory) as people had been pointing to these issues for decades. However, during boom, very few want to hear such pessimism. Does this crisis spell an end to the careless forms of banking and finance and will it herald a better economic age, or are we just doomed to keep forgetting history and repeat these mistakes in the future? Signs are not encouraging as rich nations are resisting meaningful reform…

Most of humanity lives on just a few dollars a day. Whether you live in the wealthiest nations in the world or the poorest, you will see high levels of inequality. The poorest people will also have less access to health, education and other services. Problems of hunger, malnutrition and disease afflict the poorest in society. The poorest are also typically marginalized from society and have little representation or voice in public and political debates, making it even harder to escape poverty.

By contrast, the wealthier you are, the more likely you are to benefit from economic or political policies. The amount the world spends on military, financial bail-outs and other areas that benefit the wealthy compared to the amount spent to address the daily crisis of poverty and related problems are often staggering.

Structural adjustment

Cutbacks in health, education and other vital social services around the world have resulted from structural adjustment policies prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as conditions for loans and repayment. In addition, developing nation's governments are required to open their economies to compete with each other and with more powerful and established industrialized nations. To attract investment, poor countries enter a spiraling race to the bottom to see who can provide lower standards, reduced wages and cheaper resources. This has increased poverty and inequality for most people. It also forms a backbone to what we today call globalization. As a result, it maintains the historic unequal rules of trade.

Poverty around the World

Around the world, in rich or poor nations, poverty has always been present. In most nations today, inequality—the gap between the rich and the poor—is quite high and often widening. The causes are numerous, including a lack of individual responsibility, bad government policy, exploitation by people and businesses with power and influence, or some combination of these and other factors.

Many feel that high levels of inequality will affect social cohesion and lead to problems such as increasing crime and violence. Inequality is often a measure of relative poverty. Absolute poverty, however, is also a concern. World Bank figures for world poverty reveals a higher number of people live in poverty than previously thought. For example, the new poverty line is defined as living on the equivalent of $1.25 a day. With that measure based on data available (2005), 1.4 billion people live on or below that line. Furthermore, almost half the world—over three billion people—live on less than $2.50 a day and at least 80% of humanity lives on less than $10 a day.

The poorest 40% of the world's population accounts for 5% of global income. The richest 20% account for three-quarters of world income. According to UNICEF, 22,000 children die each day due to poverty. And they die quietly in some of the poorest villages on earth, far removed from the scrutiny and the conscience of the world. Being meek and weak in life makes these dying multitudes even more invisible in death. If current trends continue, the Millennium Development Goals target of halving the proportion of underweight children will be missed by 30 million children, largely because of slow progress in southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

Poverty-related Causes of Hunger

There are many inter-related issues causing hunger, which are related to economics and other factors that cause poverty. They include land rights and ownership, diversion of land use to non-productive use, increasing emphasis on export-oriented agriculture, inefficient agricultural practices, war, famine, drought, over-fishing, poor crop yields, etc.

Solving world hunger in the conventional sense (of providing/growing more food, etc.) will not tackle poverty that leads to hunger in the first place. Further, there is a risk of continuing the poverty and dependency without realizing it, because the act of attempting to provide more food etc can appear so altruistic in motive. To solve world hunger in the long run, however, poverty alleviation is required.

Corruption

We often hear leaders from rich countries telling poor countries that aid and loans will only be given when they show they are stamping out corruption. While that definitely needs to happen, the rich countries themselves are often active in the largest forms of corruption in those poor countries, and many economic policies they prescribe have exacerbated the problem.

Corruption in developing countries definitely must be high on the priority lists (and is increasingly becoming so in the wake of the global financial crisis), but so too must it be on the priority lists of rich countries.

Causes of Debt Crisis

The causes of debt are a result of many factors, including:

- The legacy of colonialism — for example, the developing countries' debt is partly the result of the unjust transfer to them of the debts of the colonizing states, in billions of dollars, at very high interest rates.
- *Odious* debt, whereby unjust debt is incurred as rich countries loaned dictators or other corrupt leaders when it was known that the money would be wasted. South Africa, for example, shortly after freedom from apartheid had to pay debts incurred by the apartheid regime. In effect, South Africans are paying for their own oppression.
- Mismanaged spending and lending by the West in the 1960s and '70s.

In effect, due to enormous debt repayments, the poor are subsidizing the rich. Total debt continues to rise, despite ever-increasing payments, while aid is falling. For example,

- The developing world now spends $25 on debt repayment for every $1 it receives in grants.
- For the poorest countries (approximately 60), $550 billion has been paid in both principal and interest over the last three decades, on $540bn of loans, and yet there is still a $523 billion dollar debt burden.

Heavily-indebted Poor Countries

The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative set up in 1996 by the rich nations through the IMF and World Bank calls for the reduction of external debt for the poorest countries through write-offs by official donors. The IMF and World Bank have actually admitted that the HIPC initiative is backfiring in some cases and are confirming warnings that debt-relief advocates were making even before the scheme wa ed. Difficult, and sometimes unfair conditions, are often associated with th ve.

The most glaring problem with the Heavily-Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative for debt relief is that it will not provide lasting relief from debt for the highly-indebted countries of the south. The HIPC process is aimed not at cancelling debts, but at ensuring that they can be repaid. It has little to do with enhancing human development, reducing poverty, or even increasing economic growth in the debtor countries. Rather, it is designed to message debt figures down to a level where they would be deemed "sustainable" again according to the criteria of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The HIPC policy has long been criticized by many organizations for not actually amounting to much relief in real terms due to it being tied to certain conditionalities that are recommended by the IMF and World Bank, which prescribed the problems of the poorer countries in the first place. The IMF and World Bank themselves are now saying things that somewhat endorse the Drop the Debt campaign.

People who have worked on these issues for many years have frequently arrived at the conclusion that debt is not a financial or an economic problem at all but in every way a political one. It is the best instrument of power and control of North over South [and now East] ever invented; far superior to colonialism which requires an army, a public administration and attracts a bad press. Control through debt not only requires no infrastructure but actually makes people pay for their own oppression.

Debt Cancellation

As well as the admissions by some heads of international financial institutions such as the IMF that their various schemes are not working there have been some additional positive actions and decisions. The Jubilee 2000 initiative, for example, has been very beneficial here to raise awareness. Various G8 summits have seen promises of billions in debt-write off, but almost hardly are carried out, or contain a lot of spin. For example, a lot of debt relief promised may include moneys previously announced for such purposes, thus creating an impression of enormous write-offs. Bilateral debt relief also does not typically release actual money to be used for other purposes. Multi-lateral debt relief, however, could.

Free Trade

While internationalism and equitable global trading allowing fair development nations prosper and develop fairly and equitably is probably what most people would like to see, the current model of corporate-led 'free trade' and its version of globalization that has resulted, has come under criticism by many, many NGOs, developing nation governments and ordinary citizens.

It is common to hear of today's world economic system being described as "free trade" or "globalization". Some describe the historical events leading up to today's global free trade and the existing system as "inevitable". Yet, the modern world system has hardly been inevitable. Instead, various factors such as political decisions, military might, wars, imperial processes and social changes throughout the last few decades and centuries have pulled the world system in various directions. Today's world economic system is a result of such processes. Power is always a factor.

There have been numerous regional free trade agreements. Some have been controversial, while others may be beneficial. Examples include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), USA attempts at free trade agreements with African nations and so on. Critics argue that when these agreements include partners that have different levels of development, this will lead to unequal trade and favour the wealthier partners to the detriment of the poorer ones.

In our own region, India symbolizes power and has been seeking to shape the region's 'free trade' on its own terms. Its oversized and resilient economy is perceived as a threat by the much smaller economies of the region. Hence, the demand for a formula for equitable and fair trade without which progress on SAFTA (South Asia Free Trade Area) will remain stalled. The success of SAFTA will depend on the fairness and equity with which this process is carried forward.

Trade liberalization that does not ensure equitable benefits to all countries of the region with special deferential treatment for the small and LDC member-states might be difficult to sustain. Special effort with concrete practical steps, especially on the part of the region's sole predominant economy would be needed to prevent any negative fall-out of the free trade arrangement on the relatively smaller and less-protected economies of the region. As a facilitation measure, the possibility of establishing a South Asia Trade and Development Bank should be considered.

WTO and Free Trade

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the primary international body to help promote free trade, by drawing up the rules of international trade. However, it has been mired in controversy and seen to be hijacked by rich country interests, thus worsening the lot of the poor, and inviting protest and intense criticism.

Supposed to be a development round of trade talks, the almost five-year-long Doha round collapsed at the end of July 2006. The USA found itself on the defensive as around the world blame was directed at the USA, in particular by the EU. However, the EU has also been part of the reason for failure throughout the five years.

Deregulation or Protectionism

Protectionism is often referred to as being a barrier to free trade. The word seems to conjure up negative images of isolationism and subsidizing industries that could otherwise not compete fairly against others. (This can help indicate why some industries would strongly support protectionism for themselves.) Complete deregulation allows corporations to benefit but at the possible expense of people in that nation or region if that deregulation means relaxation of environmental rules, health and educational services including control of natural resources and energy. (This hints at the powerful lure that the "freeing" of trade and liberalization of access to resources from regulation has to some proponents.) Neither seems to answer the notion of fairness, though. Often those nations that promote free trade for all, want protectionism for themselves.

Public Protests around the World

Mass protests, throughout history have come at a time when enough of the population has been affected by policies of the rulers and elite. They have often been met with brutal, efficient crackdown by the guardians of the elite, be they local police, militias, national militaries, or even another nation's military forces.

The global financial crisis has spawned a global protest movement campaigning against things like inequality, corporate greed, lack of jobs, etc. Although these protests have occurred for decades, they have typically been in the developing countries, or about the situation in developing countries. As such, many Western nations, who have strongly influenced the conditions in developing countries, have typically not paid much attention to such protests, no matter how large (even the famous Battle for Seattle was more about violence than the underlying issues, for example).

The purpose of the mass demonstrations was to protest against the current form of globalization, which is seen as unaccountable, corporate led, and undemocratic, and to show the link between poverty and the various policies of the IMF and the World Bank. For the last couple of decades, the context of global protests has been the current form of globalization marginalizing so many people around the world. Known as 'Street People' they now mostly protest against key institutions of globalization, such as the G8, World Bank, IMF and the World Trade Organization.

Multi-national Corporations

Today, we know that corporations, for good or bad, are major influences on our lives. For example, of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations while only 49 are countries. In this era of globalization, marginalized people are becoming especially angry at the motives of multi-national corporations, and corporate-led globalization is being met with increasing protest and resistance. How did corporations ever get such power in the first place? What was the impact of giving corporations the same right as individuals in 1886 in the United States?

Large, transnational corporations are becoming increasingly powerful. As profits are naturally the most important goal, damaging results can arise, such as violation of human rights, lobbying for and participating in manipulated international agreements, environmental damage, child labour, driving towards cheaper and cheaper labour, and so on. Multinational corporations claim that their involvement in foreign countries is actually a constructive engagement as it can promote human rights in undemocratic nations. However, it seems that that is more of a convenient excuse to continue exploitative practices.

For a while now, pharmaceutical companies have been criticized about their priorities. It seems the profit motive has led to emphasis on research that is aimed more at things like baldness and impotence, rather than various tropical diseases that affect millions of people in developing countries. Unfortunately, while a large market therefore exists, most of these people are poor and unable to afford treatments, so the pharmaceutical companies develop products that can sell and hence target wealthier consumers.

In addition, there is concern at how some pharmaceutical companies have been operating: from poor research and trial practice to distorting results, and politically lobbying and pressurising developing countries who try to produce generics or try to get cheaper medicines for their citizens. The AIDS crisis is one example that highlights the motives of some of the larger pharmaceutical corporations. When South Africa wanted to try and produce cheaper drugs to help its own people, by producing more generic and cheaper drugs, these companies actually lobbied the USA government to impose sanctions on them!

Tax Avoidance and Tax Havens

Through tax havens, transfer pricing and many other policies — both legal and illegal — billions of dollars of tax are avoided. The much-needed money would help developing (and developed) countries provide important social services for their populations. Some tax avoidance, regardless of how morally objectionable it may be to some people, is perfectly legal, [illegible] global super elite are able to hide away trillions of dollars, resulting in massive losses of tax revenues for cash-strapped governments who then burden ordinary citizens further with austerity measures during economic crisis, for example. Yet these super elite are often very influential in politics and business. In fact, they are able to undermine democracy and capitalism at the same time.

As the global financial crisis has affected many countries, tackling tax avoidance would help target those more likely to have contributed to the problem while avoid many unnecessary austerity measures that hit the poorest so hard. But despite rhetoric stating otherwise, it does not seem to high on the agenda of many governments as you might think.

Many industries such as the energy and fossil fuels industry leave many environmental problems in their wake. Because international lending schemes are tied with reforms that include cutting back on regulatory and safety measures such as health, education and the environment, problems can arise without many resources available to deal with them. While large corporations are able to profit, the costs from environmental and other damage has to be borne by the local population.

Transnational corporations are able to exert enormous influence in no less a powerful body as the World Trade Organization (WTO). These corporations are closely linked to the WTO decision-makers themselves. As transnational corporations grow in size and power, their influence and impacts affect more and more people. These stats provide an insight into the growing size and influence of corporations.

Sustainable Development

The idea of sustainable development grew from numerous environmental movements in earlier decades. Summits such as the Earth Summit in Rio, Brazil, 1992, were major international meetings to bring sustainable development to the mainstream. However, the record on moving towards sustainability so far appears to have been quite poor. The concept of sustainability means many different things to different people, and a large part of humanity around the world still live without access to basic necessities.

The causes of poverty and of environmental degradation are inter-related suggesting that approaching sustainable development requires understanding the issues from many angles, not just say an environmentalist or economics perspective alone.

Agenda 21

The Earth Summit in 1992 unanimously adopted Agenda 21 by placing people at the centre of any development strategy. This document envisaged reversal of the trends that perpetuate disparities and destroy eco-systems on which the well-being of this planet and its inhabitants depends.

Today, regrettably, many of the old issues which Agenda 21 was meant to address continue to defy our dream of making this planet safe for life and life livable for all. Regrettably, the road from Rio to Johannesburg has been rather rough and bumpy. But it should not break our resolve. We must continue to strengthen our efforts to implement Agenda 21 in its entirety and with continued emphasis on the overall welfare of humankind.

NGOs and Development

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are non-profit organizations filling the gap where governments will not, or cannot function. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become quite prominent in the field of international development in recent decades. But the term NGO encompasses a vast category of groups and organizations. Different sources refer to these groups with different names, using NGOs, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), charities, non-profits charities/charitable organizations, third sector organizations and so on.

These terms encompass a wide variety of groups, ranging from corporate-funded think tanks, to community groups, grassroots activist groups, development and research organizations, advocacy groups, operational, emergency/humanitarian relief focused, and so on. The World Bank, for example, defines NGOs as "private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development."

In wider usage, the term NGO can be applied to any non-profit organization which is independent from government. NGOs are typically value-based organizations which depend, in whole or in part, on charitable donations and voluntary service. Although the NGO sector has become increasingly professionalized over the last two decades, principles of altruism and voluntarism remain key defining characteristics.

Many NGOs from the wealthy nations have received a bad reputation in some developing nations because of things like arrogance, imposition of their views, being a foreign policy arm or intelligence tool of the original country and so on. However, recently some new and old NGOs alike, have started to become more participatory and grassroots oriented to help empower the people they are trying to help, to help themselves. This is in general a positive turn. Yet, the fact that there are so many NGOs popping up everywhere perhaps po [illegible] nternational systems of politics, economics, markets, and basic rights. The NGO reality was summed up by an Indian author:

> *"Development is the strategy of evasion. When you can't give people land reform, give them hybrid cows. When you can't send children to school, try non-formal education. When you can't provide basic health to people, talk of health insurance. Can't give them jobs? Not to worry, just redefine the words "employment opportunities". Don't want to do away with using children as a form of slave labor? Never mind. Talk of "improving the conditions of child labor!" It sounds good. You can even make money out of it."*
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> **— Palagunmi Sainath, *Everybody Loves a Good Drought; Stories from India's Poorest Districts*, Penguin Books, 1996**

Foreign Aid - Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Foreign aid or development assistance is often regarded as being too much, or wasted on corrupt recipient governments despite any good intentions from donor countries. In reality, however, both the quantity and quality of aid have been poor and donor nations have not been held to account.

There are numerous forms of aid, from humanitarian emergency assistance, to food aid, military assistance, etc. Development aid has long been recognized as crucial to help poor developing nations grow out of poverty. ODA is basically aid from the governments of the wealthy nations, but doesn't include private contributions or private capital flows and investments. The main objective of ODA is to promote development. It is therefore a kind of measure on the priorities that governments themselves put on such matters. (Whether that necessarily reflects their citizen's wishes and priorities is a different matter!)

In 1970, the world's rich countries agreed to give 0.7% of their GNI (Gross National Income) as official international development aid annually. Since that time, despite billions given each year, rich nations have rarely met their actual promised targets. For example, the USA is often the largest donor in dollar terms, but ranks amongst the lowest in terms of meeting the stated 0.7% target. Even though these targets and agendas have been set, year after year almost all rich nations have constantly failed to reach their agreed obligations of the 0.7% target. Instead of 0.7%, the amount of aid has been around 0.2 to 0.4%, some $150 billion short each year.

Furthermore, aid has often come with a price of its own for the developing nations:

- Aid is often wasted on conditions that the recipient must use overpriced goods and services from donor countries.
- Most aid does not actually go to the poorest who would need it the most.
- Aid amounts are dwarfed by rich country protectionism that denies market access for poor country products, while rich nations use aid as a lever to open poor country markets to their products.
- Large projects or massive grand strategies often fail to help the vulnerable as money can often be embezzled away.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

The monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period. Though GDP is usually calculated on an annual basis, it includes all of private and public consumption, government outlays, investments and exports less imports that occur within a defined territory.[5]

GDP is commonly used as an indicator of the economic health of a country, as well as to gauge a country's standard of living. Critics of using GDP as an economic measure say the statistic does not take into account the underground economy - transactions that, for whatever reason, are not reported to the government. Others say that GDP is not intended to gauge material well-being, but serves as a measure of a nation's productivity, which is unrelated:

Recession

A period of general economic decline; typically defined as a decline in GDP for two or more consecutive quarters. A recession is typically accompanied by a drop in the stock market, an increase in unemployment, and a decline in the housing market. A recession is generally considered less severe than a depression, and if a recession continues long enough it is often then classified as a depression. There is no one obvious cause of a recession, although overall blame generally falls on the poor economic and fiscal management by the government.[6]

Inflation

The overall general upward price movement of goods and services in an economy (often caused by a increase in the supply of money), usually as measured by the Consumer Price Index and the Producer Price Index. Over time, as the cost of goods and services increase, the value of a dollar is going to fall because a person won't be able to purchase as much with that dollar as he/she previously could. While the annual rate of inflation the world over has fluctuated greatly over the last half century, ranging from nearly zero inflation to 23% inflation, again, it is the poor health of an economy that inflation invariably represents. The higher the inflation, the weaker is the economy. It is a challenge for economic managers of states to keep the level of inflation within reasonable limits.[7]

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[5] *http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp*

[6] *http://www.investorwords.com*

Deflation

A decline in general price levels, often caused by a reduction in the supply of money or credit. Deflation can also be brought about by direct contractions in spending, either in the form of a reduction in government spending, personal spending or investment spending. Deflation has often had the side-effect of increasing unemployment in an economy, since the process often leads to a lower level of demand in the economy.

Demand

The amount of a particular economic good or service that a consumer or group of consumers will want to purchase at a given price. The demand curve is usually downward sloping, since consumers will want to buy more as price decreases. Demand for a good or service is determined by many different factors other than price, such as the price of substitute goods and complementary goods. In extreme cases, demand may be completely unrelated to price, or nearly infinite at a given price. Along with supply, demand is one of the two key determinants of the market price.

Bear Economy

The term "bear" has been used in a financial context since at least the early eighteenth century. While its origins are unclear, the term may have originated from traders who sold bear skins with the expectations that prices would fall in the future. The opposite of bear market is 'bull market.'

A prolonged period of investment prices fall, accompanied by widespread pessimism. If the period of falling stock prices is short and immediately follows a period of rising stock prices, it is instead called a correction. Bear markets usually occur when the economy is in a recession and unemployment is high, or when inflation is rising quickly. The most famous bear market in US history was the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Command Economy

An economy where supply and price are regulated by the government rather than market forces is called a centrally planned or command economy. Government planners decide which goods and services are produced and how they are distributed. The former Soviet Union was an example of a command economy.

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[7] *Ibid.*

Fiscal Policy

Decisions by the president and Congress, usually relating to taxation and government spending, with the goals of full employment, price stability, and economic growth. By changing tax laws, the government can effectively modify the amount of disposable income available to its taxpayers. For example, if taxes were to increase, consumers would have less disposable income and in turn would have less money to spend on goods and services. This difference in disposable income would go to the government instead of going to consumers, who would pass the money onto companies.

Or, the government could choose to increase government spending by directly purchasing goods and services from private companies. This would increase the flow of money through the economy and would eventually increase the disposable income available to consumers. Unfortunately, this process takes time, as the money needs to wind its way through the economy, creating a significant lag between the implementation of fiscal policy and its effect on the economy.

Monetary Policy

The regulation of the money supply and interest rates by a central bank, such as the Federal Reserve Board in the US, in order to control inflation and stabilize currency. Monetary policy is one the two ways the government can impact the economy. By impacting the effective cost of money, the Federal Reserve can affect the amount of money that is spent by consumers and businesses.

Global Economy

The world economy continues to grow at a modest pace. Growth of world gross product is projected at 2.8 per cent in 2015, accelerating to 3.1 per cent in 2016, according to the World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) as of mid-2015 report. Growth of world gross product was projected to improve slightly from 2.6 per cent in 2014 to 2.8 per cent in 2015—a downward revision by 0.3 percentage points from the forecast presented in the WESP 2015 in January.

The current world economic situation is characterized by five 'lows': low growth, low trade flows, low inflation, low investment, and low interest rates, combined with two 'highs': high equity prices, and high debt levels". The downward revision reflects mainly deterioration in the prospects of the economies in transition and several large developing countries, especially in South America.[8]

The growth divergence between various regions was widening in 2015, owing to differing impacts from the decline in the prices of oil and other commodities, as well as country-specific factors. The short-term growth prospects of heavily commodity dependent countries worsened considerably. By contrast, commodity importers were benefiting from the lower prices in the form of reduced inflationary, fiscal and balance-of-payment pressures.[9] While the recovery in developed economies is improving, many countries still face considerable headwinds from the legacies of the global financial crisis.

The overall subdued performance of the world economy in recent years has raised concerns of a "new normal" of lower growth. The broad-based weakness in investment worldwide not only holds back current growth, but also reduces potential growth in the future. The major downside risks to the baseline outlook are related to the impact of the upcoming monetary policy normalization in the United States, ongoing uncertainties in the euro area, potential spillovers from geopolitical conflicts, and persistent vulnerabilities in emerging economies.

To mitigate these risks and ensure a return to strong, sustainable and balanced growth, a broad set of policy measures at the domestic, regional and global level is needed. The report identifies key challenges in the areas of monetary, fiscal, labour market and trade policies, underlining the need for strengthened international policy coordination. Such coordination becomes ever more critical as the Member States of the United Nations are expected to adopt a new financing framework for sustainable development and an ambitious post-2015 sustainable development agenda

These individual risk factors are interconnected and could be mutually reinforcing, potentially leading to a weaker-than-expected expansion of the global economy. The overall subdued performance of the world economy since the global financial crisis has raised concerns of a "new normal" of lower growth. The broad-based weakness in investment worldwide not only holds back current growth, but also reduces potential growth in the future.

"It is somewhat concerning that, despite highly accommodative monetary policies and historically low global interest rates, real investment has been weak in many parts of the world since the global financial crisis", the report said. In the midst of all this gloom, concerns of currency wars have intensified, as some advanced countries central banks have adopted extraordinary measures to support economic recovery in the face of conditions reminiscent of textbook "liquidity traps." Yet, despite these severe strains, and the enormous adjustment challenges faced by many countries, global trade continues remarkably free of cross border disputes and the G20 standstill on protectionism remains.

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[8] UN's Report on World Economic Situation and Prospects (2015)

[9] *ibid.*

This may be a testament to the institutions of international cooperation that, however imperfect they may be, have kept member countries engaged in the global economy and have helped to prevent "defections" from the cooperative equilibrium of sensible macro-economic policies, open markets and liberalized trade and investment regimes. But, given the challenges ahead, it is clear that these institutions will be tested, and the global community will need to strengthen them if they are to prevent the adoption of policies "destructive of national and international prosperity." That strengthening will require a clear-eyed view of their role in the global economy of the twenty-first century and the governance reforms that are needed to restore their legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness.[10]

International trade and finance

International prices of primary commodities have been on a downward trend in the past two years, and no measurable upturn is projected for 2015–2016. International prices of oil declined sharply in the second half of 2014 and are projected to continue softening in 2015–2016, as the growth of demand for oil is expected to remain weaker than the increase in supply of oil. Non-oil commodity prices have also been on a decreasing trend, although they still remain high relative to their long-term trend of the past decades. Trade growth has been sluggish in the past few years, due mainly to the slow and uneven recovery in major developed countries and the moderate growth in developing countries.

World trade is estimated to have expanded by 3.4 per cent in 2014, still well below pre-crisis trends. In the forecast period, trade growth is expected to pick up moderately along with improvement in global output, with the volume of world imports of goods and services projected to grow by 4.7 per cent in 2015 and 5.0 per cent in 2016. However, this projection is subject to various risks, including the possible disruptive effects on trade flows of any increase in geopolitical tensions in some subregions.

In order to mitigate the myriad risks and meet the various challenges, it is imperative to strengthen international policy coordination and cooperation. In particular, macroeconomic policies worldwide should be [illegible]porting robust and balanced growth, creating productive jobs, and maintaining economic and financial stability in the long run. Meanwhile, international policy coordination and cooperation is equally important for defusing geopolitical tensions and containing crises such as the Ebola pandemic.

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[10] *The New Age of Uncertainty*, James A. Haley, May 6, 2013.

Other areas that make international and multilateral approaches indispensable include strengthening the resilience of the financial sector through further regulatory reforms, deepening cooperation on tax matters, reforming the governance of international financial institutions, expediting the WTO Doha Round negotiations, achieving concerted actions on combating climate change, delivering on the commitment of official development assistance to the least developed countries, and formulating and implementing a new post-2015 global development policy agenda, including the sustainable development goals.

Sustainable development strategies need to be inclusive and take special care of the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable. Strategies need to be ambitious, action oriented and collaborative. They will need to change consumption and production patterns systemically, which might entail, inter alia, significant price corrections, encourage the preservation of natural endowments, reduce inequality, and strengthen economic governance.

IMF's World Economic Outlook[11]

Global growth was forecast at 3.5 percent in 2015 and 3.8 percent in 2016, with uneven prospects across the main countries and regions of the world in line with forecasts in the January 2015 World Economic Outlook (WEO) Update but it is still tilted to the downside. The decline in oil prices could boost activity more than expected. Geopolitical tensions continue to pose threats, and risks of disruptive shifts in asset prices remain relevant. In some advanced economies, protracted low inflation or deflation also pose risks to activity.

Despite the tumbling of oil prices by over 50% since June, 20015 providing a welcome boost to consumers through lower prices of fuel and goods, the IMF has downgraded its forecast for global growth by 0.3% this year and another 0.3% in 2016. The downgrades reflect the ongoing weakness of the eurozone and Japan, as well as slowing growth in emerging markets (especially among oil exporters).

With central bank interest rates already around zero, the ability of monetary policy to offset these price falls and help bring inflation back toward the 2% target is limited (at least according to mainstream economic theory).

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[11] *IMF WEO, 2016*

However, the rep[illegible] a warning for advanced economies such as those of the US and the UK that are seeing relatively robust economic expansion. Lower oil prices are helping drag down inflation and could mean that even faster-growth economies experience a period of falling prices. If this is allowed to continue unchecked, the IMF warns, it risks becoming a self-feeding deflationary spiral.

Relative to the previous year, the outlook for advanced economies was improving, while growth in emerging market and developing economies was projected to be lower, primarily reflecting weaker prospects for some large emerging market economies and oil-exporting countries. A setback to activity in the first quarter of 2015, mostly in North America, has resulted in a small downward revision to global growth for 2015 relative to the April 2015 World Economic Outlook (WEO). Nevertheless, the underlying drivers for a gradual acceleration in economic activity in advanced economies—easy financial conditions, more neutral fiscal policy in the euro area, lower fuel prices, and improving confidence and labor market conditions—remain intact.

In emerging market economies, the continued growth slowdown reflects several factors, including lower commodity prices and tighter external financial conditions, structural bottlenecks, rebalancing in China, and economic distress related to geopolitical factors. A rebound in activity in a number of distressed economies is expected to result in a pickup in growth in 2016.

The distribution of risks to global economic activity is still tilted to the downside. Near-term risks include increased financial market volatility and disruptive asset price shifts, while lower potential output growth remains an important medium-term risk in both advanced and emerging market economies. Lower commodity prices also pose risks to the outlook in low-income developing economies after many years of strong growth.

III. TRADE ECONOMY-RELATED GLOBAL AGENCIES & GROUPS

Bretton Woods' Institutions (BWIs)

The Bretton Woods institutions were created in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 during the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at the Mount Washington Hotel. At the conference, member nations agreed to create a family of institutions to address critical issues in the international financial system. It led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, now known as World Bank. Both institutions are now based in Washington, DC.

The IMF was designed to monitor exchange rates and lend reserve currencies to nations with trade deficits, and the World Bank to provide underdeveloped nations with needed capital — although each institution's role has changed over time. Each of the 44 nations who joined the Bretton Woods discussions contributed a membership fee, of sorts, to fund these institutions; the amount of each contribution designated a country's economic ability and dictated its number of votes.

In an effort to free international trade and fund post-war reconstruction, the member-states agreed to fix their exchange rates by tying their currencies to the US dollar. American politicians, meanwhile, assured the rest of the world that its currency was dependable by linking the US dollar to gold; $1 equalled 35 oz. of bullion. Nations also agreed to buy and sell US dollars to keep their currencies within 1% of the fixed rate. And thus the golden age of the US dollar began.

For his part, legendary British economist John Maynard Keynes, who drafted much of the plan, called it "the exact opposite of the gold standard," saying the negotiated monetary system would be whatever the controlling nations wished to make of it. Keynes had even gone so far as to propose a single, global currency that wouldn't be tied to either gold or politics. (He lost that argument.)

Though it came on the heels of the Great Depression and the beginning of the end of World War II, the Bretton Woods system addressed global ills that began as early as the World War I, when governments (including the US) began controlling imports and exports to offset wartime blockades. This, in turn, led to the manipulation of currencies to shape foreign trade. Currency warfare and restrictive market practices helped spark the devaluation, deflation and depression that defined the economy of the 1930s.

By the early 1960s, the US dollar's fixed value against gold, under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, was seen as overvalued. The Bretton Woods system itself collapsed in 1971, when President Richard Nixon severed the link between the dollar and gold — a decision made to prevent a run on Fort Knox, which contained only a third of the gold bullion necessary to cover the amount of dollars in foreign hands. By 1973, most major world economies had allowed their currencies to float freely against the dollar. It was a rocky transition, characterized by plummeting stock prices, sky-rocketing oil prices, bank failures and inflation.

Since then, IMF members have been free to choose any form of exchange arrangement they wish (except pegging their currency to gold): allowing the [illegible], pegging it to another currency or a basket of currencies, adopting the currency of another country, participating in a currency bloc, or forming part of a monetary union.

Many feared that the collapse of the Bretton Woods system would bring the period of rapid growth to an end. In fact, the transition to floating exchange rates was relatively smooth, and it was certainly timely: flexible exchange rates made it easier for economies to adjust to more expensive oil, when the price suddenly started going up in October 1973. Floating rates have facilitated adjustments to external shocks ever since.

Reasons for BWI System Failure

1. As in the case of Gold Standard, this system also did not provide for any revision in the price of gold. Due to inflation, it became uneconomical to produce gold. This led to the suspension of gold production in various countries leading to stagnation of gold reserves which had an adverse impact on international liquidity.
2. The system did not provide for any revaluation of parities due to which surplus countries such as West Germany and Japan continued to enjoy export competitiveness against the US economy. This aggravated the US trade deficit.
3. The system did not provide for a revision in the price of gold in terms of USD. Due to this, it was not possible to devalue the US dollar despite continued trade deficit. The devaluation of the dollar would have adversely affected all countries having USD reserves.
4. The continued trade deficit of the US created an over-supply of USD in the international financial markets which reduced the acceptability of the USD. When the Gold Convertibility Clause was invoked, the US authorities could not honour their commitment to redeem USD against gold. This failure on the part of the US led to the collapse of the system in 1971.

The World Bank

Since inception in 1944, the World Bank's mission evolved from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as facilitator of post-war reconstruction and development to its present-day mandate of worldwide poverty alleviation with its expansion from a single institution to a closely affiliated Group of legally separate five development institutions:

1. **World Bank**

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

(IBRD) is World Bank's original lending arm which provides vital financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the world to reduce global poverty.

2. International Development Association (IDA)

The International Development Association (IDA) is World Bank's Fund that complements World Bank's funding activities to help the world's poorest countries. Established in 1960, IDA aims to reduce poverty by providing loans (called "credits") and grants for programmes that boost economic growth, reduce inequalities, and improve people's living conditions. IBRD and IDA share the same staff and headquarters and evaluate projects with the same rigorous standards.

3. International Finance Corporation (IFC)

An agency within the World Bank Group providing financing and technical assistance to the private sector in developing nations.

4. Multi-lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)

An agency within the World Bank Group which promotes foreign direct investment in developing countries by providing non-commercial risk insurance to private sector cross-border investors.

5. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)

An autonomous international institution within the World Bank Group which seeks to remove major impediments to the free international flow of private investment posed by non-commercial risks and the absence of specialized international methods for investment dispute settlement.

The World Bank Group together has two ambitious goals: End extreme poverty within a generation and boost shared prosperity. To end extreme poverty, the Bank's goal is to decrease the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to no more than 3% by 2030. To promote shared prosperity, the goal is to promote income growth of the bottom 40% of the population in each country.

The World Bank is a vital source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the world. It is not a bank in the ordinary sense but a unique partnership to reduce poverty and support development.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) headquartered in Washington D.C. is an international organization that was initiated in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference and formally created in

1945 by 29 member countries. The IMF's stated goal was to assist in the reconstruction of the world's international payment system in the aftermath of World War II. Countries contribute money to a pool through a quota system from which countries with payment imbalances can borrow funds temporarily. Through this activity and others such as surveillance of its members' economies and the demand for self-correcting policies, the IMF works to improve the economies of its member countries.

The IMF plays three major roles in the global monetary system. It surveys and monitors economic and financial developments, lends funds to countries with balance-of-payment difficulties, and provides technical assistance and training for countries requesting it. The IMF describes itself as "an organization of 188 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world." The organization's stated objectives are to promote international economic cooperation, international trade, employment, and exchange rate stability, including by making financial resources available to member countries to meet balance of payments needs.

The IMF lends money to member countries faced with balance of payments problems, i.e. when a country fails to earn sufficient foreign currency—through exports or provision of services—to pay for its imports. In return for financial assistance from the IMF, borrower countries must implement a set of economic reforms aimed at overcoming their balance of payments problems. Loans are disbursed in instalments and payment is tied to the countries' compliance with the structural adjustment policies.

IMF's conditionality-based operational policy is perhaps the most controversial and much criticized aspect of its functioning. It always requires conditions to be met in exchange for financial resources that it gives to any country. What needs to be understood, however, is that IMF does not require collateral from countries for loans but only asks them to correct their macro-economic imbalances in the form of policy reform. If the conditions are not met, the funds are withheld. This concept of conditionality was introduced in an Executive Board decision in 1952 and later incorporated in the Articles of Agreement.

The IMF provides various types of loans to member governments. Concessional loans are granted to low-income countries at a concessional interest rate through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), while non-concessional loans are provided with a market-based interest rate through five mechanisms: the Stand-by Arrangements (SBA); Extended Fund

Facility (EFF); Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF); Contingent Credit Lines (CCL); and the Compensatory Financing Facility (CCF).

Two frequently used mechanisms for IMF loans are the Stand-by Arrangements and the Extended Fund Facility. Under the Stand-by Arrangements, member countries are allowed to borrow over a period of one to two years to support macro-economic stabilisation programmes and repayments are made within three to five years. Under the Extended Fund Facility, countries borrow for a period of three to four years and repayments are not due until five to ten years down the line.

Member countries can also avail themselves of the Fund's short-term financing facilities. The Supplemental Reserve Facility provides very short-term financing on a large scale to emerging market economies experiencing sudden loss of market confidence as a result of massive outflows of capital while the Contingent Credit Lines finances national economic policies aimed at averting an economic crisis precipitated by crisis elsewhere in the world.

Both types of financing require repayment within one to two years and carry a surcharge. The Compensatory and Contingency Financing Fund provides loans to countries experiencing shortfalls in export earnings due to unforeseen circumstances, such as natural disasters affecting crop yields. Repayments are made in three and quarter to five years.

Concerns and Criticism about the World Bank and IMF

Criticism of the World Bank and the IMF encompasses a whole range of issues but they generally centre around concern about the approaches adopted by the World Bank and the IMF in formulating their policies, and the way they are governed. This includes the social and economic impact these policies have on the population of countries who avail themselves of financial assistance from these two institutions, and accountability for these impacts. Critics of the World Bank and the IMF are concerned about the 'conditionalities' imposed on borrower countries.

The World Bank and the IMF often attach loan conditionalities based on what is termed the 'Washington Consensus', focusing on liberalisation—of trade, investment and the financial sector—, deregulation and privatisation of nationalised industries. Often the conditionalities are attached without due regard for the borrower countries' individual circumstances and the prescriptive recommendations by the World Bank and IMF fail to resolve the economic problems within the countries.

IMF conditionalities may additionally result in the loss of a state's authority to govern its own economy as national economic policies are predetermined under IMF packages.

perspectives on developm[illegible] view that the IMF has created a system of modern day colonialism that SAPs the poor to fatten the rich. The IMF, along with the WTO and the World Bank, is directing the global economy on a path of greater inequality and environmental destruction.

The IMF's and World Bank's "structural adjustment programmes" (SAPs) ensure debt repayment by recipient countries to cut spending on education and health; eliminate basic foods and transportation subsidies; devalue national currencies to make exports cheaper; privatize national assets; and freeze wages. These policies increase poverty, reduce countries' ability to develop strong domestic economies and allow multi-national corporations to exploit workers and pollute the environment.

It is also claimed that the IMF caters only to wealthy countries and Wall Street. In the process, the IMF is imposing a fundamentally flawed development model which perpetuates, not eliminates poverty. IMF is also alleged to be a secretive institution with no accountability. It is funded with taxpayer money, yet it operates from behind a veil of secrecy. For the most part, members of affected communities do not participate in designing loan packages.

The IMF works with a select group of central bankers and finance ministry officials to decide policies without input from other government agencies such as health, education and environment departments. Furthermore, the IMF has resisted attempts to open up to public scrutiny and independent evaluation. The IMF has made elites from the Global South more accountable to First World elites than their own people. IMF SAPs promote corporate welfare; they hurt workers by eliminating collective bargaining laws and lowering wages in order to provide conditions favourable to attracting foreign investors.

The IMF's mantra of "labour flexibility" permits corporations to fire at whim and move where wages are cheapest. IMF policies also hurt women as its SAPs make it much more difficult for women to meet their families' basic needs. Above all, IMF policies are also seen to hurt the environment. Its loans and bail-out packages are paving the way for natural resource exploitation on a staggering scale. They do not take into account environmental impacts of its lending policies; and environmental ministries and groups are not included in policy making.

Pakistan and IMF Policies

Pakistan is one of those developing countries which remain perennially hooked on IMF funding. For its rulers, instead of looking for homegrown solutions, this has been an easy recipe for the country's economic ailments. Pakistan seemed to have exited from Fund-supported programmes in 2004, but the country's macro-economic situation again deteriorated significantly in 2007 and 2008, when it was hit by both domestic and external shocks. "Adverse security developments, high oil and food prices, and global financial turmoil all buffeted the economy."

Pakistan's monetary and fiscal authorities were initially reluctant to request an IMF programmes, even after having implemented difficult policy reforms, including the elimination of fuel subsides. They had publicly announced that they had graduated from Fund programmes in 2004, and were counting on donor support that did not materialize. "Also, the public perception of the Fund in Pakistan was not positive at the time because conditionality under the previous Fund programme was regarded as too harsh."[12]

The 2008 Package

But when the situation came to a head in the fall of 2008, a programme was negotiated in about two weeks, under extreme time pressure. The negotiations were difficult and intense eventually leading to a "support package" to help Pakistan deal with the adverse economic conditions it was facing. These shocks, combined with governmental policy inaction during the political transition and large central bank financing of the growing fiscal deficit led to slower growth, higher inflation, and a sharp deterioration of the country's external position.

There were also intense internal discussions within the Fund on the parameters of the programme and the appropriate level of financing that would safeguard Fund resources. Shortly after the approval of the programme, the Director of the IMF's Middle East and Central Asia department, Masood Ahmed, stressed the urgency of the situation in an op-ed noting that "Pakistan's economy is at a critical juncture. Inflation has doubled and is now running at 25 per cent, the value of the rupee has fallen by a third since March [2008], and foreign exchange reserves are down to worrying levels." [13]

Overcoming these difficulties against the backdrop of the worst international economic crisis in sixty years "will require hard choices," he added. But "while the key to success lies in the hands of the government and people of Pakistan, the financing from the IMF will help to ease the path of adjustment." According to him, the Programme was aimed at restoring economic stability in a manner "that ensured social stability and adequate support for the poor during the adjustment process."

According to IMF, its 2008 Pakistan Programme's conditionality was limited only to those areas that were "macro critical" (fiscal, monetary, and financial sector issues), but it also placed a strong emphasis on strengthening the social safety net which IMF's Managing Director Strauss Kahn called 'social conditionality.' Another important objective of the programme is to improve the targeting of existing social programmes to vulnerable groups.

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[12] *http://www.imf.org/external/country/PAK/*

[13] *http://www.imf.org/external/country/PAK/*

The 2013 IMF Package

The IMF approved on September 4, 2013 a $6.6 billion loan for Pakistan to support its program to stabilize the economy and boost growth while expanding its soical safety net to protect the poor. The 36-month program under the IMF's Extended Fund Facility was aimed at bringing down inflation and reducing the fiscal deficit to more sustainable levels. The program also includes measures to help achieve higher and more inclusive growth, in particular through addressing bottlenecks in the energy sector.

The package has been progressing regularly with the latest (10th) review of Pakistan's economic program held in January-February 2016. After constructive discussions, the mission and the Pakistani authorities have reached staff-level agreement on the completion of the tenth review under the EFF arrangement. The agreement is subject to approval by the IMF Management and the Executive Board. Upon completion of this review, SDR 360 million (about US$497 million) will be made available to Pakistan.

Within weeks after coming into power with a decisive victory in May 2013 elections, the PML(N) government alluded to the inevitability of an IMF bail-out package because of serious resource constraint. Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, explaining the financial difficulties of his government, justified his government's first budget as a "bitter-pill" necessity. But he also claimed the IMF "dictation" will not be acceptable.

The fact however is the IMF never gives dictation. It only lends money on its conditions whenever it is approached by any member country with serious balance of payments problems, not earning enough foreign currency through exports or provision of services to pay for its imports. This criteria itself is an eye-opener for any borrower country. Instead of begging and borrowing, it should be focusing more on how to increase its exports and substitute imports by producing more goods and creating more services.

In the first instance, a country like ours with abundant resources of its own should never have to go to the IMF. Indeed, there is no free lunch. No foreign support, bilateral or multi-lateral, is unconditioned. There is no concept of 'charity' in international monetary dealings. In fact, the very concept of foreign aid is predicated on "mutually convergent obligations" of donor and recipient countries inherent in their political, economic, moral, social and now strategic priorities [illegible] ever be the choosers. The only way to escape IMF conditionalities is to keep distance, as India does, from the exploitative Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI).

The IMF has its statutory requirements laid down in "Washington Consensus" to expect from its borrowers a set of structural reforms, including subsidy and taxation reforms that generate higher revenues needed for their faster economic consolidation. The borrower countries are also obliged to undertake policy reforms aimed at overcoming their balance of payments problems. Loans are disbursed in instalments and payment is tied to the countries' compliance with the structural adjustment policies. This is the sum total of the IMF wheel. If we want to ride it, the decision is entirely ours.

There is nothing unusual with aid-related conditionalities. Even the famous Marshall Plan had its conditionalities to ensure the requisite oversight and accountability. In terms of conditionalities, the donor and recipient always do lot of homework to evolve the needed convergence of mutual obligations. The question, however, is: whether as a borrower we have been faithful in adhering to our own commitments in the past? If memory serves us well, no IMF prescriptive measures have ever produced the desired results because we never implemented them.

One had thought the last IMF Stand-by Arrangement would bring some structural changes in our rotten system. The loans we received were linked to stringent conditionalities and policy benchmarks, including reduced borrowings and government spending and new taxes. But the then government never changed its habits. It kept borrowing and printing money with no control over the deteriorating macro-economic situation.

With adverse security developments, high oil and food prices and global financial turmoil our crisis further aggravated. We just had no financial managers to redress the situation. The then government remained obsessed with "foreign money" and kept running after elusive "Friends of Pakistan".

Can the IMF salvage us? Yes, only if we change our governance patterns and opt for economic discipline and self-reliance. Every IMF programme for Pakistan called for, as it is bound to do under its Charter, redressing of our economic mismanagement and macro-economic imbalances. No matter how stringent the IMF conditions are, they are for our own good and should be heeded with self-respect and dignity. The alternative of going to individual countries shamelessly begging for money in the name of 'friendship' is even worse than standing in Kalma Chowk and knocking every passing car's window for help.

The lessons for every new government in Pakistan are clear. Our problems are those of pathetically poor governance, absence of the rule of law, endemic corruption, and non-existent institutionalized development strategy. There is no law and order in the country. We must fix the fundamentals of our governance. Loot and plunder of national exchequer must stop. The system that breeds corruption, tax evasion, kleptocracy, abuse of power, lavish governmental spending, a VIP culture, and violence and lawlessness will have to be rooted out from our body politic. We need larger cuts in governmental spending.

We must return to genuine economic discipline before asking the people to be ready to swallow the IMF bullet. Our problems are all at home. Their solutions are also at home, not in Abu Dhabi, Beijing, Dubai, Riyadh, London, Washington or New York. Let us be our own friends and focus on developing our economic potential and capitalizing on our geopolitical locations.

IV OTHER DEVELOPMENT BANKS AND ORGANIZATIONS

African Development Bank

An institution that works to promote both public and private investment and economic development in Africa, as well as provide financial and technical assistance to its member-states.

Asian Development Bank

An institution providing financial and technical assistance to public and private development projects in Asia and the Pacific.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

An institution that provides financial and technical assistance primarily to private sector businesses in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia in order to promote transition to open and democratic market economies.

Inter-American Development Bank

An institution that provides financial and technical assistance to public and private development projects in Latin America.

Islamic Development Bank

The Islamic Development Bank established in October 1975 with its headquarters in Jeddah is an international institution that 'fosters economic development and social progress of its member countries' who are also members of OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and Muslim communities individually as well as jointly in accordance with the principles of *shari'ah*, i.e. Islamic Law.

World Trade Organ

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. It is the primary international body to help promote free trade, by drawing up the rules of international trade. Its main function is to ensure that globally trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. However, it has been mired in controversy from the very beginning is seen to be hijacked by rich countries interests, thus worsening the lot of the poor, and inviting protest and intense criticism.

The WTO was born out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the result of negotiations. Founded in 1995 after the 8-year "Uruguay Round" of talks, it succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was created in 1948 to lower trade barriers. With 162 members November 2015, the WTO is currently host to new negotiations, under the 'Doha Development Agenda' launched in 2001.

The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a wide range of activities. But a number of simple, fundamental principles run throughout all of these documents. These principles are the foundation of the multi-lateral trading system and boil down to the following:

Non-discrimination

A country should not discriminate between its trading partners and it should not discriminate between its own and foreign products, services or nationals. Some countries have a most favoured nation treatment, but under WTO the policy is that all nations should be treated equally in terms of trade. Any trade concessions etc. offered to a nation must be offered to others.

- **Reciprocity:** Nations try to provide similar concessions for each other.
- **More Open:** Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious ways of encouraging trade; these barriers include customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as import bans or quotas that restrict quantities selectively.
- **Transparency:** Negotiations and process must be fair and open with rules equal for all.
- **More competitive:** Discouraging 'unfair' practices, such as export subsidies and dumping products at below cost to gain market share; the issues are complex, and the rules try to establish what is fair or unfair, and how governments can respond, in particular by charging

additional import duties calculated to compensate for damage caused by unfair trade.

- **Special and differential treatment:** In recognition that developing countries may require "positive discrimination" because of historic unequal trade, they deserve more time to adjust, greater flexibility and special privileges. Over three-quarters of WTO members are developing countries and countries in transition to market economies. The WTO agreements give them transition periods to adjust to the more unfamiliar and, perhaps, difficult WTO provisions.
- **Protect the environment:** The WTO's agreements permit members to take measures to protect not only the environment but also public health, animal health and plant health. These measures must be applied in the same way to both national and foreign businesses. In other words, members must not use environmental protection measures as a means of disguising protectionist policies.

The bulk of the WTO's current work comes from the 1986–94 negotiations called the Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world's trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business. The scope of WTO now also encompasses services, agriculture, and intellectual property, not just trade in goods.

There are a number of ways of looking at the World Trade Organization. It is an organization for trade opening. It is a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements. It is a place for them to settle trade disputes. It operates a system of trade rules. Essentially, the WTO is a place where member governments try to sort out the trade problems they face with each other.

Where countries have faced trade barriers and wanted them lowered, the negotiations have helped to open markets for trade. But the WTO is not just about opening markets, and in some circumstances its rules support maintaining trade barriers — for example, to protect consumers or prevent the spread of disease.

A number of countries have also spoken out against the WTO saying that there needs to be more cooperation between the North and South (a general term to refer to the Rich and Developing countries, respectively) with regards to international trade.

economies have reached a preferred or final stage of development. Classification by income does not necessarily reflect development status." Developing countries are, in general, countries that have not achieved a significant degree of industrialization relative to their populations, and have, in most cases, a medium to low standard of living. There is a strong correlation between low income and high population growth.

The development of a country is measured with statistical indexes such as income per capita (per person) gross domestic product, life expectancy, the rate of literacy (ignoring reading addiction), etc. The United Nations has developed the Human Development Index (HDI), a compound annual indicator of the above statistics, to gauge the level of human development for countries where data is available.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

Another misnomer today is an organisation called Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) because with the end of the Cold War, the very concept of non-alignment has lost its relevance. The movement, now comprising 120 members, represents over 60% of the world's population and nearly two-thirds of the UN's membership.

The NAM thus dates from the early Cold War, when many nations, particularly newly independent states, were determined to avoid choosing between Moscow and Washington. Its early leaders—Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Gemal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Josef Tito of Yugoslavia, Kwame Nkumrah of Ghana, and Sukarno of Indonesia—were giants of the era. In 1955, Sukarno hosted a landmark Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia—the first summit not dominated by major powers. The conferees pledged to uphold the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations, embraced the equality of all nations and races, championed national liberation movements against colonial powers, and insisted on non-aggression and non-interference in international relations.

The NAM really took shape in 1961, when Tito hosted the first "Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries" at which 25 countries were represented. The members of the resultant Movement vowed to pursue independent policies based on common approach in international relations. For that first decade, the NAM's substantive agenda focused on decolonization, moderating Cold War tensions, promoting nuclear disarmament, and pursuing greater equity in North-South relations. In economies have reached a preferred or final stage of development. Classification by income does not necessarily reflect development status." Developing countries are, in general, countries that have not achieved a significant degree of industrialization relative to their populations, and have, in most cases, a medium to low standard of living. There is a strong correlation between low income and high population growth.

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Throughout the Cold War years, the NAM did play a visible role in championing Third World causes, particularly in the eradication of colonial remnants and strengthening of liberation struggles and right of self-determination. It became a convenient platform for developing countries to assert their own identity and independent common position amid superpowers' influence on a whole range of global political and economic issues. All these years, it also sought an international economic environment that would promote a genuine global partnership for combating poverty and promoting development.

The Cold War has ended, and East-West rivalry no longer exists, but the NAM continues to be on the scene as a major group with a common negotiated position on global issues. It has been espousing sovereign equality of states inherent in the UN's one-state-one-vote principle and calling for an end to privilege-based anachronisms in its decision-making processes. It opposes expansion of veto-wielding permanent seats in the UN Security Council and wants increase only in non-permanent category to make it more representative of the current United Nations membership.

The numerical strength of the NAM does give it a clout as the largest voting bloc in global decision making at the United Nations. But this clout remains inconsequential because of the unbridgeable gap between the "power to decide" and the "power to implement" global decisions. This grim reality was evident from the fate of the NAM's initiatives in the inconclusive North-South dialogue and successive "development decades."

Despite all the contributions that the G-77 and the NAM have made through their negotiating skills on all these issues, there is no perceptible change on the global horizon. The overwhelming majority of developing countries remain deprived of the benefits of economic growth. Today, poor countries are poorer and rich countries richer.

Indeed, with East and West no longer remaining strategic rivals, the notion of non-alignment has become anachronistic. The relevance of the NAM as a movement is being questioned from both within and outside its membership. Neutrality and non-alignment are no longer the defining features of the NAM, which must now rearticulate its *raison d'etre* and redefine its role to be able to cope with the common challenges of the post-Cold War world.

No doubt, the role of the NAM as a movement and as an organisation now acquires even greater importance. Its biggest challenge lies in charting a new course for itself in the changed global environment. As the largest group at the United Nations, the NAM must take the lead in correcting the course and conduct of global events. Also important is the need for the NAM to remove the conspicuous anomaly of its name by using, for credibility sake, its historic acronym NAM for "New Age Movement" which will be more consistent with its new role and rationale. It is time for the NAM to become the world's awakened conscience.

ECOSOC

The Economic and Social Council is one of the six United Nations organs which functioning under the overall authority of the General Assembly coordinates the economic and social work of the United Nations and the United Nations family of organizations. As the central forum for discussing international economic and social issues and for formulating policy recommendations, the Council plays a key role in fostering international cooperation for development.

The Council has 54 members, elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms. It meets throughout the year and holds a major session in July, during which a high-level meeting of Ministers discusses major economic, social and humanitarian issues. It also consults with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), thereby maintaining a vital link between the United Nations and civil society.

ECOSOC's subsidiary bodies meet regularly and report back to it. The Commission on Human Rights, for example, monitors the observance of human rights throughout the world. Other bodies focus on such issues as social development, the status of women, crime prevention, narcotic drugs and sustainable development. Five regional commissions promote economic development and cooperation in their respective regions.

The G-8

The G8, or "Group of Eight," consists of eight large world economic powers, namely, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and the US. The G7, as the group is sometimes known, lacks Russia. The G8 has, for the most part, been replaced by the G-20 since 2008.

The G-20

The Group of Twenty (G20) is the premier forum for international cooperation on the most important issues of the contemporary global economic and financial agenda. The objectives of the G-20 refer to:

1. Policy coordination between its members in order to achieve global economic stability, sustainable growth.
2. Promoting financial regulations that reduce risks and prevent future financial crises.
3. Modernizing international financial architecture.

The G-20 brings together finance ministers and central bank governors from 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America plus the European Union.

The G-20 was formally established in September 1999 when finance ministers and central bank governors of seven major industrial countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) met in Washington, D.C. in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1997-1998, which revealed the vulnerability of the international financial system in context of economic globalization and showed that key developing countries were insufficiently involved in discussions and decisions concerning global economic issues.

Finance ministers and central bank governors of G-20 started to hold annual meetings after the inaugural meeting on December 15-16, 1999, in Berlin. In November 2008, a decision was made to change the format of G-20 meetings and additionally hold leaders' summits (summits of heads of state and government), which has made the forum what it is today.

The BRIC

An acronym for the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China combined. The general consensus is that the term was first prominently used in a Goldman Sachs report from 2003, which speculated that by 2050 these four economies would be wealthier than most of the current major economic powers. The BRIC thesis only posits that China and India will become the world's dominant suppliers of manufactured goods and services, respectively, while Brazil and Russia will become similarly dominant raw materials.

It's important, however, to note that the Goldman Sachs thesis isn't that these countries are a political alliance (like the European Union) or a formal trading association - but they have the potential to form a powerful economic bloc. BRIC is now also used as a more generic marketing term to refer to these four emerging economies. Due to lower labour and production costs, many companies also cite BRIC as a source of foreign expansion opportunity.

CHAPTER 9

PAKISTAN & REGIONAL COOPERATION

REGIONAL COOPERATION

1. Economic Regionalism

Economic regionalism is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon and constitutes the basis of today's regional cooperation and regional organisations in different parts of the world. The earlier economic models were all rooted in a state-dominated system of mercantilism, which pervaded the economic scene in the Western world from the sixteenth century to the latter part of the eighteenth century. Each state sought to enhance its power and security by amassing treasures of precious metals useful to buy off opponents and to hire mercenary troops for military campaigns.

In the latter part of the mercantilist era, a rising class of merchants and entrepreneurs began to demand greater measures of economic freedom. The new liberalism, grounded in the philosophy of *laissez-faire*, broke down internal restrictions in European states and, following the Napoleonic wars, fostered the development of an international trading system embracing the concept of free trade. The twentieth century saw re-emergence of economic nationalism inspiring a new trend of unilateral and bilateral determination of economic policies.

World War II arrested this trend. Under US leadership, the Allies evolved a system of regional cooperation to facilitate the war effort and laid plans for rebuilding a multilateral trading system once peace was restored. Unlike the *laissez-faire* economy of the nineteenth century, the new liberalized world economy was to be reconstructed by building regional and global institutions to facilitate agreement on trade, monetary and investment matters.

This marked the beginning of an institutionalized regional integration movement in Europe, which for centuries had exuded mutual suspicion and hostility through carefully nurtured nationalisms. The foremost post-War regional arrangement was the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) established in 1948 as a joint means of implementing the European recovery programme and restoring economic viability to the war-devastated region.

The success of the institutional approach in Europe's transformation led to what is today known as world's most economically and politically advanced regional integration arrangement, the **European Union (EU)**. Europe's success story was a model that many other regions in the world tried to emulate but with little or varying degrees of success. They had neither the environment nor the means and a "Marshall Plan" that the post-War Europe was endowed with. Since the mid-1980s, the **EU** has made major strides toward economic union of its member-states while also attaining higher level of political coordination.

The Single European Act coming into force in 1987 as an amendment to the Treaty of Rome was a major integrative measure committing members to "complete the internal market by December 31, 1992, with the removal of all barriers to the free movement of money, trade products, workers, and services among the member-states." The Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 1993 transformed the European Community into **European Union** envisaging "tighter" economic and political integration to be achieved in stages before 1999. In the economic realm, the most significant provision of this Treaty was the "creation of the **Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a European Central Bank** as its key agency to regulate the **EU** monetary policy, including the issuance of a new common European currency (euro) to replace national currencies.

Regional arrangements on trade promotion and economic progress have been proliferating and are now a worldwide phenomenon. A **North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA)** originally consisting of the USA and Canada since 1988, and later expanded to include Mexico in 1992 has been another significant free trade arrangement which has been operational with modest success and many problems. A larger free trade arrangement, Free Trade Area of the Americas (**FTAA**) is also envisaged but no consensus among its prospective members was reached at the Mar Del Plata Summit.

Among the developing countries, in particular, there have been several attempts to promote free trade on a regional basis. The Communist world attempted a regional economic grouping, called **COMECON**, in 1949 as an economic bloc comprising the former Soviet Union, and six East European countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Finland, and Romania), plus Angola, Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam.

In Latin America, many regional and sub-regional arrangements have been attempted with focus on tariff reductions and free trade areas. These included the Latin American Integration Association (**LAIA**, Spanish acronym **ALADI**) comprising Mexico and ten South American countries as a successor to the Latin american Free Trade Associ… which had earlier failed to accomplish a free trade area.

In Central America, the Central American Common Market has been struggling without success to become a proper Central American Economic Community, while its members (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua) have also agreed with Mexico, Venezuela and Columbia to form a single free trade area. In this region, the **Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM)** and the **Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)** have shown a relatively greater resilience and potential for economic integration.

In July 2002, African heads of state and government replaced the Organization of African Unity by the African Union and launched the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which will operate under the auspices of the AU, is a comprehensive framework for Africa's development, including a market access initiative to improve intra-African trade and measures geared to increasing African countries' participation in the multilateral trading system.

With the exception of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has moved successfully toward an Asean Free Trade Area, all other regional and sub-regional arrangements, notably the South Pacific Forum (SPF), Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union, D-8[1], Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and SAARC have yet to deliver on their promise.[2]

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN, established in 1967 now comprising ten member-states is today the only regional organisation other than the European Union, which has pursued and achieved genuine economic integration and made a visible difference in the political, economic and cultural life of its member-states.

Despite its cultural diversities and differing views on political and governance systems, ASEAN represents an unparalleled regional homogeneity. What makes this organisation even more remarkable is its attractiveness to other regions and countries, including major powers, for mutually beneficial cooperation not only in the economic field but also in political and security areas.

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[1] Shamshad Ahmad, "New Life Within SAARC", Institute of Foreign Affairs-FES (Nepal), Kathmandu, November 2005

[2] Ibid.

A number of countries and organisations have become ASEAN's "dialogue partners" involving periodical dialogue meetings on matters of mutual interest. Pakistan is also a candidate for this partnership and is currently engaged in a "sectoral dialogue" preparatory to full partnership. ASEAN has also established its credentials as a major factor of regional stability. The formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF in 1994 was an important initiative aimed at promoting confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in the region.

Regional Cooperation in South Asia

Regional cooperation in our part of the world is not a recent phenomenon. We started this journey in 1964 when Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, motivated by a regional impulse, established a cooperative mechanism called **"Regional Cooperation for Development" or RCD** as it was more familiarly known. It was dissolved in 1979 when revolution took place in Iran. Two other regional organisations, namely **the Economic Cooperation Organisation or ECO** as it is commonly known, and **SAARC**, emerged in our region in 1985 with ambitious goals and objectives.

(a) Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO)

ECO, headquartered in Tehran, was essentially the reincarnation of the defunct **RCD** which had been dissolved in 1979 but it assumed a new dimension and a global identity with its transformation in 1992 from a trilateral entity into a ten-member-states organisation when six newly-independent republics of the former Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) plus newly freed Afghanistan joined it as its members making it after the then European Union the world's second largest regional cooperation organization.

The Treaty of Izmir signed in 1977 as the legal framework for the RCD and later adopted as the basic Charter of ECO was modified to provide a proper legal basis to ECO's transition from RCD at the Ministerial Meeting held in Islamabad in June 1990. Following the amendment in the Treaty of Izmir, ECO was fully launched in early 1991. The break-up of the former Soviet Union led to the independence of republics of Central Asia and Caucasus.

In their bid to open up to the outside world and as a manifestation of their urge to revive their historic affinities with the peoples of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, six of these republics, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan along with Afghanistan sought the membership of ECO and were admitted into the organization. The participation of these new members in the activities of the Organization commenced after their formal accession to the Treaty of Izmir at an Extraordinary Meeting of ECO Council of Ministers held in Islamabad on May 28, 1992.

At an Extraordinary Meeting of the ECO Council of Ministers was held in Izmir, Turkey on September 14, 1996, the member-states finalized ECO's basic documents including its fundamental Charter, the revised Treaty of Izmir which also lists the objectives and principles of the Organisation. ECO's principal objective is promotion of sustainable development for socio-economic well-being of the people in the member states through intra-regional economic cooperation with special focus on trade, energy, and transport and communication. Sovereign equality and mutual benefit are the basic principles of the regional cooperation.

Globally, in October 1993, ECO acquired observer status with the United Nations and established cooperative linkages with various regional cooperation organizations including the European Union. In 1994, we also started an inter-regional cooperative mechanism in the form of annual consultations among the major regional organizations of Asia and Pacific in areas of mutual interest, especially trade and investment, transport and communications, human resource development, and energy. This consultative process however doesn't seem to have survived the vicissitudes of time.

At that crucial stage in ECO's evolution, this regional grouping, besides pursuing its multi-sectoral regional cooperation agenda, also provided to its new members, all of them land-locked countries, a natural access to the outside world facilitating the transition of their political and economic systems into the global mainstream.

Most importantly, ECO served to revive the historic cultural and emotional links among the peoples of our region who had been kept apart for decades through artificial barriers. This is a vast region comprising almost 400 million people and a territory of more than 7 million square kilometres, immensely rich in natural resources with unmatched oil and gas reserves. In the 1990s, despite many challenges at that crucial stage in ECO's evolution especially notable disparities in terms of economic development and patterns of governance, several institutional and regional policy frameworks were developed by the organization including the Quetta Plan of Action, Istanbul Declaration and Almaty Outline Plan on Transport and Communications.

Simultaneous with the identification of the region's priority areas, ECO was able to finalize several institutional projects and agreements which included ECO Trade and Development Bank, ECO Shipping Company, ECO Air and ECO Reinsurance Company. At the third ECO Summit in Islamabad in Mach 1995, not only formal agreements on the establishment of these institutions were signed but also formal decisions were taken on the setting up of two other institutions, namely the ECO Science Foundation and ECO Culture Institute.

For trade facilitation among the member-states, in addition to an MoU concluded in 1992 establishing a Preferential Tariff Arrangement, two other instruments, namely the ECO Transit Trade Agreement and the Agreement on Simplification of Visa Procedures for Businessmen of ECO countries were also signed in 1995. In the field of energy, an elaborate network of oil and gas pipelines from central Asian member-states to Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and beyond was also drawn. These routes were expected to benefit not only the ECO regional states but also to provide outlets to the Central Asian oil and gas to the outside world.

All those regional plans unfortunately remain unimplemented because of the ensuing war-led turmoil in Afghanistan. Looking back in retrospect, the process of regional cooperation in ECO unfortunately has remained slow with many problems engulfing the region. These included the overall backwardness of the new members and their preoccupation with economic transition, the restructuring policies in the founding members, still-evolving role of the private sector, competitive pressures from other regional and international economic groupings, paucity of financial resources and unending Afghan turmoil.

All these problems had a dampening effect on the pace of progress within the ECO framework. The process of regional cooperation remained slow with many problems engulfing the region. These included the overall backwardness of the new members and their preoccupation with economic transition, the restructuring policies in the founding members, still-evolving role of the private sector, competitive pressures from other regional and international economic groupings, and paucity of financial resources.

Nevertheless, today ECO can boast of a solid framework of cooperation, a forward looking agenda and economic strategy and an expanding horizon of activities. Yet, we have a long way to go to accomplish the objectives of the Treaty of Izmir. Our organization has yet to harness its full potential and bring tangible benefits to the

ECO community. This inevitably requires peace and harmony in the region and a fresh regional impulse with unity of purpose among the ECO member-states.

(b) South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established on December 8, 1985 in Dhaka. Founding members of SAARC are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan joined as the eighth member in 2007. China, Iran, Japan, South Korea, Mauritius, Myanmar, Australia, United States, and European Union are affiliated with SAARC as Observers. Australia and Myanmar were admitted to SAARC as Observers during the 15th SAARC Summit (Colombo, August 2-3, 2008).

The SAARC Charter affirms the desire of the South Asian States to promote peace, stability and progress in the region. The broad objectives are to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia; accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development; and strengthen collective self-reliance through mutual collaboration and assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields. According to Article X of the Charter, "Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity" and "Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations." With 1.5 billion inhabitants, the region now represents almost 25% of the world population, but only 1.97% of world GNP. Average per capita income is even less than $500.

The SAARC Secretariat and member-states observe December 8, as the SAARC Charter Day. The Secretariat of SAARC is located in Kathmandu. It is headed by a secretary general (appointed in alphabetical rotation) and serves as the channel of communication between SAARC and other international organizations. The SAARC Secretariat is supported by Regional Centres established in member countries to promote regional cooperation. These Centres are managed by Governing Boards comprising representatives from member states, SAARC secretary-general and Ministries of Foreign/External Affairs of the host countries.

Pakistan attaches great importance to SAARC and is committed to the principles and objectives of the SAARC Charter and has played a proactive role to make SAARC a model of regional cooperation, based on the principles of sovereign equality. It favours consolidation of the progress made through better coordination for result-oriented activities and avoidance of venturing into too many areas. Pakistan believes that a peaceful and secure environment in the region is of vital importance for the promotion of economic development. It is imperative that the member-states commit themselves to removing the underlying causes of tension in the region and to foster trust, friendship and good neighbourly relations.

SAARC Performance

SAARC came into being as an expression of South Asia's collective resolve to develop a coherent regional cooperative framework in an increasingly inter-dependent world and to keep apace with the changing times for the socio-economic well-being of its peoples. It was meant to bring a change in terms of poverty eradication and sustainable development to a region which is home to one-fifth of humanity. Even after quarter of a century of its existence, however, the desired change is nowhere in sight.

What has gone wrong with SAARC is a question that keeps agitating the minds of policy makers and practitioners of all sorts both within and outside this region. With its almost negligible output and a yawning gap between its promise and performance, SAARC has yet a long way to go before it comes of age. The common vision upholding the ideals of peace, stability, good-neighbourly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation in South Asia remains a distant dream. SAARC has neither "improved the quality of life" in our region, nor "accelerated the economic growth, social progress and cultural development" of its member-states.

South Asia is today one of the world's poorest regions of the world with a vast majority of its peoples still living in grinding poverty and sub-human conditions. Five of eight SAARC member-states – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives and Nepal – belong to the United Nations category of Least Developed Countries or LDCs. South Asia's total external trade is only a small fraction of the region's GDP while its intra-regional trade is also non-consequential. With one or two exceptions, SAARC countries also lag behind in developing genuine democracy, rule of law and good governance.

Economic growth indices, with rare exceptions, are static, if not going downward. South Asia's imports and exports constitute a much smaller share of the GDP than in Latin America or East Asia, while the tariffs are among the highest in the world. Protectionism continues to limit mutual market access. Intra-regional trade is non-consequential representing only 4% of the total trade. The collective share of the SAARC region in world trade is just 1%.

SAFTA

South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was signed in 2004. The Agreement superseded the SAARC Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA), which was in place since 1993. SAFTA came into force in January 2006. There are four important issues under SAFTA: (i) Sensitive list, (ii) Rules of Origin, (iii) Technical Assistance to LDCs, and (iv) the mechanism for compensation of revenue loss to LDCs due to trade liberalization programme. No doubt, trade is an important element of regional cooperation. SAARC must pursue the free trade goal.

But our region's trade architecture has inherent "speed breakers" if not "road blocks" in the form of restrictive trade barriers. The foremost challenge lies in their removal and creation of an environment that allows the free and fair promotion of trade in the region. The success of SAFTA will depend on the fairness and equity with which this process is carried forward. Free trade tends to become a boon for the stronger trading partners, allowing them to dominate the marketplace. Trade liberalization that does not ensure equitable benefits to all countries of the region with special deferential treatment for the small and LDC member-states might be difficult to sustain.

Trade must be viewed as a means of development and not an end itself. While efforts need to be made for the elimination of restrictive barriers to mutual trade and the opening of markets in the region on the basis of "fairness and equity," we must also ensure that the process of operationalization of SAFTA remains linked to the region's development strategies. Sustainable development and poverty eradication should be the over-arching goals of SAARC and realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) must be integrated with time-bound national development strategies.

Despite many commonalities in the region, South Asia continues to suffer from endemic political instability and socio-economic malaise. Foremost is the need for an enabling environment free of mistrust and hostility without which no regional arrangement anywhere in the world has worked. Political commitment and deeper engagement on the part of member-states will facilitate the regional impulse to keep apace with the changing times. For an "enabling environment", we must free South Asia of tensions, military confrontations and escalating military budgets.

With its unbroken legacy of poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy and conflict, SAARC, as a regional cooperation organization has not gone beyond declaratory pronouncements with no tangible achievement to its credit. Problems besetting its member states and those hampering a coherent regional approach remain unaddressed. SAARC's regional approach not only lacks operational inadequacies but is also captive to the peculiar geopolitical environment in which India's hegemonic role and its outstanding problems with its neighbours continue to hamper meaningful progress towards regional integration.

Further, India's geographic centrality in the region has given rise to a host of border conflicts and water disputes in the region all of which involve India, be it India-Pakistan, India-Bangladesh or others. All SAARC countries except Afghanistan share a border with the largest state of the region. This unique geographic feature limits the scope of cooperation to a great degree.

Absence of an intra-regional dispute settlement mechanism has severely limited SAARC's capacity to contribute to regional peace, security and development without which there can be no meaningful progress in socio-economic and cultural cooperation in the region. For an enabling environment, South Asia must free itself of tensions, conflicts and escalating military budgets.

At the regional level, as in the case of ASEAN, SAARC countries also need to adopt an institutionalized approach by establishing a regional political forum, called "South Asia Regional Forum" not only to reinforce the process of "confidence building, preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes" within our region but also to institute inter-regional cooperative and dialogue partnership relationships with relevant counterparts to promote regional and global peace and security.

The objectives of SAARC as set forth in its Charter represent our "common vision" which should continue to guide regional cooperation in a holistic manner, while striking balance between ambition, the region's peculiar environment and operational capacity. The foremost priority should be to ensure that we have our regional perspective clearly before us, our goals and priorities pragmatically defined and our wherewithal appropriately geared towards the realization of our declared objectives.

This would require an attitudinal change both at the national and regional levels to move away from our "declaratory stance" to "implementation mode". The real challenge, therefore, lies in moving from the realm of ideas to implementable plans of action. South Asia needs an exceptional impulse to keep pace with the changing times. This fresh regional impulse, must spring from within South Asia. In the context of "systemic re-orientation", SAARC must adapt itself to the new realities even if it means the rewriting of its basic charter.

For SAARC's "structural reinforcement", we need to establish coherent modalities and effective mechanism for implementation, coordination and follow-up of the agreed regional action plans. The needed "re-orientation" must focus on action-oriented approach, avoiding too many meetings and excessive documentation and moving away from the declaratory stance to goal-based implementation mode.

Increased engagement of non-governmental stakeholders, including NGOs, civil society and the private sector in realization of SAARC's goals will not only help bridge the mental divide, created by governmental policies and propaganda, between the peoples of the region but also give an added impetus to the process of regional cooperation. Besides simplifying and facilitating travel within the region, we must promote people-to-people contacts, business and cultural exchanges, and cooperative linkages among educational institutions in the region.

(c) The Developing Eight (D-8)

The Developing Eight (D-8) is a trans-regional cooperation organization established on June 15, 1997 with its headquarters in Istanbul, Turkey. It is essentially a group of developing countries with large Muslim populations that have formed an economic development alliance. These include Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. D-8 is a global arrangement rather than a regional one, as the composition of its members reflects. It is a forum with no adverse impact on bilateral and multi-lateral commitments of the member countries, emanating from their membership to other international or regional organizations.

The objectives of D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation are to improve member-states' position in the global economy, diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making at international level, and improve standards of living. The idea of cooperation among major Muslim developing countries was mooted by Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, the prime minister of Turkey, during a Seminar on "Cooperation in Development" which was held in Istanbul in October 1996. The group envisioned cooperation among countries stretching from South East Asia to Africa.

Member-states also pledged to work in solidarity to confront common challenges including food security, mitigating the impact of national disasters and countering all forms of extremism, which, they said, undermine economic progress and negatively affect the livelihoods of people. They welcomed the ratification of the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) by Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey, and its entry into force, and the current efforts towards its implementation. The D-8 group, with a total population of one billion people, has a combined market value of $1trillion and plans to increase the trade between member countries from $130 billion to $507 billion by 2018.

The main areas of cooperation include finance, banking, rural development, science and technology, humanitarian development, agriculture, energy, environment, and health. D-8 Summits are held every two years. The Eighth Summit of D-Eight Countries was held in Islamabad on November 22, 2012 at which the Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their commitment to the goals and objectives of the D-8 including previous Declarations.

(d) Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

China initiated a Shanghai Five grouping in 1996 with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as a regional consultative mechanism to strengthen mutual confidence building and disarmament, and to prevent any terrorist or extremist threats from a perennially unstable Afghanistan. The regional group was later renamed as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001, and was expanded to include Uzbekistan as its sixth member.

Its Charter visualized a new security concept anchored on mutual trust, disarmament and cooperative regional security through a new state-to-state relationship with equal partnership instead of alignment at its core, and a new model of mutually beneficial regional cooperation. The Organization's creation was seen as a diplomatic innovation for China, which has traditionally been isolationist and wary of multilateral alliances. Last 12 years have seen the SCO developing into a major regional and global entity with a comprehensive agenda and a framework of cooperation in all areas of mutual interest to its members, including military, security, political, economic, trade and cultural fields.

Translated into geostrategic terms, the SCO now represents a well-designed confluence of interests among the major powers of China and Russia, and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, with the exception of Turkmenistan, which claims to pursue a policy of "neutrality." In the years to come, the SCO might distinguish itself as a major addition to the existing multi-lateral organizations of the world. Its significance, and ability to oppose USA interest in Central Asia, is likely to increase with time, making it an important group for the United States to watch.

Efforts are already underway to put the SCO on the global radar screen as a major regional cooperation organization capable of interacting with other regions as well as major international organizations, including those within the United Nations system. Interestingly, four of SCO members, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are also members of ECO. Likewise, two of ECO's founding members Iran and Pakistan are also associated with SCO as its observers. At the last SCO Summit in Ufa (Russia), both India and Pakistan were made permanent members of SCO with effect from January 2016. This will enable Pakistan to play an active role in promoting regional cooperation within the framework of ECO, SAARC and SCO.

There is a tremendous overlap between the two organisations in terms of their natural and human resources. In fact, SCO could greatly benefit from the enormous work already done under the auspices of ECO in the form of three action plans, namely the Quetta Plan of Action, the Istanbul Declaration, and the Almaty Outline Plan on Transport and Communications. Their combined untapped economic potential, if exploited properly through innovative national and regional strategies, could transform this part of Asia into an economic power house, besides making it a major factor of regional and global stability.

We could jointly capitalise on our geography and natural resources through development of transport and communication infrastructure, mutual trade and investment and common use of the region's vast energy resources. One must, however, admit that SCO and ECO, like SAARC, will remain captive to the geopolitics of the region. With Afghanistan still in turmoil and India-Pakistan peace as elusive as ever, there is no prospect of an early breakthrough towards meaningful economic integration in this part of Asia. Peace in Afghanistan remains crucial for the success of both ECO and SCO.

In view of the commonality of their economic development goals, the two organizations could collaborate closely to benefit from each other's experiences. Economic advancement of this region will have a positive impact on the overall security environment of the region, making it a factor of global peace and security and future well-being of more than one half of humanity living in the ECO and SCO regions.

(e) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

ASEAN was established in August 1967 initially with five members but it now comprises ten members representing today the only regional organization other than the European Union, which has successfully pursued and achieved genuine economic integration and made a visible difference in the political, economic and cultural life of its member-states. ASEAN members are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

The motivation for the creation of ASEAN was the common fear of communism in the aftermath of post-World War II conflicts in the region and a desire of its member-states to be able to concentrate on their nation building, self-reliance and economic development. It was a move to unify the region under what was called the 'ASEAN Way' based on the ideals of non-interference, informality, minimal institutionalization, consultation and consensus, non-use of force and non-confrontation.

On February 24, 1976, the founding ASEAN members signed a Treat of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) giving a statutory shape to their cooperative endeavour. The Treaty was amended on December 15, 1987 to open the document for accession by states outside Southeast Asia, and again on July 25, 1998, to condition such accession on the consent of all member-states. India and China were first, outside ASEAN to sign the treaty in 2003. Pakistan also acceded to the Treat in July 2004. The USA signed the TAC in 2009.

The purposes and principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and its provisions for the pacific settlement of regional disputes and for regional cooperation in order to achieve peace, amity and friendship among the peoples of Southeast Asia are in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. ASEAN, which is headquartered in Jakarta (Indonesia), has been a spectacular successes story as an example of regional cooperation. Today, it represents a combined GDP of nearly $1,000 billion, an average annual growth rate of over 4-5%, and a cumulative trade of $720 billion, and is close to accomplishing what is today known as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).

Significant progress has been made under this arrangement for elimination, within ASEAN, of tariff and non-tariff barriers, thus increasing the region's competitive edge as a production base in the world market and its poter [illegible] investments. Despite its cultural diversities and differing views on political and governance systems, ASEAN represents an unparalleled regional homogeneity. What makes this organization even more remarkable is its attractiveness to other regions and countries, including major powers, for mutually beneficial cooperation not only in the economic field but also in political and security areas.

A number of countries and several organizations have become ASEAN's "dialogue partners" involving periodical dialogue meetings on matters of mutual interest. Pakistan is also a candidate for this partnership and is currently engaged in a "sectoral dialogue" preparatory to full partnership. ASEAN has also established its credentials as a major factor of regional stability. The formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF in 1994 was an important initiative aimed at promoting confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in the region.

Despite the great diversity of its membership, which now includes 25 members, the ARF has established effective principles of dialogue and cooperation, featuring decision making by consensus, non-interference, incremental progress and moving at a pace comfortable to all. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) draws together 25 countries which have a bearing on the security of the Asia-Pacific region. It comprises the 10 ASEAN member-states (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam); the 10 ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia and the United States), one ASEAN observer (PNG); as well as the DPRK, Mongolia and Pakistan. East Timor was admitted to the ARF in 2005.

In a region with little history of security cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum thus becomes a principal forum for security dialogue in Asia. The ARF complements the various bilateral alliances and dialogues which underpin the region's security architecture. The ARF is premised on the idea - drawn from the ASEAN experience - that a process of dialogue can produce qualitative improvements in political relationships. It provides a setting in which members can discuss current regional security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security in the region.

Asean-Pakistan

Pakistan had officially become ASEAN sectoral dialogue partner at the Inaugural Meeting on the Establishment of ASEAN-

Pakistan Sectoral Dialogue Relations in Islamabad, Pakistan on 5-7 November 1997. At the first formal meeting of ASEAN-Pakistan Joint Sectoral Cooperation Committee (APJSCC), held in Bali on February 5, 1999, the two sides agreed to intensify their efforts to make their Sectoral Dialogue mutually beneficial and substantive. On the areas of cooperation, the meeting agreed that ASEAN-Pakistan sectoral dialogue will initially cover the sectors of trade, industry, investment, environment, science and technology, drugs and narcotics, tourism and human resource development.

At present, ASEAN has 12 Full Dialogue Partners which include China, Japan, South Korea, Papua New Guinea, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, European Union, India and Mongolia. All ASEAN countries except Singapore are supportive of Pakistan's bid for Full Dialogue Partnership. We are not only an aspirant of full dialogue partner status with ASEAN but also want a seat in the East Asia Summit, a major regional process of global importance.

Pakistan acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) at the 11th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Jakarta on July 2, 2004 during which Pakistan had officially become a member of ARF.

CHAPTER 10

PAKISTAN AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

I. MUSLIM WORLD AT A GLANCE

The term **Muslim world** (also referred to as **Muslim/Islamic Ummah**) has several meanings. In a religious sense, the Islamic Ummah refers to all those in a collective sense who adhere to the religion of Islam. In a cultural sense, the Muslim Ummah refers to Islamic civilization, inclusive of non-Muslims living in that civilization. In a modern geopolitical sense, the term Islamic Nation usually refers collectively to Muslim majority states or nations.

As of 2015, over 1.6 billion or about 23.4% of the world population are Muslims. Of these, around 62% live in Asia-Pacific, 20% in the Middle East-North Africa, 15% in sub-Saharan Africa, around 3% in Europe, and 0.3% in the Americas.

Islamic Civilization

From the outset, Islam became a world religion and created a distinctive civilization which stretched from one end of the globe to the other. Already during the early Muslim caliphates, first the Arabs, then the Persians and later the Turks set about to create classical Islamic civilization. Later, in the thirteenth century, both Africa and India became great centres of Islamic civilization and soon thereafter Muslim kingdoms were established in the Malay-Indonesian world while Chinese Muslims flourished throughout China.

Islam is a religion for all peoples from whatever race or background they might be. That is why, Islamic civilization is based on a unity which stands completely against any racial or ethnic discrimination. Such major racial and ethnic groups as the Arabs, Persians, Turks, Africans, Indians, Chinese and Malays in addition to numerous smaller units embraced Islam and contributed to the building of Islamic civilization. Moreover, Islam was not opposed to learning from the earlier civilizations and incorporating their science, learning, and culture into its own world view, as long as they did not oppose the principles of Islam.

The sense of brotherhood and unity was a central emphasis and it helped to erode in broad Islamic ethos local affiliations to a particular tribe, race, or language - all of which in Islamic teachings became subservient to the universal brotherhood of Islam. The global civilization thus promoted by Islam permitted people of diverse ethnic backgrounds to work together in cultivating various arts and sciences. Although the civilization was profoundly Islamic, even non-Muslim "People of the Book" participated in the intellectual activity whose fruits belonged to everyone. The scientific climate was reminiscent of the present situation in America where scientists and men and women of learning from all over the world are active in the advancement of knowledge which belongs to everyone.

The global civilization created by Islam also succeeded in activating the mind and thought of the people who entered its fold. Islam transformed the nomadic Arabs who became torch-bearers of science and learning. The Persians who had created a great civilization before the rise of Islam nevertheless produced much more science and learning in the Islamic period than before. The same can be said of the Turks and other peoples who embraced Islam. The religion of Islam was itself responsible not only for the creation of a world civilization in which people of many different ethnic backgrounds participated, but it played a central role in developing intellectual and cultural life on a scale not seen before.

For more than six hundred years Arabic remained the major intellectual and scientific language of the world. During the centuries following the rise of Islam, Muslim dynasties ruling in various parts of the Islamic world bore witness to the flowering of Islamic culture and thought. In fact, this tradition of intellectual activity was eclipsed only at the beginning of modern times as a result of the weakening of faith among Muslims combined with external domination. And today this activity has begun anew in many parts of the Islamic world now that the Muslims have regained their political independence.

Islamic polity since its advent has gone through different phases. Islamic victories over the centuries through African continent onward into Europe, and across the Indian Ocean into India, Far East, Iran and Central Asia made Islam a formidable reality and a veritable challenge for the West. In the course of this journey, the Islamic world experienced ups and downs with this adversarial relationship resulting in crusades that dominated much of the eleventh century. During most part of the Muslim history, caliphates remained an important facet representing unified Islamic polity and the apex institution of Islamic governance.

But after centuries of civilizational development and ascendancy, Muslims began to decline at every level in the fifteenth century onward which on the other hand coincided with the rise of European civilizations. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries AD, Islamic regions fell under the sway of European imperial powers. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the colonization of the Muslim world, collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and after the World, War I, the Western powers divided the Muslim world into small satellite states as their spheres of influence by re-demarcating the Middle East and Africa.

Although affected by various ideologies, such as communism, during much of the twentieth century, Islamic identity and Islam's salience on political questions have arguably increased during the late twentieth century and early twenty first century. Rapid growth, western interests in Islamic regions, international conflicts and globalization influenced Islam's importance in shaping the world of the twenty-first century.

The modern age brought radical technological and organizational changes to Europe and Islamic countries found themselves less modern when compared to the many western nations. Europe's state-based government and rampant colonization allowed the West to dominate the globe economically and forced Islamic countries into subservience. The Muslim world is today no longer a monolithic bloc. It is a weak and helpless community of 57 countries with no unity of purpose. In fact, especially after the World War II, it has been an entity divided against itself.

In 1947, after the partition of India, Pakistan became the largest Islamic country in the world (by population) and the tenth largest post-WWII state in the modern world. In 1971, after a bloody war of independence, East Pakistan became an independent state called Bangladesh. Today, Pakistan is still the second largest Islamic country in the world. Pakistan is presently the only nuclear power of the Muslim world and is one of the more developed nations among the Muslim countries. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, by population. India has the fourth largest Muslim population followed by Bangladesh.

II. CLASH OF CIVILIZATION

Samuel Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse thinking about the nature of global politics in the post-Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that liberal democracy and Western values had become the only remaining ideological alternative or, specifically in the case of Francis Fukuyama, that the world had reached the end of history in a Hegelian sense.

Samuel Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In the article, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the twenty-first century would be along cultural and religious lines. As an extension, he posited that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest ranking of cultural identity, would increasingly become useful in analyzing the potential for conflict. In the *Foreign Affairs* article, Huntington writes:

> *"It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the*

> *dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future."*

According to him, "the defining characteristic of the 21st century will be a clash of civilizations which will supplant the conflicts between nation states and ideologies that characterize the 19th and 20th centuries."

Another Western historian, Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion: "We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations - the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both."

Interestingly, in support of his thesis, Huntington quoted an Indian Muslim writer, M.J. Akbar, who believed: "The West's next confrontation is definitely going to come from the Islamic world. It is in the sweep of Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for the new world order will begin." (need to give references to quotes in this segment) Due to an enormous response and the solidification of his views, Huntington later expanded the thesis in his 1996 book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

Huntington refers to countries that are seeking to affiliate with another civilization as "torn countries." Turkey, whose political leadership has systematically been engaged in Westernization of the country since the 1920s, is his chief example. Turkey's history, culture, and traditions are derived from Islamic civilization, but Turkey's Western-oriented elite imposed Western institutions and dress, embraced the Latin alphabet, joined NATO, and is avidly seeking to enter the European Union.

According to Huntington, a torn country must meet three requirements in order to redefine its civilizational identity. Its political and economic elite must support the move. Second, the public must be willing to accept the redefinition. Third, the elites of the civilization that the torn country is trying to join must accept the country.

Huntington's piece in *Foreign Affairs* created more responses than almost any other essay ever published in that journal. There have been many criticisms of his thesis from wildly different paradigms. Some have argued that his identified civilizations are very fractured with little unity. Vietnam still keeps a massive army, mostly to guard against China. The Muslim world is severely fractured along ethnic lines with Kurds, Arabs, Persians, Turks, Pakistanis, and Indonesians all having very different world views.

In the context of Islam and Christianity, one must admit that there has been a historic adversarial relationship, at times a political conflict that goes back to the very advent of Islam. It certainly is not a twenty-first century phenomenon. It goes back to the very advent of Islam and since then was always seen as an ideological, intellectual and political challenge by the European civilizations. They were not prepared to see a new unified global power which soon expanded to the East as well as the West.

Islamic victories through African continent onward into Europe, and across the Indian Ocean into India, Far East, Iran and Central Asia made Islam a formidable reality and a challenge for the West. That was the beginning of the clash of civilizations with ups and downs in that adversarial relationship and then in the eleventh century climaxing into crusades. In this process, caliphates emerged as a unified Islamic polity and an institution representing the Muslim unity and power.

But we all know that after centuries of civilizational development and ascendancy, Muslims began to decline at every level in the 15th century onward which on the other hand coincided with the rise of European civilizations. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the colonization of the Muslim world, collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and after the World War I the Muslim world being divided into small states by re-demarcating the Middle East and Africa.

In 1917, General Allenby spoke of the West's sense of victory over Islam when he entering into Jerusalem, he shouted "The crusades have been completed." Likewise, when the French military commander entered Damascus, he straight went to Saladin's tomb and shouted emotionally: "Nous revenons, Saladin" (We are back Saladin). The civilizational conflict has always been a political conflict and even today it remains a political conflict. The post-9/11 situation in particular is witnessing this conflict with renewed intensity.

Islam itself is being demonised by its detractors with obsessive focus on the religion of individuals and groups accused of complicity or involvement in terrorist activities. Islam is blamed for everything that goes wrong in any part of the world. The Muslim freedom struggles of yesterday are now seen as the primary source of "militancy and terrorism." West's leaders are often heard speaking of West's values of freedom and democracy. They believe the Muslims hate and feel jealous of the West's economic and technological progress.

battles of the Cold War on behalf of the West. The Muslims would not have played the pivotal role in dismantling of the Berlin Wall which brought freedom and democracy to Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, the Muslims themselves remain deprived of the same dividends. If the Muslims were against the West, they would not have fought wars among themselves. Today, the West does not have to fear Islam because the Muslim world divided against itself is at its weakest point in history.

Muslims, like all other people in the world, have many different pursuits, and not all their priorities and values need be placed within their singular identity of being Islamic. It is, of course, not surprising that the champions of Islamic fundamentalism would like to suppress all other identities of Muslims in favour of their own version of creed. And it is also extremely odd that those who want to overcome the tensions and conflicts linked with Islamic fundamentalism also seem unable to see Muslim people in any form other than their being just Islamic. People see themselves—and have reason to see themselves—in many different ways as an integral part of peace loving, moderate and tolerant humanity.

III. THE MUSLIM WORLD IN CRISIS

The Muslim world today represents the tragic story of Medusa, the ill-piloted French naval ship in the nineteenth century that ran aground because of its incompetent captain's blunders and his dependence on others for navigational guidance, leaving behind a sordid tale of helplessness, death and desperation. The Medusa's wreck is still out there, stuck on the West African coast. Like Medusa's wreck, the Muslim world is just lying out there, aimlessly floating like a stricken ship with no one to steer it out of the troubled waters.[1]

Representing one-fifth of humanity as well as of the global land mass spreading over 57 countries and possessing 70% of the world's energy resources and nearly 50% of the world's natural resources, the Muslim world should have been a global giant, economically as well as politically. Rich in everything but weak in all respects, it represents only five percent of the world's GDP and is totally a non-consequential entity with no role in global decision-making, or even in addressing its own problems.

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[1] *The story begins in Paris in the year 1816. The French monarchy had been restored to the throne by the English after they had defeated Napoleon at Waterloo. In a show of support for the newly reinstated king, they offered the French the port of St. Louis, in Senegal on the African west coast. The French king, Louis XVIII appointed a Frigate-Captain Hugues Duroy de Chaumereys to lead the fleet to take the possession of the gifted port. He had never commanded a ship, not to talk of a fleet. Throughout his career he had worked only as a custom officer. A painting in a Paris art gallery shows Medusa's wreck still lying on West African coast.*

Though some of them are sitting on the world's largest oil and gas reserves, the majority of Muslim countries are among the poorest and most backward in the world. Poor and dispossessed, Muslim nations emerging from long colonial rule may have become sovereign states but are without genuine political and economic independence. With rare exceptions, they are all at the mercy of the West for their political strength and survival and are politically bankrupt with no institutions other than authoritarian rule. They have no established tradition of systemic governance or institutional approach in their policies and priorities.

The rulers in today's Muslim world, without exception, are at the mercy of foreign powers for their political strength and survival, and are responsible for the current political, economic and military subservience of their countries to the West. Their lands and resources remain under "protective" military control of their masters, who are also the direct beneficiaries of their oil proceeds and investments.

Every ingredient of political life in these so-called sovereign states has been faked; sovereignty is not sovereignty, parliament is not parliament, law is not law, and the opposition parties are as corrupt and wasted as the ruling parties. Even the independence following the colonial powers' handing over of the reins of government to local rulers was not true independence. Other than being members of the United Nations, they have no semblance of sovereignty, independence or freedom.

Peace is the essence of Islam and yet the Muslim nations have seen very little of it, especially after the World War II. Conflict and violence are pervasive in the Muslim world. Some states are home to foreign military bases, while others have allowed foreign forces to use their territory freely and even to carry out their "operations" at will. There are others selflessly engaged in proxy wars on behalf of others and in some cases against their own people. The tragedies in Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq and Afghanistan represent the continuing helplessness of the world's Muslims.

Global terrorism is now being used to justify military occupations and to curb the legitimate freedom struggles of Muslim peoples. Muslim issues remain unaddressed for decades. Palestine is tired and has given up. Iraq is still burning. Afghanistan has yet to breathe in peace. Kashmir is devastated and stands disillusioned. Lebanon is simmering. Pakistan is suffering the worst leadership crisis. Iran is on notice. The Muslim world could not be more chaotic and more helpless. Surely these are critical times for the Muslim world.

What aggravates this dismal scenario is the inability of the Muslim world as a bloc to take care of its problems or to overcome its weaknesses. Its rulers have mortgaged to the West not only the security and sovereignty of their countries but also the political and economic futures of their nations. Despite material affluence in a few oil-rich countries, there is a widespread sense of political and economic deprivation in the Muslim world.

These are all a dreary phenomena for which the rulers of the Muslim world alone are responsible. Thanks to our obscurantist mindset, we have done nothing to secure our future in this alarmingly chaotic world. It makes no sense dwelling nostalgically on Islam's past and "lost" glory. For us, the steady erosion of Islamic polity and power, the Muslim world's lurch into Western colonialism, and now, total political, economic, social and technological backwardness, should be stark reminders of the historical magnitude of the failures of Muslim leadership.

But we cannot entirely blame the West for the Muslim world's institutional bankruptcy, its political and intellectual aridity; its deficiency in knowledge, education, and science and technology; its aversion to modernity and modernization; and its growing servility to the West. The Muslim world itself is responsible for being where it is today. Things will not change unless the Muslim world fixes its own fundamentals and puts its house in order. Angels will not descend to help or salvage it. It must take control of its own destiny through unity, mutuality and cohesion within its ranks.

Its wealth and resources should be used to build its own strength and for its own socio-economic well-being. The key to reshaping the destiny of the Muslim world lies in its political and economic independence and military strength with each Muslim nation opting for peace and democracy, and for knowledge and technology as top priority. Instead of blaming America and the West for all our problems and for everything that goes wrong in the world, we in the Muslim world need to look at our own weaknesses and failures.

IV. PAKISTAN AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

Pakistan as a leading Islamic country has always been in total solidarity with the Muslim world and its legitimate causes including the Palestinian issue, and has always been ready to contribute to the peace efforts in the Middle East. Pakistan has been playing an active role at the United Nations in support of the need and urgency for addressing the Palestinian issue and the Middle East situation to avert an explosive situation endangering global peace.

In the ultimate analysis, the salvation of the Muslim world does not lie with one individual or any inter-governmental organisation. The key to reshaping the destiny of the Muslim world lies in the political, economic and social stability and strength of individual Muslim nations. Each one of them at the national level will have to reconstruct its existing mindsets and priorities to opt for peace and democracy, and for "good and accountable" governance rooted in the will of the people.

Things will not change unless each Muslim country fixes its own fundamentals and puts its house in order. Each country must regain its sovereignty and independence, and take control of its own political and economic destiny through self-esteem and self-reliance.

V. ORGAINSATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC)

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference) is the second largest inter-governmental organization after the United Nations which has membership of 57 states spread over four continents. The Organization is the collective voice of the Muslim world seeking to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world.

The Organization was established upon a decision of the historical summit which took place in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco on 12th Rajab 1389 Hijra (25 September 1969) as a result of criminal arson of Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem. In 1970, the first ever meeting of Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) was held in Jeddah which decided to establish a permanent secretariat in Jeddah.

The present Charter of the Organization was adopted by the Eleventh Islamic Summit held in Dakar on March 13-14, 2008 which laid down the objectives and principles of the Organization and fundamental purposes to strengthen the solidarity and cooperation among the member-states. Over the last 40 years, the membership has grown from its founding members of 25 to 57 states. The Organization has the singular honour to galvanize the Ummah into a unified body and have actively represented the Muslims by espousing all causes close to the hearts of over 1.5 billion Muslims of the world.

The Organization has consultative and cooperative relations with the United Nations and other inter-governmental organizations to protect the vital interests of the Muslims and to work for the settlement of conflicts and disputes involving member-states. In safeguarding the true values of Islam and the Muslims, the Organization has taken various steps to remove misperceptions and [illegible] through advocated elimination of [illegible] scrimination against the Muslims in all form[illegible] manifestations.

The member-states of the OIC face many challenges in the twenty first century and to address those challenges, the Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit held in Makkah in December 2005, laid down the blueprint called the Ten-Year Programme of Action which envisages joint action of member-states, promotion of tolerance and moderation, modernization, extensive reforms in all spheres of activities including science and technology, education, trade enhancement, and emphasizes good governance and promotion of human rights in the Muslim world, especially with regard to rights of children, women and elderly and the family values enshrined by Islam.

Under the Charter, the Organization aims, *inter alia*, to:

- Enhance and consolidate the bonds of fraternity and solidarity among the member-states.
- Safeguard and protect the common interests and support the legitimate causes of the member-states and coordinate and unify the efforts of the member-states in view of the challenges faced by the Islamic world in particular and the international community in general.
- Respect the right of self-determination and non-interference in the domestic affairs and to respect sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each member-state.
- Ensure active participation of the Member States in the global political, economic and social decision-making processes to secure their common interests.
- Reaffirm its support for the rights of peoples as stipulated in the UN Charter and International law;
- Strengthen intra-Islamic economic and trade cooperation; in order to achieve economic integration leading to the establishment of an Islamic Common Market.
- Exert efforts to achieve sustainable and comprehensive human development and economic well-being in member states.
- Protect and defend the true image of Islam, to combat defamation of Islam and encourage dialogue among civilizations and religions.
- Enhance and develop science and technology and encourage research and cooperation among member-states in these fields.

In order to realize these objectives, member-states shall act, [illegible] principles.

1. All member-states commit themselves to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
2. Member-states are sovereign, independent and equal in rights and obligations.
3. All member-states shall settle their disputes through peaceful means and refrain from use or threat of use of force in their relations.
4. All Member States undertake to respect national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of other Member States and shall refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of others;
5. Member-states shall uphold and promote, at the national and international levels, good governance, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.

The Organization is composed of the following main bodies:

(i) The **Islamic Summit**, composed of Kings and Heads of State and Government of Member States, is the supreme authority of the Organization. It convenes once every three years to deliberate, take policy decisions and provide guidance on all issues pertaining to the realization of the objectives and consider other issues of concern to the Member States and the Ummah.

(ii) The **Council of Foreign Ministers**, which meets once a year, considers the means for the implementation of the general policy of the Organization by, *inter alia*:

- Adopting decisions and resolutions on matters of common interest in the implementation of the objectives and the general policy of the Organization.
- Reviewing progress of the implementation of the decisions and resolutions adopted at the previous Summits and Councils of Foreign Ministers.

(iii) The **General Secretariat**, which is the executive organ of the Organization, entrusted with the implementation of the decisions of the two preceding bodies.

In order to coordinate and boost its action, align its view points and stands, and be credited with concrete results in various fields of cooperation - political, economic, cultural, social, spiritual and scientific - among member-states, the Organization has created different committees, nearly all, at ministerial level, a number of which are chaired by Heads of State.

The Al-Quds Committee, the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs (COMIAC), the Standing Committee for Economic and Trade Cooperation (COMCEC), and the Standing Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (COMSTECH) are the ones chaired by Heads of State.

The number and types of secondary organs and institutions, working toward the achievement of the OIC objectives, have been steadily increasing, and cover various areas of cultural, scientific, economic, legal, financial, sports, technological, educational, media, as well as vocational, social and humanitarian. Depending on their degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the parent organization, they are classified as subsidiary organs and specialized or affiliated institutions.

One must however also know the reality. Whatever its professed goals and objectives, the OIC is merely an inter-governmental organisation and cannot be expected to do things that only governments of sovereign states can do. It has neither the credentials nor any operational capacity to be the panacea for the ills of its member-states. Though its ideological basis gives it a unique character, it remains seriously handicapped by the absence of regionality and complementarity in its geostrategic, political and economic interests.

CHAPTER 11

WORLD AFFAIRS & INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

WORLD AFFAIRS: AN OVERVIEW

I. Historical Perspective

Premier Chou En-lai was once asked by a visiting journalist what in his opinion were the historical effects of the French Revolution of 1789. Premier Chou En-lai's sage reply was: "It is perhaps too early to tell." That response, on the surface may have appeared thoughtless if not flippant, but at a deeper level, it did reflect a reality; the reality of never-ending impact of global dynamics in world affairs. Even a domestic event of historic magnitude in one state can have wider, long-term implications not only for its own future but also that of its neighbours and other nations around the world.

To understand the contemporary phenomenon of 'world affairs' one must have some idea about the historical perspective of international politics which represents the whole spectrum of international relations through which nations encounter nations. International politics is all about how states deal with each other and among themselves. And there is a long history to this process of inter-state relations while the state system itself and the concept of state sovereignty have also gone through an evolutionary process.

For most of human history, people have lived in stateless societies with no concentrated authority or organised economic and political power. Initially states emerged through conquest by force or by threat of use of force. Among the first known states were those created in Ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China, the Americas (e.g. Aztec civilization, Inca civilization) and others, but over time, a variety of different forms of states developed employing a variety of justifications for their existence such as common tribal or ethnic or linguistic origins or affinities, the theory of social contract, etc.

It is only in relatively modern times that states have almost completely replaced "stateless" societies. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 marked the beginning of the European state-system which initially consisted of twelve well-defined sovereign states and codified the rules of conduct among sovereign and "equal" states. Since states are the persons of public international law, it follows that the law is concerned with such political entities as are generally recognised as "states" within international society.

It is generally agreed that a state, in order to be worthy of the name, must possess citizens or subjects and a territory. A nation is not merely an administrative unit, but an entity with a collective social, identity, one that is based on a common historical, linguistic, ethnic or cultural heritage. Likewise, governments come and go but states remain a political entity as long as they are sovereign and independent. A State (with capital "S") is a self-governing political entity which can also be used interchangeably with country.

The Nation-state

The term "nation" and "state" are quite distinct conceptually, yet they are often used interchangeably. The "nation" is a historical concept founded on s cultural identity shared by a single people; the state is a political unit in terms of population, territory, government and sovereignty. The state provides a basis for political loyalty in the form of citizenship whereas the nation promotes an effective relationship through which the individual gains a sense of identity. Though different versions have been in use for a formal definition of the term nation-state, the communitarian nation differs from the administrative machinery of the state much as the human spirit differs from the bones and muscles of one's body.

A nation-state is a state or country that has not only defined borders and territory but also a nation of principally the same type of people, organized by either race or cultural background, and where generally, everyone would speak the same language, probably practise the same or similar types of religion, and share a set of ethnic, cultural and "national," values. Thus, when a nation has a State of its own, it is called a nation-state. Places like France, Egypt, Germany, and Japan are the few examples of nation-states. There are also some States which have two nations, such as Canada and Belgium.

Historically, the leaders of states have relied upon nations as a base of support for official laws and policies, indeed, as a basis for their own legitimacy. It was only in the 1648 Westphalia Treaty that the concept of state sovereignty and the rise of independent nation state came to be recognised as the cornerstone of the modern state system. It meant the rulers, or the legitimate sovereigns, had no internal equals within a defined territory and no external superiors challenging the ultimate authority within the territory's sovereign borders. This particular European system was then exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia through colonialism and the "standards of civilization".

The idea that each state should have, or coincide with its underlying nation goes back many years before the doctrine of national self-determination was enshrined, albeit selectively, in the Versailles Treaty after World War I. Even today, the nation, and its associated ideology – nationalism – continue to provide a formidable obstacle to constructive international cooperation on a range of common global problems. But all states in today's world are not nation-states, an entity and an idea which is getting blurred in the globalizing world.

In an age of total war, of instant global communications and fast, cheap travel, the concept of nation-state has appeared to many observers as an obsolete, and to some, even dangerous anachronism. Contemporary observers and leaders alike have devoted considerable effort throughout the post-war years to go -- in the popular parlance -- "beyond the nation-state." Obsolete though it may be in many ways, the nation-state nevertheless persists as do, quite obviously, a multitude of nations.

State Sovereignty

Sovereignty is in fact a relatively recent innovation connected to the emergence of the nation-state as the primary unit of political organization. State sovereignty today denotes the competence, independence, and legal equality of states. The concept is normally used to encompass all matters in which each state is permitted by international law to decide and act without intrusions from other sovereign states. These matters include the choice of political, economic, social and cultural systems, and the formulation of foreign policy.[1]

Within the state, sovereignty signified the rise of the monarch to absolute prominence over rival feudal claimants such as the aristocracy, the papacy, and the Holy Roman Empire. Internationally, sovereignty served as the basis for exchanges of recognition on the basis of legal equality, and therefore as the basis of diplomacy and international law.[2] In some ways the emergence of the concept of sovereignty ran parallel with the similar emergence of the idea of private property, both emphasizing exclusive rights concentrated in a single holder, in contrast to the medieval system of diffuse and many-layered political and economic rights.[3]

At its core, sovereignty is typically taken to mean the possession of absolute ***authority within a bounded territorial space.*** There is essentially an internal and external dimension of sovereignty. Internally, a sovereign government is a fixed authority with a settled population that possesses a monopoly on the use of force. It is the supreme authority within its territory. Externally, sovereignty is the entry ticket into the society of states. Recognition on the part of other states helps to ensure territorial integrity and is the entry into participating in diplomacy and international organisation on an equal footing with other states.[4]

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined — not least by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. The ideal of 'nationalism' has also persisted through the twentieth century as manifested in the emergence of decolonized new states and breakup of the Soviet Union as well as the former Yugoslavia (and Pakistan in 1971) into smaller nation states.

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[1] Sovereignty, Francis Hinsley, London: Basic Books, 1966.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Sovereignty; Barrry Buzan, Answers.Com*

[4] State Sovereignty as Social Construct, Biersteker, T. J. and C. Weber, Eds. 1996.

Modern Concept of Sovereignty

The concept of sovereignty was closely related to the growth of the modern nation-state, and today the term is used almost exclusively to describe the attributes of a state rather than a person. In its contemporary context, sovereignty is the claim to be the ultimate political authority, subject to no higher power as regards the making and enforcing of political decisions. By the end of the eighteenth century, the concept of the social contract led to the idea of popular sovereignty, or sovereignty of the people, through an organized government. The Hague Convention (1899), the Geneva Convention (1949), and the United Nations all have restricted the actions of sovereign countries in the international arena, as has international law.[5]

A sovereign state is often described as one that is free and independent. In its internal affairs it has undivided jurisdiction over all persons and property within its territory. It claims the right to regulate its economic life without regard for its neighbours and to increase armaments without limit. No other nation may rightfully interfere in its domestic affairs. In its external relations it claims the right to enforce its own conception of rights and to declare war.[6] This description of a sovereign state is denied, however, by those who assert that international law is binding.

Today, sovereignty is essentially based on borders, not any capacity on the part of governments. In the international system, sovereignty represents the claim by the state to full self-government, and the mutual recognition of claims to sovereignty is the basis of international society. Sovereignty is the power of a state to do everything necessary to govern itself, including making, executing, and applying laws; imposing and collecting taxes; making war and peace; and forming treaties or engaging in commerce with foreign nations. Thus, sovereignty entails enormous responsibility for governance on which it claims sovereignty.

Because states are limited by treaties and international obligations and are not legally permitted by the U N Charter to commit aggression at will, they argue that the absolute freedom of a sovereign state is, and should be, a thing of the past. Westphalia was a model suited only for a very limited number of state entities — no more than a dozen of them and predominantly European. In current international practice this view is generally accepted. The United Nations is today considered the principal organ for restraining the exercise of sovereignty.[7] The concept of state sovereignty, the principles of international law, and the politics of the balance of power have emerged as the three cornerstones of the modern inter-state relations.

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[5] *Sovereignty; Barry Buzan, Answers.Com' 2008*

[6] *ibid.*

The post-1945 system of international order enshrined in the UN Charter inherited this basic model. Following decolonization, what had been a restrictive and Eurocentric (that is, Western) order became global. There were no longer "insiders" and "outsiders" because virtually every person on Earth lived within a sovereign state. At the same time, the multiplication of numbers did not diminish the controversial character of sovereignty. In accordance with Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter, the world organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all member-states.

While they are equal in relation to one another, their status of legal equality as a mark of sovereignty is also the basis on which inter-governmental organizations are established and endowed with capacity to act between and within states to the extent permitted by the framework of an organization. In 1949, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed that "between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations."[6] Thirty years later, the ICJ referred to "the fundamental principle of state sovereignty on which the whole of international law rests."[8]

As a hallmark of statehood, territorial sovereignty underlies the system of international order in relations among states. An act of aggression is unlawful, not only because it undermines international order, but also because states have exercised their sovereignty to outlaw war. In addition, the failure or weakening of state capacity that brings about a political vacuum within states leads to human tragedies and international and regional insecurity. Repressive, aggressive, or collapsed states may result in threats to international peace and security.

Within the Charter of the United Nations, there is an explicit prohibition on the world organization from interfering in the domestic affairs of member-states. What may be the Charter's most frequently cited provision, Article 2(7), provides that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter." In sum, sovereignty is a key constitutional safeguard of international order.

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[7] *Sovereignty; Barry Buzan, Answers.Com' 2008*

[8] *ICJ Reports*, 1986, Para 263

Empirically, sovereignty has routinely been violated by the powerful. In today's globalizing world, it is generally recognized that cultural, environmental, and economic influences neither respect borders nor require an entry visa. The concept of state sovereignty is well entrenched in legal and political discourse. At the same time, territorial boundaries have come under stress (example: Pakistan's tribal areas under USA and NATO attacks including notorious drone attacks) and have diminished in significance as a result of contemporary international relations.[9]

Not only have technology and communications made borders permeable, but the political dimensions of internal disorder and suffering have also often resulted in greater international disorder. Consequently, perspectives on the range and role of state sovereignty have, particularly over the past few decades, evolved quickly and substantially. There also exist vastly differing views on the moral bases of sovereignty. These views translate into various bases for legal systems.

Limits of Sovereignty

There are important and widely accepted limits to state sovereignty and to domestic jurisdiction in international law. First, the Charter highlights the tension between the sovereignty, independence, and equality of individual states, on the one hand, and collective international obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security, on the other. According to Chapter VII, sovereignty is not a barrier to action taken by the Security Council as part of measures in response to "a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression." [10]

In other words, the sovereignty of states, as recognized in the UN Charter, yields to the demands of international peace and security. And the status of sovereign equality only holds effectively for each state when there is stability, peace, and order among states. Second, a number of other contemporary issues have placed increasing limits on the exercise of sovereign authority which may also be limited by customar ligations in international relations and law. States are legally responsible for the performance of their international obligations, and state sovereignty therefore cannot be an excuse for their non-performance. 11

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[9] *"The New-Old Disorder in the Third World, Global Governance,* Mohammed Ayoob (1995).

[10] *"Sovereignty, Intervention, and the Law: A Tenuous Relationship of Competing Principles Christopher M. Ryan,* Millennium: Journal of International Studies (1997).

Obligations assumed by states by virtue of their membership in the United Nations and the corresponding powers of the world organization presuppose a restriction of the sovereignty of member-states to the extent of their obligations under the Charter. Specifically, Article 1 (2) stipulates that "all Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."

Furthermore, under "Purposes and Principles," this same article obliges member-states to achieve international cooperation in solving problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. This article further recognizes the United Nations as a centre for harmonizing the actions of states in the attainment of these common ends. Thus, the Charter elevates the solution of economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems, as well as human rights, to the international sphere. These matters cannot be said to be exclusively domestic.

Sovereignty therefore carries with it primary responsibilities for states to protect persons and property and to discharge the functions of government adequately within their territories. The quality and range of responsibilities for governance have brought about significant changes in state sovereignty since 1945. In particular, since the signing of the UN Charter, there has been an expanding network of obligations in the field of human rights. These create a dense set of state obligations to protect persons and property, as well as to regulate political and economic affairs.

In the 1990s, the Security Council began to reinterpret the Charter to more frequently favour human rights over the protection of state sovereignty. Through a series of resolutions, the United Nations has justified intervention in the internal affairs of states without their acquiescence. In cases such as Somalia, Sudan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the Security Council has gradually expanded the definition of international threats to peace and security to justify intervention in circumstances that would have been inconceivable in the past.

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[11] "*Sovereignty, Intervention, and the Law*, Christopher M. Ryan, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (1997).

Sovereignty has also been eroded by contemporary economic, cultural, and environmental factors. Finally, both to facilitate and to limit the more troubling effects of these developments, along with a range of other purposes, supranational organizations have emerged as a significant source of authority that, at least to some degree, place limits on state sovereignty. A whole range of private organizations have also emerged to infringe on sovereign authority as well. In addition to human rights NGOs global civil society organizations have emerged around numerous issues. Civil society groups have had a growing, yet uneven, effect on nation-states and international organizations.[12]

The growth of multi-lateral institutions, e.g. Bretton Woods Institutions, to manage the global economy constrains state action.[13] The increasing mobility of capital has led states to pursue increasingly similar policies along the neo-liberal model. Others find that, while the tasks of the state may be changing, the state very much remains the key driver of globalization processes. That is not to say that all states have equal influence in the process. Nor can the outcomes be reduced to strictly positive or negative because the multitude of processes involved impact different states in different ways.[14]

Together all of this suggests that the concept of sovereignty is under considerable pressure. Some aspects of sovereignty still exist and are honoured in most circumstances, but many inroads are being made into state authority by many actors in many different circumstances. Where this will lead has yet to be determined.

Contemporary Challenges

The limits on sovereignty discussed above are widely accepted. They originate in the Charter itself, in authoritative legal interpretations of that document, and in the broader body of international law that has been agreed on by states. In recent decades, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, five more radical challenges to the notion of state sovereignty have emerged: continuing demands for self-determination, a broadened conception of international peace and security, the collapse of state authority, the increasing importance of popular sovereignty, and the emergence of unipolarity.

In many ways, a central contemporary difficulty arises from the softening of two norms that had been virtually unchallenged during the Cold War, the sanctity of borders and the illegitimacy of secession. Existing borders were sacrosanct, and it was unthinkable that an area of a state would secede, even with the consent of the original state. At the end of the Cold War, however, these relatively clear waters became muddied.

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[12] *World Society and the Nation-State*, Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., (2000).

[13] *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economics*, Ohmae, K.(1995).

[14] *Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State?*, Mann, M. (1997).

First, the Soviet Union became a "former superpower." Russia inherited the Soviet Union's legal status, including a permanent seat on the Security Council, but 14 other new states were created. Shortly thereafter, Yugoslavia broke up into six independent states. Later in the decade, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia.

The **second challenge** is the broadening interpretation of threats to international peace and security, the Charter-enshrined licence to override the principle of non-intervention. It arises from the fact that the Charter's collective system of international peace and security was crafted on the experience of the World War II, some of which is of doubtful contemporary relevance. Collective efforts by the United Nations to deal with internal problems of peace and security, and gross violations of human rights, including genocide, have therefore run against the grain of the claim to sovereign status as set out in the Charter.

The **third challenge** to traditional interpretations of state sovereignty has arisen because of the incapacity of certain states to effectively exercise authority over their territories and populations. In some cases, sovereignty is a legal fiction not matched by an actual political capacity. They are, in the words of one analyst, "quasi-states."[15] The **fourth challenge** to traditional state sovereignty emerges from the changing balance between states and people as the source of legitimacy and authority. The older version of the rule of the law of states is being tempered by the rule of law based on the rights of individuals.

And **finally** the challenge of unipolarity itself has caused unprecedented erosion in the role, authority and credibility of the United Nations. The new unipolarity has left very little space for the United Nations to play any meaningful role in addressing the issues of global peace and security. Its role has been circumvented by the unabashed use of military power which is now the universal norm. [16] No wonder, in today's radically transformed world, with the softening of national boundaries, and new concepts and ideas having replaced old ones, the dominant themes of world affairs today are those of multi-lateralism and globalization.

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[15] *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*, Robert H. Jackson, (1990)

[16] *UN's gala season*, Shamshad Ahmad, *The Nation*, September 27, 2008.

The history of diplomacy is commonly [illegible]ed between the 'old diplomacy' that reache [illegible] the nineteenth century and the "new diplomacy" of the twentieth. In the early twentieth century, the French system was modified to include 'open diplomacy' of ad hoc and permanent conferences, notably the League of Nations. The "old diplomacy" or, as it is more commonly known, "bilateral diplomacy" was dominated for almost three hundred years by the "French system of diplomacy," which established and developed several key features of contemporary diplomacy — resident ambassadors, secret negotiations, ceremonial duties and protocol, honesty, and professionalism.

Old diplomacy was predominantly limited to the conduct of relations on a state-to-state basis through resident missions (embassies), with the resident ambassador being the key actor. The "new diplomacy" that emerged in the nineteenth century and found its fuller expression in the twentieth is different from the "old diplomacy" in two aspects: first, the growing emphasis on public diplomacy open to public scrutiny and control, and second, the projected establishment of an international organization as a forum for peaceful settlement of disputes and as a deterrent to the waging of aggressive war.

Old diplomacy faded into the background after World War II with the emergence of standing diplomatic conference (or as it is more commonly known, international organization). By the middle of the twentieth century, the international arena became too big and too complex for traditional bilateral diplomacy to manage, opening the way for international and regional organization with defined rules of procedure, permanent secretariat and permanently accredited diplomatic missions, and shifting the emphasis in diplomatic method from traditional bilateralism to multilateralism.

With the end of the Cold War, multilateral diplomacy has gone-through another transition. The focus seems to have shifted from development to "peace-related activities and peacekeeping." According to the Oxford Dictionary, the term 'diplomacy' is used to mean "the management of international relations by negotiations; the methods by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoy." "Diplomacy is the method by which nation-states, through authorized agents maintain mutual relations, communicate with each other, and carry out political, economic, and legal transactions."

In an informal or social sense, diplomacy is the employment of tact to gain strategic advantage, one set of tools being the phrasing of statements in a non-confrontational or social manner. But states do resort to force, propaganda or law. In a system of sovereign entities, a state may enhance its power at the expense of its rivals through violent coercion or throug [illegible] d bargaining which ma well involve trickery and misrepresentation. The end is the sa The means differ depending upon circumstances. In esse diplomacy is a well-resourced and skilful political activity betw and among states in pursuit of their respective foreign policy without resort to force, propaganda or law.

Diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotia between accredited persons (the diploma of the diplomat) represe groups or nations. It usually refers to inter-state diplomacy, the co of international relations through the intercession of professi diplomats with regard to issues of peacemaking, culture, econom trade and war. International treaties are usually negotiated diplomats prior to endorsement by national politicians. Functiona diplomacy is conducted bilaterally or multi-laterally.

Also there are various categories of diplomacy employed states or governments and even by governmental and no governmental organizations. These include *inter alia preventi diplomacy* (preventing conflicts or escalation of tensions or dispu into conflicts), *public diplomacy* (exercising influence throug communication with general public in another nation), soft pow (hearts and minds diplomacy) and *economic diplomacy* (usin economic means to increase influence and power).

Diplomacy is a dynamic concept and keeps adapting itself to the geo political and socio-economic environment. In that sense, diplomacy can be neither new nor old. Its *raison d'etre* does not change. Its objective to reconcile contrary viewpoints between and among states and to develop a balance also remains constant. Diplomatic practice is also a mirror of the society in which it is practised. Diplomacy and those through whom it is conducted, namely the diplomats will remain as long as the human race endures simply because it is the sole means we have for adjusting relations between states without recourse to war.

The twentieth century saw a completely novel form of institutional dimension added to the multi-lateral system with a universal character and membership, initiated first in 1919 by the League of Nations and then in 1945 by the United Nations. Together with balance of power, which it reinforces and reflects, diplomacy was considered the most important institution of the post-World War II world order in which international organization as the hub of multi-lateral diplomacy came to be placed above that of the sovereign states.

The Cold War dynamics however changed multi-lateral diplomacy in many ways. Instead of being partners, the major international players became rivals seeing most issues in terms of their effect on the power of each bloc. The United Nations became violent coercion or through [illegible] l bargaining which ma well involve trickery and misrepresentation. The end is the sa The means differ depending upon circumstances. In esse diplomacy is a well-resourced and skilful political activity betw and among states in pursuit of their respective foreign policy g without resort to force, propaganda or law.

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The Cold War dynamics however changed multi-lateral diplomacy in many ways. Instead of being partners, the major international players became rivals seeing most issues in terms of their effect on the power of each bloc. The United Nations became another arena for the clash [illegible] and political confrontation between the two hostile military alliances. One must accept there is no statecraft at global level. Some degree of cooperation is necessary for the UN system to work. For this reason, while there were no Chapter VII resolutions during the Cold War, subsequently a number of Chapter VII resolutions were adopted including on Iraq and terrorism.

International Organization (Multilateralism)

States have, over the years, discovered that their interests are better advanced within a broader system of binding rules than without such a system. Rules help define rights, including property rights, as well as duties, including duties to do and not to do certain things. What precisely these rights and obligations are depends on a whole complex of circumstances: political, economic, cultural, and technological.

The Congress of Vienna in 1815 represented the first attempt to institutionalize the regular convening of conferences to help manage relationships among the most powerful states. International co-operation to promote collective security originated in the Concert of Europe that developed after the Napoleonic Wars in the nineteenth century in an attempt to maintain the *status quo* between European states and to avoid war. The Concert of Europe represented an informal agreement concluded in Vienna among the victors over Napoleon (England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, joined later by the vanquished, France).

The participating countries codified the status and functions of diplomats and established the principle that any member could initiate a call for a conference with the others. The ensuing period also saw the development of international law, with the first Geneva Convention establishing laws dealing with humanitarian relief during wartime, and The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 governing rules of war and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The emergence of contemporary international organization and multilateralism was in large measure a response to the rapid technological and economic evolution, and to the political and social upheavals that accompanied it.

This response was manifest in two emerging trends in the nineteenth century: development of conference system and cooperative institutional frameworks. The first examples of modern international organization were the river commissions in Europe to oversee river traffic, operate navigational facilities, and settle violation of rules. These included the Central Rhine Commission between France and Germany in 1804, and the European Danube

Commission in 1856. Later in the century came the International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the Universal Postal Union (1874).

In 1919, a completely novel form of institutional arrangement was added to multi-lateral system with a universal character and membership, initiated first by the League of Nations and then in 1945 by the United Nations. These organizations were based on shared aspirations with broad agendas, a constitutionally-mandated common role and voice for all members, large or small, and a proper decision-making mechanism (voting, unanimity or consensus).

At the end of the World War II, a spate of regional organizations for economic and/or political cooperation emerged, first in Western Europe, then in Latin America and elsewhere, with varying degrees of success and effectiveness in terms of cooperation and integration. The contemporary international system was finally established through post-World War II decolonization process. Besides the establishment of the United Nations, the other post-World War II phenomenon was the ideological polarization of the world in two rival blocs, East and West leading to what was called the "Cold War." The two blocs engaged in a global power struggle represented in NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances.

The Cold War dynamics changed multi-lateral diplomacy in many ways. Instead of being partners, the major international players became rivals seeing most issues in terms of their effect on the power of each bloc. In that intensely bipolar world, a group of nations which considered themselves aligned neither with the East nor with the West decided to pursue independent policies of their own free of super-power influence. In 1961, they formally established an organization called the **Non-Aligned Movement** or **NAM** with a view to following "independent" policies of their own free of "super-powers influence" and maintaining their own common positions on political and economic issues of global relevance.

The most successful post-War attempt has been the European Union, which originated in 1951 with the European Coal and Steel Community and then since the mid-1980s, made major strides toward economic and political integration of its member-states. Europe's success story was a model that many other regions in the world tried to emulate but with little or no progress. They had neither the environment nor the means and a "Marshall Plan" that the post-War Europe was endowed with.

As cooperation among states increased during the nineteenth century, a pattern of organization and procedures developed. Each international agency or organization with its own mandate or mission, specific character as well as institutional machinery, also had certain basic characteristics common to all organizations. These included criteria-based membership, an agreed charter or constitution, an annual or biennial general conference, a council or decision-making body, a budget with financial support from member-states through contributions on an agreed basis such as ability-to-pay, benefits derived, equality, or on the basis of a combination of such principles, and a secretariat or headquarters.

Conduct of relations at the level of multiple countries working in concert at regional or global levels is what John Gerard Ruggie describes as "multi-lateral" diplomacy. What distinguishes the multilateral form from others is that it coordinates behaviour among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct."[17] Multilateral diplomacy is mostly conducted through conferences and meetings attended by delegations from participating countries at different levels (official, technical, diplomatic, ministerial and summit or heads of state/government level).

"In the greater realm of the nation-states, each actor is something less than the omnipotent entity it aspires to be; in the end therefore, nation-states join with others in order to compensate for their shortcomings, to make up for their obvious and not so obvious weaknesses. International organization promises something the individual states cannot achieve in isolation. Security, development and prosperity are hardly realizable goals in the absence of cooperative arrangements. Moreover, in no arrangement is this more obvious than in the United Nations system".[18]

Conference diplomacy is today considered an effective means of taking decisions at regional and global levels on issues of peace and security, socio-economic development and humanitarian and human rights matters. A conference is subject-focused and thus concentrates minds on one issue or series of related issues, and with the involvement of all parties concerned facilitates a mutually acceptable outcome through 'consensus' or any other agreed decision-making process.

International organization embodies a "centralization of collective activities" through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus. These increase the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization's ability to affect the understandings, environment and interests of states. Two functional characteristics have been identified by Diehl as leading the states, in appropriate circumstances, to prefer international organizations as vehicles of cooperation.

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[17] *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, Ruggie, John Gerard (1993). New York: Columbia University Press, p. 14.

[18] The United Nations: *International Organization and World Politics*, Ziring, Riggs, Plano, p.1)

These are "centralization" and "independence." The first, centralization entails "a concrete and stable organizational structure and administrative apparatus managing collective activities, and the second, independence means the ability to act with a degree of objectivity and autonomy within defined spheres." [19]

The League of Nations

The League of Nations was an international organization, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, created after World War I to provide a forum for resolving international disputes. The first 26 articles of the Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, contained the Covenant of the League of Nations. The League had two basic aims: to preserve peace through collective action and pacific settlement of disputes through arbitration and conciliation, and to promote international cooperation in economic and social affairs.

The establishment of the League of Nations was first proposed by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States as part of his Fourteen Points plan for an equitable peace in Europe. He saw in it "a guarantee of peace" through a collective security system but ironically the United States itself never joined the League because the SA Senate then dominated by hardliners and conservatives refused to ratify the League's Covenant.

Article X of the Covenant was the crux of the League's mandate without which it would be merely a debating society. Wilson refused to delete or amend this Article which read:

> *"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this objective shall be fulfilled."*

The SA Senate considered this Article as an important dilution of American sovereignty. Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass) saw it as both unconstitutional and un-American. The USA thus remained out of an organization that it had created as part of the Treat of Versailles.

Structurally, the League of Nations had an assembly, a council and a secretariat. But functionally, it was handicapped from the very beginning because three of the major powers were not its members. The United States crucially never joined; Germany and Russia were initially kept out of the League and were allowed to be its members only from 1926 and 1934, respectively. Japan and Italy both withdrew in the, 30s. The League then depended mainly on

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[19] *The Politics of Governance:* Paul F. Diehl, pp. 10-11).

Britain and France, which were excessively depleted in the War were hesitant to act forcefully.

Another reason for the League's failure was that it had no teeth to enforce its decisions. It was also difficult for governments long accustomed to operating independently to work through this new organization. No wonder, its League's inability to stop the expansion of the Axis powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, in the 1930s and 1940s, led to a second world war. The League had no military power of its own, and for enforcement of its decisions, it depended on its members which were not willing to use sanctions against other countries. Moral authority alone was insufficient. No wonder, the League failed in its chief aim of keeping the peace.

On April 19, 1946, the League of Nations formally approved a motion of its own demise as an organization.

The United Nations

The Allies of World War II after the war developed the United Nations system. A Charter was drafted at conferences attended by leaders of the USA, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and occasionally other Allied nations. At the end of the war, the Big Three along with the governments of China and France invited all nations to a conference in San Francisco in 1945 where the UN Charter was adopted.

The founding of the United Nations system, its evolution and it wide-ranging interests and activities have no parallel in human affairs. The United Nations was established with the twin goals of peace and prosperity. For the realization of these goals, it was considered "mankind's last best hope." It was also a pragmatic response to imperatives of the fast-changing world as a result of increasing global inter-dependence and phenomenal technological advances.

Multi-lateral cooperation was to be a norm for resolving all global problems. With this norm, the United Nations was to pioneer the way to a new and better world. The United Nations also signified the era of decolonization as the age of empires had run its course. As a universal organization, United Nations came to be regarded as an instrument of international legitimacy because of the "belief" in its ideals by the nations of the world. To what extent the United Nations has served its purpose is there to for all to see.

Briefly, however, we know that hard realities intervened to interrupt the rebuilding of the world on a moral or just order. The new unipolarity has been unleashing its own challenges putting multi-lateral diplomacy at another transition threshold. Regrettably, the UN system is being used to legitimize the strategic and security set-up only suited to the few. No doubt, the United Nations has not fulfilled its promise of peace and prosperity. The critics of the United Nations would even say that it has failed to live up to the lofty ambitions enshrined in its Charter.

But one must accept that there is no alternative to the United Nations. The United Nations has indeed served the purpose of saving humanity, during the second half of the twentieth century, from the recurrence of the great disasters of the first half. Despite its failures and constraints, it may not be fair to blame the United Nations for what it has not been able to accomplish. The onus for its "failures" rests on its members, especially the veto-wielding five permanent members of the Security Council. One area in which the United Nations stands out with distinction is the peace-keeping operations, deployed to monitor and observe peace process in conflict areas. (Pakistan tops the list of troop-contributors.)

The Commonwealth

The Commonwealth is an association of 53 independent states consulting and co operating in the common interests of their peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace. It is home to 2.2 billion citizens, about 30% of the world's population, drawn from the broadest range of faiths, races, cultures and traditions. The Commonwealth includes some of the world's largest, smallest, richest and poorest countries, spanning five regions. Thirty-two of its members are small states, many of them island nations. Leaders of the Commonwealth member countries meet every two years to discuss issues of mutual concern and interest.

The association does not have a written constitution, but it does have a series of agreements setting out its beliefs and objectives. These Declarations or Statements were issued at various Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings. The first, fundamental statement of core beliefs is the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which was issued at the 1971 summit in Singapore. Among other things, it stresses the need to foster international peace and security; democracy; liberty of the individual and equal rights for all; the importance of eradicating poverty, ignorance and disease; and it opposes all forms of racial discrimination.

The Commonwealth's guiding principles are in its Charter. Commonwealth policies are shaped by member countries which have an equal say on decisions affecting them. The Commonwealth organisations put these decisions and plans into action. They are involved in diverse activities, from helping countries with trade negotiations to encouraging women's leadership, building the small business sector, supporting youth participation at all levels of society and providing experts to write laws.

Small states are sovereign countries with a population of 1.5 million people or less. There are 32 Commonwealth small states.

with limited resources, they face many challenges. Some larger countries — Botswana, Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia and Papua New Guinea — are classified as small states as they share similar characteristics: decline in global trade and investment, lack of readily available information for investors, trading partners and capacity to harness growth opportunities. As members of the Commonwealth, small states have an equal voice.

The Commonwealth helps its member countries take advantage of opportunities for economic growth and improve their ability to manage long-term development. It also works with member countries to help resolve conflicts or tensions. Good governance, strong democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights and respect for diversity are Commonwealth values. Any member seen in breach of these values can be suspended from membership.

A ministerial group called Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), established in November 1995, is tasked to deal with any cases of serious or persistent violations of the Commonwealth's fundamental political values. It recommends measures to restore democracy and constitutional rule. Composed of 10 Commonwealth member-states, CMAG has authority to suspend a country from the Commonwealth. Its activities, composition and remit are reviewed every two years.

Pakistan was suspended from the Councils of the Commonwealth on November 22, 2007, after the imposition of emergency rule in the country. Pakistan's membership was restored after general elections in 2008. Pakistan was previously suspended from the Councils of the Commonwealth in October 1999 after Gen. Musharraf's military coup and was restored to full membership in May 2004.

Globalization[20]

Ours is a world in which no individual, and no state can exist in isolation. Human beings have interacted across the globe for centuries. But today's globalization is different. It is happening more rapidly, driven by new engines. In our current age, globalization is having a profound effect upon national and international rules – it is, for example, influencing the norms that govern world commerce, transportation, environmental protection, to name only a few. Globalization, as an ongoing process, is bringing us more choices and more opportunities for progress and prosperity. It has grown from a purely economic or technological concept and now assumes a cultural dimension as well.

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[20] Globalization: *Challenges of blessings and burdens*, Shamshad Ahmad, *Dawn*, February 11, 2002.

Globalization is an inexorable phenomenon spurred by technological and information revolutions and resulting in the unprecedented global interaction. Per se it is neither panacea nor bane. There are those who benefit and those who lose. But in many dimensions the impact is inescapable. For example, cell phones and television electronic media have changed life all around the humanity. Taliban use them, so do the business tycoons of America and China. Poverty and inequality is there but that requires different approaches of development and good governance. The process, however, has still not significantly touched an extraordinary proportion of humanity and hence has not yet truly earned its title, 'globalization.'

No wonder, it remains one of the most widely discussed and often most vehemently challenged phenomenon of our times. There are those who look at globalization as the only panacea for the world's ills, especially issues of poverty and under development. And then there are those who think globalization is a curse. Those supporting globalization are convinced the rising tide will benefit everyone. In their view, poverty and inequality are falsely attributed to the very economic integration that is lifting the majority of the developing world's people out of poverty. Those who look at globalization as a curse believe it has actually aggravated economic disparities, worsening conditions for the poor.

The fact of the matter is that the market-driven process of globalization, integrating national economies into the world economy, is an asymmetric one, with some winners but many losers. Growth and development have not and cannot automatically bring about reduction in inequality. The growing size of the pie does not ensure that everyone will get his or her piece of pie. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, however, has tried to draw a balance between the two schools of thought by acknowledging the "productive contributions of global integration" and accepting that "global economy has actually brought prosperity to many different areas of the globe."

But he also wants us to recognise "the enormous inequalities that exist across the globe and often within each country." [21] There is no level playing field, because a level playing field is just not possible between strong and weak economies unless international regulatory measures are in place to control the predatory policies of the more powerful players.

The growth of multi-lateral institutions, e.g. Bretton Woods Institutions with no role for developing countries in managing the global economy has not helped the situation. These institutions have only served to perpetuate the old divide. We are also witnessing gradual erosion of the traditional concept of state sovereignty as is evident in growing geo political belligerence and energy-driven power struggle in different parts of the world.

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[21] *Imaging Tomorrow: Global doubts*, Amartya Sen, (August 2000).

Globalization does create aspirations for consumption patterns and life-styles that cannot be sustained socially, culturally, politically or environmentally unless the process is appropriately managed. It is also apparent that mismanagement could lead to serious consequences for the global economy and humanity. No wonder, Former British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown (also later served as prime minister) rightly observed that the issue is not whether we should have globalization or not. It is how well or badly, fairly or unfairly we manage globalization.

The question remains if globalization was working well then why are there so many poor people in the world at a time of such abundance of wealth. Why is the number of least-developed countries increasing? Apparently, there is a tendency to oversimplify the whole issue by saying that there is no alternative. If it is so, then one is to believe that income disparities would continue to aggravate and poor will continue to become poorer and rich, richer. Poverty curtain will keep the world divided in two unequal halves, one embarrassingly rich and the other desperately poor. Bridging this woeful divide and reducing poverty is today's most daunting challenge. [22]

The technology sector is in shambles, popular sentiment has turned strongly against many of the tenets of globalization. Lending to emerging markets has all but dried up. Debt default is becoming a reality. Unemployment is on the rise and global economy remains in recession. In addition, globalization continues to exert its destabilizing and often unequalizing effects. Will the international consensus that supports globalization last when it is failing the large part of humanity? The outlook is not very positive.

While there is strong support in many circles for free trade, economic liberalization, technological advances and free capital flows, we already are witnessing a strong political reaction against globalization. This backlash has been evident in the return of populist anti-globalist movements and street clashes in major cities hosting global summits or events, also drew thousands of anti-globalist protesters. There has been growing disenchantment in many societies with the disruptions and uncertainties that follow in the wake of globalization.

The voices of civil society can only be ignored at great peril to the process of global economic integration. The challenge for the international community and for the world leaders is, therefore, to ensure that the perils and promise of globalization are managed to benefit the large majority of people living in poverty and misery. They have to ensure that the political consensus that was necessary to support the broad and sometimes disruptive social changes that accompany globalization is not reversed.

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[22] *Globalization: Challenges of blessings and burdens*, Shamshad Ahmad; *Dawn*, February 11, 2002

How do we promote global integration that benefits all and leads to minimum disruption or is least costly in terms of human sufferings? How do we avoid the disruptive consequences that followed earlier periods of globalization? Owing to the deepening global economic crisis and growing dissatisfaction with the rising cost of economic integration, the situation might appear similar to the earlier endings of globalization periods.

But, unfortunately, we have different tools to deal with this situation. We have a whole system of multi-lateral institutions to deal with global economic, financial and social crises. We have the World Trade Organization to ensure that countries do not withdraw behind the walls of protectionism, which could lead to increase in hunger and poverty. These institutions, however, need to bring greater coherence and consistency in their policies through coordination and close cooperation.

But enhanced cooperation will not achieve the desired ends as long as the asymmetries and bias against the poor and under-privileged persist in the global system. The regimes governing trade, technology and finance are not responsive to the needs of developing countries. The rules of the game for globalization are unequal in construct, and inequitable in outcomes. The process of integration should be carefully managed. This can be achieved only through tailoring the process of integration to the level of economic development in a country, capacity of its existing institutions and industries.

The policy efforts of developing countries should be accompanied by an accommodating global environment. The case for a holistic, coherent, democratic and participatory multi-lateral economic framework for equitable global economic integration is compelling. The time has come to think of a new paradigm whereby countries that are part of the WTO system should have same rights, but their obligations will vary and will be a function of the stage of their development. To some extent, this has been recognized during the WTO meeting in Doha.

Similarly, the time has also come for changing the orientation of the Bretton Woods Institutions. The burdens and blessings of globalization should be shared and managed through open, democratic, transparent and participatory multilateralism. United Nations, a democratic institution with universal membership, could provide a central forum for the management of global economic integration. In sum, if globalization is not made to work for everyone then it might not work for anyone. The challenge is to manage globalization for the benefit of all. Either we all win or we all lose. Choice is ours to make.

III. WAR AND PEACE

Changes in the conduct of international relations have usually taken place through war or technological innovations. The Napoleonic Wars led to the creation of the Concert of Europe, World War I to the League of Nations, and World War II to the United Nations as the victors in each war attempted to set up a system or organization to preserve the gains they had made and to prevent future wars.

Indeed, since the Napoleonic times, the nation-state has been associated with the age of total war, of horrific conflicts between the peoples of the world rather than just their armies. This unfettered spirit of the nation, when combined with the revolutionary advances in military technology in the nineteenth and twentieth century, has led to the bloodiest years in the history of humanity. Europe then developed institutional arrangements for streamlining regional and international cooperation.

War has afflicted mankind since the very first civilizations. Moralists have denounced it as the greatest of evils. Statesmen have deplored it but often pronounced it salutary or necessary to preserve freedom, honour and peace. The most recent example of this paradox came when US President Barack Obama while receiving his Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in 2009 proclaimed war as an ethical aspect "which ennobles human activity." He justified wars to make peace. "For make no mistake. Evil does exist in the world," he declared while making his case that "evil must be fought with evil."

War is phenomenon of politics to be understood within the context of political motives. In international law, the distinction between war and peace is sharp and clear. In political practice, however, the distinction has become less clear for we now "wage peace" and prevent war by preventive 'phony wars' cold wars', 'wicked wars' and 'wars in self-defence' as Charles A. Beard once put it, "perpetual war for perpetual peace." [23] Despite semantic confusions, the fact of the matter is that in a State system of competing powers, the primary objective of foreign policy in peace and in war is neither war nor peace but something common to both.

If history is any lesson, enhancement of the power of a state to resist the will of others and impose its own will upon them, and the diminution of the power of others to resist its will and impose their will upon it is invariably the catalyst in power politics. In "war", this goal is pursued by overt violence, and in "peace", by bargaining or negotiations, at times also accompanied by threats of use of force. Arms and allies are the tools of power. The task of diplomacy is to keep the powder dry and to win friends and influence people.[24]

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[23] *International Politics*, Frederick-Schuman; McGraw Hill Book Company Inc., 1958

How to succeed in diplomacy is a question simply answered though the answer is more easily stated than practised: "maintain armed forces larger and heavier than those of your rival and well adapted to the service of your political purposes, and conclude alliances with other powers against your potential enemy, taking care to keep him isolated. But avoid allies far stronger or far weaker than yourself for the former will seek to rule you and the latter will bring you to ruin by proving liability in war and a constant drain on your resources in peace. One powerful and trustworthy ally is worth a dozen feeble and fickle allies."[25]

Therefore, other things being equal, a limited coalition of a few formidable powers, strategically placed, is preferable to a general aggregation of doubtful states scattered far and wide. As for the broader question of the general orientation of foreign policy, all diplomacy, like all politics, is the art of the possible. Statesmanship consists in perceiving the limits of what is possible. Delineating objectives clearly, and organizing power commensurate with commitments. To amass power inadequate to purposes, or excessive for their attainment, is to invite insolvency.[26]

An obviously 'satiated' state will concern itself with maintaining the *status* quo and resisting all efforts to change it. An 'unsatiated' state will strive to take advantage of every opportunity to alter the distribution of satisfactions. Both, if wisely governed, will weigh the consequences of acts less in terms of the 'merits' of any given controversy than in terms of the probable effects of alternative solutions on the total balance of power. For in the game of power politics, only power can match power, whether it is used to preserve or to change the prevailing apportionments of the stakes of diplomacy.

And since power in the final test is military might, the stakes which will be cherished most dearly and pursued most assiduously will be (or ought to be) those things which affect relative fighting capacity.[27] Wars are fought to secure, retain, or prevent the foe from acquiring the components of power which are deemed decisive for the future balance of fighting capacity. Moral indignation on both sides is universal since both are convinced they are defending Good against Evil.

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[24] *ibid.*

[25] *ibid.*

[26] *ibid.*

[27] *A Study of War*, Quincy Wright, University of Chicago Press, 1942.

In reality, however, what wars are about is suggested in the famous answer attributed to Francis I (King of France 1515-47) when asked what differences of view involved him in constant hostilities with his royal brother, Charles V (Holy Roma Emperor 1519-1556) "None whatsoever. We agree perfectly. We both want control of Italy."

The popular view that democracies are less given to war-like adventures than autocracies or dictatorships has no foundation in fact. Democratic rabble rousers are as much addicted as spell-binding tyrants to embarking upon war abroad as a means of promoting unity and loyalty" at home. Ironically, in recent centuries, it has been the Atlantic democracies, not the Eastern autocracies, which have waged war upon and subjugated or dispossessed the native peoples of most of the non-European world. There is absolutely no established historical correlation between the devotion to democracy and devotion to peace. [28]

European wars

Initially, in Europe, religion was a motivation for war as Protestant and Catholic states battled it out even though they all were inside the Holy Roman Empire. Changing the relative balance of power within the Empire was at issue. Gradually, it developed into a more general conflict involving most of the great powers of Europe. In this general phase the war became less specifically religious and more a continuation of the Bourbon–Habsburg rivalry for European political pre-eminence, leading in turn to further warfare between France and the Habsburg powers.

The Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) was a series of wars principally fought in Central Europe, involving most of the countries of Europe for various reasons ignited in 1618 over an attempt by the king of Bohemia (the future Holy Roman emperor Ferdinand II) to impose Catholicism throughout his domains. Protestant nobles rebelled, and by the 1630s most of continental Europe was at war. It was one of the longest and most destructive conflicts in European history, and one of the longest continuous wars in modern history.

A major consequence of the Thirty Years' War was the devastation of entire regions, denuded by the foraging armies. Famine and disease significantly decreased the population of the German states, Bohemia, the Low Countries, and Italy; most of the combatant powers were bankrupted. While the regiments within each army were not strictly mercenary, in that they were not units for hire that changed sides from battle to battle, some individual soldiers that made up the regiments were mercenaries.

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* *International Politics, Frederick Schuman, McGraw Hill Book Company Inc., 1958.*

The problem of discipline was made more difficult by the hoc nature of Seventeenth-century military financing; armies we expected to be largely self-funding, by means of loot taken or trib extorted from the settlements where they operated. This encoura a form of lawlessness that imposed severe hardship on inhabitan the occupied territory.

The Thirty Years' War was ended with the treaties Osnabrück and Münster, part of the wider Peace of Westphalia. Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648 radically shifting balance of power in Europe.

As a result of the Treaty of Westphalia, the Netherlands gai independence from Spain, Sweden gained control of the Baltic France was acknowledged as the pre-eminent Western power. T power of the Holy Roman Emperor was broken and the Germ states were again able to determine the religion of their lands. So of the quarrels that provoked the war went unresolved for a mu longer time.[29]

On the Continent, the age of democracy, dictatorshi terrorism, military conscription, total war, and new attempts to uni the world by the sword began abruptly in France after 1789. The er of the French Revolution and Napoleon represents a nearly successful effort prior to the twentieth century at the restoration of a universal empire by conquest. The power of earlier aspirants of ascendancy over Europe (Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV looked feeble compared to the military might and diplomatic prestige of France under Napoleon. The old balance of power was completely disrupted. In 1804, aping ancient Rome, he made himself Emperor, and his Europe seemed likely to include all of Europe within its limits.

The Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815)

These were a series of wars between Napoleon's French Empire and opposing coalitions. As a continuation of the wars sparked by the French Revolution of 1789, they revolutionized European armies and played out on an unprecedented scale, mainly owing to the application of modern mass conscription. French power rose quickly as Napoleon's armies conquered much of Europe but collapsed rapidly after France's disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812. Napoleon's empire ultimately suffered complete military defeat resulting in the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in France and the creation of the Concert of Europe (1815).

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[29] *International Politics*, Frederick Schuman, McGraw Hill, Book Company Inc., 1958.

Despite a final victory against Napoleon, five of seven coalitions saw defeat at the hands of France. France defeated the first and second coalitions during the French Revolutionary Wars, the third (notably at Austerlitz), the fourth (notably at Jena, Eylau, and Friedland) and the fifth coalition (notably at Wagram) under the leadership of Napoleon. These great victories gave the French army a sense of invulnerability, especially when it approached Moscow. But after the retreat from Russia, in spite of incomplete victories, France was defeated by the sixth coalition at Leipzig, in the Peninsular War at Vitoria and at the hands of the seventh coalition at Waterloo.[30]

The wars resulted in the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and sowed the seeds of nascent nationalism in Germany and Italy that would lead to the two nations' respective consolidations later in the century. Meanwhile, the global Spanish Empire began to unravel as French occupation of Spain weakened Spain's hold over its colonies, providing an opening for nationalist revolutions in Spanish America. As a direct result of the Napoleonic wars, the British Empire became the foremost world power for the next century, thus beginning Pax Britannica.

The politics of Europe was dominated for centuries by the conflict simmering between the off shore island kingdom of Great Britain and France located on the mainland of Europe. The defeat of Napoleon at sea in the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) and on land at Waterloo (1815) resolved that rivalry. In time, though, France was able to recover and emerged by the mid nineteenth century as the second largest Imperial power, second only to the British.

Germany which for centuries had been no more than an aggregation of principalities dominated usually by Prussia, finally achieved a nation-state identity following its unification under Count Bismarck in 1871. Supported by huge indigenous reserves of coal and iron, it made the bumpy transition from a primarily agricultural economy to an aggressively industrialized one. In Russia, the forcible modernization by Czar Peter the Great and in Japan the westernization during the Meiji Restoration created stresses within each country that erupted in a heightened sense of national consciousness, fuelled by an incandescent assertive patriotism.

The long ***Pax Britannica*** (1815-1914) was not so much a new epoch as an uneasy interlude between global conflicts for hegemony. These fabulous decades were marked by startling shifts in the distribution of influence among "Great Powers." After a last bid for European and world domination, France gave way to Britain. New

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[30] *International Politics*, Frederick Schuman, McGraw Hill Book Company Inc., 1958.

Powers emerged in the shape of Italy, Germany, America and Japan. British ascendency was questioned by the USA, resisted by Russia, and at length challenged by a new Reich. The armed peace for all it dreams of universal brotherhood may have been a wondrous new ag but it was marked by such posturing and chest thumping in the name the tribal gods as presaged blood sacrifices on flaming altars. [31]

The century between Waterloo and Sarajevo will probabl always remain, in a popular sense, a unique era. The system technology had completely revolutionized. The new masters industry, finance and commerce became new elite in almost all th states of the Western world. The progressive dissolution of th Ottoman Empire presented an opportunity to the Slavic Christians southeastern Europe to achieve liberation and statehood.

The expansion of power at the expense of Turkey, the "sick man of Europe" as it was called then, alarmed London and Paris leading to the Crimean War (1854-56). In 1877, Russia waged war on Turkey using the Slavic still under Turkish rule as pawns in her game of expansion. In 1912-13, the Balkan states waged war against Turkey. In 1913, they fell out among themselves fighting the Second Balkan War (1913) resulting the Balkanization with the creation of six new states which became an arena of Great Power rivalries.

IV. THE GREAT WARS

World War I

The World War I originally called the Great War, raged from 1914 to 1918. Mostly fought in Western Europe in muddy, bloody trenches. World War I saw the introduction of the machine-gun and poison gas into battle. It was an extremely bloody war, with huge losses of life and little ground lost or won. Fought mostly by soldiers in trenches, World War I which was sparked by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 and which ended with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 saw an estimated 10 million military deaths.

The Salient Features of World War I

Vienna declared war on Serbia. Berlin supported Vienna. St. Petersburg supported Serbia. Paris supported St. Petersburg. Rome hesitated. London with no firm commitment sought to negotiate. Russia ordered mobilization on July 30, 1914; German declaration of war against Russia on August 1, 1914. Germany declared war on Belgium and France on August 3 Britain declared war on Germany on August 4 converting Europe into an inferno.

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[31] *International Politics*: Frederick Schuman; McGraw Hill Book Company Inc., 1958.

This vortex of death sucked in all the powers and also all lesser states. In the Far East, Japan declared war occupying German islands in the Pacific and in 1915 also attempted to impose a protectorate in China. Italy sold her support to the highest bidder and declared war on its erstwhile allies on May 25, 1915. Turkey joined the Central Powers on November 5, 1914. USA, moved by balance of power considerations and concern for its lucrative exports of war supplies to the Allies, declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917. The War ended with a new German government suing for peace. An armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.

The World War I of 1914-18 altered irreversibly the map of Europe, and at the same time disturbed the equilibrium that sustained inter-state relations and intra-state stability. Kingdoms suddenly disintegrated and in their place emerged sometimes smaller nation-states, each clinging to a perception of its new nationalism that gave an identity to discernible bonds of language, religion, social and institutional traditions, territory and history. The instability created in Europe by the World War I and the fragile peace that followed it set the stage for another international conflict – World War II — which broke out two decades later and would prove even more devastating.

Causes of World War I

World War 1 is actually much more complicated than a simple list of causes. While there was a chain of events that directly led to the fighting, the actual root causes are much deeper and part of continued debate and discussion. The list below is an overview of the most popular reasons that are commonly cited as the root causes of World War 1:

1. Mutual Defence Alliances

Over time, countries throughout Europe made mutual defence agreements that would pull them into battle. Thus, if one country was attacked, allied countries were bound to defend them. Before World War I, the following alliances existed: Russia and Serbia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, France and Russia, Britain and France and Belgium, and Japan and Britain.

Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, Russia got involved to defend Serbia. Germany seeing Russia mobilizing, declared war on Russia. France was then drawn in against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany attacked France through Belgium pulling Britain into war. Then Japan entered the war. Later, Italy and the United States would enter on the side of the allies.

2. Imperialism

Imperialism is when a country increases *their* pow wealth by bringing additional territories under *their* contro World War 1, Africa and parts of Asia were points of co amongst the European countries. This was especially true b the raw materials these areas could provide. The i competition and desire for greater empires led to an in confrontation that helped push the world into World War I.

3. Militarism

As the world entered the Twentieth century, an arms begun. By 1914, Germany had the greatest increase in build-up. Great Britain and Germany both greatly increa navies in this time period. Further, in Germany and particularly, the military establishment began to have a influence on public policy. This increase in militarism help the countries involved in war.

4. Nationalism

Much of the origin of the war was based on the desire Slavic peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina to no longer be Austria-Hungary but instead be part of Serbia. In this nationalism led directly to the War. But in a more general wa nationalism of the various countries throughout Europe contri not only to the beginning but the extension of the war in Eu Each country tried to prove their dominance and power.

5. Immediate Cause (Assassination of Archduke F Ferdinand)

The immediate cause of World War I that made all aforementioned items come into play (alliances, imperial militarism, nationalism) was the assassination of Archduke F Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary. In June 1914, a Serbian nation assassinated him and his wife while they were in Sarajevo, Bo which was part of Austria-Hungary. This was in protest to Aust Hungary having control of this region. Serbia wanted to take o Bosnia and Herzegovina. This assassination led to Austria-Hung declaring war on Serbia. When Russia began to mobilize due to alliance with Serbia, Germany declared war on Russia. Thus, beg the expansion of the war to include all those involved in the mutu defence alliances.

A Family Affair

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A Family Affair

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European monarchies — many of which fell during the war (including those of Russia, Germany and Austria – Hungary) - were interrelated. The British monarch George V's predecessor, Edward VII was the German Kaiser's uncle and, via his wife's sister, uncle of the Russian tsar as well. His niece, Alexandra, was the tsar's wife. Edward's daughter, Maud, was the Norwegian queen, and his niece, Ena, Queen of Spain; Marie, a further niece, was to become Queen of Romania.

Despite these familial relations — nine kings attended Edward's funeral — European politics was all about power and influence of protection and encirclement. Hence the tangled web of alliances that sprung up in the wake of the rise of the newly united German Empire in 1871. The main factors that led inexorably to World War could be summed up as:

- Austro-Hungarian determination to impose its will upon the Balkans.
- A German desire for greater power and international influence, which sparked a naval arms race with Britain, who responded by building new and greater warships.
- The *Dreadnought*; a French desire for revenge against Germany following its disastrous defeat in 1871.
- Russia's anxiety to restore some semblance of national prestige after almost a decade of civil strife and a battering at the hands of the Japanese military in 1905.

World War II

The devastation of the World War I had greatly destabilized Europe, and in many respects World War II grew out of issues left unresolved by that earlier conflict. In particular, political and economic instability in Germany, and lingering resentment over the harsh terms imposed by the Treaty, of Versailles fuelled the rise to power of Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist (Nazi) Party. After becoming Reich Chancellor in 1933, Hitler swiftly consolidated power, anointing himself Führer (supreme leader) in 1934.

In the mid-1930s, he began the rearmament of Germany, secretly and in violation of the Treaty of Versailles After signing alliances with Italy and Japan against the Soviet Union, Hitler sent troops to occupy Austria in 1938 and the following year annexed Czechoslovakia. Hitler's open aggression went unchecked, as the United States and Soviet Union were concentrated on internal politics at the time, and neither France nor Britain was eager for confrontation.

Outbreak of World War II (1939)

In late August 1939, Hitler and Soviet leader Joseph S signed the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, which incite frenzy of worry in London and Paris. Hitler had long planned invasion of Poland, a nation to which Great Britain and France guaranteed military support if it was attacked by Germany. The with Stalin meant that Hitler would not face a war on two fro once he invaded Poland, and would have Soviet assistance conquering and dividing the nation itself.

Rising to power in an economically and politically unsta Germany, Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist (Nazi) Pa rearmed the nation and signed strategic treaties with Italy and Jap to further his ambitions of world domination. When events beg happening in Europe that would eventually lead to World War many Americans took an increasingly hard line towards gettin involved. The events of World War I had fed into America's natur desire to isolationism, and this was reflected by the passage Neutrality Acts along with the general hands off approach to th events that unfolded on the world stage.

On September 1, 1939, Hitler invaded Poland from the west; two days later, France and Britain declared war on Germany, beginning World War II. On September 17, Soviet troops invaded Poland from the east. Under attack from both sides, Poland fell quickly, and by early 1940 Germany and the Soviet Union had divided control over the nation, according to a secret protocol appended to the Non-aggression Pact. Stalin's forces then moved to occupy the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and defeated a resistant Finland in the Russo-Finish War. In July 1941, the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis was created. Over the next six years, the conflict would take more lives and destroy more land and property around the globe than any previous war.

America's involvement in world affairs — albeit belated — was its overt admission that it was not simply a kin to Europe but that it had a larger responsibility to the rest of the world. This was to manifest itself when America gradually urged imperialist powers—the German, the Dutch, and later the British and the French—to divest themselves of their colonies. This awareness was to be tested dramatically by the attack on the United States at Pearl Harbour on December 2, 1941, by an increasingly militarized and aggressively expansionist Japan. As a result United States entered World War II on the side of the Allies.

After America declared war on Japan, Germany, and Italy declared war on the USA. America actually followed a Germany First strategy, mainly because it posed the greatest threat to the

West, it had a larger military, and it seemed the most likely to develop newer and more lethal weapons. But in fact as the Japanese began occupying French Indo-China and the Philippines, it had to fight on two fronts: Europe and the Pacific.

World War II was thus primarily fought between two large military alliances. The Axis powers were a group of countries led by Nazi Germany, the Kingdom of Italy (until its defeat), and the Empire of Japan. The Allies, led by the United Kingdom, its Commonwealth (excluding the Irish Free State), and France (until its defeat), were joined in the European theatre by the Soviet Union in June 1941 and by the United States in December 1941. In the Asia-Pacific theatre the Allies were led by the Republic of China, following the 1937 invasion of China by Japan, and the United States and the British Commonwealth, following the 1941-42 Japanese attacks.

World War II Ends (1945)

Heavy casualties sustained in the campaigns at Iwo Jima (February 1945) and Okinawa (April-June 1945), and fears of the even costlier land invasion of Japan led Truman to authorize the use of a new and devastating weapon—the atomic bomb—on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August. On August 10, the Japanese government issued a statement declaring they would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and on September 2, US General Douglas MacArthur accepted Japan's formal surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

Atomic Bombs

Throughout the war, America had been working on the creation of atomic bombs through the Manhattan Project. In August 1945, America led by Harry Truman, who took over the presidency after FDR's death, decided to drop atomic bombs on two cities in Japan. Part of the rationale for this decision was that they wanted to avoid the loss of life that would accompany an invasion of the Japanese mainland. Hiroshima was the first target on August 6 and then Nagasaki was hit on August 9. The two bombs killed approximately 100,000 Japanese instantly. By September 1, 1945, the Japanese had unconditionally surrendered. This was V-J Day (Victory over Japan day).

At the Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945, US President Harry S. Truman (who had taken office after Roosevelt's death in April), Churchill and Stalin discussed the ongoing war with Japan as well as the peace settlement with Germany. Post-war Germany would be divided into four occupation zones, to be controlled by the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States and France. On the divisive

[illegible]

Causes of World War II

1. Treaty of Versailles (1919)

The German people were very unhappy about the treaty and [illegible] Germany could not [illegible] considered it too harsh a settlement. [illegible] During the 1920s the people [illegible] pay the money in reparations and during the [illegible] world economic [illegible] unemployment [illegible] Germany suffered extreme hardship. People were disillusioned [illegible] and price of food and basic goods. People [illegible] a man who promised to [illegible] the government and voted to power a man [illegible] the Treaty of Versailles. His name was Adolf Hitler.

2. Hitler's Actions

Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in January 193[illegible] Almost immediately he began secretly building up Germany's army and weapons. In 1934 he increased the size of the army, began building warships and created a German Air Force. Compulsory military service was also introduced. Although Britain and France were aware of Hitler's actions, they were also concerned about the rise of Communism and believed that a stronger Germany might help to prevent the spread of Communism to the West. They remained complacent over the situation.

In 1936, Hitler ordered German troops to enter the Rhineland. At this point the German army was not very strong and could have been easily defeated. Yet neither France nor Britain was prepared to start another war. Hitler also made two important alliances during 1936. The first was called the Rome-Berlin Axis Pact that allied Hitler's Germany with Mussolini's Italy. The second was called the Anti-Comintern Pact and allied Germany with Japan.

3. Failure of Appeasement

When Germany began re-arming in 1934, many politicians felt that Germany had a right to re-arm in order to protect herself. It was also argued that a stronger Germany would prevent the spread of

Communism to the west. In 1936, Hitler argued that because France had signed a new treaty with Russia, Germany was under threat from both countries and it was essential to German security that troops were stationed in the Rhineland. France was not strong enough to fight Germany without British help and Britain was not prepared to go to war at this point. They remained silent.

The most notable example of appeasement was the Munich Agreement of September 1938. The Munich Agreement, signed by the leaders of Germany, Britain, France and Italy, agreed that the Sudetenland would be returned to Germany and that no further territorial claims would be made by Germany. The Czech government was not invited to the conference and protested about the loss of the Sudetenland. They felt that they had been betrayed by both Britain and France with whom alliances had been made.

However, the Munich Agreement was generally viewed as a triumph and an excellent example of securing peace through negotiation rather than war. When Hitler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, he broke the terms of the Munich Agreement. Although it was realised that the policy of appeasement had failed, Chamberlain was still not prepared to take the country to war over "a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing." Instead, he made a guarantee to come to Poland's aid if Hitler invaded Poland.

4. Failure of the League of Nations

The League of Nations was an international organisation set up in 1919 to help keep world peace. It was intended that all countries would be members of the League and that if there were disputes between countries they could be settled by negotiation rather than by force. In theory, the League of Nations was a good idea and did have some early successes. But ultimately it was a failure.

The whole world was hit by a depression in the late 1920s. A depression is when a country's economy falls. Trade is reduced, businesses lose income, prices fall and unemployment rises. In 1931, Japan was hit badly by the depression. People lost faith in the government and turned to the army to find a solution. The army invaded Manchuria in China, an area rich in minerals and resources. China appealed to the League for help. The League action remained ineffective. When the League demanded Japanese withdrawal from Manchuria, Japan's response was to leave the League of Nations.

The League of Nations itself had inherent weaknesses. It never had a universal membership. Even the United States which had authored the very concept of the League never joined it. As a punishment for having started World War I, Germany was not allowed to join and Russia was also excluded due to a growing fear of

Communism. Other countries decided not to join and some joined but later left. The League in fact had no power. It had no teeth to enforce its decisions, and in times of crisis, it was unable to act quickly. The Council of the League met only four times a year and decisions had to be by consensus which was mostly not easy to achieve.

The Century of Bloodbath

The emergence of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799 and his inexorable domination of Europe can be said to have set in motion a succession of actions that spawned doctrines that were to reappear in different form, at different times, and in different parts of the world. These included the eruptive force of Nationalism during the eighteenth century. The expansive resurgence of Imperialism during the nineteenth century, the use of force as a substitute for diplomacy during the Twentieth century which also saw the disintegration of colonial empires and rise of independent states in their place.

More than half of the present the United Nations members were colonial dependencies before World War II. The main catalyst for change was the War itself which destroyed the political balance that had sustained the stranglehold of imperialism for over two centuries. In that global chaos, the seed of the idea for a new post-war world organization in place of the failed League of Nations was planted by President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain, in the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941.

The Twentieth Century indeed was the bloodiest, costliest century of warfare in human history.

Two world wars and a large number of major revolutions, wars and conflicts along with significant social, political, and economic upheavals made the period from 1901 to 2000 of great importance in a historical and military sense. More than 160 million people were killed in the Twentieth century which is now remembered as the "century of bloodbath". The scale of war-led destruction and misery dwarfs almost every earlier period in known history. Besides the two great wars, an unprecedented great economic depression, several other wars, invasions, military occupations, oppression, massacres and genocides, exploitation, poverty, misery, hunger and disease, particularly AIDS, are the painful reminders of the last century.

But there was also a brighter side of that century making it "the best of times" in human history. Its positive count includes unprecedented accomplishments in science and technology, upsurge of freedom, democracy and human rights, awakening of masses, spread of knowledge and information, and emergence of globalization. Peaceful rise of China and emergence of economic giants in East Asia represent another positive feature of the last century.

These developments have no d[illegible] the years transformed the world and contributed significantly to the amelioration of human life and dignity. Today, the question is, shall we excel the Twentieth century in bloodbath and destruction or shall we build upon its political, economic, social and other gains? Unfortunately, the twenty-first century has not started well. It began with yet another long, wicked war with no end in sight. We are burdened with the same old problems, perhaps in their acutest form. Armed conflicts remain pervasive. Our world is currently marked by what we call the challenges of strategic power game, oil politics, economic adventurism, religion-based extremism, terrorism and highly discriminatory nuclear security order.

V. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Inter-State Relations

The history of international relations is often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, where the modern state system was developed. Prior to this, the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Westphalia instituted the legal concept of sovereignty, which essentially meant that rulers, or the legitimate sovereigns, had no internal equals within a defined territory and no external superiors as the ultimate authority within the territory's sovereign borders.

A simple way to view this is that sovereignty says, "I'm not allowed to tell you what to do and you are not allowed to tell me what to do."

Classical Greek and Roman authority at times resembled the Westphalian system, but both lacked the notion of sovereignty (Westphalia was relations among a number of equal states where-as Rome was a single empire under Pax Romana). Westphalia encouraged the rise of the independent nation-state, the institutionalization of diplomacy and armies. This particular European system was exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia via colonialism and the "standards of civilization". The contemporary international system was finally established through decolonization during the Cold War. However, this is somewhat over-simplified.

While the nation-state system is considered "modern", many states have not incorporated the system and are termed "pre-modern". To address the phenomenon of inter-state relations, we must understand the role and relevance of modern diplomacy. It was born in northern Italy where existed from the twelfth century onward a micro-economic state system which became the matrix in which modern statecraft was conceived. Here also emerged the first modern "societies."

Changes in the conduct of international relations have usually taken place through war or technological innovations. The Napoleonic Wars led to the creation of the Concert of Europe, World War I to the League of Nations, and World War II to the United Nations as the victors in each war attempted to set up a system or organization to preserve the gains they had made and to prevent future wars. Prior to this, the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order.

In essence, the history of international relations is to be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which not only ended the Thirty Years' War but also marked the inception of the modern state system. Prior to this, the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Even in our own part of the world, the earliest traces of organised societies go back to nearly 1500 BC., with pastoral societies developing into civilizations through the rudiments of their own religio-philosophical systems.

So earlier on, power and religion were the main instruments of statecraft. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 represented the first attempt to institutionalize the regular convening of conferences to help manage relationships among the most powerful states. This response was manifest in two emerging trends in the nineteenth century: development of conference system and institutionalized cooperative frameworks. In Vienna, the victors over Napoleon (England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, joined later by the vanquished, France) created the Concert of Europe as an informal agreement to preserve the *status quo* in the Continent.

The participating countries codified the status and functions of diplomats and established the principle that any member could initiate a call for a conference with the others. Although the roots of diplomacy go back to the earliest stages of organized human society, the Peace of Westphalia not only marked the beginning of the European state-system (which initially consisted of twelve well-defined sovereign states) but is also believed to be the origin of modern diplomacy as an institution governing inter-state relations.

The Westphalian principles of sovereignty and the territorial state that were established in the seventeenth century are the foundation of today's multi-lateral diplomatic system which led to the codification of rules of conduct among sovereign and "equal" states and institutionalization of armies giving rise to the concept of power and politics.

Post-World War II Dynamics

Following the end of World War II, with Allied victory, the international system went through a major transformation in which

Bipolar conditions with the SA, on the one side and the Soviet Union, on the other, imposed an enormous burden on the post-World War II inter-state relations as well as their multi-lateral behaviors. The Cold War dynamics changed inter-state diplomacy in many ways. Instead of being partners, the major international players became rivals seeing most issues in terms of their effect on the power of each bloc. The two rival blocs were represented in mutually hostile NATO and Warsaw Pact military alliances. This power struggle, ironically, was also a factor of an existential global balance of power.

In that global tug and pull environment, however, diplomacy remained the most important institution of the post-World War II 'world order' in which the role of international organization as the hub of multi-lateral diplomacy came to be placed even above that of sovereign states. Also in that intensely bipolar world, a group of nations considering themselves aligned neither with the East nor with the West decided to pursue independent policies of their own free of super-power influence.

In 1961, they established the **Non-Aligned Movement or NAM** as a bloc with their own common positions on political and economic issues of global relevance. But in today's unipolarity, even they have become irrelevant. In the Cold War era, Asia, in particular, suffered some of the most violent eruptions of the East-West rivalry and even some of the longest wars of the last century. In fact, the real Cold War took place on Asian soils. No wonder, even after the Cold War, Asia's major regions continue to be a global hot spot and are still the arena of an undeclared East-West rivalry.

Since after the World War II, Asia's geopolitical landscape had gone through a sea change in terms of its emerging political, economic and strategic problems and priorities.

The collapse of the former Soviet Union not only left a truncated and weakened Russia but also reshaped Asia's political map with the emergence of new independent states in Central Asia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. This is an area of tremendous importance, strategically as well as economically.

Post-Cold War Scenario

Beginning in late 1989, states, peoples and nations were suddenly freed from the constraining influence of the two "blocs" headed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The new unipolar world has a new configuration of power unleashing its own security challenges and problems for the world community. The end of the Cold War has introduced considerable uncertainty in international relations and caused confusion in multi-lateral diplomacy.

The demise of the Soviet Union is often attributed to its defeat by the West-backed *jihadi* forces in the Afghan War. There is another view as well. While Afghanistan was a catalyst, the Soviet Union imploded because it was a closed country which was no longer tenable after the spread and development of electronic media which first impacted on Eastern Europe. Secondly, *perestroika* also failed as the transition from centralized economy was sudden and could not be managed. (China incidentally had never been a completely closed society as they always allowed overseas Chinese to visit China; even during the Cultural Revolution there used to be hundreds of thousands of overseas Chinese in the country at a given time.)

While as a result of the Afghan war, the Soviet Union was greatly weakened and the myth of its army was exposed, the precipitous collapse was a bizarre accident of history as a result of the three Slavic presidents including Yeltsin conspiring to get rid of Gorbachev by simply withdrawing from the Soviet Union which came about in Minsk Declaration. This was stated by Yeltsin later on in TV interviews. The others were taken by surprise which led to the Almaty Declaration three days later announcing CIS.

The end of the cold war had provided the world an opportunity to revert to the concept of collective security and acceptance of the United Nations as an instrument of international legality. Today, however, the United Nations is no longer the sole or meaningful arbiter on issues of global relevance and importance. Regrettably, the United Nations system is being used to legitimize the strategic and security set-up suited to the few. The Security Council has become a tool in this process. Might seen wrong by all has never been claimed so "right".

Injustice and oppression remain unabated. Armed conflict remains pervasive. Wars of aggression and attrition, invasions in the name of self-defence, military occupations, massacres and genocides, human tragedies and humanitarian catastrophes, and a culture of extremism and violence continue to define the "new world disorder." Historical grievances and outstanding disputes continue to remain unaddressed. Iraq is still burning. Afghanistan has yet to breathe peace. Kashmir is disillusioned. Palestine has given up.

Another evolution has been the growing presence in the Security Council agenda of internal conflicts in which "parties to the dispute" are not sovereign but rather groups or factions within states involving crises of humanitarian nature. The examples are in large numbers, but notably they include conflicts in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Afghanistan, Georgia, Angola, Mozambique, and Liberia, and also Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and former Yugoslavia.

In the economic, environment and social fields, the United Nations is unable to protect and promote the interests of developing countries effectively. Global development agenda has been set aside, if not shelved. The world remains divided between two unequal halves, one incredibly rich, and the other desperately poor. Economic adventurism of the nineteenth century is back. What is even more disturbing is that the world's two largest regions, Africa and South Asia, both rich in natural and human resources, are the biggest victims of poverty and violence.

The weird unipolarity has been unleashing its own security challenges and problems for the entire world community. The power-led, and oil and gas-driven Great Game is already on with serious ramifications for global peace and security and concomitant tensions and instability in some parts of Asia. The concept of global security has also changed from its Cold War context only to be replaced by security arrangements at regional and sub-regional levels (NATO, Euro-defence, Balkans, Mediterranean security, etc.). In effect, NATO is today America's convenient military bandwagon to build coalitions in extending its global power outreach.

The complacent world has never been so chaotic. What aggravates this bleak scenario is the growing inability of the international community to respond to these challenges with unity of purpose. There is no global consensus on major peace and security issues or on how to address them. The international system surely needs balance through new multi-polarity in which China, EU and perhaps a resurgent Russia could be possible contenders. But there is still a long way to go.

There is however another narrative for the current global scenario that cannot be ignored. When we talk about balance and the same time about the sad predicament of smaller countries, we are suggesting the need for another powerful patron. Also in the world today, a very large number of countries in Europe, Latin America and even in large parts of Africa and Asia are quite at peace with themselves and the world situation.

Of course, we in our region are in bad shape but that does not mean that most of the other countries are that way. We see the difference in China, which is one-fourth of humanity or large swaths of Latin America which are fast developing and are at peace, i.e. another 700 million people or South East Asia and the Far East sans China, yet another 700+ million people still representing a contented portion of humanity at peace with itself.

Emerging World Order

The foremost reality of contemporary international relations is the vast range of politics through which states deal with each other.

These interactive conta[illegible] to other stream realities of inter-state relations that notably include the dynamics of war and peace, power and diplomacy, trade and commerce, coercion and cooperation, engagement and estrangement, bilateralism and multi-lateralism, economic regionalism, security regionalism, and at times also underpinning global polarity, a concept that refers to an arrangement of power in blocs within international system.

The concept of power in today's international relations can be described as the degree of resources, capabilities and influence in international affairs. It is often divided into the concepts of hard power and soft power — hard power relating primarily to coercive power, such as the use of force, and soft power commonly covering economics, diplomacy and cultural influence. But there is no clear dividing line between the two forms of power. Countries now find that they have to fend for themselves in a local or regional and quite often hostile environment.

If 'containment' was the keyword describing international diplomacy during the twentieth century, 'belligerence' in the name of 'security' is its substitute during the present one. The international system surely needs balance through multi-polarity in which China, EU and perhaps a resurgent Russia are already possible contenders. China, with its surge of economic success, combined with its growing military power and political stature is already a super-power, playing a major role not only for the maintenance of international peace and security but also in averting any major global economic crises.

Meanwhile, some Europeans hope, and some Americans fear, that EU-rope might also become a superpower. One view, still quite prevalent in France, is that EU-rope should be a rival superpower to the United States. Another, more widespread in Germany and Britain, is that it must remain a strong partner of the United States. But in today's unipolar world, for all practical purposes and despite resentment in some of the nationalistic EU members, the European Union has accepted a 'subservient' global role and relevance only as an extension of the United States.

Although, some people look at Euro-American bondage as one cultural continuum, there are voices within Europe calling for more Europe in the form of a United States of Europe as a single nation and a single federation of states, similar to the United States of America which could then claim a "superpower" status on the global scene and also a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. But this sounds like fiction, not reality.

With globalization of traditional and non-traditional threats, there is now a level of convergence of interests among the major powers of the East and the West. They are partners in several consultative multi-lateral mechanisms, including P-5, G-8, G-20, APEC, and ARF, in which they work closely with the USA on major security and economic issues including terrorism, energy security and nuclear proliferation.

Against this backdrop, for both Asia and Africa, the real challenge in the twenty-first century is to capitalise on their own power and resources asserting their role as a balancing factor in this lopsided world by carving out a new niche in the global geopolitical matrix. As the largest regional groups at the United Nations they must claim at least two permanent seats each in the expanded Security Council for criteria-based rotation among their states. At least, Asia is large and rich enough to represent the real East of the world, now totally dominated by the West.

The security order in this part of the globe, still dominated by the USA is gradually being balanced by the rapid rise of China which is using its phenomenal economic, political and military influence as a major factor of regional and global stability. China while developing economically and militarily is pursuing a proactive and dynamic economic and security policy for engaging the East Asian neighbours and expanding its influence through economic route.

China is already pursuing a policy of engagement with all including the USA Russia and India which shows its interest in stabilizing rather than destabilizing this part of the world. This should not be a cause for concern to other major international players. China is also pursuing an engagement policy in multi-lateral frameworks which should remove the apprehensions of its neighbouring countries and regions.

As regards the over-all USA policy on Asia-Pacific security, it has also been undergoing readjustment in view of the emerging realities. There are several developments which are being instrumental in the implementation of current USA policy: These include restructuring of USA force deployments, greater integration of US-Japan operational capabilities in the Pacific and more role-sharing by Japan.

Also there is an operational integration of military capabilities of USA Japan, Australia, India and to lesser extent South Korea in the Pacific. Another important USA policy is creation of extra strategic counter-pressure points against China also in regions other than East Asia, such as deployment of troops in Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, improving military relations with the immediate neighbours of China, especially near-alliance relations with India. The USA policy is primarily geared towards engaging China in multi-lateral frameworks to raise its stakes in peace and stability besides determining the strategic direction of China within these frameworks in a way that it could maintain its global supremacy in the foreseeable future.

China while developing economically and militarily is pursuing a proactive and dynamic economic and security policy for engaging the East Asian neighbours and expanding its influence through economic route. Given the current deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations the triangular relations among the United States, Japan, and China will shape the new security order emerging in East Asia. Relations among the three nations are of key strategic importance because they are at the heart of the balance of power in Asia. All these are complicated and complex issues and need dialogue and confidence-building measures at multi-lateral level to find a solution through peaceful means.

The major impediment for a successful multi-lateral diplomacy to defuse tensions and resolve lingering contentious issues in Northeast Asia is the trust deficit between major players. At present there are two multi-lateral dialogue forums, which could facilitate a dialogue on the security issues and enable the stakeholders in peace to evolve a mechanism for sustaining peace and resolving disputes.

There are three key security issues in Northeast Asia: Firstly, and the most crucial one is the political and security environment on the Korean peninsula, especially after nuclear test by North Korea. It is also related to the issue of proliferation by North Korea. Secondly is the Taiwan issue and Sino-Taiwanese relations including Taiwan's intended moves toward independence and the USA-Japanese support to Taiwan's security. Thirdly, is the issue of development (jointly with Japan) and deployment of NMD and TMD system in Northeast Asia, which would directly undermine Chinese strategic interests.

Peace, we agree by now, is much more than the absence of war. Peace has come to mean more than harmony among nations; it also means harmony within nations. Countries that are not at war with other countries are not necessarily at peace with themselves (our own example). The concept of security, in turn, is also evolving. Today, it means inclusion, cohesion, and integration, a sense of belonging to a society and a prevailing order within and among nations predicated on fairness and respect for differences and human dignity. The only legitimate security is security rooted in the well-being of the people.

The UN Charter confers on the Security Council primary responsibility of international peace and security. This was understood basically to mean resolving disputes among states with international consequences. That was the original intention of the Charter. Yet these two bedrock concepts — peace and security, the very conceptual rationale of the organization's mission — are also undergoing a radical change of perception today.

For smaller countries, the concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity that gave them, at the United Nations an equal voice and an occasional platform from which to ventilate their grievances are no longer adequate shields against superpower interference or regional tendencies towards hegemony. Their foreign policies are being calibrated increasingly to a more introspective focus conditioned by external compulsions. National strategic interests are becoming inextricably entwined with domestic security imperatives.

Countries find that they have to fend for themselves in a local or regional and quite often hostile environment. If containment was the keyword describing international diplomacy during the twentieth century, Security would be its substitute during the present one.

Prevention of Armed Conflicts

Effective conflict prevention requires states to rethink the ways in which they define their national interest in any given crisis. As the world has changed in profound ways since the end of the Cold War, our conceptions of "national interest" also need to follow suit. A new, more broadly defined concept of "national interest" would make it easier for states to come together in the cause of preventing conflict among, between and within states. In confronting a growing number of challenges facing humanity, the collective interest is the sum total of national interests and collective action is the only viable option.

The most prudent and tested method of conflict resolution is the recourse to preventive diplomacy as outlined in Chapter VI of the Charter. But "prevention is better than cure" is only a rhetorical expression in the United Nations speeches. Prevention requires timely and effective intervention to address the root causes of conflicts and disputes which has never been UN's forte. The end of the Cold War had provided an opportunity to revert to the concept of collective security, generating hopes that peace would no longer remain hostage to antagonistic, heavily militarized blocs. But the new unipolarity leaves very little to be addressed meaningfully through multi-lateral approach.

The post-9/11 world in particular has witnessed unprecedented erosion in the role, authority and credibility of the United Nations. Today, the United Nations is no longer a meaningful arbiter on issues of global relevance and importance. Its role has been circumvented by the unabashed use of power. Today, the United Nations is no longer seen as "mankind's last best hope." Washington, not New York, is the focus of world attention for actual decision making on issues of global relevance and importance.

As the United Nations reform process lingers on inconclusively, there are serious differences among the member- states on whether states have the right to use military force pre-emptively, and whether

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Agreement must be reached on these questions if the United Nations is to be — as it was intended to be — a forum for resolving differences rather than a mere stage for acting them out. But given sincerity of purpose, the Charter itself offers a good basis for the understanding that we need on these vital questions.

But one basic premise must remain intact. No country, however powerful or dominant, should resort to pre-emptive or preventive use of force or to punitive action unless it is authorized by the Security Council within the scope of Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter. Collective action based on collective interest should be the only legal option which must be pursued under the aegis of the UN Security Council.

VI. MIDDLE EAST CRISIS (Palestinian Issue)

European geopolitics in the earlier half of the twentieth century in the wider Middle East region contributed to a lot of instability overall. The British Empire, especially, played a major role in the region. During World War I, in 1916, it convinced Arab leaders to revolt against the Ottoman Empire (which was allied with Germany). In return, the British government would support the establishment of an independent Arab state in the region, including Palestine.

Yet, in contradiction to this, and to also get support of Jewish people, in 1917, Lord Arthur Balfour, then British foreign minister issued a declaration (the Balfour Declaration) supporting the establishment of "a Jewish national home in Palestine." As a further complication, there was a deal between Imperial Britain and France to carve up the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and divide control of the region. The spoils of war were to be shared.

As with the 1885 Berlin Conference where Africa was carved up amongst the various European empires, parts of the Middle East were also to be carved up, which would require artificial borders, support of monarchies, dictators and other leaders that could be regarded as "puppets" or at least could be influenced by these external powers. After the World War I, Britain governed Palestine as a League of Nations mandate. The Palestinians and the Jews in the area may have detested each other but both struggled together against the British mandate. As it got more and more embroiled in the area, Britain asked the United Nations in 1947 to take over the duty of running the area.

From 1920 to 1947, the British Empire had a mandate over Palestine. At that time, Palestine included all of Israel and today's Occupied Territories, of Gaza, West Bank, etc. The increasing number of Jewish people immigrating to the "Holy Land" increased tensions in the region. The conflict emerging out of the inter-communal violence in Mandatory Palestine between Jews and Arabs from 1920 erupted into full-scale hostilities in the 1947 civil war. The conflict continues to the present-day on various levels.

The British mandate to govern Palestine ended after the World War II, and in 1947, the United Nations voted through General Assembly Resolution 181 to partition Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and a small international zone. Arabs rejected the idea, but the plan moved forward and the British officially withdrew on May 14, 1948, and the Jewish National Council proclaimed the State of Israel. USA recognition came within hours. Hostilities broke out almost immediately after the state of Israel was proclaimed. The next day, Arab forces from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded the new nation.

By the cease-fire on January 7, 1949, Israel had increased its original territory by 50%, taking western Galilee, a broad corridor through central Palestine to Jerusalem, and part of modern Jerusalem. Israel was admitted to the United Nations as a member on May 11, 1949. In 1956, a full-scale war broke out when Israel attacked the Sinai – Egypt east of the Suez Canal. In 1956, Egypt, led by Gemal Abdel Nasser, had nationalised the Suez canal. Up to 1956, this had been co-owned by Britain and France with both countries benefiting from the profits this canal made. Now, Nasser believed that these profits should go to Egypt.

As a result of this, Britain and France had helped Israel plan out its October attack on Egypt. Their plan was simple – Israel would attack the Sinai (east of the Suez canal) while Britain and France would attack and occupy the Suez canal zone. When the Security Council voted on a resolution for Israel to withdraw from the Sinai, Britain and France vetoed it. The Security Council transferred its power to the General Assembly using the 'Uniting for Peace' principle and the UN General Assembly called for a cease-fire, creating on November 5, 1956, it created a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to oversee the maintenance of cease-fire between the Israelis and the Egyptians.

Just one day later, the British and French launched their attack on the Suez. The United Nations was powerless to stop this attack. However, under USA pressure, they had to pull out of the Suez. The UNEF remained in the Sinai as a buffer until it was asked to leave by

President Nasser in 1967. In reaction, Israel launched attacks on Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. This war lasted only six days and the fighting stopped when the UN Security Council ordered a cease-fire and adopted Resolution 242 which till now remains the broader framework for peace to the Middle East.

The Resolution 242 required Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza, and other Arab lands it had occupied in 1967 war, and also called for a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem while recognising the right of every state concerned in the Middle East to live in peace with free navigation in international waterways and secure boundaries between each nation in the Middle East. All the involved nations signed Resolution 242 except Syria. However, it was not long before it became clear that each side – Arabs and Jews – interpreted each point differently.

Each side also put a different emphasis on each point. What was important to the Arabs had much less importance to Israel. As an example, Israel declared its intention of staying in Arab land that they considered to be of strategic importance to the 'survival' of Israel. The Arab nations viewed the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab land as not open to interpretation. With such distrust, it was clear that the dispute will continue with more conflict to follow.

And a conflict did follow with another Arab-Israel war suddenly erupting in 1973 and once again the United Nations could do nothing to prevent it. Egypt then had a new leader – Anwar Sadat. He announced that any future peace for the Middle East could only be settled once and for all by the use of military force. On Israel's most holy of days, Yom Kippur, Egyptian forces crossed Suez canal to capture some lost territory east of Suez. Israel in reaction did cross on to the West of Suez canal triggering another Arab-Israeli conflict. The UN Security Council adopted another Resolution 338 calling for a cease-fire.

Since then, all initiatives on Middle East have been controlled by the United States leaving virtually little or no role with the United Nations. It was only as a result of USA Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger's 'shuttle diplomacy' that a Disengagement Agreement was signed in January 1974. This allowed for a new UNEF to be sent to the Middle East. In fact, between 1973 and the 1978 Camp David agreement, most of the work done at a diplomatic level regarding the Middle East was centred on an American input. It was again the USA that brokered 1978 Camp David Accords signed between Israel, Egypt and the USA, with Israel returning Sinai back to Egypt in return for peace between them.

To many in the Arab world, Egypt had sold out to USA pressure. To the USA and Israel, this was a great achievement. Egypt was obviously not to be underestimated in its capabilities, so the best thing would be to ensure it is an ally, not an adversary. The Camp David Accords did lead to the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel in 1980.

In the late 1980s came the Palestinian uprising—the *Intifada*. While there was much of a non-violence movement initially, the mainstream media concentrated on the violence. Young Palestinians confronted Israeli troops with nothing more than sling shots and stones. Thousands were killed by the Israeli military. Many suicide activists killed Israeli soldiers and caused other damage. Many innocent civilians were killed on both sides.

The 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between PLO and Israel officially called "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or Declaration of Principles" were a framework for the future relations between the two parties. The Accords provided for Israel's recognition of PLO and creation of a Palestinian Authority with the responsibility of administering the West Bank and Gaza Strip to be vacated by the Israeli forces. The Oslo Accords were also criticized as a one-sided agreement benefiting only Israel, not the Palestinian people. It resulted in Israeli control of land, water, roads and other resources.

Yet, in 1994, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, ending 27 years of occupation. A Palestinian police force replaced them. It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated. Permanent issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security and borders were deliberately left to be decided at a later stage. Further attempts through to the beginning of 2000 were made at continuing the Wye River accord, but kept breaking down due to Palestinian protests of continued new Israeli settlements.

Another Camp David summit in 2000 also failed to come up with solutions on Jerusalem. In late 2000, Ariel Sharon's visit to the Mount Temple sparked a new round of protests and violence. In 2002, Israel started construction of a large defensive security fence in the West Bank supposedly to stop terrorists from making their way in to Israeli cities and settlements. While it mostly seems to have worked, those large fences have drawn international criticism for going quite far into Palestinian land not Israeli land. Israel also continued controversial settlement programmes in disputed areas.

Support for the Accords, of the concessions made and the process were not free from criticism. The repeated public posturing of all sides has discredited the process, not to mention putting into question the possibility of achieving peace, at least in the short-term. Both the Camp David and Oslo Accords, if anything, are believed to have further divided the Arab world and eventually resulted into the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar el-Sadat in 1981 and PLO chief Yasser Arafat in 2004 through suspected poisoning. The final settlement of the Palestinian issue as well as durable peace in the Middle East are nowhere in sight.

Further strain was put on the process after Hamas won 2006 Palestinian elections and wrested military control from the Palestine Authority in Gaza in 2007. Although it offered Israel a number of long-term ceasefires, Hamas has repeatedly refused to recognize Israel, to renounce violence, or accept agreements previously made by the Palestinian Authority. Hamas has even renounced the Oslo Accords while at the same time claiming the benefits gained by the Palestinians from the Accords. Meanwhile, after the Oslo accords, Israel refrained from building new settlements although but continued expanding existing settlements.

While the UN Security Council has attempted to pass numerous resolutions critical of Israel, the USA has vetoed almost all of them. Nevertheless, there have been some resolutions demanding that Israel return land that was captured in the 1967 war, etc. (such as United Nations Resolution 242). The United Nations Resolution 181 of 1948 allowed for both Jews and Arabs to live in Israel, which goes counter to claims of some groups that Israel should not exist. The USA has also provided Israel with enormous military aid, to the extent that in the Middle East, Israel has the most advanced and superior military. Their high tech/military industries are also very advanced. Israel also has undeclared nuclear weapon capability.

An additional source of frustration for the Palestinian people is that the land that is being settled by Israelis is usually prime land, and hence the various peace negotiations usually leave Palestine with the less usable land. Israel also thereby controls water sources. The non-contiguous land (Gaza and West Bank) and the Israeli control over Palestinian movement also mean disconnection. This allows the possibility of providing cheap labour to Israel, so it is in their economic interest to pursue this type of division.

UN Security Council Resolution 242

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council on November 22, 1967 in the aftermath of the Six Day War. It was adopted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.

It calls for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency." It also calls for the recognition of all established states by belligerent parties (Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan) of each other and calls for the establishment of peace and secure and recognized boundaries for all parties.

The Arab states accepted the resolution. However, the Israelis and Palestinians rejected it.

It is one of the most commonly referenced United Nations resolutions in Middle Eastern politics. It has been argued that UNSC Resolution 242 has binding force under Article 25 of the UN Charter owing to its incorporation into UN Security Council Resolution 338 and that it is also binding on Israel and the PLO by agreement owing to its incorporation into the Oslo Accords.

The basic principles accepted in this resolution thus are:

1. Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories.
2. Right of every state in the area to live in peace with secure borders.
3. Return of Palestinian refugees.

Arab Peace Initiative

The Arab Peace Initiative was floated by the then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah as a potential solution to both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was presented on March 28, 2002 during the meeting of the Arab League at the Beirut Summit, and achieved the unanimous consent of all members of the Arab League.

The Initiative calls for the state of Israel to withdraw its forces from all the Occupied Territories, including the Golan Heights, to recognize "an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as a "just solution" for the Palestinian refugees.

In exchange the Arab states affirmed that they would recognize the state of Israel, consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over and establish "normal relations" with Israel.

The initiative is based upon:

- The principle of land for peace.
- The conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the conflict will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties

The proposal, from Saudi Arabia, offered Israel recognition by the Arab countries, including into peace agreements and normalisation of relations if Israel would:

- withdraw from all territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war;
- provide a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem; and
- recognize the establishment of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The goals of the initiative are:

- Full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967.
- Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.
- The establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
- A just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem, to be agreed upon in accordance with section 11 of UN General Assembly Resolution 194.

Implementation steps

The Arab Initiative calls for the establishment of a special committee composed of a portion of the Arab League's concerned member-states and the secretary-general of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for the initiative at all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim states and the European Union.

VII. THE AFGHAN WAR

South Asia was globally important during the Cold War era and remains relevant to world's peace and security even in today's changed environment. The policy of containment, in its final phase, was enacted on the soil and rugged mountains of this region with Pakistan and Afghanistan playing a decisive role in dismantling what the free world called the 'evil empire" of the former Soviet Union.

The same two countries now constitute the pivotal frontline and battlefield of the ongoing global war on terror. The effectiveness of their role and relevance in this process remains closely linked to the larger strategic situation in this region. And at no time has South

Asia figured more prominently in USA foreign policy. Today, the new administration of Barack Obama had an unprecedented opportunity to transform not only the US foreign policy in this region but also the region itself.

It must reconcile itself to one reality in the first instance. Had the USA not walked away from Afghanistan after the Soviet pull out, perhaps the history of our world today would have been different. If the world had remained engaged with the people of Afghanistan, providing them strength and succour to change the policies of their post-Soviet government, the situation today might have been totally different.

The genesis of the Afghan crisis is rooted in the chaos and conflict that engulfed this unfortunate country in the aftermath of the Soviet Afghan war. The tragedy of September 11 becomes relevant to the Afghan crisis only as an epilogue to this sad chapter which till now remains unclosed from the previous century.

And the fact remains that opportunities were missed in managing the Afghan imbroglio for good reasons as well as bad, and the unpalatable consequences could have been avoided if a country as chaotic and as primitive as Afghanistan had been treated with greater care and compassion, and assisted in its gradual transition to global standards of "conduct and behaviour."

Indeed, the Afghans are not the only victims of the Afghan tragedy. Pakistan has suffered more in multiple ways in terms of refugee influx, socio-economic burden, rampant terrorism and protracted conflict in its border areas with Afghanistan. This is a reality that even Obama's Secretary of State Hilary Clinton acknowledged in her testimony in the House Appropriations Committee. She accepted that the USA had a share in creating the problem that now plagues Pakistan. She said:

> *"Let's remember here... the people we are fighting today we funded them twenty years ago... and we did it because we were locked in a struggle with the Soviet Union. 'So there is a very strong argument which is... it wasn't a bad investment in terms of Soviet Union but let's admit what we sow, we harvest."*

The Afghan crisis, both during and post-Soviet occupation era has had a direct impact on Pakistan's social, cultural, political, economic and strategic interests. For decades, Pakistan has remained burdened with millions of Afghan refugees and afflicted by a culture of drugs and guns, commonly known as the

"Kalashnikov" culture, which has since then been tearing apart its social and political fabric.

The role that Pakistan and Afghanistan are now required to play to make the world safer and more peaceful is inevitably conditioned by the overall political, socio-economic and security environment of South Asia. What the USA needs to understand is that the effectiveness of their role and capability in this process will suffer if other conflicts and disputes continue to engage and divert their attention and resources.

Vice-President Joe Biden has summed up our case well by acknowledging that no strategy for Afghanistan will succeed without Pakistan's assistance. In his view, "the USA must strengthen its cooperation with the people and government of Pakistan, help them stabilize the tribal areas and promote economic development and opportunity throughout the country."

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are historically and physically part of South Asia which also includes India. For any regional approach to succeed in Afghanistan, the India-Pakistan equation will have to be kept straight. President Obama understood this linkage. He knew that no strategy or road-map for durable peace in the region including in Afghanistan would be comprehensive without focusing on the underlying causes of conflict and instability.

In a pre-election television interview, President Obama said that his administration would encourage India to solve the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, so that Islamabad can better cooperate with the United States on Afghanistan. He reiterated his resolve to work with the newly-elected government in Pakistan in a coherent way, and in doing so, he said, "we should try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants."

In the context of South Asia, the USA must remain sensitive to Pakistan's legitimate concerns and security interests. Any policies that create strategic imbalances in the region and fuel an arms race between the two nuclear-capable neighbours with an escalatory effect on their military budgets and arsenals will be no service to the peoples of the two countries.

The real challenge is to mix deft diplomacy, security support and economic aid in pursuit of durable peace in this volatile region. But peace in this volatile region would remain incomplete without addressing the India-Pakistan issues which are not without direct impact on the overall situation in the Afghan theatre.

The Afghan Peace: A Way Forward

Henry Kissinger was right. The fundamental issue in Afghanistan is not so much how the war will be conducted but how it will be ended. Three years ago, he forewarned that "America cannot withdraw from Afghanistan now, but neither can it sustain the strategy that brought us to this point." He ruled out the practicality of America's traditional anti-insurgency tactics in seeking to create a central government in Afghanistan and help it extend its authority over the entire country and, in the process, bring about a modern bureaucratic and democratic society. This strategy just cannot work in Afghanistan. The country is too large, the territory too forbidding, the ethnic composition too varied, the population too heavily armed. No foreign conqueror has ever succeeded in occupying Afghanistan. Even attempts to establish centralized Afghan control have rarely succeeded and then not for too long.

Therefore, rather than pursuing tactical objectives, the USA should have explored with Pakistan's help a durable Afghan peace. Speaking of peace in Afghanistan, it is important that the transition process does not ignore the Afghan demographic reality and is not weighted in favour or against any particular ethnic group. Durable peace in Afghanistan will come only through reconciliation of all Afghan factions with no selectivity or exclusivity. Afghans alone should be the arbiters on their domestic governance issues. The preconditions that both sides have been seeking to set for talks should no longer prevent the start of the negotiations, and should instead be pursued as their respective benchmarks in a political solution.

Outsiders including Pakistan can nudge the Afghan parties to agree to dialogue but cannot force the outcome. The process for reconciliation among Afghans will have to be Afghan led, i.e. the Afghan government and the various Afghan groups in particular the Taliban. Among outsiders, the USA as the occupation power and Pakistan because of the presence of Taliban leaders and Afghan refugee population on its territory have a key role in encouraging the reconciliation process and stabilization of Afghanistan in the post-2014 phase.

UN as a Facilitator

One option for a peace settlement could be to pursue it under the aegis of the United Nations. As negotiations move ahead, reciprocal confidence-building measures may be useful in demonstrating the visibility of progress toward political settlement. An Afghan settlement will need to be negotiated in an atmosphere of mutual trust and credibility. This [illegible] guaranteed only if the whole peace process [illegible] conducted under United Nations auspices with the involvement of P-5 and Afghanistan's bordering countries which have direct stake in Afghan peace.

Whatever the name for "facilitation" — mediator, back channeler, negotiator, facilitator — of this process — the most appropriate 'facilitator' will be the United Nations that alone can offer the services and framework for the main players to negotiate the Afghan peace. To start with the United Nations secretary-general should appoint a special representative to lead this facilitation phase. The United States shall be the essential interlocutor from the international community in charting a path toward the Afghan settlement, and will need to maintain an ongoing dialogue with all parties to the extent possible during the negotiating process.

The United Nations should establish a mutually acceptable Afghan forum for open national dialogue on negotiations. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA) is uniquely positioned to support Afghan civil society's debate on negotiations around the country, especially through district and provincial level dialogue. A standing international conference should also be convened to provide formal scaffolding for a multilateral negotiating process. At the centre of the process from the start will be the Afghan parties who will be required to resolve their core internal issues of governance. A political process must address both domestic Afghan governance issues, and the security concerns of the states in the region and the broader international community. Afghans themselves must have the responsibility to reach compromises on the internal Afghan issues.

Meanwhile, the Afghan government must. also reset its functional mode and improve governance, limit corruption, and augment the rule of law to sustain Afghan public support for the political process. As the Afghans approach an agreement on their governance arrangements, the United Nations should directly engage the neighbours in the region and broader international community in a parallel track on regional security, economic cooperation, and post-conflict peace-keeping operation. In this regard, Pakistan's legitimate concerns must be taken care of by ensuring that the Afghan soil is not used for undermining its security and territorial integrity.

To ensure neighbouring countries' security concerns, a precisely negotiated guarantee of Afghanistan's "non-alignment" including positive and negative security assurances backed by the UN Security Council should be provided. A peace settlement must contain international guarantees based on UN Charter's purposes and principles, for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of Afghanistan with solemn mutual undertaking by all neighbouring and regional countries to respect the principle of non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

The international community should provide for measures supporting a counter-terrorism capability during the transition period. It is also important that the regional countries do not use the territory of Afghanistan for destabilizing activities in third countries.

International resources will be crucial to sustaining a peace settlement, and should be contingent on Afghans honouring the accord. To secure a stable Afghanistan, there is a need for sharp focus on Afghanistan's economic and social development, including trans-regional development. This would require a major role for the corporate sector of the West in the development of Afghanistan.

Multi-lateral development agencies, especially the World Bank and Asian Development Bank will also need to be involved in generating requisite 'reliable' financing for Afghanistan's development needs. Drug trade is fuelling terrorism and must be addressed through vigorous anti-narcotics measures with international assistance and cooperation, including an effective crop substitution programme and a mechanism of stringent border controls to check cross-border movement of militants, drugs and weapons.

A political settlement along the above lines may not be ideal but a negotiated peace, however imperfect, is palpably preferable to the alternative: a prolonged and purposeless conflict in which the central threat from Al-Qaeda survives. an early negotiated peace will surely be good for Afghanistan, for the USA and its allies, and indeed also for Pakistan and the region.

Beyond 2014 Scenario

If history is any lesson, things never remain static. They keep changing as the world and its dynamics do, not magically, not providentially but by the inevitable process of change that is always inherent in the rise and fall of power. And historically, the rise and fall of power mostly followed long wars. The twelve-year long war in Afghanistan is about to end. The process of change, it seems, is about to begin. The Afghan endgame would perhaps be the beginning of the change. But what kind of change do we expect at the end of this long war?

Again, if history is any lesson, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the World War I and World War II, it was the victors in each war that installed a peace to preserve the gains they had made. Do we have any idea who at the end of the Afghan war is going to be the victor? Not chaos, one hopes. An ominous uncertainty still looms large on the horizon, leaving us with no reason to be euphoric about the post-2014 scenario. Even in Washington, assessments foresee the region fast approaching a period of "change with potential upheaval." Unfortunately, throughout the ongoing Afghan war, a basic lesson of military history ignored was that you don't start a war unless you know how to end it.

At least till now, other than the scheduled 2014 military withdrawal, Washington doesn't seem to have any dialogue strategy, much less a peace plan to end the Afghan war that in the first instance was a wrong war to start. It forced Taliban out of power but never defeated them. Twelve years later, it is only looking for a 'strategic stalemate' in which it can withdraw but not entirely. It plans to keep a certain size of military presence as a training-cum-counter-terrorism mission. Those familiar with Afghan history know what it means for any foreign presence on its soil, no matter under what arrangement or nomenclature.

One would be better off not drawing any over-optimistic scenarios beyond 2014 and instead be realistic enough to remain ready for what Washington foresees "a period of change with potential upheaval." Since 2014, all eyes have been on Pakistan to bring Taliban to the negotiating table. The Afghan government in particular has been keen that Pakistan should use its good offices to persuade the Taliban to engage with the Afghanistan government. We had our limitations rooted in our own domestic problems. Earlier, the USA had tried to organize a dialogue with the Taliban's Qatar Office but it did not work.

After the change of government in Kabul, Pakistan and Afghanistan took conscious and determined step to improve their relations and deepen their mutual understanding and solidarity. This was a new beginning. In July 2015, we were finally able to host the first round of talks between the representatives of the Afghan government and Taliban in Murree. Pakistan was successful in not only bringing the Afghan representatives across the negotiating table but also enabled the USA and China to observe these talks. Pakistan was at the centre of this unprecedented and constructive move towards Afghan peace.

This was the first ever direct contact between the Afghan government officials and Taliban fighters in 14 years. The atmosphere of the talks was good; the prospects for the second round looked promising. But there are forces both in Afghanistan and in the region that remain inimical to any genuine peace in Afghanistan and are sparing no effort to sabotage the dialogue process. Within weeks after the first groundbreaking meeting, the revelation of Taliban leader Mullah Omar's demise disrupted the dialogue process.

But Pakistan remains committed to promoting the Afghan peace process. Together with China, Pakistan represents a natural partnership from within the region that can bring about the real change in this volatile region. Both can join together in converting Pak-Afghan border into an economic gateway for the region, and as a linkage of peace and cooperation with Central Asian countries. Given their geopolitical location and unparalleled mutuality of interests, both can also contribute in a significant way to Afghanistan's development process including hydroelectric and infrastructure projects. The proposed 'economic corridor' (CPEC) linking Pakistan's coastal areas with northwest China, on completion, will bring overarching economic and trade connectivity, bilaterally as well as regionally that would be of great benefit to land-locked Afghanistan.

Post-2014 China-Pakistan Cooperation

What are the realistic prospects of the post-2014 China-Pakistan cooperation in pursuit of regional peace and security? Based on unparalleled mutuality of strategic interests, they represent the only natural partnership that can genuinely contribute to the regional peace and security after the much awaited 2014 crossbar. There are factors to support this assumption.

Emerging as a pillar of strength for the world community, China is shouldering heavy responsibilities not only for the maintenance of international peace and security but also in averting any major crises in Asia. China also has concerns over America's Asian agenda involving creation of extra strategic counter-pressure points against it. These include deployment of foreign troops in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan and establishment of military alliances with China's immediate neighbours including

India which is being bolstered as a nuclear and military counterweight against China.

Another complementary factor is the special relationship that China and Pakistan already enjoy with a strong strategic dimension that not only serves their own mutual interests but also ensures stability and security of our region. This relationship is politically very strong and consistent and will hopefully remain immune to any adverse impact of regional or global geostrategic readjustments and realignments. As the winds of change blow across this region, both China and Pakistan will have to explore new avenues of reinforcing their strategic relationship.

Already, their bilateral collaboration is being given a larger regional dimension with the proposed 'economic corridor' linking Pakistan's coastal areas with northwest China. On completion, it will be a 'game-changer' project with an overarching economic and trade connectivity, bilaterally as well as regionally. It is a huge agenda. For China, it is a commitment to realising its own 'dream of national rejuvenation' through accelerated development of its western region whereas for Pakistan, it is a commitment to reviving the national economy and realising its 'Asian Tiger dream'. The challenge now lies in how vigorously and faithfully they can translate their dreams into reality.

Both China and Pakistan are convinced that peace in Afghanistan will bring peace and stability to the regions of South-West Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf, and perhaps even beyond. Thus, both want early restoration of peace in Afghanistan, free of foreign influence or domination. In its essence, it has to be an Afghan-led peace process involving two tracks: one addressing the Afghan domestic governance issues, and the other dealing with guarantees on its non-aligned status and regional security situation.

On core domestic issues, Afghans alone are the final arbiters and should be resolving them in keeping with their own culture and tradition through a multi-tiered national dialogue. On regional issues, the United Nations should directly engage the neighbours in the region and broader international community in a parallel track on guarantees for regional security, economic cooperation, and post-conflict peace-keeping operations.

The Kabul Declaration of December 22, 2002 on Good Neighbourly Relations signed under UN auspices by Afghanistan's six bordering states, namely Iran, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, provides the most appropriate multi-lateral basis for these guarantees on Afghanistan's independence and non-interference in its internal affairs.

On its own part, Pakistan, for historical and geopolitical reasons, is a crucial player in the Afghan endgame. There is no other country in the world with deeper stakes in Afghan peace. We in Pakistan must acknowledge, however, that the effectiveness of our long-term role in Afghan peace and reconciliation would be predicated on its ability to overcome its own domestic problems, especially the security situation.

CHAPTER 12

NON-PROLIFERATION & GLOBAL DISARMAMENT

I. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and furthering the goal of disarmament. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. Even though the Treaty was originally conceived with a limited validity of 25 years, the signing parties decided by consensus, to extend it indefinitely, and without conditions during the first Review Conference in New York on May 11, 1995.

The Treaty recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China (also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council). Four other states are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons, while Israel has had a policy of opacity regarding its own nuclear weapons programme. Today, other than five states including the four believed to be in possession of nuclear weapons, 190 states are signatories of the NPT.

Several additional measures have been adopted to strengthen the NPT and the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime and make it difficult for states to acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons, including the export controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the enhanced verification measures of the IAEA Additional Protocol. The Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the IAEA, which also plays a central role under the Treaty in areas of technology transfer for peaceful purposes.

The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Although the concept of "pillars" is not expressed anywhere in the NPT, the Treaty is nevertheless sometimes interpreted as a *three-pillar* system, with an implicit balance among them:

1. Non-proliferation
2. Disarmament
3. Peaceful uses of nuclear technology

The NPT is often seen to be based on a central bargain: "the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the five NPT nuclear-weapon states (NSW) in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals." The Treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings called Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The NPT's preamble contains language affirming the desire of treaty signatories to ease international tension and strengthen international trust so as to create some day the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons, and treaty on general and complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from national arsenals.

Under the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) undertake not to transfer "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce" a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) to acquire nuclear weapons. (Article I) Likewise, the non-nuclear weapon-state (NNWS) parties to the NPT agree not to "receive," "manufacture" or "acquire" nuclear weapons or to "seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons." (Article II)

The NNWS also agree to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. (Article III)

These three Articles represent the "first pillar" of the Treaty proscribing 'non-proliferation.'

The **"second pillar"** dealing with 'disarmament' is rooted in Article VI of the NPT. The wording of this Article, however, arguably imposes only a vague obligation on all NPT signatories to move in the general direction of nuclear and total disarmament, saying, "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament."

Under this interpretation, Article VI does not strictly require all signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty. Rather, it only requires them "to negotiate in good faith." This shows the biggest weakness of the Treaty. On the other hand, some governments, especially non-nuclear-weapon states belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, have interpreted Article VI's language as being anything but vague. In their view, Article VI constitutes a formal and specific obligation on the part of NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, and argue that these states have failed to meet their obligation.

Globally, there is a growing disappointment with the limited progress on nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have thousands of nuclear warheads in their combined stockpile and have shown a reluctance to disarm further. Critics of the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states sometimes argue that the failure of the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, especially in the post-Cold War era, has disillusioned some non-nuclear-weapon NPT signatories of the NPT. Such failure, these critics add, provides justification for the non-nuclear-weapon signatories to quit the NPT and develop their own nuclear arsenals.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued July 8, 1996, failed to address the question of 'legality' but did endorse the interpretation of the text of Article VI that claims this obligation involves all NPT parties (not just the nuclear weapon states) and does not suggest a specific time frame for nuclear disarmament. The ICJ opinion noted: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."[1]

The **"third pillar"** allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to NPT signatory countries for peaceful purposes. This involves development of civilian nuclear energy programmes in those countries, as long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programmes are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. Since very few of the states with nuclear energy programmes are willing to abandon the use of nuclear energy, the "third pillar" of the NPT under Article IV provides other states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons.

Under Article IV, the Treaty recognizes the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but restricts this right for NPT parties to be exercised "in conformity with Articles I and II" (the basic non-proliferation obligations that constitute the "first pillar" of the Treaty). All the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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[1] *www.icj-cij.org*

Article V requires each party to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis.

As the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station uses enriched uranium fuel, it follows that states must be able either to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market. Mohamed ElBaradei, then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has called the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities the "Achilles' heel" of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As of 2007, 13 states have an enrichment capability.

The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear-weapon states. It was recognized that the Cold War deterrent relationship between just the United States and Soviet Union was fragile. Having more nuclear-weapon states would reduce security for all, multiplying the risks of miscalculation, accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, or from escalation in tensions, nuclear conflict. The Treaty today provides the norm and the foundation for an international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.

NPT Dichotomies

The five nuclear-weapon states undertook a legal commitment under Article VI of the Treaty to work towards general and complete disarmament. However, nearly four decades since, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons are still held, mostly on high alert by two largest nuclear-weapon states. A credible programme for disarmament with a reasonable timeframe does not appear to be forthcoming despite all the non-proliferation slogans.

Unless the NPT regime is reconciled to the nuclear reality and the three other states (India, Pakistan and Israel) which possess nuclear weapons besides the NPT-5 are incorporated into the non-proliferation regime, there will remain a gaping hole in the NPT regime. Undue restrictions on the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a right guaranteed under Article IV, only serve to strengthen the monopoly of few over nuclear technology while forcing others to look for ways outside the Treaty. Such discrimination is dangerous for the integrity of the regime.

IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the principal multi-lateral organization mandated by the international community to deal with nuclear [illegible] established in 1957 and based in Vienna, it is essentially the nucleus around which all other parts of the global nuclear governance system revolve. Viewed as one of the most effective and efficient organizations in the United Nations family, the IAEA has, in many respects, evolved deftly — shedding unrealizable visions, seizing new opportunities and handling with aplomb several international crises. After 60 years, while the IAEA does not need a dramatic overhaul, it could benefit from strengthening and reform.

Five-yearly NPT Reviews

Since the NPT came into force in 1970, the five-yearly review conferences (RevCons) have been taking place to assess the implementation of the Treaty's provisions and to make "recommendations on measures to further strengthen it." Twenty-five years after the NPT entered into force, a conference of the state parties was held, as mandated in Article X, to decide whether the Treaty should be extended indefinitely or for an additional fixed period, or periods. Accordingly, in 1995, the state parties at a conference decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely.

The non-nuclear states agreed to this extension only after the nuclear-weapons states assured them of their continued commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The 2000 RevCon was the first occasion for soul-searching and an opportunity to the state parties to reflect and find as to what went wrong in realisation of the NPT's objectives. The non-nuclear states wanted a clearer commitment from the nuclear-weapons states to complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They also defined 13 steps to serve as benchmarks of their progress in that direction. The nuclear-weapons states, once again as a ritual, undertook to pursue the goal of "total elimination" of their nuclear arsenals.

At the 2005 RevCon, no substantive discussions could begin for almost three weeks due to disputes over the agenda. A key sticking point was the 2000 conference mandate for review of the Treaty taking into account the decisions and resolution adopted in 1995. Like the earlier review conferences, the 2010 RevCon also could not go beyond the usual rhetoric. Mostly, the agendas to NPT conferences have remained an inconsequential procedural matter. For most governments, the composition of the agenda has been a subject of political value.

In the first four review conferences held so far, the most noteworthy common feature has been the disillusionment of the non-nuclear parties with what they consider the failure of the three nuclear parties, the US, UK and the Soviet Union, to live up to their treaty obligations. Article VI of the NPT obligates all signatory parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control."

The Treaty's preamble contains a similar undertaking on the part of the signatories. The three nuclear parties are viewed clearly in breach of their obligation to implement Article VI and the preamble, which are aimed primarily at preventing "vertical" proliferation. These nuclear powers are more interested in reducing the risks of "horizontal" proliferation and pursued their own non-proliferation agendas in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. The success of these NPT conferences will depend on whether the nuclear-weapons states will agree to certain new elements in the context of Article VI.

These include their unequivocal commitment to total elimination of their own nuclear arsenals, acceptance of the principle of irreversibility vis-à-vis nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms-control measures, voluntary transparency in terms of their nuclear-weapons capability and implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI, further reduction of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, and measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons. If global disarmament is beyond reach today, it is only because the multi-lateral system is being used to legitimise the strategic and security set-up for a few.

There has been a progressive erosion of genuine will towards disarmament, as witnessed in the unifocal, self-serving non-proliferation policies of the key powers, violation of treaty obligations and the weakening of United Nations disarmament institutions. The last session of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament is a case in point, where an attempt was made yet again to bulldoze a selective and preferential agenda, rather than adopt an integrated approach to holistically address the four core issues identified as crucial elements of nuclear disarmament. As a result, the consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation has weakened.

There are clear differences of perspective, approach and modalities among states to promote international and regional peace and security through disarmament and non-proliferation. If global disarmament is beyond reach today, it is only because the multi-lateral system is being used to legitimise the strategic and security set-up for a few.

Meanwhile, lack of progress in the resolution of long-standing regional disputes, emergence of new forms of conflicts, which emanate from power asymmetries, as well as economic and social disparities and injustices, continue to obstruct the objective of equal security for all.

In addition to horizontal and vertical proliferation of WMDs at state level, the threat of acquisition and use of WMDs by non-state actors has become a growing concern. An attempt is also being made to "redefine" the whole nuclear issue by shifting the focus from nuclear disarmament to nuclear terrorism. But this strategy will not be a substitute to the overarching goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world. Unless the nuclear-weapons states change their view of global security, there is no prospect for a global consensus on disarmament in pursuit of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

Discriminatory and short-sighted policies providing selective access to nuclear technology for narrow gains in disregard of equitably applicable criteria-based approach have further undermined the international non-proliferation regime and detract from its credibility and legitimacy. These selective country-specific arrangements are likely to facilitate diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. Undue restrictions on the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a right guaranteed under Article IV, only serve to strengthen the monopoly of a few countries over nuclear technology, forcing others to look for ways outside the Treaty.

Such discrimination is dangerous for the integrity of the regime. Unless the NPT regime is reconciled to the nuclear reality and the three *de facto* nuclear states are incorporated into the non-proliferation regime, there will remain a gaping hole in the NPT regime. India's former external affairs minister Jaswant Singh had rightly called for an end to "nuclear apartheid."

II. WORLD'S NUCLEAR DILEMMA

Surely no philosophical discourse is needed to understand or agree that nuclear weapons are never meant to be used. But the first, and hopefully the very last, time nuclear weapons were ever used was when America's 'Little Boy' and 'Fat Man' descended in August 1945 on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August) wreaking havoc of a kind the world had never experienced before. Since then every year in August, the world commemorates the anniversary of that human disaster in the hope that we have now become wiser and will not let another Armageddon befall us.

The current global trends in nuclear security, however, are not very encouraging as the world loses momentum towards "general and complete disarmament" as envisaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). There has been a progressive erosion of genuine moves toward this overarching goal as witnessed in unifocal discriminatory non-proliferation policies of the key powers, violation of treaty obligations and weakening of UN disarmament institutions.

Woefully, beyond rhetoric, there seems to be no progress towards a nuclear weapon-free world. The current global nuclear order inspires no confidence in the non-proliferation agenda which is being followed in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner with scant commitment to the overarching goal of "general and complete disarmament" as envisaged in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The Cold War is over, yet tens of thousands of nuclear weapons remain in arsenals around the world. At least nine states including the five declared as nuclear-weapon states in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are known to be in possession of roughly 27,000 nuclear warheads, and have produced and continue to produce weapons-grade fissile materials. Together the US and Russia alone possess more than 95% of the world's nuclear weapons. Their command and control systems are still tuned to permit immediate launch. The situation elsewhere is no less alarming.

In recent years, four prominent US statesmen, Henry Kissinger, William J. Perry, George P. Schultz, and former Senator Sam Nunn, representing a powerful bipartisan **Quartet** of individuals with impeccable credentials as "Cold Warriors" have been warning that "the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era." In their view, the world had reached a tipping point because nuclear weapons considered as means of "deterrence" during the Cold War were now becoming "increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective." [2]

It is sobering to think that in more than 60 years since the first nuclear weapon was exploded (an occasion that moved one of its developers, Robert Oppenheimer, to famously admit that the sight made him think of the lines from the *Bhagavad-Gita*, ("Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds"), the threat to humanity from nuclear weapons has not only resisted containment but rather morphed into new forms including what the Quartet described as local, regional or even international nuclear ambitions as well as "non-state actors" and potential "rogue states."

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[2] *On the nuclear precipice*, Shamshad Ahmad, *The Nation*, August 29, 2009.

The real problem, however, with the overall architecture of the nuclear dilemma now is the rhetorical stance on the part of the NPT-5, especially the US and Russia, which have 95% of the nuclear arsenals. What they are really saying is that they can have their weapons forever, but everyone else should do without them. That is an unworkable position. President Obama has himself acknowledged that he may not live long enough to see a nuclear-free world, and that the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal "as long as these weapons exist."

In his Prague speech on April 5, 2009, President Obama presented an ambitious three-part strategy to address the international nuclear threat proposing measures to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear arsenals, strengthening the NPT and halting proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states, and preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials. According to him, nuclear terrorism was the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.

Later, at a meeting in Moscow on July 6, 2009, US President Obama and his Russian counterpart Medvedev reached an understanding for a follow-up treaty to the START before it expires at the end of 2009. But the world knows that partial efforts at arms reduction and arms limitation in their essence do not amount to disarmament as envisaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These measures only take away the focus from Article VI of the NPT calling for a nuclear-weapon-free world through arms control and general and complete disarmament.

To our friends in the Western world, the nuclear question has traditionally been uni-dimensional. The high priests of non-proliferation do not scratch below the surface. The symptom, not disease, is their problem. Instead, their undivided focus has been and remains on non-proliferation only as a concept which they have adapted to their own self-serving intent and purpose. The all important underlying causes impelling nuclear proliferation are conveniently ignored.

A whole vast field of the non-proliferation regime has been built up to confine everybody within its four walls. But this policy has already failed, in part because the nuclear powers have reneged on the promise of their various treaties which, after all, were supposed to be temporary measures, meant to keep the genie in the bottle while complete disarmament was the goal down the road. If we are still journeying toward that goal, it only seems to be getting further and further away.

No doubt, nuclear dangers now abound on many fronts. All told, there are currently nuclear weapon materials in more than 40 countries, some in Senator Sam Nunn's words, "secured by nothing more than a chain link fence." These stockpiles do not seem to prevent the nuclear powers from admonishing the rest of the world to refrain from joining the nuclear club—or be subject to possible sanctions, a situation that Sam Nunn has described as telling people not to smoke while you have a cigarette dangling from your mouth.

Discriminatory, country-specific and short-sighted policies for access to nuclear technology motivated by narrow gains in disregard of equitably applicable criteria have further undermined the international non-proliferation regime and detract from its credibility and legitimacy. The situation is further compounded by the clear possibility of such arrangements leading to diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. The US-India nuclear deal is a glaring example of country-specific waiver from the otherwise equitably applicable criteria-based international non-proliferation regime.

It was indeed ironic that the NSG, which was set up in response to the first act of nuclear proliferation in South Asia in 1974, and works on the basis of consensus to prevent further proliferation, decided unanimously to reward the perpetrator of such proliferation. Given the consensus rule anyone of these 46 nations could have blocked this decision. The fact that they did not do so was because of their profit motives got the better of their principles or they simply lacked the courage of their convictions.[3]

What they ignore is that only criteria-based approaches on the basis of equality and non-discrimination would be sustainable. Cooperative arrangements at the regional level in terms of technical assistance and capacity building to ensure export controls over sensitive technologies should be developed in place of the existing exclusive arrangements which are directed at technology denial through discriminatory approaches. Such arrangements should supplement the UN system and should follow the principles enshrined in the UN Charter.

III. FLAWED DISARMAMENT APPROACH

The end of the Cold War had provided an opportunity to revert to the concept of collective security, engendering hopes that peace would no long [illegible] hostage to antagonistic, heavily militarised blocs. But today tens of thousands of nuclear weapons still remain in arsenals around the world. Political will of the states, especially of the nuclear-weapon states will be the decisive factor. They cannot achieve security for themselves at the cost of insecurity for others.

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[3] *Need for even-handedness*, Shamshad Ahmad, *The News*, June 30, 2010.

Unless they change their view of global security, there is no prospect for a global consensus on disarmament in pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world. President Obama may be sincere in calling for such a world. He is surely echoing the global sentiment. But he knows the reality and admitted that he may not live long enough to see a nuclear-free world, and that the US will maintain a nuclear arsenal "as long as these weapons exist". This sums up the entire disarmament scenario.

Meanwhile, the world is witnessing an erosion of arms control and disarmament measures, reversal of non-proliferation policies of the key powers, violation of treaty obligations and weakening of United Nations disarmament institutions. As a result, the consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation has weakened. There are clear differences of perspective, approach and modalities among states to promote international and regional peace and security through disarmament and non-proliferation.

Lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament and advocacy by few powerful states of doctrines such as pre-emption, development of new war-fighting nuclear weapons and the development and deployment of destabilizing systems like the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems are perpetrating tensions at the regional and global levels. Also, lack of progress in the resolution of long-standing regional disputes, emergence of new forms of conflicts, which emanate from power asymmetries, as well as economic and social disparities and injustices, continue to obstruct the objective of equal security for all.

Public opinion within Europe and the United Nations is reflective of growing discontent over the major nuclear powers' hypocritical policies on nuclear disarmament issues. The nuclear weapon states must agree on the basic principles and elements to revive the consensus on international disarmament and non-proliferation. Unless the major nuclear powers take practical steps in pursuit of Article VI of NPT, the world will remain stuck on a hazardous nuclear precipice, and the prospects for a nuclear-weapon-free world described as "Global Zero" would remain elusive.

Progress toward a world without nuclear weapons is predicated on genuinely equitable efforts to break the current impasse in the CD disarmament machinery for several years, [illegible] the Conference on Disarmament (CD), a Geneva-based [illegible] forum [illegible] towards negotiating a new nuclear arms control [illegible] several years of deadlock, it adopted its "programme of work" involving four core issues, namely Nuclear Disarmament, [illegible] Security Assurances, Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), all equally [illegible] issues that need to be addressed in a balanced and [illegible] verifiable manner.

Initially, there was consensus not only to address [illegible] in an integrated manner but also to work towards a [illegible] Before joining the consensus on CD's "programme of [illegible] Pakistan imposed no conditionalities and sought to [illegible] modalities of implementation of the Conference's agenda [illegible] for "unconditional" equal treatment to all the four "core" [illegible] included in the "programme of work" in line with certain [illegible] principles so that no state is put at a disadvantage vis-a-vis [illegible] states. For Pakistan, incorporation of international and [illegible] verification into an FMT mandate is of critical importance. [illegible] directly from our vital national security interest.

In contrast, India spelt out on the floor of the Conference [illegible] number of conditionalities for joining the consensus. It linked [illegible] concurrence to joining the negotiations on FMT to its perspective [illegible] the scope of the treaty will be limited to "cut off" future production [illegible] fissile material only. India made it clear that it will join an FMCT [illegible] if its national security interests were fully addressed, and will [illegible] accept obligations which hinder its strategic programme, including [illegible] FBR and its "three-stage nuclear programme."

This was a clear indication that India intends to [illegible] exemption in the FMT similar to those it has been granted under [illegible] US-India deal. This would mean that India will be free to keep [illegible] eight "civil" nuclear reactors and the breeder programme outside safeguards. These reactors can produce a significant amount of plutonium. Any FMT with such exemptions will obviously be meaningless. But no one in Geneva session sought to question India's conditionalities. This ironically was an aspect on which India and other major nuclear-weapon states seemed to have complete convergence of interests.

Pakistan had joined the consensus on the "programme of work" in "good faith" on the assumption that the CD would be enabled to substantively address all the four "core" issues without any selectivity or discrimination. This was a clear evidence of Pakistan's constructive approach in support of CD's work as the only multi-lateral disarmament negotiating forum. As anticipated, Pakistan soon discovered alarming manoeuvres on the part of some countries which traditionally have had a uni-dimensional approach on nuclear disarmament issues. No wonder, the CD 'programme of work' in Geneva remains deadlocked.

The process was a non-starter from the very beginning. While the "programme of work' was agreed, the document on "implementation" was never discussed before and as such was open to negotiations. Rather than opening up the document on the "implementation" for consultations, which is norm in any multi-lateral process, the Western countries portrayed them as an attempt by Pakistan to block the CD. There have been attempts to set aside the principle of verification to cater to some specific interests. This goes against the security inertest of the majority of states and undermines the principle of "equal security for all."

In view of the highly discriminatory nuclear order being promoted by the so-called champions of non-proliferation, Pakistan cannot afford complacence and must not succumb to any pressure or blackmail to compromise on its supreme national interests. Specifically on FMT, the issue of stocks has become even more crucial for Pakistan. No fissile material treaty would be comprehensive without a robust verification regime that covers not only the future production but also the existing stockpiles. This is the key to cessation of a nuclear arms race.

Any nuclear cooperation arrangement without adequate international safeguards has the potential for increasing fissile material stocks that can be diverted towards weapons production as was done in the past. For this reason, the issues of verification and stocks have become vital for Pakistan in any negotiations on a FMT. We cannot also ignore the ominous implications of US-India nuclear deal in terms of its bolstering of India's massive nuclear and conventional build-up, including its nuclear "triad" and adoption of an offensive "Cold Start" doctrine based on rapid convention strike capability.

Pakistan must resist attempts to make exemptions in line with the US-India deal with negative consequences for our security as well as for regional stability. What the Western countries should realise is that their attempts to disturb the strategic balance in South Asia are no service to the people or the cause of peace and security of this region. They must understand that instead of making "preferential" and discriminatory nuclear deals they should be contributing to strategic stability by reducing security gaps in this volatile region.

If global disarmament is beyond reach today, it is only because the multi-lateral system is being used to legitimise the strategic and security set-up for a few. The last session of the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a case in point where an attempt was made yet again to bulldoze a selective and preferential agenda rather than adopt an integrated approach to holistically address the four core issues identified as the crucial elements of nuclear disarmament. There has been a progressive erosion of genuine will towards disarmament as witnessed in the unifocal, self-serving non-proliferation policies of the key powers, violation of treaty obligations and the weakening of United Nations disarmament institutions.

For decades, Pakistan made several proposals to keep South Asia free of nuclear weapons. But our efforts were thwarted by the Indian nuclear tests in 1998, to which we were forced to respond to restore the strategic balance in the region. Since then, we have been pursuing a policy of restraint and responsibility and have even offered to India a Strategic Restraint Regime involving conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint and conventional balance. It is these stabilizing arrangements that our Western friends should be supporting if stability in South Asia is important to them. But for self-serving reasons, they are building India as a nuclear counter-weight against China.

As regards the CD, it has been kept from starting substantive work for more than a decade because after the 1995 Shannon mandate for a multi-lateral, non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty, the US back-tracked on the issue of verification. This impasse was not due to Pakistan. It was due to reluctance of the Western nuclear powers to agree to the verification clause. This has been the real issue because without verification states can cheat on their obligations. A non-verifiable and mere cut-off treaty will not be a disarmament measure. It will just freeze the *status quo* and not further the goal of disarmament. For Pakistan, this has been particularly important because of our previous experience when India entered into a bilateral agreement with us in 1992 not to develop chemical weapons.

Since that agreement was not verifiable, India cheated. When it joined the Chemical Weapons Convention subsequently, India declared itself a possessor state. In 2009, after more than a decade of stalemate in CD negotiations, the US restored its support for a verifiable fissile material treaty. That is how a consensus became possible on the CD's "programme of work" in May the same year which Pakistan joined in good faith on the assumption that in its subsequent work the CD will accord equal treatment to all the four core issues. It was a misjudgment on Pakistan's part. We forgot our experience in negotiations on the NPT in the '60s when the US managed to exclude the issues of negative and positive security guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states.

Ironically, India, the biggest beneficiary of America's nuclear largesse, did not hesitate to spell out several conditionalities before joining the consensus on the "programme of work" making it clear that it is a "nuclear weapon state" and will not accept obligations not in keeping with or prejudicial to its national security interests, or which hinder its strategic programme, its R&D requirements and its three-stage nuclear programme. It said it will not accept an FMT "placing an undue burden on its military non-proscribed activities." This is what we should have done before joining the consensus. Any FMT with India-specific scope and consideration will not only be totally meaningless but also inimical to our vital national interests.

IV. REVITALIZATION OF NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

- A partial and self-centred agenda imposed is a recipe for increased insecurity at the global and regional levels. There is a need to evolve a new consensus on the entire range of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues based on the principles of the UN Charter, global agreements, especially the Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the first special session of the **UNGA devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I).**
- Such a consensus should be promoted through consultations and agreements among all UN member states, not just some self-selected, even if well-meaning, group of countries. The principle of equal security for all should be upheld with no selectivity or preference. Equal security has to be promoted multi-laterally, not through unilateral or national means or within restricted groups, no matter how powerful.
- The best defence against the possible use of WMDs or their acquisition by non-state actors is through the total elimination of such weapons. This is what the Quartet proposals and other disarmament movements have zeroed on. Over 27,000 nuclear weapons are still held, mostly on launch-on-warning alert, by two largest nuclear-weapon states. Progress should be made in the area of disarmament on a non-discriminatory basis to maintain international peace and security.

- The Conference on Disarmament has a central role to play in multi-lateral negotiations on universal and non-discriminatory treaties for general and complete disarmament. Emphasis of such negotiations at the CD should be on legally binding agreements on negative assurances, pending general and Complete disarmament, Prevention of Arms Race in Outer space (PAROS) - both of which should be linked to the multi-laterally negotiated, non-discriminatory and verifiable FMCT. In parallel, they should strongly support mechanisms to ensure states compliance with their obligations and resolution of disputes arising there from through peaceful means.
- Regional and sub-regional approaches to disarmament through agreements on the maintenance of military balance and non-induction of destabilizing weapon systems must be encouraged. Forums to address security and political issues through dialogue and cooperation must be expanded and reshaped to effectively cater to collective security within the region. An arrangement of negative security assurances at the regional level and agreement on prohibition on the deployment of destabilizing systems like the ABMs may be explored.
- Cooperative arrangements at the regional level in terms of technical assistance and capacity building to ensure export controls over sensitive technologies should be developed. Such arrangements should replace the existing exclusive arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Wassnoar Arrangements and Australia Group which are directed at technology denial and fail to serve the objective of non-proliferation because of non-inclusion of a majority of states.
- However, noble objectives such as peace, stability, security and socio-economic development will continue to elude various sub-regions of Asia should they fail to address the central issues of inter-state conflicts. Efforts by states to promote confidence building measures (CBMs) often reach a deadlock if not complemented by sincere political will to resolve their fundamental disputes peacefully.
- There is a need to evolve non-discriminatory criteria for access to dual-use technology for peaceful uses. In the context of US-India nuclear deal, the shared objective of stability in South Asia would have been better served if the United Nations had considered a package approach for Pakistan and India which would prevent a nuclear arms race in the region, promote

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restraint while ensuring the legitimate needs of both countries for civilian nuclear power generation.

- Export control arrangements such as MTCR, NSG and Australia Group serve a useful purpose. However, there is a need to balance international export control arrangements so that international cooperation in the peaceful uses of dual-use technology is not hampered. The restricted nature of these export control arrangements is an impediment to the global implementation of non-proliferation standards.
- If states are required to meet standards set by these arrangements then they should be given opportunity to participate in these arrangements and benefit by sharing best practices and experiences of the founding members of these arrangements in the area of export controls and keep abreast of technical developments.
- Regardless of the progress in relation to the steps outlined above, states should be alive to their national responsibilities to prevent and combat proliferation to other states and non-state actors and institute mechanisms to ensure the safety and security of their strategic assets. Objectives of peace, stability, security and socio-economic development will continue to elude various regions should they fail to address the central issues of inter-state conflicts. In keeping with UN Charter, efforts by states to promote CBMs often reach a deadlock if not complemented by sincere political will to resolve their disputes peacefully.

V. SOUTH ASIA'S NUCLEAR SAGA

It was India, not Pakistan that introduced an ominous nuclear dimension into the volatile security environment of this region through its first nuclear test in 1974. It was hailed by the West as a "peaceful" nuclear test. The world then discovered the fallacy of India's claims, that its nuclear programme had been exclusively for peaceful uses during the Nehru era and that the nuclear weapons programme was initiated by the Shastri government only after the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964.[4]

There is incontrovertible evidence now that Dr Homi Jehangir Bhabha, the architect of the Indian nuclear programme, had with Nehru's approval already built a clandestine nuclear weapons development capability within the structural framework of the

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[4] *A South Asian reality*, Shamshad Ahmad, *The News*, May 28, 2012.

Indian civilian nuclear programme. From the very beginning, Indian nuclear pursuits were a source of concern to Pakistan, compelling it to prepare itself and go nuclear in reciprocation. Pakistan faced a double jeopardy. On the one hand, we faced India's nuclear ambitions as a direct threat to Pakistan's security and survival, on the other, we faced sanctions imposed by our friends and allies in the name of nuclear "non-proliferation."

They even denied us the means of a conventional defence. In the absence of any security umbrella, Pakistan was left with no choice but to orient its nuclear programme for defence purposes and to develop an indigenous nuclear and missile capability. But we never challenged the non-proliferation regime when the NPT was being finalised in 1968. In fact, we supported its objectives. We did not sign the Treaty only because India refused to do so and was adamantly pursuing its ambitious nuclear-weapons programme.[5] Since the negotiations for the NPT in 1968, in fact, every single non-proliferation initiative came from Pakistan.

In 1974, after India's nuclear explosion at Pokhran close to Pakistan's border, we launched a major diplomatic campaign to prevent nuclear proliferation in our region and presented a series of proposals to spare our region from the spectre of nuclear conflict. These included a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia, a joint renunciation of acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, mutual inspection of nuclear facilities, simultaneous adherence to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards, bilateral nuclear test ban and a missile-free zone in South Asia. India and the world ignored them.

In June 1991, we proposed a five-nation conference, which was later expanded to also include all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to discuss conventional arms control and confidence-building measures as well as the promotion of nuclear restraint. In 1997, before the UN General Assembly, the prime minister of Pakistan proposed mutual and equal restraint by Pakistan and India on the development of nuclear and ballistic missiles. All these proposals aimed at establishing an equitable and non-discriminatory regime in South Asia were rejected by India and ignored by the world community.

After its "peaceful" explosion" in 1974 which the West described as 'smiling Buddha', India never looked back. With overt and covert support of the major powers, it continued its nuclear weapon programme disguised by deceit. In April 1998, Pakistan's prime minister addressed a letter to the G-8 heads of state and government drawing their attention to India's threatening nuclear designs and the imminence of its nuclear tests under the new BJP government. Our warnings remained unheeded. India's five nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, proved us completely right. India had struck another serious blow to the NPT regime.

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[5] *ibid.*

A critical factor encouraging and emboldening India's defiance of global non-proliferation standards had been the selective and discriminatory application of these norms against Pakistan, while virtually acquiescing to the successive escalatory steps by India. We did not respond in a tit-for-tat manner, although we had every legal and political right to do so. For 17 days after India's nuclear tests, we waited for the world to do something about India's nuclear threats. Nothing happened. In fact, we were advised to take the high moral ground by not responding to India's tests in kind and thus forfeit, in the name of non-proliferation, our right to exist as a free people.

Meanwhile, our restraint was being misunderstood in India. The BJP government and its leaders started making threatening statements. Pakistan instantly became the first country in the world to be subjected to nuclear blackmail. Peace was hanging by a slender thread in South Asia. It was only when India embarked upon a nuclear blackmail against Pakistan by threatening military action in Kashmir that Pakistan had to conduct its own tests. In the absence of any assurances or security guarantees, we had no choice but to take measures to protect our freedom and independence. Pakistan exploded five nuclear devices on May 28 and followed that up with one more on May 30.

Our tests were an act of self-defence; they established our minimum credible deterrence and in fact restored the regional strategic balance, serving the larger interest of peace and stability in South Asia. We had proven our capability. There were no doubts left any more. No doubt, it was a difficult but inevitable decision guided solely by our vital national interests. In reaching that decision, the country's elected civilian leadership withstood all pressures and inducements and did not trade off Pakistan's security interests for any monetary package. We were offered monetary packages but no price was greater than the country's security and survival as an independent state. As anticipated, there was adverse reaction to our tests from the USA and other Western countries.

They had not shown the same reaction over India's tests. The formal reaction of the international community, especially the major powers, to South Asian nuclear tests was set out in the UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 6, 1998, which *inter alia*, condemned the tests and called for a rollback by both countries of their nuclear capabilities, signature of the CTBT, progress on the FMCT and restrictions on missile delivery systems.[6] Most importantly, the Security Council resolution not only recognised that the tests were conducted first by India and then by Pakistan but also in its operative clause (Para 5) urged India and Pakistan to resume their dialogue "on all outstanding issues, encouraging them "to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir."

The USA on its part also engaged both India and Pakistan in a dialogue on equal footing from June 1998 to February 1999 to urge them mutual restraint. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot held eight rounds of talks with India's External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad to explore the possibility of persuading the two nuclear-capable neighbours to seriously look at CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-Off negotiations, export controls and strategic restraint which basically meant non-deployment and restraint on delivery systems. The talks also sought to encourage dialogue on Kashmir.

While both sides remained firm on their basic position on the benchmarks and made no commitments. However, as a result of this eight-round dialogue, a clear nuclear parity was established between the two countries in the form of an implicit "strategic linkage" promising them "equality of treatment" in terms of any future coercive or supportive treatment. Regrettably, nuclear weapons were introduced in our region by India. They are a reality now. They constitute an essential element of our security in the form of credible nuclear deterrent. They also constitute a credible nuclear deterrent for India. We cannot even imagine giving up our nuclear option for any reason now.

The only option is to remove the causes of instability and conflict in our region. At the epicentre of all problems remains the unresolved Kashmir dispute which must be addressed in a fair and just manner. For the world community, however, it is important to understand and recognize the conceptual difference between the strategic policies of India and Pakistan. For India, it is global status, and for Pakistan it is its security and survival. While India's tests destabilized the security environment in South Asia, Pakistan's tests restored the nuclear and strategic balance, and also averted the risk of a disastrous conflict that could have resulted from any misadventure by India.

We still want good-neighbourly and tension-free relations with India and would earnestly pursue peaceful settlement of our disputes. We are also ready for a mutually acceptable strategic and conventional arms restraint regime with India. In fact, pursuant to the Lahore Declaration (1999), we have signed an agreement on "nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs)". The international community must also avoid discriminatory treatment for or against either or both. They must be treated at par in terms of any concessions allowing access to technology, equipment or fuel for civilian purposes.

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[6] *A South Asian reality*, Shamshad Ahmad, *The News*, May 28, 2012

Credible Minimum Deterrence

Pakistan's current nuclear strategy is defensive rather than aggressive; it is based on credible minimum deterrence, and unlike India, is driven by security concerns, not great power ambitions. Pakistan's nuclear capability has indeed served its purpose as a means of minimum credible deterrence between India and Pakistan, and has also restored a strategic balance in our region. Contrary to unwarranted and motivated insinuations, Pakistan's nuclear assets are as safe as those of any other nuclear power. We do have a command and control system that is safe and secure in professional hands and is based on international guidelines as laid down by IAEA.

Yes, for reasons not even remotely connected to our nuclear capability, the first decade of our overt nuclearization has been painful and challenging for our country. But this has nothing to do with our nuclear "status." If we were not a nuclear power, our fate today would have been worse than Afghanistan. Our present crisis is a crisis of governance manifesting itself in our economic malaise, energy shortage and perilous security situation. Our failures have nothing to do with our nuclear capability. Today, our nuclear capability is our asset, not liability. We must preserve and keep upgrading it as an asset for our security and survival.

We will also have to change the world's perception of our country, which surely has many reasons and assets other than terrorism and violence to be recognised as a responsible member of the international community. No country will then fear us or have any doubts about the safety of our nuclear assets.

VI. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

No nuclear-weapon state operates without a nuclear doctrine. Besides other things, a doctrine is imperative for operational reasons. Contrary to motivated campaign by Pakistan's detractors, Pakistan also has an elaborate doctrine (though not declared). In its essence, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is aimed at deterring any kind of aggression against Pakistan which can endanger its territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is based on 'restraints and stability,' with strong commitment to non-proliferation and export-control and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Pakistan also seeks avoidance of arms race in the region.

In evaluating the doctrinaire approach of India and Pakistan, one thing becomes abundantly clear. India's nuclear doctrine is status driven whereas that of Pakistan is security led. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, though not declared, is based on credible minimum deterrence and strategic restraint and responsibility. Pakistan's current nuclear strategy is defensive rather than aggressive; it is based on credible minimum deterrence, and unlike India, is driven by security concerns, not great power ambitions. Pakistan has elaborate Command and Control structures and we have very transparently shared details of our C&C system with outsiders. In contrast little is known about the Command and Control structures of India. (India refused to have an exchange of views with Pakistan on C & C structures as a CBM).

Some broad contours of our doctrine, as elaborated from time to time by policy makers are as follows:

- Credible minimum deterrence.
- Sole objective is to deter any kind of aggression against Pakistan which can endanger its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- Restraint and responsibility.
- Promotion of regional restraints and confidence building for avoidance of arms race.
- Non-use against non-nuclear-weapon states.
- Not to be the first ones to conduct further nuclear tests.
- Strong commitment to non-proliferation and export control.

VII. INDIA-PAKISTAN DETERRENT STABILITY

There is a near consensus among the deterrent optimists that a minimum deterrence regime is successfully working between India and Pakistan, though various descriptions of this deterrence differ from each other. The pre-1998 deterrence regime has been described as non-weaponized deterrence, recessed deterrence and existential deterrence. For a stable non-weaponized deterrent regime, India and Pakistan refrained from assembling or deploying nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

With the May 1998 nuclear tests, the non-weaponized deterrent regime is consigned to the dustbin of history. The weaponization policies proclaimed to be followed after India-Pakistan nuclear tests in May 1999 and attendant doctrinal development has added transparency and enhanced deterrent stability, although at a higher level of threshold, and provided other essential pre-requisites of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Pakistan also seeks avoidance of arms race in the region.

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- Not to be the first ones to conduct further nuclear tests.
- Strong commitment to non-proliferation and export control.

VII. INDIA-PAKISTAN DETERRENT STABILITY

There is a near consensus among the deterrent optimists that a minimum deterrence regime is successfully working between India and Pakistan, though various descriptions of this deterrence differ from each other. The pre-1998 deterrence regime has been described as non-weaponized deterrence, recessed deterrence and existential deterrence. For a stable non-weaponized deterrent regime, India and Pakistan refrained from assembling or deploying nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

With the May 1998 nuclear tests, the non-weaponized deterrent regime is consigned to the dustbin of history. The weaponization policies proclaimed to be followed after India-Pakistan nuclear tests in May 1999 and attendant doctrinal development has added transparency and enhanced deterrent stability, although at a higher level of threshold, and provided other essential pre-requisites of nuclear deterrence are fulfilled. [7] These may include early warning systems, survivable weapons capabilities including second strike capabilities and credible delivery systems. However, the present state of strategic stability between India and Pakistan is a precarious one, which needs a more constant monitoring and vigil than the former Cold War models.

The increase in mistrust and hostility between India and Pakistan in the wake of the Kargil crisis and the unresolved Kashmir dispute compounds the problems of nuclear arms competition, missiles proliferation and deployment and adds to divergent perceptions about strategic stability and regional security in South Asia. India's triad of nuclear deterrence (submarine based assets) provides it an assured second strike capability. Western experts often tell us that this is in fact a stabilizing factor since a state which establishes the credibility of its deterrence (assured second strike capability) does not have much incentive to increase its warhead numbers. If this logic applies to India then it should also apply to Pakistan and therefore we also have a right to take steps to have an assured second strike capability through the development of sea-based assets.

Pakistan's Restraint Approach

For us, promotion of an environment of peace and security at the regional and global levels is of crucial importance. Our policy stems from our conviction that a peaceful and secure environment internally, regionally as well as globally would contribute towards economic growth and development which would lead to reduction in poverty and help enhance the welfare of our people. Nuclear capability constitutes an essential element of our security in the form of credible minimum deterrence. It also constitutes a credible nuclear deterrence for India. We would like to see peace and stability in South Asia at the lowest level of armaments. We have been a strong advocate of keeping South Asia free of weapons of mass destruction.

Our long-standing pursuit of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia was thwarted by the nuclear weapons tests in our neighbourhood to which we were obliged to respond to maintain mutual deterrence. Since then, we have pursued, as a 'responsible' nuclear-weapon state, a policy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD). In the context of Composite Dialogue, we have finalized a number of nuclear and conventional CBMs with India including an MoU signed on February 21, 1999 on RRMs which has since been formalized into an agreement between the two governments. We remain opposed to a nuclear and conventional arms race in South Asia and in pursuit of this objective we continue to pursue the establishment of a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) with India.

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[7] *Indian Nuclear Deterrence*, Z. I. Cheema, Oxford University Press, 2010.

Recent Developments

Taking the first decade of the twenty-first century as a reference point, some major recent developments include: a) strategic partnership between India and the United States (foundation laid during President Clinton visit to India in March 2000); 9/11 and its correlation with India and Pakistan in the context of counter-terrorism; the 2002 stand-off between Pakistan and India; India's Cold Start doctrine; enunciation by India of its nuclear doctrine based on triad capability; India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement and similar agreements by Russia, UK and France with India; NSG exemption to India (despite NPT barrier); large-scale military modernization by India including in the conventional, nuclear, missile, space and missile defence fields.

There is an inevitable cumulative effect of these developments on Pakistan's threat perception and response options. Policymakers in world's major capitals, especially Washington has an obligation not to widen nuclear disparities in this region and should have followed an even-handed approach in dealing with India-Pakistan nuclear equation, the only one in the world that grew up in history totally unrelated to the Cold War. It was a direct offshoot of a long-standing legacy of India's conflictual relationship with its two immediate neighbours. They should have been working extra-time to promote a sense of security and strategic balance in this region. But this never happened.

Country-specific preferential treatment that India is receiving in terms of access to nuclear technology in violation of global non-proliferation regime is not only widening nuclear imbalances in the region but also seriously undermining the prospects of India-Pakistan restraint and stabilization. Any measures that contribute to lowering of the nuclear threshold and fuelling of an arms race between the two nuclear-armed neighbours are no service to the people of this region. A stable nuclear security order is what we need in South Asia. Only criteria-based approaches on the basis of equality and non-discrimination would be sustainable.

On its part, Pakistan continues to pursue, as a responsible nuclear-weapon state, credible minimum deterrence as its doctrinaire policy. We remain opposed to a nuclear and conventional arms race in South Asia. Our long-standing proposal for nuclear and missile restraint, conventional balance and conflict resolution will go a long way in promoting the needed restraint and stabilization in our region. India, however, remains averse to our proposal citing extra-regional concerns while its force potential remains Pakistan specific.

India's doctrine of Cold Start is based on the possibility of a limited conventional war. This threatening posture and introduction of ABMs can seriously undermine strategic stability in this region. The adversary may be required to take remedial steps thus generating an unnecessary arms race. Strategic stability is an important function of conventional stability. If the conventional asymmetry grows, the weaker side's reliance on nuclear weapons will grow.

VIII. INDIA-PAKISTAN CBMs

CBMs are meant only to manage a complex relationship while both sides try to resolve the core issues. They provide an environment for such conflict resolution. CBMs cannot be an end in themselves and without parallel movement on resolution of disputes, CBMs may not guarantee long-term peace as can be seen by the frequent break down of talks.

The **Lahore MoU of February 1999** provides for "bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict." Within the framework of the Lahore MoU, Pakistan has been willing to discuss threat perceptions, security concepts and doctrines with India, with the objective of avoidance of conflict and arms race. It was in the spirit of the Lahore MoU that Pakistan proposed a **Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR)** with three interlocking elements: conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint, and conventional stability/balance. A number of our CBMs proposals have also been based on this provision of the Lahore MoU.

The central objectives of our proposals are (i) avoidance of conflict, and (ii) prevention of arms race. This can be done through arms limitation CBMs. Harmonization of doctrines may not be necessary. For example, during the Cold War both the adversaries were engaged in CBMs, yet NATO never adopted 'No First Use' and still refuses to do so.

In a nuclearised South Asia, any adventurism must be avoided. 'Limited ' conventional war is not an option and should not be considered. However, the Indian doctrine of Cold Start is based on the possibility of a limited conventional war. During the CBMs talks, Pakistan has also been proposing that both sides look at doctrines which are defensive rather than offensive in nature. However, it has not gotten a positive response. On our part, the best harmonization of security doctrines will be the Indian acceptance of Pakistan's proposal for a "No War Pact", which is broader than "No First Use" and encompasses both conventional and nuclear fields.

Pakistan's conventional force is substantially smaller than that of India. We are, therefore, vulnerable to "No First Use" of nuclear weapons. To offset this disadvantage, we do not subscribe to NFU of nuclear weapons. This was also NATO's doctrine which has smaller conventional forces compared to Russia. We could agree to **NFU** if India agrees not to launch a conventional attack against Pakistan. We are concerned by India's adoption of **"Cold Start"** doctrine which aims to give India the ability to stage a decisive conventional attack on Pakistan in less than two to three weeks that might be required for international intervention to stop the conflict.

This doctrine was war-gamed in 2006 as the ***Sanghe Shakti*** (Joint Power) exercise involving strike aircraft, tanks and over 40,000 soldiers which an Indian commander claimed was aimed at "dismembering a nation not-so-friendly at the shortest possible time." Given our concern about conventional imbalance, Pakistan might be interested in a South Asian treaty modelled on the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement that imposed ceilings for conventional weapon system. It is very important that both sides recognize linkage between strategic and conventional stability in South Asia. For example, Indian doctrines, such as Cold Start, which envision limited conventional war under a nuclear over-hang are inherently dangerous.

Indians cannot make their own judgment about Pakistan's nuclear threshold. It is therefore important for both sides to agree on discussions with each other on their threat perceptions and security concerns (as provided for in the Lahore MoU). It is also important for India to consider several Pakistani proposals on conventional CBMs such as no new forward deployments of strike formations from their existing positions. Initially, Pakistan had asked for the inclusion of cruise missiles in the pre-notification agreement. India did not agree. There was no reason for us to reiterate the proposal. In Track-II events, we have shown flexibility on the inclusion of cruise missiles in the pre-notification agreement. Pakistan also has been flexible on considering the possibility of risk-reduction CBMs.

We have always said that both sides should move from risk-reduction CBMs to CBMs on avoidance of arms race. This can include mutually acceptable arms limitation measures. Arms which are defensive rather than offensive in nature. However, it has not gotten a positive response. On our part, the best harmonization of security doctrines will be the Indian acceptance of Pakistan's proposal for a "No War Pact", which is broader than "No First Use" and encompasses both conventional and nuclear fields.

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We have always said that both sides should move from risk-reduction CBMs to CBMs on avoidance of arms race. This can include mutually acceptable arms limitation measures. Arms reduction will come later. India remains averse to all these gestures. It is not even inclined to consider arms limitation measures such as non-deployment of de-stabilizing systems such as ABMs. They cite their extra-regional concerns. However, their force potential continues to be Pakistan specific. It may be worthwhile to consider broader discussions involving Pakistan, India and the P-5. (a CBM agreed to in the June 10, 2004 JS at the end of first round of nuclear CBM talks in Delhi. This was never followed up. But for this to happen the P-5 will have to accept Pakistan, and India as NWS).

Escalation has to be addressed in a broader context. The underlying reasons/conflicts have to be resolved. Otherwise, the possibility of escalation will always be there. Our proposals on nuclear and missile restraints, coupled with our conventional CBMs, proposals can address situations where escalation can take place. However, CBMs are not an end in themselves. Underlying causes have to be addressed. We agree on the need for dialogue on evolving technologies and their impact on regional stability. Both countries can avoid an unnecessary arms race by agreeing on non-use of evolving technologies in a manner that can impact strategic stability. What needs to be acknowledged is that CBMs are tools for management of complex relationships but cannot in themselves ensure lasting peace and stability without parallel movement on conflict resolution.

In Process CBMs

CBMs cannot be taken as an end in themselves. In parallel, there must be progress towards the resolution of all disputes. Otherwise, in the presence of disputes, the utility of CBMs will diminish in the long run. In pursuance of the February 21, 1999 MoU signed in Lahore, Pakistan and India commenced a process of talks on nuclear and conventional CBMs from June 2004. Several rounds were held until the dialogue process was disrupted by November 2008 Mumbai attacks. In the Joint Statement issued at the end of first round of nuclear CBMs talks in June 2004, both sides had agreed that *the respective nuclear capabilities of both countries were a factor for stability in South Asia.*

So far, both sides have agreed to a number of nuclear CBMs which include the establishment of Foreign Secretaries' hotline, agreement on pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic missiles and the agreement on reducing risks of accidents relating to nuclear weapons. Outside the framework of the Composite Dialogue process, both sides already have since 1988 an Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities. All these CBMs are in the nature of 'risk reduction' CBMs. We would like to have more meaningful CBMs for the avoidance of arms race and arms limitation. For example, our proposals for the non-introduction of ABM systems (which is part of the SRR) and other de-stabilizing systems is a proposal in this direction. India on the other hand is averse to even consider these proposals.

Pakistan's Position on CBMs

Pakistan has maintained that strategic stability in South Asia is inseparably linked to conventional balance between the two countries. Imbalance in the conventional field is a de-stabilizing factor which impacts on strategic stability by lowering the nuclear threshold. Conventional capability on both sides should be non-threatening and non-aggressive and should be backed by a non-aggressive and essentially defensive posture in terms of force locations and doctrines. CBMs with India are meant to (a) reduce the risk of conflict, (b) avoid an arms race, and (c) promote measures for restraint and strategic stability in South Asia. CBMs can help create an environment of trust between the two countries and pave the way for conflict resolution.

Indian Position on CBMs

Indian approach is restrictive, focusing on discussions within the framework of the 1999 Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). India does not recognize linkage between conventional and strategic stability. While being keen on pursuing nuclear CBMs in order to demonstrate responsible behaviour in the nuclear domain and playing to the international audience, India has not been very forthcoming in pursuing conventional CBMs with Pakistan. In June 2004, India had initially agreed to hold only nuclear CBMs talks with Pakistan. During the nuclear CBMs talks held in New Delhi in October 2007, the Indian side appeared to be reluctant to pursue new CBMs, especially those which could link India and Pakistan together in the nuclear field.

India is opposed to any further bilateral restraint measures and maintains that its security concerns transcend South Asia, and therefore, it cannot tie itself up bilaterally. This position notwithstanding, more than 90% of India's force potential remains Pakistan specific. In the light of the Indian efforts to develop a strategic equilibrium with China, there is likelihood of an increase in both fields of Indian nuclear forces: weapons and ballistic missiles. This will leave Pakistan to face a **Hobson's choice**: to upgrade **minimum credible deterrence** vis-à-vis India or accept the Indian strategic primacy in South Asia with attendant ramifications, something Pakistan has long rejected.

Pakistan's Position on "No-First-Use (NFU)"

Neither Pakistan, nor the international community can be taken in by India's so-called "no-first-use" policy. No-first-use has never been accepted as the basis for determining the deterrent postures of any of the nuclear-weapon states. No first-use is not verifiable, and was not subscribed by NATO in the past and even now. India itself places no credibility in the "no-first-use" doctrine.

If it did, it should have accepted China's assurance of "no-first-use" and of "non-use" of nuclear-weapons against non-nuclear states. This would have obviated the need for India's nuclear-weapon acquisition and nuclearization of South Asia. India's "no-first-use" declaration is in fact designed to secure for itself "recognition" as a nuclear-weapon state, which would flow from "acceptance" of its "no-first-use" and "non-use" assurances. Pakistan's proposal for a **No War Pact** is more comprehensive than just no-first-use of nuclear-weapons. No-first-use is therefore essentially a political talking point used by India.

Pakistan's Position on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Pakistan voted in favour of UNGA Resolution in 1996 that called for the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Pakistan therefore was not opposed to the objective and purposes of the Treaty. By declaring a unilateral moratorium on further testing, Pakistan has affirmed its resolve to abide by the main provisions of the CTBT. The CTBT's entry into force requires the adherence of all the 44 designated states, including all nuclear weapons states, whether or not they are recognized as such. This is a cardinal element in establishing a norm against explosive testing. The CTBT would, however, not be a nuclear disarmament measure because some of the more technologically advanced states would continue to develop and improve weapons designs through sub-critical or non-detectable tests.

Pakistan's Position on Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABMs)

Ballistic missile defence and strategic stability is a subject which has not only been one of the most debated subjects but also a highly controversial issue in the realm of modern warfare. Today, regional security environment in different parts of the world is only an extension of the current global security paradigm with all its alarming ramifications for the world at large. Pakistan has never taken an official position on BMD issue as it has never affected us directly. It may have come under discussions in bilateral meetings only in the context of our concerns over the introduction of ABMs in our region.

We hope the current BMD campaign by USA and Russia does not lead to any transfer of technology or weapons system to our region as it would negatively affect the regional stability. We believe the ABMs are inherently destabilizing and must be avoided as they would seriously affect regional stability. They also undermine regional and global peace and security. In particular, in South Asia, the introduction of ABMs should be avoided as it would erode strategic stability in the region and generate an unnecessary arms race. If one country employs missile systems, the target country is faced with two choices: Either to increase its throw weight capability, or to acquire missile defence capability of its own.

Both options are destabilizing and will generate an unnecessary arms race besides siphoning off resources which could be more productively employed elsewhere.

Pakistan has proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) to India with three interlocking elements, i.e. (a) conflict resolution, (b) nuclear and missile restraint, and (c) conventional balance. The elements of SRR related to nuclear and missile restraint include non-acquisition or deployment of Anti-Ballistic Systems which, in our view, would go a long way in promoting nuclear and conventional stabilization in our region.

Pakistan's main concern has always been to offset India's superior conventional strength. Its offer of a No War Pact is more comprehensive than just NFU of nuclear weapons. Since Pakistan's actions in the nuclear and missile fields at each stage are *force majeure* in response to India's escalatory steps, an element of mutuality in restraint and responsibility is required for nuclear and conventional stabilization in our region. India's ABMs system necessitates Pakistan to enhance its "throw weight" capacity (warheads and missiles) to overcome interception. Similarly, India's triad of nuclear deterrence provides it an assured second strike capability.

In an attempt to justify these 'overkill' measures, we are often told that these measures are in fact a stabilizing factor since a state which establishes the credibility of its deterrence (assured second strike capability) does not have much incentive to increase its warhead numbers. If this logic applies to India then it should also apply to Pakistan and therefore we also have a right to take steps to have an assured second strike capability through the development of sea-based assets. Indian Cold Start doctrine talks about quick and intense conventional offensive against Pakistan. What could be the response of any conventionally weaker state to such a threat? A credible response will come only through counter force.

Nuclear deterrence is the only answer. For this, we must develop deterring tactical warheads. Hence, credible minimum deterrence for Pakistan is a dynamic concept in the face of India's fast developing capabilities. You might think such options are dangerous. But given the dangerous and irresponsible Indian weapon inductions, aggressive doctrines, force postures and devious nuclear cooperation arrangements enabling diversion of nuclear material for military purposes, dangerous options do become inevitable.

Doctrines such as Cold Start and deployment of ABMs will not only lower the nuclear threshold but also undermine the region's strategic stability. The adversary may be required to take remedial steps thus generating an unnecessary arms race. Finally, strategic stability is an important function of conventional stability. If the conventional asymmetry grows, the weaker side's reliance on nuclear weapons will grow. Against this backdrop, issues of nuclear and strategic stability in this volatile region are predicated on the principle of indivisible security based on a mutually agreed strategic restraint regime.

ANNEXES

1. India-Pakistan Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) February 21, 1999

The following is the text of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Raghunath, and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, in Lahore on Sunday:

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan:-

- Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter;
- Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit;
- Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23rd September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;
- Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries;

Have on this day, agreed to the following:-

1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war

between the two cour [illegible] adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.

4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.

5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.

6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.

7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors-General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.

8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.

Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid 1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements. Done at Lahore on 21st February 1999 in the presence of Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

(K. Raghunath)
Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India
(Shamshad Ahmad)
Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

2. The Nuclear Subcontinent: Bringing Stability to South Asia

By Shamshad Ahmad

From *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1999

Summary

Pakistan's atomic tests made South Asia more secure, writes its foreign secretary, and helped provide India and Pakistan to better relations and talks on Kashmir.

Editor's Note

In the aftermath of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, *Foreign Affairs* has published "Against Nuclear Apartheid" by India's senior adviser on defense and foreign affairs, Jaswant Singh, (September/October 1998) and "Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia" by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (March/April 1999). Below, Pakistan's foreign secretary responds.

To restore strategic balance to South Asia, Pakistan was obliged to respond to India's May 1998 nuclear blasts. India already held an advantage in conventional weaponry, and it followed its underground tests with statements threatening nuclear blackmail. Pakistan's nuclear tests were undertaken in self-defense. By establishing mutual deterrence, they have served the interests of peace and stability in South Asia.

Pakistan's Proposals for Peace

The nuclearization of South Asia is a reality now. But all South Asian states remain committed to the goals of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As members of the Non-aligned Movement, Pakistan and India have always stood for a principled and non-discriminatory attainment of these goals. Both are ready to cooperate with the international community to promote peace, security, disarmament, and non-proliferation. What they need is a mutually agreed credible strategic restraint regime.

Pakistan is acutely aware of the risks and responsibilities accompanying nuclear weapons. Pakistan responded to India's 1974 nuclear test with redoubled efforts to keep the region nuclear-free, realizing that a nuclear race in South Asia would have far-reaching consequences. It proposed a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia; a joint renunciation of acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons; mutual inspection of nuclear facilities; adherence to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on nuclear facilities; a bilateral nuclear test ban; and a missile-free zone in South Asia.

In June 1991 Pakistan proposed a five-nation conference, which was later expanded to also include all permanent members of the UN Security Council, to discuss conventional arms control and confidence-building measures as well as the promotion of nuclear restraint. In 1997, before the UN General Assembly, the prime minister of Pakistan proposed mutual and equal restraint by Pakistan and India on the development of nuclear and ballistic missiles. These initiatives not only remained unanswered by India but elicited little support from the international community.

India also accelerated the pace of its missile programs with 16 tests of the Prithvi design and 4 of the Agni, both of them nuclear-capable and targeted at Pakistan's cities. Prithvi missiles were inducted into India's armed forces and deployed against Pakistan, forcing Pakistan to develop an indigenous missile capability, as its zero-missile-zone proposal was rendered redundant. It was the absence of security that finally compelled Pakistan to orient its nuclear program for defense. The country needed an indigenous defense capability. Past sanctions had degraded its conventional capabilities to the point that it was inconceivable to counter an Indian nuclear threat through conventional means.

But it is in both sides' fundamental interest to avert a nuclear arms race. Moving swiftly toward a strategic-restraint regime, with nuclear and conventional stabilization measures, is imperative. With this perspective, Pakistan has resumed its dialogue with India, focusing on peace, security, confidence-building, and the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue. Pakistan has formally proposed a framework for discussions that includes measures to prevent a nuclear and ballistic-missile race, risk-reduction mechanisms, the non-induction of anti-ballistic missile and sea-launched ballistic missile systems, and the maintenance of nuclear deterrence at the minimum level. Pakistan has also proposed a mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces.

Managing Nuclear Weapons

In February 1999, at Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif's invitation, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Lahore. They issued a joint declaration committing both sides to a peaceful resolution of outstanding issues including Kashmir and decided to work for conclusive measures in nuclear and conventional arms control, build mutual confidence, and avoid the risks of conflict. Pakistan and India must conduct their relations on the basis of sovereign equality, endeavor to settle the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, and build a more secure and prosperous future for their peoples.

A Durable Peace

The world must also pay attention to the root causes of insecurity and instability in South Asia. Resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is indispensable for the region's peace and prosperity. The principles for settling this dispute justly have been enunciated in Security Council resolutions, which must be implemented.

The US-Pakistani dialogue on security and nuclear issues has also progressed. The United States has adopted a pragmatic approach, recognizing the steps that Pakistan has taken for peace and global nonproliferation. The United States must continue to play an important role in transforming South Asia's security environment from confrontation to cooperation. Economic sanctions and coercive measures against Pakistan will serve neither peace nor non-proliferation. These sanctions and pressures are unjust and unwarranted. Pakistan has not violated any legal obligations or international norms. Sanctions must be lifted.

The nuclearization of South Asia is a reality. But all South Asian states remain committed to the goals of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As members of the Non-aligned Movement, Pakistan and India have always stood for a principled and non-discriminatory attainment of these goals. Both should cooperate with the international community to promote peace, security, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

Shamshad Ahmad is Foreign Secretary of Pakistan and its principal interlocutor in nuclear and security talks with the United States and India.

SHAMSHAD AHMAD

Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan

Shamshad Ahmad is a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan with a distinguished public service career spanning four decades during which he also served as Ambassador to South Korea (1987-1990), Ambassador to Iran (1990-1992), as Secretary-General, Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (1992-1996), and as Pakistan's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN (2000-2002). Earlier, he held various posts at headquarters in Islamabad and in Pakistan missions at Tehran, Dakar, Paris, Washington and New York (1967-2002).

As Foreign Secretary, he played a key role in stabilization of the regional situation by negotiating in June 1997 an India-Pakistan peace process familiarly known as 'Composite Dialogue' and also had an eight-round dialogue with his US counterpart, Strobe Talbot on nuclear restraint and stabilization in south Asia (1998-1999). Shamshad Ahmad has already authored a book 'Dreams Unfulfilled' (2009).

ADVANCE PRAISE FOR

PAKISTAN AND WORLD AFFAIRS

"Shamshad Ahmad has undertaken an extraordinary journey of taking us along with him into the time and starting his narration from the ancient history when Pakistan may have been born in the "*cradle of civilization*", and passing through bygone Aryan and Buddhist civilizations, updating it to Muhammad Bin Qasim who ushered a new era of Muslim civilization followed by Delhi Sultanate and the magnificent Mughal rule, and administration lasting from 1526 to 1858."

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